The nature of Carthaginian imperial activity: Trade, settlement, conquest, and rule by Rainey, Sean
THE NATURE OF CARTHAGINIAN 
IMPERIAL ACTIVITY: 
TRADE, SETTLEMENT, CONQUEST, 
AND RULE 
A Thesis 
Submitted in Partial Fulfilment 
of Requirements for the Degree 
of 
Doctor of Philosophy 
at the University of Canterbury 
By 
Sean Rainey 
Classics Department 
University of Canterbury 
2004 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
I would like to acknowledge the support and expertise of the staff of the Classics 
Department at the University of Canterbury. Through their generosity and provision I 
was able to undertake and accomplish a difficult task. In particular I would like to 
thank Dr. Victor Parker for his tireless support and knowledge in supervising this 
thesis. Without his encouragement and assistance, this project would not have been 
possible and I would like to express my total gratitude. I also wish to extend my 
thanks to the Ph.D. students in the Classics Department at the University of 
Canterbury for their reassurance and understanding. In addition to this I would like to 
acknowledge the University of Canterbury for providing an excellent academic 
environment, enabling me to undertake such research and providing me financial 
security through a Ph.D. scholarship. 
I wish to extend my warmest thanks to my family and friends for their 
unwavering support and love. Most of all I want to thank my wife Selma. Owing to 
her sacrifice and selt1ess attitude I was able to undertake this thesis. Without her 
gentle spirit guiding me I would not have been able to complete this long journey. I 
would also like to acknowledge the complete faith and love my parents have given me 
and the debt lowe them for these and much more. I would like to extend this to all 
my family (which has fortunately grown since I started) who always stood by me over 
the years. Thank you one and all for the support and care you have given me. 
- 7 APR 2005 
I. 
II. 
CONTENTS 
ABSTRACT 
ABBREVIATIONS 
INTRODUCTION 
THE PHOENICIANS 
Early Phoenicia - Vassalage, Opportunity, and Trade 
Phoenician Expansion 
A Model of Phoenician Settlement 
Cyprus 
North Africa 
The Western Mediterranean and Beyond 
Atlantic North Africa 
Spain 
The Balearic Islands 
The Central Mediterranean 
Sardinia 
Sicily 
Malta, Gozo, and Pantelleria 
CARTHAGE 
Carthage: Its Foundation and Context 
The Site of Carthage 
The Phoenician Legacy and the Development of Punic Carthage 
The Phoenician Decline and the Rise of Carthage 
The Sea and Trade 
Government 
Religion 
The People of Carthage 
Territory 
iii 
PAGE 
vi 
Vll 
1 
12 
12 
15 
16 
17 
22 
27 
27 
28 
33 
34 
35 
38 
43 
50 
50 
52 
56 
57 
58 
60 
63 
67 
71 
III. THE CARTHAGINIAN COLONIES 75 
The Problems of Carthaginian Colonisation 75 
The Early Stages of Carthaginian Colonisation 76 
Ebusus 77 
Carthaginian Colonisation in the Fifth and Fourth Centuries 80 
Lilybaeum 81 
The Periplus of Hanna 85 
Later Carthaginian Colonisation 95 
Carthago Nova (New Carthage) 95 
Other Carthaginian Colonies 103 
IV. CARTHAGINIAN DEVELOPMENT: 
POPULATION, SETTLEMENT, AND TERRITORY109 
V. 
Population Movement 
Redevelopment and Resettlement 
North Africa 
Sicily, Malta, Gozo, and Pantelleria 
Sardinia 
Spain 
Carthaginian Provincial Reorganisation 
North Africa 
Sicily 
Sardinia 
Spain 
DIFFUSION OF CULTURE 
North Africa 
Sicily 
Spain 
Sardinia 
iv 
110 
115 
116 
120 
129 
136 
143 
143 
147 
150 
152 
155 
155 
159 
163 
167 
VI. CONTACT BEYOND THE EMPIRE 174 
Egypt and the North African Greeks 174 
The Etruscans 179 
Rome 184 
The Phocaean Colonies 196 
Greece 206 
Sicily and Magna Graecia 215 
Africa 225 
Beyond the Pillars of Heracles 231 
VII. METHODS AND MOTIVES OF CARTHAGINIAN 
AGGRESSION AND EXPANSION 239 
Early Conquest - Building the Empire 239 
The Greek Encroachments 240 
Sardinia 242 
Spain 243 
North Africa 244 
Sicily 245 
Carthage at its Height 247 
North Africa 247 
Sicily 251 
Spain 263 
Sardinia 264 
The Later Stages of Military Expansion 266 
The Lead up to The First Punic War 266 
The First Punic War 268 
The Second Punic War 271 
CONCLUSION 278 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 305 
v 
ABSTRACT 
Carthage was a powerful and influential state in the Central and Western 
Mediterranean from the ninth to the second century BC. From its humble beginnings 
as a Phoenician trading port on the coast of modern Tunisia, Carthage grew rapidly, 
assuming control of much of the Phoenician territory in North Africa, Spain, Sardinia, 
and Sicily. In addition to these major territories, the Carthaginians, like the 
Phoenicians before them, were active beyond the boundaries of the contemporary 
ancient world in the Atlantic, Africa, Europe, and Southern Britain. In many respects, 
Carthage continued the activities of its Phoenician forebears by trading, colonising, 
and maintaining an empire. However, based on its Phoenician heritage, intermingling 
with North African Berber culture, and foreign influence, Carthage developed its own 
distinctive society and culture. 
Carthaginian society was constantly evolving. This had an obvious effect on 
its activities and the nature of its empire. Carthage and the Punic culture it spawned is 
often characterised by this empire and its associated activities, as they were primary to 
its economy, society, and function in antiquity. Aspects of Carthaginian activity were 
changeable and often inter-related and like Carthage's society were constantly 
developing. Associated Carthaginian motivation and methods are often 
distinguishable and can be identified as defining factors in greater areas of society and 
history. 
This thesis addresses a much maligned and mysterious society based primarily 
on its activities and tactics abroad. The main object is to establish a Carthaginian 
character as distinctive from its Phoenician predecessors and that of other 
contemporary nations in the Western Mediterranean such as the Greeks and Romans. 
This study addresses various forms of such activity over a broad chronological period 
in relation to internal developments and foreign pressures and influences. 
Carthaginian activity was defined by various and mutable forms of trade, settlement, 
and active expansion. These remained integral parts of Carthaginian society in general 
and are vital factors in our understanding of this civilisation and its interaction with 
others. 
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INTRODUCTION 
It is interesting that one of the more important non Greco-Roman peoples in antiquity 
remains the most mysterious. The Carthaginians dominated large areas of the Western 
Mediterranean for several centuries, maintaining a large empire on both land and sea. 
Carthage conquered, influenced, and interacted with a large number of peoples in 
many territories. From its strategic location on the central North African coast it 
oversaw much of the traffic in the Western Mediterranean. Following their Phoenician 
forbears, the Carthaginians expanded into large areas of North Africa, Spain, Sardinia, 
and Sicily along with numerous other smaller islands and territories. The 
Carthaginians also actively explored and settled parts of the Atlantic coastlines of 
West Africa and Europe. Through such means as colonisation, trade, and conquest the 
Carthaginian presence was felt in most areas in the West as well as areas in the 
developed East. 
It is likely that Carthage was founded some time around the end of the ninth 
century as one of many Phoenician coastal ports along the North African coast. 
Alongside the likes of Hadrumentum, Leptis Magna, and Utica, Carthage fulfilled its 
initial function as part of a larger trade network which spanned most of the North 
African coast. Such a network was also instituted in coastal areas of Southern Spain, 
Sardinia, Western Sicily and islands such as Malta and the Balearics. In their base on 
the Levantine coast, the Phoenicians grew wealthy from such settlements. Phoenician 
opportunity in the West was far greater than in the East. The Phoenicians were under 
the near-constant overlordship of more powerful peoples such as the Egyptians, the 
Hittites, and the Assyrians from the second half of the second millennium onwards. 
Nevertheless, excelling in the maritime and mercantile activities, the Phoenicians 
were able to placate their eastern masters by functioning as useful merchants fulfilling 
the latter's needs for various commodities. The Phoenicians' ability to move beyond 
the control and interest of such powers enabled them to create a trade-based 'empire' 
of their own. Although comprised of separate city-states, the Phoenician identity was 
bound by trade and the sea, opening the Western Mediterranean several centuries 
before the arrival of any developed rival. 
The Phoenician legacy to Carthage cannot be underestimated. Apart from a 
common social and cultural heritage, the Phoenician appetite for trade and exploration 
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was transmitted to Carthage. The rapid development of Carthage coupled with the 
decline of Phoenician influence in the West during the sixth century, nominated a 
clear successor. Carthage gradually assumed the Phoenician 'Empire' in the West as 
its own, along with the lucrative trade routes, settlements, and partnerships with many 
peoples. As in the time of the Phoenicians, several core provinces comprised the 
Carthaginian Empire: North Africa, Spain, Sardinia, and Western Sicily. 
Nevertheless, from the end of the sixth century Carthage developed this inheritance 
both to solidify what it had, as well as to increase its power and territory. It is 
instantly clear that Carthage was willing to depart from the established methods of the 
Phoenicians to operate its empire. The nature of the Carthaginian Empire was unique, 
employing and adapting older methods, while instituting its own foreign policies, 
which would ultimately define it as Carthaginian. 
THE BASIC NATURE OF THE CARTHAGINIAN EMPIRE 
The nature of the Carthaginian Empire is not easily classified. The Carthaginians 
employed several characteristic techniques to expand and maintain their influence 
within and beyond the boundaries of their empire. The Phoenician legacy of trade 
naturally remained important for them. Despite contemporary accounts of more 
aggressive military encounters overshadowing the mercantile nature of Carthage, it 
continued to trade extensively as the Phoenicians had done before. Although 
gradually supplemented with other industry, trade remained the mainstay of the 
Carthaginian economy and a driving force behind Carthaginian expansion abroad. 
Like the Phoenicians and the Greeks, the Carthaginians also maintained an 
active policy of settlement abroad. This manifested itself in several forms from as 
early as the seventh century. There are several solid examples of Carthaginian 
settlements which fit well into a more traditional Greek model. The Carthaginians did 
not however, adhere solely to a Greek, or for that matter Phoenician model. We find a 
number of distinctive Carthaginian patterns of settlement emerging. One of the 
strongest was certainly their remodelling of the older Phoenician 'Empire' which saw 
regions redeveloped or resettled as Punic settlements, rather than older Phoenician or 
indigenous foundations. Even within characteristic settlement patterns there were 
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major variances in Carthaginian policy. Carthaginian settlement was as distinctive as 
it was changeable. 
Then there is the nature of Carthaginian military activity. The role of military 
aggression of various design is evident in most empires, both ancient and modern, and 
Carthage is no exception. Unlike the Phoenicians, the Carthaginians were often 
willing to employ a strong military policy to enforce their influence in a certain area 
or over a certain people. As with other aspects of Carthaginian activity abroad, this 
was conducted without a standardised policy, i.e. separate areas or instances were 
dealt with by various methods. Thus we find the Carthaginians active in military, 
diplomatic, and political spheres in areas both under their control, and in neighbouring 
states. The size and diverse nature of the empire meant that a single military policy 
would not suffice in every area, and as a result we find varying degrees of military 
involvement and activity in separate areas often over long periods of time. 
The main methods Carthage used to maintain and expand its empire aid in 
defining it. Such methods were often interrelated or prompted the use of another: for 
example, if Carthage wanted to facilitate trade, it would create new settlements or go 
to war to protect or expand settlements and trade routes. As previously stated, it is not 
a simple task in defining the exact nature of the Carthaginian Empire and its methods 
abroad. 
MODELS OF SETTLEMENT 
When discussing aspects of Phoenicio-Punic settlement, it is natural to compare it to 
the nearest contemporary model, i.e. that of the Greeks. It is difficult to discuss the 
nature of both Phoenician and Carthaginian settlement as an entirely unique process 
as in many respects its mechanisms fit into the limits of the Greek model of 
colonisation. Given the time, the means, and the contact between these groups it is 
natural for similarities to occur. Although one tries not to consider Phoenician or 
Carthaginian settlement in Greek terms, it is often unavoidable owing to such 
correspondence. It is perhaps better to view these groups of colonising peoples as 
working within a similar system, but with different agendas. 
The Greek model of colonisation is a familiar development in Greek society 
stretching from the eighth to the sixth century traditionally, but in fact surviving well 
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into the fifth century. Reasons behind such motivation for colonisation are often 
identified as overpopulation and potential trade. 1 The fundamental characteristic of 
Greek colonisation was that each new colony was designed as an independent replica 
of its metropolis. Social, political, and cultural traditions were continued in a colony 
usually with little deviation from those established in the metropolis. The vast 
majority of Greek colonies adhered to such a practice and in doing so became 
permanent settlements with established political and social functions. Another 
common feature of such sites was their connection with arable territory. As these sites 
were designed as permanent city-states, they needed to be self-sufficient, and 
therefore needed land for agricultural use. The concept of trade was by no means 
foreign to Greek states, and there are a number of Greek emporia or colonies which 
were certainly geared for trade.2 However, this remained a secondary function to most 
colonising states and colonies alike. The preference in the Hellenic world was to 
colonise primarily for social needs; mercantile interests, although apparent, were 
certainly less important. 
The Phoenician practice of settlement, although working within a similar 
system, was the opposite of the Greek model. The Phoenician emphasis on trade as 
the primary motive for settlement resulted in large networks of emporia with a 
smaller emphasis on permanent civic and social settlement. The Phoenicians preferred 
to settle coastal areas with any number of smaller foundations rather than large single 
settlements. Again they were not averse to settling permanent independent 
foundations, but coastal emporia were certainly preferred. We find large coastal 
networks of Phoenician settlement in areas of Southern Spain, Sardinia, North Africa, 
Atlantic Africa, and to a lesser extent Sicily consisting of any number of coastal 
emporia of varying size. These networks also usually contained a larger and more 
1 The problem of overpopulation appears as the defining factor behind most Greek colonies. We find 
most of the major colonising states dominating small areas of fertile land. With an increase of 
popUlation and the lack of primogeniture in Greek law, states such as Corinth, Chalcis, and Thera were 
able to cope by relieving their overpopulation through colonisation. The idea of a Greek colony settled 
primarily as emporia is less clear. Most Greek colonies, however, were settled with possibility of 
developing trade. This is often considered a secondary function as a Greek emporion functioned 
independently from its metropolis. States such as Massilia, Byzantium, and Syracuse all grew wealthy 
from the subsequent trade they generated. 
2 There are several forms of emporia throughout the Greek world. The Massiliot colony of Emporion 
certainly lived up to its etymology by becoming a major port for trade in Northern Spain. Naucratis in 
Egypt also operated as a type of emporion although it was operated as a type of treaty port used by 
several Greek states. Other settlements such as Epidamnus were settled to dominate a specific trade 
route. It is likely that the Phocaeans of Alalia on Corsica were also operating the site as an emporion as 
well as a base for piracy. 
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permanent settlement which was more akin to the Greek model. Sites such as Gades, 
Motya, Caralis, and even Carthage developed into primary provincial centres, which 
presumably helped manage smaller settlements. Despite this settlement pattern, the 
Phoenicians rarely commanded large amounts of territory. By not committing 
manpower to conquest, they could manage their empire more easily with limited 
resources. The coastal nature of the majority of Phoenician settlements certainly 
suggested a strong connection with the sea, and in particular trade. This is emphasised 
by the fact that Phoenician settlements generally did not command large stretches of 
adjoining agricultural land. A number of sites such as Leptis Magna, Malaga, and 
Tharros did maintain rich agricultural hinterland, but it was by no means a 
prerequisite for settlement. Even the larger sites of Gades and Motya were settled on 
offshore islands, while Carthage only commanded large stretches of fertile land after 
later conquest. Presumably a large number of Phoenician settlements relied on 
seaborne traffic to supply them with basic commodities. This naturally meant 
Phoenician sites were less durable than their permanent Greek counterparts, and often 
remain relatively unknown. 
The Carthaginian model of settlement was based primarily on that of the 
Phoenicians. Carthage maintained its inherited desire to trade and settled accordingly. 
By inheriting the settlements of the Phoenicians, the Carthaginians did not need to 
send out as many of their own. Generally they relied on redeveloping their empire, but 
from the few examples we possess, it appears that Carthage settled new networked 
emporia as well as permanent centres designed to dominate specific territories. As we 
will see, Carthage did not maintain a standard colonial policy but still operated within 
the conventions of contemporary settlement. 
UNDERSTANDING CARTHAGE - ANCIENT AND MODERN 
INTERPRETATIONS 
As previously mentioned, for one of the most powerful empires in antiquity the 
Carthaginians remain somewhat enigmatic. This often stems from the nature of our 
sketchy literary accounts. Our knowledge of the Carthaginians is dictated by ancient 
literary opinion, which unfortunately is mostly hostile. It is natural that Greek and 
Roman authors were unwilling to praise or even to describe fully the Carthaginians 
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who were at best rivals and at worst enemies. This problem is compounded by the 
almost complete lack of Phoenicio-Punic sources. The handful of inscriptions or basic 
testimonia we possess, although insightful regarding certain aspects of Carthaginian 
history or society, are sporadic and ultimately insufficient. Weare therefore nearly 
completely reliant on Greek and Roman authors for a literary tradition. 
The nature of the literary evidence we have regarding Carthage is an 
incomplete mosaic spread throughout a large number of ancient authors. The main 
periods of Greek and Roman interest were naturally those which concerned them 
most, i.e. the Greek wars on Sicily and the Punic Wars. The accounts of Timaeus and 
Ephorus (which survive in part in Diodorus) as well as those of Appian, Polybius, and 
Livy comprise the largest narrative accounts regarding Carthage. As the opposing and 
victorious sides wrote these accounts, they are generally biased and often flawed. 
Otherwise we must rely on the likes of Aristotle and Justin for brief but sometimes 
detailed accounts of the Carthaginian constitution or of historical events respectively. 
Presumably more detailed works once existed such as those of Mago and Philinus, but 
are now lost to us. The nature of the bulk of literary information we possess regarding 
Carthage is fragmentary and often sensational or anecdotal in nature. Even in these 
shorter accounts a degree of hostility against Carthage can often be identified. At best 
the literary picture of Carthage is threadbare in a number of areas of history or aspects 
of society. The first chronological reference to Carthage dated after its settlement in 
814 was the founding of Ebusus in 654/3; then the battle against the Phocaeans in ca. 
600; following that the victory at Alalia in 535; and then finally a more coherent 
picture emerges with the first major Carthaginian invasion of Sicily in 480. In 
between such events there are basic references, which can be placed in a broader 
chronological context. To gain a reasonable picture of any aspect of Carthaginian 
history or society often requires grafting several separate sources together. 
Owing to the scarcity of literary facts regarding Carthage, one must often turn 
to alternate sources of information. Archaeological information is proving 
increasingly useful at piecing aspects of Carthaginian society together. Fortunately 
Carthage and its empire remained mercantile by nature and material remains often 
attest a detailed Carthaginian presence and often the nature of that presence in a 
number of areas. This is particularly evident in areas of Phoenicio-Punic activity 
where the literary record is poor such as Sardinia and Malta. Material remains based 
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on trade and settlement provide a more complete picture of the Carthaginians' activity 
in all areas of their empire and their contact with peoples both in mainstream cultures 
such as the Etruscans and the Greeks and with less developed localised peoples. 
The archaeological record of Carthage, its empire, and its contacts is by no 
means complete. Subsequent settlement of Punic sites by Rome and in later times 
renders surveys of Carthaginian activity at many sites incomplete. This is evident in 
the likes of Leptis Magna and Lilybaeum by the Romans and Tingis (Tangier) and 
New Carthage (Cartagena) in later times. This is compounded by the superficial 
nature of Phoenicio-Punic settlement. As mentioned previously, many Phoenician 
and, to a lesser extent, Carthaginian emporia were small coastal settlements 
depending on trade. These were often little more than seasonal or temporary ports 
which left little enduring trace on archaeological records. The conceivable number of 
such settlements which may have existed and since vanished is considerable. Another 
problem that affects our archaeological record is a lack of Punic wares or 
distinguishable commodities in developed areas. There is relatively little physical 
evidence of Punic remains in Greek, Egyptian, and Roman centres. The amount of 
foreign imports in Carthage and throughout its empire suggests heavy trade. 
Presumably Carthage was exporting commodities which did not leave enduring 
remains on the respective archaeological records of its more developed trading 
partners. 
One interesting aspect of Carthaginian trade in relation to material remains is 
its late adoption of systematised coinage. The adoption of coinage in Carthage 
followed increased contact with the Greeks but did not surface until the late fifth 
century. As a result, we only possess numismatic evidence demonstrating trade and 
production from the late fifth century, leaving earlier periods of contact unattested. 
Finally the size of the Carthaginian Empire poses obvious problems in 
obtaining a detailed survey of activity. The sheer expanse of coastline suggests 
numerous settlements that remain unknown. Otherwise Carthage dominated areas that 
bordered terra incognita. There is evidence suggesting Carthaginian activity beyond 
the Pillars of Heracles and Saharan North Africa. The size of both areas coupled with 
the often superficial nature of Carthaginian activity has left little indelible evidence in 
these areas. The extent of any Carthaginian presence will likely remain unknown. All 
the same, despite some consequential flaws in our archaeological record of Carthage 
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and its empire, it still provides an essential insight into areas of Carthaginian activity 
which is often missing from our literary records. 
The nature of the evidence we possess regarding Carthage has an obvious 
effect on modern understanding and scholarship. In many respects the partiality of the 
Greek and Roman writers has endured to the present. The general lack of coverage 
afforded to Carthage and its affairs in antiquity has naturally limited modern 
interpretation. The extremely limited Phoenicio-Punic literary tradition coupled with 
the nature of Greek and Roman sources has left gaping holes in our knowledge of 
Carthaginian history and society. The relative increase of archaeological material and 
interpretation has certainly helped address this problem. Large areas of Carthaginian 
activity are being illuminated by evidence of settlement, trade, and interaction with 
other peoples. This is particularly true regarding the Carthaginian provinces in Spain, 
Sardinia, and Western Sicily. However, the archaeological record is by no means 
complete and is also hindered by a corresponding literary tradition. 
As a legacy of the nature of our literary and, to a lesser extent, archaeological 
tradition regarding Carthage, modern interpretation has naturally been attracted to 
periods of Carthaginian history or society which have better coverage in ancient 
sources. While these accounts have greatly increased our understanding of aspects of 
Carthage, they generally follow set parameters. As a result, there are still major areas 
of Carthaginian civilisation which remain unaddressed. 
Warmington's history of Carthage was primarily based on the accounts of 
Diodorus and Polybius with the main focus beginning in the fifth century. 3 Such a 
survey of Carthage was useful, but a typical treatment. A standard history of Carthage 
includes an introduction with the Phoenicians, culminating in the foundation of 
Carthage in the late ninth century. This usually continues after a gap of over three 
hundred years with the Greek wars on Sicily. This period coincides with the growth of 
Carthage, its empire, and the development of Punic culture. From an historical view 
this treatment continues with the wars against the Greeks and then the Romans during 
the three Punic wars, until the destruction of Carthage in 146. In between the 
historical narrative, there is room for discussion of trade, basic society, political 
organisation (based on the accounts of Aristotle and Polybius), and religion. The 
3 B.H. Warmington, Carthage (London 1960). 
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nature of our surviving literary tradition has dictated such a course to a large degree, 
and this is obvious in modern scholarship. 
More recent accounts of Carthage have tended to be more detailed, with the 
likes of Walter Ameling4 and Werner Huss5 providing more comprehensive accounts 
of Carthaginian military, political, and social spheres. These more recent accounts 
continue the tradition of Stephane Gsell6 who wrote the first detailed account of 
Carthaginian society and growth in North Africa as part of his magnum opus on the 
entire history of the region. Further general study into the social and cultural aspects 
of Carthage have been presented by the Picards in an attempt to piece together a more 
detailed picture of the city and its people.7 There have also been several 
comprehensive studies regarding Carthaginian activity in specific areas. Pedro 
Barcelo has compiled a compendium of Carthaginian activity and settlement in Spain 
before the Barcid invasion in the second half of the third century.s Linda-Marie Hans 
has studied Carthaginian activity and relationships in Sicily.9 Sabatino Moscati has 
covered several areas of Carthaginian involvement including Sicily, Sardinia, and 
Italy.1O There have also been several specific studies of Carthaginian Sardinia by 
Ferruccio Barreca.II 
The archaeological profile has provided further depth to modern interpretation 
of Carthaginian activity. By nature this information is more selective than 
comprehensive. Some specific sites are studied in detail, however others remain 
relatively unknown to modern interpretation. More prominent and unoccupied sites 
have provided the most useful information. Carthage, along with several North 
African sites continue to provide large amounts of material remains and the best 
physical picture of Carthaginian activity. In Sicily, Motya and Panormus provide 
relatively detailed archaeological records, especially for the Punic period. This is also 
evident in several other sites including Elymian Eryx. In Sardinia and Spain we have 
4 Walter Ameling, Karthago -Studien zu Militiir Staat und Gesellschaft (Munich 1993). 
5 Werner Huss, Die Karthager (Munich 1990); Geschichte der Karthager (Munich 1985). 
6 Stephane Gsell, HAANII (Paris 1921). 
7 Gilbert Charles and Collete Picard, Carthage - A Survey of Punic History and Culture from its Birth 
to the Final Tragedy, translated by Dominique Collon (London 1987); The Life and Death of Carthage, 
translated by Dominique Collon (London 1968); Daily Life in Carthage at the Time of Hannibal, 
translated by A. E. Foster (London 1961). 
8 Pedro A. Barcelo, Karthago und die Iberische Halbinsel vor den Barkiden (Bonn 1988). 
9 Linda-Marie Hans, Karthago und Sizilien (Hildesheim 1983). 
10 Sabatino Moscati, Italia Punica (Milan 1986). 
11 Ferruccio Barrecca, La civiltafenicio-punica in Sardegna (Sassari 1988); La Sardegnafenicia e 
punica (Sassari 1974). 
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widespread evidence of specific settlements and larger areas of Carthaginian activity. 
Southern Spain and Sardinia provide comprehensive archaeological evidence of 
Phoenician and Carthaginian provincial settlement, organisation, trade, and industry. 
The major flaw in our archaeological record remains its selective nature. As 
mentioned previously, there is little physical evidence of Carthaginian interaction 
with more developed peoples in the archaeological records of the latter. Presumably 
trade was considerable with the Romans, Egyptians, Greeks, and Etruscans, however, 
there is relatively little Carthaginian evidence amongst these cultures. The extent of 
the Carthaginian Empire and its activities beyond this also make it difficult to provide 
a comprehensive archaeological survey. Presumed activity and settlement in large 
areas, coupled with the often superficial method of Phoenicio-Punic settlement, have 
revealed little information. This is obvious in areas such as the Atlantic, the Sahara, 
but also in parts of the North African coast, as well as contact with areas of Italy, 
Southern France and North-eastern Spain. 
The problem remains that our knowledge of Carthage is dictated by the 
selective nature of our sources both literary and archaeological. Even modern 
interpretation suffers a similar fate of being forced to omit large areas of Carthaginian 
history, society, and culture through a general lack of evidence. Unfortunately any 
wide-ranging survey of Carthage and its empire is threatened by the nature of this 
problem. 
CARTHAGE AND ITS EMPIRE 
As we have seen, developing the idea of any comprehensive survey of almost any 
aspect of Carthaginian society or history is fraught with difficulty based on the limited 
evidence. This is certainly the case when attempting to create a detailed account of 
Carthage's history or salient aspects of its society such as politics or religion. The 
scattered nature of information, both geographically and chronologically is not 
conducive to such research. The nature of the Carthaginian Empire provides a 
different interpretation using such information owing to the large size of the empire 
and the long period which it existed. The scattered nature of our evidence provides 
widespread information regarding Carthage, its provinces, and its activities abroad. 
Although this information is by no means complete, it is possible to make several 
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conclusions regarding the Carthaginian Empire and activity which in turn help 
elucidate our incomplete knowledge of Carthage in general. The nature of such 
research is varied. Literary evidence still provides the best interpretative insight into 
the nature of Carthaginian activity abroad. A diverse range of ancient authors 
provides a variety of accounts or references to Carthage and its empire. Beyond this, 
archaeological evidence provides insight into most major areas and many settlements 
within the empire, and a number of others beyond it tracking settlement, trade, and 
influence. By employing all possible resources, distinctive Carthaginian patterns and 
policies become more apparent. 
Carthage maintained a diverse policy when planning and controlling its 
empire and activity abroad. This activity manifested itself in a number of forms. 
Carthage governed and developed its empire according to its interests. These were 
initially based on trade and settlement, however, an increase in military conquest 
becomes apparent. Such a combination saw Carthage expand and maintain contact 
and control using these three major categories and a number of variations. Based on 
the evidence we possess, it becomes clear that Carthage maintained distinctive 
policies abroad. These policies and activities defined it as characteristically 
Carthaginian, separating it from any contemporary power. In turn, the nature of the 
Carthaginian Empire and its actions help define a proper sense of Carthaginian 
identity, which owing to surviving evidence and ancient opinion, has suffered 
throughout antiquity and into modem times. 
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I. THE PHOENICIANS 
The abiding image of the Phoenicians in antiquity is their association with the sea. 
The Phoenicians' reputation as seafarers inspires both admiration for their maritime 
skill and vilification of their underhanded trading tactics. It was they who, according 
to Pliny, developed navigation and opened the shipping lanes of the Mediterranean 
and beyond in antiquity.! The Phoenicians were extraordinarily active in ancient 
shipping and oversaw the traffic of commodities and culture for centuries. 
Before we can conclude anything about the Carthaginians, we must first look 
at their predecessors, the Phoenicians. As one might expect from a colony, Carthage 
continued the traditions of its metropolis, Tyre; in particular the latter's dependence 
on the sea. Trade, colonial activity, and conquest were all conducted on, and 
connected to the sea. In many ways the Phoenician legacy was to define Carthaginian 
society, its characteristics, and its activities 
EARLY PHOENICIA - VASSALAGE, OPPORTUNITY, AND TRADE 
Tyre, you used to say: I am a ship perfect in beauty. Your frontiers stretched far out to 
sea,' those who built you made you perfect in beauty. Cypress from Senir they used for 
all your planking. They took cedar from Lebanon to make you a mast. From the tallest 
oaks of Bashan they made your oars. They built you a deck of cedar inlaid with ivory 
from the Kittim isles. Embroidered linen of Egypt was used for your sail and for your 
flag. Purple and scarlet from the Elishah islands formed your deck-tent. Men from 
Sidon andfrom Arvad were your oarsmen. Your sages, Tyre, were aboard serving as 
sailors. The elders and craftsmen of Gebal were there to caulk your seams. 
(Ezekiel 27:3-9) 
The bulk of the evidence for early Phoenician society revolves around the 
Phoenicians' activities as traders and seafarers. This is attested from an early period 
with evidence from the third millennium BC, which albeit scanty, suggests that the 
Phoenicians were operating as the traders and merchants of the powerful eastern 
empires. Such evidence attests early Byblite connections with the Egyptian Old 
1 Pliny NH. V.67. 
12 
Kingdom and Mesopotamia.2 During stages of the second millennium the Phoenician 
cities often became vassal states both of the Hittites and of the Egyptians. Although 
these cities were reduced to subject status, they still flourished under what appears to 
be minimal Egyptian and Hittite interference. The Amarna letters of the fourteenth 
century suggest that the southern Phoenician city-states exercised a fair degree of 
autonomy under formal Egyptian overlordship while alluding to active trade between 
Phoenician cities and Egypt.3 During the eleventh century, an Egyptian official, 
Wenamon travelled to Byblos and was robbed of his funds to pay for a shipment of 
timber at Dor.4 His account demonstrates continuing seaborne mercantile activities 
between Byblos and Egypt. 
It appears that in the North the Hittites instituted a similar, although somewhat 
tighter system of vassalage with several Phoenician city-states required to aid the 
former in times of war.s The value of the Phoenicians to the larger states of Egypt and 
the Hittites is considerable. Although formally subject to these larger states, the 
Phoenicians' autonomy, to a certain extent, resulted from the aid they lent their 
overlords in terms of trade and mobility at sea.6 
From the fourteenth century the Phoenicians began to expand their interests 
further abroad. This is best demonstrated by increasing evidence of contact with such 
cultures as Mycenaean Greece. By the twelfth century, the decline of the Egyptians 
and the destruction of Hittite civilisation left the Phoenician states with no major 
power to contend with in the East.7 In such a political climate, the Phoenician cities 
seem to have enjoyed two or three centuries of full independence when they 
flourished as traders and settlers. This is further represented by their activity both on 
the Levantine coast and elsewhere. A number of Biblical records describe the 
Phoenicians as the characteristic traders of Eastern Mediterranean. The best example 
survives from in the reign of Hiram of Tyre (ca. 970-940) who was allied to King 
2 Donald Harden, The Phoenicians (New York 1962) pA4. 
3 EA 139-152,160, Azim of Amurru provides eight ships along with a quantity of boxwood logs and 
large logs to Amenophis IV. 
4 ARE.IV.563, 566. 
5 These include Amurru, Ugarit, and Aleppo, HDT. 4, 5, 8,9,14,16,17. 
6 Susan Frankenstein, 'The Phoenicians in the Far West: A Function of Neo-Assyrian Imperialism", 
Mesopotamia 7: Power and Propaganda a Symposium on Ancient Empires (Copenhagen 1979) 
pp.263ff. 
7 Invaders from the northwest had destroyed Mycenaean Greece. Although Philistine and Hebrew 
encroachments are evident on the Levantine coast, there was a distinct power vacuum. Although the 
Sea Peoples were defeated by the Egyptians under Ramses III (ARE. IV.52; also see under Memeptah, 
ARE. IlI.579), they still shattered Egyptian rule in the East. 
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Solomon of Israel. Hiram, on request, supplied cedars for the construction of 
Solomon's new temple.s We also find Hiram supplying Solomon with experienced 
sailors (1 Kings 9:26) and the triennial shipment of ivory, wood, gold, silver, and 
baboons from Tarshish (possibly Tartessus in Spain, 10:22). From these few examples 
from the first book of Kings we can see how the Phoenicians were widespread and 
well-known travellers and traders by the tenth century. 
This period of relative freedom ended in 876 with the arrival of the Assyrians 
under Assurnasirpal and his heirs who reduced the main Phoenician cities to tributary 
status once more.9 That the individual Phoenician sites often came into contlict with 
their Assyrian rulers suggests a tighter system of vassalage. 1O Nevertheless, the 
Phoenicians remained active traders in spite of such contlict and controL In a number 
of Assyrian inscriptions standard Phoenician characteristics appear. On one occasion 
several Phoenician cities provided to the Assyrian King a tribute of silver, gold, lead, 
copper (including vessels), coloured woollen garments, linen garments, a great and a 
small pagutu, maple-wood, boxwood, ivory, and a dolphin.ll There are several 
inscriptions which list similar tribute payments from Phoenician cities.12 
By the end of the seventh century the Neo-Babylonian Empire had ousted 
Assyria as the dominant eastern power, and the Phoenician cities fell under 
Babylonian ruleY The onset of Persian domination in Phoenicia saw a new method of 
tribute: namely military service. On a number of occasions we find Phoenicians 
comprising a considerable section of the Persian navy. Thucydides claims that the 
Persian navy active during the Pentecontaetia was composed of Phoenicians, 
Cilicians, and Cyprians.14 Herodotus mentions an earlier fleet also consisting of these 
three nationalities fighting for the Persians. IS The Persians were willing actively to 
employ the Phoenicians as sailors for their navy in accordance with their reputation as 
being some of the best seafarers of the period. Following the fall of Persia, the 
81 Kings 5:15-32. 
9 Shalmaneser III (858-825), The gates of Balawat and the black obelisk illustrate Tyrian ships paying 
tribute to the Assyrian King (Harden pp.52-3). Under Tiglatpileser III (754-727) we find evidence of 
tribute from Amurru (ARAB. 1.304). 
10 Tyre in particular paid for its desire for independence enduring several length sieges, see Joseph. Ap. 
1.156; AI. X.228. 
11 ARAB. 1479. 
12 ARAB. 1302, 803, 815, II.912. 
13 Tyre, the last remaining enclave of resistance of the Levantine coast, was captured in 573/2 by 
Nebuchadnezzar following an eleven-year siege. This event proved a watershed in Phoenician history, 
especially for its activities in the West. 
14 Thuc. 1.112. 
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Macedonians and their successors, the Seleucids, were next to assume control of 
Phoenicia. This finally gave way to Roman domination during the first century BC. 
A brief history of ancient Phoenicia gives the impression that the Phoenicians 
were constantly defeated and subjugated by more powerful nations. The Phoenician 
city-states however, managed to maintain their high levels of seaborne independence 
abroad despite their technical status as subject peoples. The division of Phoenicia into 
squabbling city-states belies the Phoenicians' common culture as seafarers. As 
divided states they were never considered a united threat to their respective masters. 
In fact they were valued as assets to the ruling powers, providing trade and mobility. 
Although the Phoenicians were often subjected by various powers, they maintained an 
ability to expand by means of the sea beyond the immediate control of their rulers.16 
This is shown in their ability to trade and develop their own interests, which as we 
will see, evolved into a kind of 'empire' of their own. 
In what follows we will often speak of 'the Phoenicians' out of necessity since 
we rarely hear which Phoenician city founded a specific settlement. All the same, this 
should not mislead into a belief that the Phoenician cities operated as a monolithic 
front which co-ordinated policies. Rather we should think of the cities and their many 
settlements and the various merchants in them as having many shared interests. These 
shared interests resulted in much informal co-operation along the trading routes, co-
operation which frequently causes our sources to speak of 'Phoenician' settlements 
and 'Phoenician' activities rather than those of individual Phoenician cities. 
PHOENICIAN EXPANSION 
A sure method of gauging the Phoenicians' influence is their presence abroad. We 
have already witnessed some of their mercantile activities in the Near East. However, 
what truly defined their actions was their contact, influence, and general expansion 
throughout much of the Mediterranean. Phoenician trade saw them present throughout 
the East and even active in the Red Sea and the interior trade routes. There was, 
however, little opportunity for physical expansion owing to the presence of 
15 Hdt. VI.6, VII.90. 
16 For general accounts of the history of the Phoenician homeland see Harden, Chp. Ill; Sabatino 
Moscati, The World of the Phoenicians, translated by Alastair Hamilton (London 1968) Chp. 1.2. 
15 
established and powerful states in these areas. 17 Despite near-constant domination in 
their homeland, the Phoenician city-states expanded abroad and exercised a high 
degree of autonomy beyond the reach of the dominant powers of the East. The 
Phoenician method of expansion differed markedly from other antique cultures. They 
were able to expand and to establish emporia and various settlements, and to maintain 
them successfully because of their own disinterest in orthodox conquest and 
domination of foreign territory and peoples. 
A MODEL OF PHOENICIAN SETTLEMENT 
Like the Greeks', the Phoenicians' expansion adhered to a reasonably standard model 
of settlement. However, it is important not to be misled into defining this 
phenomenon as an extension of the better-known models from Greece. We have 
already discussed the nature of both forms of settlement as generally working within 
the same standard model. Although there are a number of similarities which will 
become more evident, Phoenician settlement was distinctive from the basic Greek 
model. Primarily, the bulk of Phoenician settlement was not aimed at founding 
autonomous cities but at furthering trade. The Greek term emporion, or trading 
establishment best describes the majority of smaller Phoenician settlements and even 
the primary functions of the larger settlements. A smaller percentage was geared for 
permanent settled and civic function. Larger centres such as Gades, Utica, Lixus, and 
Motya did maintain proper infrastructure and a permanent population. These centres 
in turn usually dominated networks of smaller settlements. Smaller centres such as 
Toscanos (Spain) and Bithya (Sardinia) possessed permanent populations and 
presumably had limited localised governance. Finally, there were the smaller 
Phoenician trading ports. These remained superficial, relying on seasonal or 
temporary trade or passing traffic. Such centres were presumably numerous, but given 
their nature, often untraceable. Such a system of settlement allowed the Phoenicians 
to develop networked areas of commercial interests. Cyprus, North Africa, Southern 
Spain, Western Sicily, and Sardinia developed into coastal areas of Phoenician 
settlement and trade. 
17 The same problem beset the later Greek city-states during the eighth century when attempting to 
colonise new territories. As a result we find most Greek colonies founded in undeveloped areas of the 
Mediterranean such as Sicily and Southern Italy and beyond in the Propontis and the Black Sea. 
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The typical Phoenician settlement also differed somewhat from the traditional 
Greek model in its topography. Owing to their mercantile purpose and maritime 
nature, the vast majority of settlements were coastal with access to the sea and 
therefore able to remain in contact with other Phoenician settlements and seaborne 
traffic. As a result, these settlements usually had a serviceable harbour, or a beach. 
These settlements are characteristically well-guarded. Many were notably settled on 
offshore islands (Motya, Gades, and Mogador) or defensible headlands or peninsulas. 
Such a trait suggests that the Phoenicians remained indifferent towards building 
territory in the interior. They rather preferred to keep their settlements small and 
manageable without concerning themselves with dominating native populations and 
large territories. This is emphasised by the Phoenician policy of building amicable 
relations with local peoples with which they came into contact. These peoples actually 
served as markets for selling commodities and a means of obtaining others for further 
production and export. 
Phoenician settlement abroad was successful because it functioned in a 
mercantile sphere beyond the influence and competition of the developed powers of 
the East. By maintaining simple, but effective coastal networks of settlement fed by 
native and their own industrial bases, the Phoenicians were able to maintain a virtual 
imperium sine terra. Unlike Greek models where colonies established chorai as 
quickly as possible, Phoenician settlements preferred bases from which they could 
trade. 
CYPRUS 
Phoenician activity on Cyprus is problematic regarding its initial settlement. The 
island's proximity to Phoenicia as well as the constant trade between the two areas 
make it difficult to discern exact colonial boundaries. Nonetheless evidence suggests a 
possible initial Phoenician presence as early as the eleventh century BC.ls Several 
prominent Phoenician settlements are attested on Cyprus, dominating much of the 
eastern third of the island. These Phoenician colonies seem to have remained 
relatively independent until the reign of the Assyrian King Sargon II (721-705). Even 
18 Excavations at Kition have dated the acropolis to the eleventh century, see E. Gjerstad et al. (eds.), 
The Swedish Cyprus Expedition, Vol. IV.2 (Stockholm 1948) p,436ff. There is debate over the date of 
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then they remained mostly autonomous. Moreover they retained their distinct 
Phoenician character despite near often vassal status under the Assyrians, Egyptians, 
Persians, Greeks, and Romans. 
The extent of Phoenician settlement on Cyprus was limited by existing 
Eteocypriot and Greek settlements, such as Amathus and Paphos.19 Phoenician 
settlements and emporia were still able to develop and dominated a considerable 
portion of the island. The earliest Phoenician inscription we have from Cyprus is a 
funerary inscription from the ninth century.20 This coincides with the first 
distinguishable type of Phoenician pottery, the 'Red Slip' ware. Although such a date 
could suggest the beginning of concerted Phoenician settlement in the area, there are 
traces of Syro-Palestinian pottery at Salamis dating from the eleventh century 
suggesting an earlier Phoenician presence on CypruS.21 The travels of Wenamon saw 
him accidentally arrive on Cyprus (Alas a) ca. 1070, although it is unclear whether or 
not the settlement was Phoenician.22 Eleventh century colonisation of Cyprus is not 
inconceivable when we consider that the Phoenician settlements of Utica and Gades 
far to the west may have been established possibly as early as 1100 Be. Owing to the 
lack of concrete evidence, however, it would be advisable to leave open the question 
whether Phoenician contact with Cyprus in the eleventh century involved only trade 
or extended already to rudimentary settlement. It was not until the ninth or eighth 
century, however, that the Phoenicians fully utilised Cyprus by establishing 
permanent foundations and emporia. 
Phoenician settlement on Cyprus due to the lack of evidence. Most archaeological and epigraphic 
evidence survives from the ninth and eighth centuries onward. 
19 Traditionally Greek colonisation of Cyprus coincides with the fall of Troy (1184 BC). It is likely that 
this date is slightly exaggerated and actual colonisation took place later. Parker presents the tenth 
century as a more likely date for the arrival of the Greeks ("Zur Datierung der Dorischen Wanderung", 
Mus. Helv. LIT, 1995, pp.130-154. Greek colonisation presumably predated the Phoenician presence on 
the island which has been possibly dated as early as the eleventh century, see Sir George Hill, A 
History o/Cyprus, VoL I (Cambridge 1972) Chp. V. Greek contact and settlement with Cyprus remains 
problematic owing to a lack of evidence, see EG. Maier, "Kinyras & Agapenor", Acts o/the 
International Archaeological Symposium, Cyprus between Orient and Occident, V. Karageorghis (ed.), 
(Nicosia 1986) pp.311-320. 
20 KAI. 30. 
21 See Vassos Karageorghis, Kition Mycenaean and Phoenician Discoveries in Cyprus (London 1976) 
p.95. 
22 ARE. IV.591. Recent scholarship has pointed to the lack of Phoenician characteristics in his account 
as proof of no Phoenician presence in Cyprus at that time. Nevertheless, Wenamon may not have 
arrived in a Phoenician settlement. In any case, the presence of a bilingual member of the court 
suggests contact between Egypt and Cyprus a possible result of trade, which during this period was 
becoming increasingly Phoenician. 
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The Phoenician settlements on Cyprus were certainly geared for trade. It is, 
however, difficult to categorise settlements as purely Phoenician, as Phoenician 
settlers may often lived alongside Greek and native populations.23 Only a handful of 
settlements can be safely identified as Phoenician. Most other towns on the island 
probably contained a strong Phoenician presence suggesting that the Phoenicians were 
also using them as trading centres. Coastal settlements such as Kition, Amathus, and 
Salamis were all coastal ports servicing the Levantine coast. Interior settlements such 
as Tamassos and Golgoi would have supplied the coast with commodities from 
workshops while interacting with native and Greek settlements.24 Northern coastal 
towns such as Lapethos (a Greek town temporarily ruled by Phoenicians) and Ayia 
Irini would have been important ports for trade with the southern coasts of Anatolia 
and with Greece.25 The situation of various Phoenician settlements on Cyprus is 
characteristic considering the influence of their mercantile nature. Although such 
settlements were not restricted to trade, their original function for trade-orientated 
expansion is apparent. 
Kition, the primary Phoenician settlement on Cyprus was situated at the head 
of an inlet which reached the foot of its acropolis giving the settlement an enclosed 
harbour.26 Excavations have revealed an ancient moat and city walls along with 
considerable remains of both Phoenician and Greek cultures.27 From the topography 
23 Franz Georg Maier, "Factoids and Fifth-Century Cyprus: The Case of Fifth-Century Cyprus", JHS 
CV, 1985, pp.32-39, has categorised this problem well dnring the fifth century. It is difficult to 
distinguish certain Greek or Phoenician towns on the island even at such a late date. 
24 See AT Reyes, Archaic Cyprus (Oxford 1994) Chp. VI. There is a great deal of archaeological 
evidence which demonstrates internal interaction between separate Phoenician states. Although they 
were often politically divided, Phoenician settlements show common artistic trends and diffusion 
patterns. Certain types of ceramics, sculpture, and glyptic groups show various trends of movement 
throughout Cyprus attesting established trade and contact routes. 
25 There is evidence of a Phoenician presence in Anatolia. The Karatepe inscription (KAI. 26) is an 
eighth century bilingual document in Hieroglyphic Luwian and Phoenician of King Azatiwatas 
describing various conquests of the King and the states subjected to tribute status. Greek interaction 
with Phoenician traders needs no explanation. A bilingual Greek and Phoenician inscription from 
Rhodes, albeit from the second century BC, it is testament to a Phoenician presence on the island (KAI. 
44). It is apparent that the Greek settlements on Cyprus were also in constant contact with their 
Phoenician neighbours. The Greek temple of Aphrodite (Astarte) at Paphos was an important 
Phoenician cult centre. Otherwise such Greek settlements would have been constantly trading with 
Phoenician merchants. There was an obvious understanding and familiarity of the Phoenicians in 
Greece as shown by their literary characterisation, see Irene 1. Winter "Homer's Phoenicians: History, 
Ethnography, or Literary Trope? [A Perspective on Early Orientalism]", The Ages of Homer, Jane B. 
Carter and Sarah P. Morris (eds.), (Austin 1995) pp.247-271. For more specific evidence of Phoenician 
trade with the Greece and Rhodes see Glenn Markoe, Phoenician Bronze and Silver Bowls from 
Cyprus and the Mediterranean (Berkeley 1985) pp.117-127. 
26 Strabo XIV.6.3. 
27 See Karageorghis, Kition, Mycenaean and Phoenician Discoveries in Cyprus (London 1976) for a 
detailed account of both Greek and Phoenician remains at Kition. 
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of Kition it appears that the city developed around its primary feature: the harbour, 
and therefore the trade it generated. The Phoenicians however, developed the site 
fully with defences, temples and other civil buildings. 
Amathus, on the southern coast reveals no direct evidence suggesting 
Phoenician settlement, however it shows Phoenician characteristics. Like a number of 
Cypriot towns it probably became a Phoenician settlement for a period.28 Its 
topographic details are standard: an acropolis, harbour, and city walls. There is also 
evidence of the cult status of Heracles Malika (Melqart) in the town suggesting 
Phoenician presence and/or influence.29 
Tamassos, in central Cyprus was one of the ancient kingdoms of Cyprus. 
However there is evidence of a Phoenician presence there in the fourth century BC, 
when its king, Pasikypros sold his kingdom to Pumiathon, king of Kition?O This 
transaction is corroborated by two contemporary inscriptions naming Tamassos as 
being governed by Kition.31 The importance of this town revolves around its position 
in the copper producing area of Cyprus. The presence of such an important natural 
resource would certainly attract Phoenician interest. 
Idalion, also in Central Cyprus seems to have a similar history to that of 
Tamassos. An ancient kingdom of Cyprus, it fell to Kition during the fifth century and 
was governed by the latter. There is also strong Phoenician cultural influence in the 
city with evidence of cults of Astarte, Reshef (assimilated as Apollo), and Anat 
(assimilated as Athena).32 
Finally we have evidence of a town named Carthage in Cyprus. The 
Phoenician term Qart-Hadasat simply means 'New Town'. When we consider 
Carthage in Libya and New Carthage in Spain, it becomes apparent that this was a 
standard colonial name in Phoenicio-Punic society.33 In an inscription dated between 
750-725 BC the governor of Qart-Hadasat refers to himself as the servant of Hiram, 
king of the Sidonians.34 This refers to Hiram II of Tyre who in turn was a vassal ruler 
28 Steph. Byz. S.v. 'A,.ux8oU<;. 
29 Hill, p.lO 1. 
30 Duris of Samos, F.Gr.Hist. 76, FA. 
31 KAl. 32, 33,41. 
32 e.g. CIS. 1.89,1.93; KAI. 38. 
33 A similar colonial name used was Soloeis. This was the name of one of the three original Phoenician 
towns in Sicily. It is also the name of one of the foundations established during the periplus of Hanno 
during the fifth century, see Chp. Ill, n.S? and text. 
34 KAJ. 31. Although Hiram was king of Tyre, the position was often referred to as the King of the 
Sidonians, e.g. 1 Kings 16:31. The title of king and the identity of the Phoenician inhabitants of the 
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under Tiglatpileser lIes The site of Qart-Hadasat is still unknown.36 Both Kition and 
Amathus have been suggested as candidates. The latter is certainly a possibility but 
not proved; whereas the former is unlikely when we take into account a fifth century 
inscription from Kition. This inscription names a man from Carthage and 
distinguishes him as a (Cypriot) Carthaginian and therefore not from Kition.37 
Although the Phoenician presence on Cyprus was initially based around a 
trade agenda, it becomes apparent that the new Phoenician settlements on the island 
soon mimicked their metropoleis as politically active and divided city-states. Kition is 
probably the best example of a politically active city on Cyprus. During the fifth 
century it incorporated Tamassos and Idalion into its kingdom. Otherwise evidence 
from Marium and Lapethos suggests some form of Phoenician rule.38 Both cities were 
Greek foundations on the north coast of Cyprus. During Ptolemaic times we find 
Marium's king, Praxidemus son of Sesmai commissioning a bilingual inscription to 
Anat which was found at Lapethos.39 This King in fact bore besides his Greek name 
Praxidemus a Phoenician one which is neither a transliteration nor a translation: 
c,l,lhl.l::l, "Ba'al replaces". Such a document certainly attests to some Phoenician 
influence in the royal line of Marium.40 Lapethos also attests such a Phoenician 
incursion into Northern Cyprus. Coins of the fifth century king, Demonicus were 
struck with Phoenician characters suggesting Phoenician sovereignty over the town.41 
It seems apparent that despite vassal status under Assyrian, Egyptian, Persian, and 
Ptolemaic rule, the Phoenician towns of Cyprus remained relatively independent and 
politically active.42 
It appears that much like the majority of Greek colonies, the Phoenician 
settlements on Cyprus continued close contact with their respective metropoleis. We 
may assume that trade between the new settlements and their respective mother cities 
remained constant, evident in the similarity of style and influence of commodities. We 
Levantine coast assumed several forms, see H.I. Katzenstein, The History ofTyre (Jerusalem 1997) 
p.82. 
35 "New City" on Cyprus is also attested later during the rule of the Assyrian King, Esarhaddon in the 
following century CANEr 291b). 
36 For a discussion of several possible locations of the site see Katzenstein, pp.207ff. 
37 KAI. 37. 
38 Maier, p.3S. 
39 KAl. 42. 
40 See Hill, p.99 n.6. 
41 Moscati, The World of the Phoenicians pp.lOS-6; Maier, "Factoids", p.3S. 
42 See ARAB. n.690, 876. Under Asarhaddon and Assurbanipal during the seventh century Phoenician 
towns such as Tamassos, Kurion, and Qart-Hadasat are named as separate states of vassalage. 
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have seen from one inscription how the Cypriot colony of Qart-Hadasat owed 
allegiance to Hiram of Tyre.43 Whether this colony originated from Tyre or the latter 
had more recently gained power over the former is unclear. If Tyre was the metropolis 
of Qart-Hadasat, this inscription would suggest a connection between the two cities. 
A connection between Phoenician cities on the Levantine coast and those on Cyprus 
can be seen during the reign of the Assyrian King, Sennacherib (705-681) when he 
defeated the King of Tyre, Lule (Elulaeus). Three repetitive inscriptions claim Lule 
fled to Cyprus where he subsequently died.44 This brief example implies that there 
was a connection between a metropolis and a subsequent settlement amongst the 
Phoenicians as existed among the Greek states. 
Although Phoenician settlement on Cyprus is problematic, it is discernible. It 
remained a natural destination for Phoenician traders and settlers. It also provided an 
excellent base for offshore expansion while still in close contact with Phoenicia. 
Cyprus allowed the Phoenicians a number of basic commodities for trade including 
copper and timber. Phoenician presence in Cyprus would have facilitated contact with 
the Greeks on Cyprus and beyond into the Aegean. Although there is no direct 
evidence proving that Cyprus was the area of the earliest Phoenician expansion 
abroad, it is a likely point of initial contact and would have remained an integral part 
of rapidly developing Phoenician interests abroad. 
NORTH AFRICA 
In addition to Carthage, there were several attested Phoenician settlements in North 
Africa, which although not as illustrious as their neighbour, were still important 
foundations. The foundation date of Carthage by Elissa in 814 BC is based on literary 
tradition but is generally accepted. There is, however, evidence to suggest an earlier 
Phoenician presence in North Africa. It appears that the Phoenicians may have been 
actively trading and establishing settlements on the North African coast as early as 
1100 BC. 45 Much like the Phoenician settlements on Cyprus, those in North Africa 
were founded with seaborne trade and contact with the interior in mind. As in the case 
43 KAI. 31. 
44 ARAB. II.239, 309, 326. 
45 According to Philistus, Zor and Carchedon originally settled the site in the late thirteenth century. 
Harden (p.66) dispels this earlier expedition as an eponymous myth with Zor being the Greek name for 
Tyre and Carchedon that for Carthage (FCH. I, 50 Eusebius Chron. 804, p.126; App. Pun. 1). 
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of Cyprus, the literary tradition does not match archaeological data in establishing a 
chronology of Phoenician settlement. Although Utica was supposedly settled around 
1100 as the first Phoenician foundation in the area, so far no direct archaeological 
evidence has been discovered for a possible Phoenician presence in North Africa 
before the ninth or eighth centuries. It is likely that Phoenician presence in several 
supposed sites was superficial and left few lasting remains. This is compounded 
further by the redevelopment and expansion of several sites during the Punic period 
from the fifth century. As a result it is often difficult to discern a number of supposed 
Phoenician sites in North Africa stretching from Libya to the Pillars of Herac1es. 
From the identified Phoenician settlements we know, there are several 
common characteristics attesting their primary functions. Most Phoenician settlements 
in North Africa were semi-permanent or permanent bases revolving around trade 
between the west and north and Phoenicia to the east. Such settlements usually 
possessed good harbours and often dominated at least a small area of agricultural 
land. Although permanently settled, most Phoenician North African settlements did 
not extend their dominion into the hinterland, preferring to rely on seaborne trade. It 
was only Carthage that later extended its chara into the interior, forming a large 
empire on both land and sea. Often settlements were placed in relative proximity to 
each other in order that Phoenician ships could expect safe anchorage after each day 
of travelling, as Phoenician sailors were traditionally not fond of sailing at night. As a 
result we find a network of Phoenician settlements along the North African coast 
designed to facilitate trade and contact. 
There is little doubt that dozens of Phoenician settlements of varying size and 
tenure dotted the North African coast acting as points of anchorage and trade for the 
busy Mediterranean trade routes. Few of these sites have survived or have been 
attested as original Phoenician settlements. Temporary settlements would have left no 
enduring traces on the landscape, while larger settlements are difficult to discern 
owing to constant cultural change during Punic and Roman times. 
Utica was one of the oldest and most famous Phoenician foundations in North 
Africa. Founded on a promontory, it dominated a good port and a fertile alluvial 
plain.46 Literary evidence suggests a foundation date of ca. 1100 by Tyre almost three 
46 App. Lib. 75. 
23 
centuries previous to Carthage.47 Pliny writing in AD 77, claims that the cedars in the 
temple of Apollo (Reshef) had lasted for 1178 years and were put in place at the time 
of the foundation of the city (1101 BC).48 According to Josephus, King Hiram of Tyre 
sent an expedition against Utica, which he claims was due to the colony's refusal to 
pay tribute, possibly attesting the existence of Utica in the tenth century.49 Otherwise 
we have the account of Justin who claims that ambassadors from Utica welcomed 
Elissa and the colonists of Carthage as relatives suggesting Utica was well established 
by the late ninth century .50 However the archaeological record of Utica suggests a 
later permanent establishment dating from the eighth century.51 Unfortunately the 
Phoenician history of Utica is mostly unknown, and the city is better attested during 
its Punic stage.52 Nonetheless its size and reputation suggest a flourishing city which 
became a major trading port. It still remained second only to Carthage in North Africa 
during the latter's dominance and maintained a degree of independence. 53 
Leptis Magna rose to prominence as a Roman city but was initially founded by 
the Phoenicians and subsequently developed by the Carthaginians. The earliest 
evidence at the site dates from the seventh century, although it may have functioned 
earlier as a trading pOSt.54 According to Sallust, it was founded in a similar manner to 
Carthage. 55 A group of Tyrians, driven from their homeland by civil disturbances 
settled the site. Even in Sallust's day, he claims that despite intermarriage with the 
native population, the laws and civilisation were essentially Tyrian. The positioning 
of Leptis Magna is typical for a Phoenician settlement. Founded adjacent to a 
47 VeIl. Pat. 1.2.3. 
48 Pliny NH. XVI.216. 
49 Ap. IJ 19, see Moscati, The World of the Phoenicians, p.97. 
50 Justin XVIII.S. 
51 Alexandre L6zine, Carthage - Utique, Etudes d' architecture et d'urbanise (Paris 1968) p.146. 
52 e.g. Lezine, p.134. 
53 This is demonstrated by its special mention as separate to Carthage (along with Tyre) in the second 
Romano-Carthaginian treaty in ca. 306 BC (Polyb. II1.24). Although this admission implies formal 
recognition of Utica's autonomy, it was probably more a Carthaginian recognition of the former's 
standing and antiquity. There is little evidence otherwise which supports Utica's autonomy from 
Carthaginian rule. Nevertheless, it would be unfair to classify Utica as ever being a totally Punic city. 
Carthage probably would not have assumed official control of the city and its activities until at least the 
fifth century. It probably retained remnants of its Phoenician character, although its continual contact 
with Carthage must have been influential. It even emphasised its older independence by siding with the 
Romans against Carthage during the Third Punic War. Appian (Lib. 75) claims that Utica, realising the 
plight of Carthage, welcomed Scipio Aemilianus claiming ancient animosity against the Carthaginians. 
As Appian's text suggests however, it was probably due more to necessity: Utica realised that Carthage 
was finished and any support would be foolish. As a result, Utica was deemed a free town in North 
Africa and once again became the major city in North Africa until the refoundation of Carthage by 
Caesar a century later, also see Chp. II, n.90. 
54 Markoe, p.182. 
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protective harbour, it bordered the oasis Wadi Lebda. The importance of the olive 
trade especially during Roman occupation was testament to its fertile hinterland.56 
Sabratha was in origin a mere Phoenician trading post founded as early as the 
eighth or seventh century probably by the Tyrians.57 It appears originally to have been 
a seasonal trading post before becoming a permanent settlement during Punic times 
from the fifth century onwards. It was well located for trade along the North African 
coast and into the interior to the Ghadames oasis. Naturally, Sabratha was situated 
near a serviceable harbour and evidence of a pre-Roman circuit wall suggests that it 
had grown to a high level of prosperity from humble foundations. 58 From the few Pre-
Roman remnants attested at Sabratha, Punic, Greek, and Egyptian remains suggest 
that the site was actively trading abroad and presumably with the interior.59 
Hadrumentum (Sousse) was permanently settled by the Phoenicians probably 
around the same time as Leptis Magna and Hippo during the eighth century or 
possibly slightly later.60 Literary tradition claims that it was another Tyrian 
settlement.61 Like the other North African settlements we have seen, Hadrumentum 
was situated on a harbour which dominated a fertile area and accordingly benefited by 
both land and sea. Although the site became a renowned Roman centre, many 
Phoenicio-Punic artefacts still remain. There are remnants of a topheth dating from 
the sixth century as well as other material remains.62 It appears that Hadrumentum, 
like Utica, remained independent until Carthaginian expansion reduced its official 
status to that of a dependant. 
Oea (modern Tripoli), another Phoenician foundation, lay between Sabratha 
and Leptis Magna and was also founded by the Tyrians. Silius Italicus claims that it 
was a mixed colony of Sicilians and Africans.63 It was situated on a small yet 
functional harbour next to a fertile coastal oasis. It was possibly refounded by Aradus, 
Tyre, and Sidon during the mid-fifth century BC with each city-state establishing its 
55Zug. LXXVII.!, XIX.I; Sil. Pun. III.256; Pliny NH. V.76 
56 Regarding the archaeological remains at Leptis Magna in both the Phoenician and Punic periods see, 
Theresa Howard Carter, "Western Phoenicians at Lepcis Magna", AlA LXIX.2, 1965, pp.123-132. 
57 Sit Pun. III.256. It is possible that Silius Italicus uses Tyrians as an epithet for Phoenicians in 
general. 
58 Philip M. Kenrick et al. (eds.), Excavations at Sabratha 1948-1951 (London 1986) p.8. 
59 MacKendrick, p.165; Kenneth D. Matthews Jr., Alfred W. Cook, Cities in the Sand - Leptis Magna 
and Sabratha in Roman Africa (Philadelphia 1957) p.48. 
60 SalIust (lug. XIX.!) mentions all three together as a distinct group of Phoenician settlements in North 
Africa. 
61 Solinus XXVII.9. 
62 Louis Foucher, Hadrumentum (Paris 1964) pp.33ff. 
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own quarter in the city.64 There is evidence of a third or second century necropolis at 
the site along with Punic pottery with imagery of Tanit.65 Originally little more than a 
trading port, like other Phoenician settlements it was developed further by the 
Carthaginians and then later by the Romans. 
There are several other Phoenician settlements on the northern coast of Africa. 
Auza, (not yet identified) according to the Tyrian archives, was apparently founded by 
Ittobaal in the ninth century.66 Sallust also claims that the Phoenicians founded 
Hippo.67 Unfortunately he does not mention whether this was Hippo Regius (Annaba) 
or Hippo Diarrhytus (Bizerte). Both are characteristic Phoenician sites but contain 
only evidence of Punic remains. 
Similarly, the Phoenicians most likely spread west across the coast of North 
Africa as their presence in the region grew. Eventually the Phoenicians maintained 
forms of settlement at a number of coastal sites in Algeria and Morocco en route to 
the Far West. 
Phoenician settlements along the coast of North Africa mimicked their 
respective metropoleis in that they remained independent and often divided city-states 
with a common culture and an inclination toward maritime trade. It was only the 
advent of Carthage that united these cities under a single political power. As we have 
seen however, some Phoenician cities retained their Phoenician identity and 
maintained aspects of this original heritage (as did Carthage itself). It appears from 
literary sources that Tyre was the main colonising state of Phoenicia. Other 
Phoenician states, however, probably founded settlements along the coast as well. The 
colonising cities presumably did not officially co-ordinate settlement policy, though 
in the nature of things a good deal of informal co-operation probably existed between 
various cities' settlements. Certainly such co-operation would have benefited the 
merchants who were present. The early centuries of the first millennium witnessed the 
development of such a Phoenician network of colonies operating on the North African 
coast. Primarily restricted to the coast, they would have greatly facilitated trade and 
contact between the Western Mediterranean and the East. 
63 Sit Pun.IlI.257. 
64 GGM. I, Ps. Scylax 104, p.78 (ed. Muller). 
65 Moscati, The World of the Phoenicians, p.121. 
66 Joseph. Ai. Vm.324. 
67 lug. XIX. 1 
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THE WESTERN MEDITERRANEAN AND BEYOND 
Expansion and settlement in the western areas of the Mediterranean is testament to the 
Phoenicians' skill in navigation and their attraction to trade and exploration. It seems 
as though the Phoenician cities employed a model similar to that which they used in 
other parts of the Mediterranean, one of contact through trade by means of the 
establishment of coastal emporia. It appears that permanent Phoenician contact 
extended along the eastern and southern coasts of Spain as well as Atlantic Africa.68 
Otherwise we have evidence of trade with the Balearic Islands, Tartessus (probably 
located in Baetica), the Atlantic coasts of Spain and France, and possibly Southern 
Britain. It appears that despite the great distance from the Levantine coast, the 
Phoenicians not only had early contact with this area but also were actively 
establishing settlements possibly by 1100 Be. 
ATLANTIC NORTH AFRICA 
According to some ancient sources, Atlantic North Africa was once well populated 
with Phoenician colonies.69 These emporia, as Strabo describes them, had vanished by 
his time leaving only larger establishments, fewer in number.70 The most illustrious 
and enduring of these sites was Lixus. According to Pliny, there was a shrine of 
Heracles at Lixus which was said to be older than that at Gades.71 Once again 
archaeological evidence is scant, only attesting Phoenician presence at the site as 
early as the seventh century with sporadic settlement.72 During his periplus in the fifth 
century, the Carthaginian Hanno describes the river Lixus in familiar terms as well as 
contact with the native LixitaeY The constant use of the site of Lixus in antiquity has 
68 We will look primarily at known Phoenician settlements. Possibilities of contact with equatorial 
Africa, Atlantic France, and Britain are not clear but will be discussed in the Carthaginian era 
especially regarding the reported journeys of Hanno and Himilco. 
69 Strabo XVIII.8.2; Avienus OM. Ll.438-442. 
70 Both Strabo (XVIII.3.8) and Avienus (OM. L.439) claim these cities had vanished by their day. 
71 Pliny NH. XIX.63. 
72 Maria Eugenia Aubet, The Phoenicians and the West - Politics, Colonies and Trade, translated by 
Mary Turton, (Cambridge 1987) p.247; M. Tarradell, Marruecos Punico (Tetuan 1960) Chp. VI. 
73 GGM. I. 112, pp.92-93 (ed. Mtiller). The Lixitac must have had contact with the Phoenicians or 
Carthaginians as they provided the expedition with interpreters for the journey south. 
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left a relatively poor picture of Phoenicio-Punic settlement.74 The site of Lixus, 
however, is the aspect which is of most interest when considering Phoenician colonial 
patterns. Strabo states that it lay among many other Phoenician settlements on a bay 
called Emporicus.75 The bay itself was situated at the mouth of the Loukkos River 
which gave Lixus (and other supposed Phoenician colonies) a well-sheltered harbour 
at the entrance to a navigable river.76 It appears that Phoenician traders at Lixus would 
have had access to resources of gold, ivory, copper, and lead. The site of Lixus had 
obvious benefits for Phoenician mercantile interests, and the characteristics of the site 
relate to this fact. 77 
The other Phoenician colony we know of in the area is Mogador. Situated on a 
small coastal island like Lixus, evidence from the site shows that it was inhabited 
from the seventh century onwards. Potsherds attest contact with Phoenicia and Cyprus 
along with Greece demonstrating the eastern Phoenician trade routes operated as far 
as Atlantic Morocco. Otherwise the site has revealed fish and whalebone dumps 
which confirm that this was an important industry of the settlement.78 Such evidence 
is reinforced by Pseudo-Aristotle who claims that the Phoenicians of Gades sailed 
past the Pillars of Hercules for four days to fish for tuna, possibly around Mogador.79 
Despite the southern location of Mogador, several of its attributes show Phoenician 
interest and activity.80 
SPAIN 
Like North Africa, Spain saw an influx of Phoenician trade-based contact which 
developed into settlement. This contact was concentrated on the southern and eastern 
coasts and into the interior. Spain had several incentives for the Phoenicians' interest. 
Primarily it offered them silver. It appears that the silver trade developed early 
between the Levantine coast and Spain. It is possible that the Biblical kingdom of 
74 The subsequent history of Lixus saw it in constant use is antiquity. It become a centre influenced by 
Hellenistic culture before being rebuilt by the Mauritanian King Juba II and finally being annexed as 
part of the Roman province of Mauretania during the reign of Caligula. 
75 Strabo XVII.3.2. 
76 Aubet, The Phoenicians and the West, p.248. 
77 For a full geographic description of the site of Lixus see Tarradell, pp.133-136. 
78 M. Fernand Benoit, Mogador, comptor Phenicien du Maroc Atlantique (Tangier 1966) p.51. 
79 Ps. Aristotle Mir. Ausc. 136; Aubet, The Phoenicians and the West, p.247, believes these could be 
the Canary-Saharan shoals. 
80 See Tarradell, pp.18lff. 
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Tarshish was in fact the western kingdom of Tartessus in Baetica.81 During the reign 
of Solomon, it is claimed that a fleet laden with gold, silver, ivory, apes, and baboons 
would return once every three years.82 There are a number of Biblical references to 
Tarshish and its connection to both Phoenicia and to the extraction of precious metals 
emphasising its importance to Phoenician trade.83 It is quite conceivable that the silver 
(and other metals including gold and copper) extracted from Spain did pave the way 
for Phoenician expansion throughout the Mediterranean. Diodorus reports that the 
wealth extracted from Iberia enabled the Phoenicians to found colonies in Africa, 
Sardinia, and Spain.84 The association of the Phoenicians with the silver trade is 
evident from both Biblical and archaeological examples.85 It is possible that their 
ability to secure such obvious quantities of precious metals from the West may have 
been an underlying reason for such freedom from their masters in the East. 
Again the chronology of Phoenician expansion in Spain is problematic. The 
primary Phoenician settlement was Gades, an island just off the southern coast. It was 
traditionally founded around the same time as Lixus and Utica ca. 1100 Be. If Gades 
was operating as the main Phoenician settlement during the reign of Solomon and his 
connection to Tarshish, this would date the city at least to the late tenth century. 
Archaeological evidence, however, only attests a presence from the eighth century.86 
It would appear that early Phoenician contact in Spain is possible, but like the other 
spheres of activity was probably basic trade from semipermanent or seasonal emporia. 
Concerted efforts at settlement would have begun later most likely during the eighth 
century as was the case in Cyprus and North Africa. Again, we should think, however, 
not so much of officially co-ordinated activity on the part of the various Phoenician 
cities, but rather of a good deal of co-operation. 
81 1 Kings 10:22; 2 Chronicles 9:2l. 
82 The length of such a journey would probably coincide with the vast distance of sailing from one end 
of the Mediterranean and back again. This is especially evident in the reported cargo of the fleet 
suggesting numerous stops. Gold could have originated from the west coast of Africa where Herodotus 
claims the Carthaginians (and probably the Phoenicians before them) bartered with the local peoples 
for gold (IV.l96). Such lUXUry items as apes, baboons, and ivory probably had origins in Africa and 
may have been acquired from any Phoenician port in West or North Africa. 
83 Isaiah 23:1; Jeremiah 10:9. 
84 Diod. V.35.S. 
85 Ezekiel 27:l2, 28:4. The abundance of Phoenician silver artefacts attested throughout the 
Mediterranean is testament to the prevalence of such a precious metal. Silver bowls are a characteristic 
type suggesting a constant supply of silver in the Phoenician world. 
86 Richard 1. Harrison, Spain at the Dawn of History - Iberians, Phoenicians and Greeks (London 
1988) p.4l; Aubet, The Phoenicians and the West, p.218; Hans Geog Niemeyer, "The Phoenician 
Settlement at Toscanos", in The Phoenicians in Spain, pp.34-35; Manuel Pellicer Catalan, "Phoenician 
and Punic Sexi", in The Phoenicians in Spain, p.53. 
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The primary Phoenician settlement in Spain was Gades (Gadir, modern 
Cadiz).87 According to Velleius Paterculus and Strabo, the site was settled around 
1100.88 The topography of Gades suggests its main purpose as a city based around 
trade. Gades itself was a small archipelago which sheltered a bay at the mouth of the 
Guadalete River. It was located near the Guadalquivir Valley and had access to the 
rich deposits of silver, gold, tin, and copper in Huelva and the Sierra Morena.89 There 
is evidence of a number of Phoenician temples and sanctuaries attributed to 
Phoenician Gades: the famous temple of Melqart,90 another to Astarte,91 and a 
sanctuary to Ba'al-Hammon.92 Otherwise there is evidence of walls, a necropolis, and 
a later fortress. Archaeological evidence attests permanent settlement from the eighth 
century. This is echoed in the hinterland of Gades with evidence of imported 
Phoenician pottery in Tartessian and other native Spanish settlements from the mid-
eighth century.93 In addition to its location on an offshore island, it was situated so as 
to dominate trade originating in Southern Spain and monitoring all traffic passing 
through the Pillars of Heracles from the Atlantic. Its position enabled it to remain 
mostly separate from any potential troubles on the mainland while at the same time 
depending on it for its own existence. Owing to such factors, Gades remained an 
important settlement throughout antiquity.94 
Although the prominence of Gades established it as the primary Phoenician 
settlement in Spain, there is evidence of further Phoenician expansion and settlement 
elsewhere on the peninsula. Phoenician settlement on the southern and eastern coasts 
of Spain reveals a characteristic pattern. Small settlements, often only a few 
kilometres apart dotted the coastline establishing a coastal trading network being fed 
87 The name Gadir means 'fortress' (i'~ : literally a walled in place) cf. Pliny NH. IV.120; Solinus 
XXIII.12. 
88 Velleius Paterculus (1.3) claims that this event was contemporary to the Dorian invasion of Attica 
during the reign of the last Athenian king, Codrus and the archonship of his son Medon. Strabo (ll.5.5) 
claims that the Tyrians founded the colony by the order of an oracle and that it took three attempts to 
settle Gades. 
89 For a study into the region and the changing topography of Gades throughout antiquity see Aubet, 
The Phoenicians and the West, pp.223-232. 
90 Diod. XXV.1O.1, V.20.2; Strabo IllS.S; Arr.ll.16.4. 
91 Avienus OM. Ll.267-273. 
92 Strabo ll.s.3; Pliny NH.IV.120. 
93 Aubet, The Phoenicians and the West, p.230. 
94 The advantages of the site were not lost on later nations and it remained the primary Spanish 
stronghold of the Carthaginians until the foundation of Carthago Nova in 228 BC. It passed over to 
Roman rule and received Roman citizenship status under Caesar in 49 Be. It retained much of its 
Phoenician character by striking coins with Phoenician legends until the reign of Claudius and retained 
its Phoenicio-Punic language at least until the first century AD (Strabo 13.2, m.2.13-14). 
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by the hinterland.95 Phoenician settlements such as Toscanos, Malaga, and Abdera 
were established to service the Phoenician trade and communication network. Strabo 
briefly describes Phoenician settlement along the coast of Spain, claiming that Malaga 
(Malaca), Abdera (Adra) and Saxitani (Sexi) were all Phoenician settlements.96 He 
claims that Malaga was a market for the tribes of the opposite coast (North Africa) 
and had stores of salt-fish. This would suggest that there was a trade route between 
Malaga and the Phoenician settlements on the North African coast. Presumably 
fishing vessels operating in the Atlantic would supply the stores of salt-fish at such 
settlements. Otherwise the area around Malaga possessed deposits of gold, silver, and 
copper. We can see two of the primary functions of a Spanish settlement like Malaga: 
to exploit the minerals of its hinterland and to facilitate Phoenician trade and contact 
in the area. A vienus describes the settlement patterns of the Phoenicians in Southern 
Spain, which are also attested by archaeological evidence. He claims that many cities 
stood in this area of Andalusia and many Phoenicians once held these lands.97 
Phoenician settlements on the south coast had at one stage reached saturation point, a 
fact that only archaeology is reaffirming.98 
One of the characteristics of the Southern Spanish settlements was their 
topography. Primarily, in true Phoenician style, all had good access to the sea. Just as 
important was their connection to the interior. As a result we find the majority of 
settlements founded on promontories or low hills at the mouths of rivers. This 
facilitated access to the interior and the silver, gold, and copper producing areas found 
there. As in the case of Cyprus and North Africa, the Phoenician ports in Spain were 
fed by local populations (in this case Tartessian and other Spanish settlements).99 
95 See Aubet, The Phoenicians and the West, p.252f. Malaga is only 4km. from Cerro del Villar, 
Toscanos is seven kilometres from Morro de Mezquitilla which itself lies only 800m. from Chorreras. 
96 III.4.2-3. 
97 OM. L1.440, 459-460. 
98 For an overview of Phoenician settlements in Southern Spain see Aubet, The Phoenicians and the 
West, pp.249-272; Maria Eugenia Aubet Semmler, "Notes on the Economy of the Phoenician 
Settlements in Southern Spain", in The Phoenicians in Spain, pp.79-95; Moscati, The World oJ the 
Phoenicians, pp.230-242. 
99 Such a system of raw minerals (or materials) exchanged for Phoenician commodities has precedent 
in Africa. Herodotus (IV. 196) claims that the Carthaginians use a similar system with Libyans beyond 
the Pillars of Hercules. He claims the traders leave their goods on the beach and then retreat, upon 
which the local people leave a quantity of gold in exchange for this. Although the Tartessians were 
probably far more advanced culturally and socially, the idea of a straight exchange of precious metals 
for Phoenician lUXury items is apparent, see J. M: Blazquez, Tartessos y los origenes de la 
colonizacionJenicia en occidente (Salamanca 1968) passim. This is also echoed by the diffusion of 
Phoenician style artefacts into Southern Spain and non-Phoenician settlements. See Maria Eugenia 
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These populations would have been in contact with local Phoenician bases. It is 
certain that there were some Phoenician or mixed settlements of varying degree in the 
interior overseeing industry .100 These settlements were connected to those on the coast 
and therefore the sea. The Phoenician settlements in Southern Spain usually possessed 
reasonable harbours for anchorage. As these sites were situated at the mouths of 
alluvial valleys, there was room for agriculture to support coastal populations. Sites 
also generally had distinctive necropoleis and there is evidence of fortification at 
several locations. 101 Naturally, the abundance of archaeological evidence we have 
revolves around trade. This homogeneity of materials gives us a consistent 
chronological picture of Phoenician activity in the area from the eighth century. From 
the dating of necropoleis and potsherds it appears that concerted Phoenician 
settlement began during the first half of the eighth century before intensifying during 
the seventh.102 Phoenician domination of trade in coastal Spain did not last however, 
as by the mid-sixth century, many Phoenician settlements had been abandoned and 
those which survived were subsumed under Carthaginian rule within a century. 
There are a number of underlying factors behind the decline of Phoenician 
activity in the Far West. First, the kingdom of Tartessus, the supplier of Phoenician 
silver and gold for centuries collapsed during the sixth century. Although it occupied 
a wealthy region and stood in constant contact with Phoenician traders to the south (as 
well as Greeks to the northeast103), this once flourishing kingdom vanished from 
sight. 104 The demise of Tartessus more or less coincided with that of the Phoenicians' 
Aubet Semmler, "The Phoenician Impact on Tartessos: Spheres of Interaction", in The Phoenicians in 
Spain, pp.225-240. 
100 Evidence of Phoenician presence in the southern Spanish hinterland revolves primarily around the 
extraction of minerals. Tejada la Vieja, although a Tartessian settlement, has an 'urban character' with 
stone-built warehouses and ore refining facilities, see Markoe, The Phoenicians, p.184. Rio Tinto in the 
mountains of Huelva was constantly mined in antiquity and there is evidence of a small Phoenician 
settlement which has a good deal of archaeological evidence characterising it as a centre for ore 
refinement. Similar to Cyprus and Sardinia, Phoenician interests in rich mineral producing hinterlands 
would have caused them to look inland for sites for potential settlements. 
101 e.g. The site of Toscanos is positioned close to Alarcon which has been interpreted as a military 
outpost with rudimentary city walls (Niemeyer, "The Phoenician Settlement at Toscanos", pp.32-34). 
102 See Hans Georg Niemeyer, Das friihe Karthago und die phOnizische Expansion im Mittelmeerraum 
(Gottingen 1989) pp.23-33; also Aubet, The Phoenicians and the West, pp.249-257. 
103 There are several references of Greek-Tartessian contact in the literary sources. Herodotus (IV.152) 
tells of the voyage of Colaeus, a Samian who was blown off course through the Pillars of Hercules and 
landed in Tartessus. Herodotus (1.163) also claims that the Phocaeans ventured to Tartessus and 
befriended King Arganthonius who donated a considerable sum of money so that a wall could be built 
around Phocaea against the Persian threat. 
104 The decline of Tartessus in the sixth century was apparently sudden and not reported by our literary 
sources, see Ju. B. Tsirkin, "The Downfall of Tartessos and the Carthaginian Establishment on the 
Iberian Peninsula", RStudFen XXIV.2, 1996, pp.141-152. 
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presence in the area. Eventually Punic control from Carthage replaced their influence. 
This displacement of Phoenicians by Carthaginians saw a number of social and 
cultural changes in the region. The transition heralded a restructuring of the more 
frequent Phoenician coastal settlements in Southern Spain in favour of fewer larger 
centres. A number of the smaller settlements were subsequently abandoned, and 
Southern Spain became an area of Carthaginian and Greek interests. lOS 
THE BALEARIC ISLANDS 
The Balearic Islands also appear as early centres for Phoenician activity and 
settlement. Both major islands in the group attest typical forms of Phoenician 
settlement although Ibiza, and especially the main settlement of Ebusus, is the main 
focus. 106 Although the site of Carthage's first settlement in 654/3,t°7 the island 
appears originally to have been an important Phoenician foundation en route from the 
eastern Phoenician settlements to Spain and the Atlantic. The major settlement on 
Ibiza was Ebusus, which is taken from the Phoenician Ibshim (~\!l:J') meaning 'Isle of 
Pines' . 108 Diodorus claims that it was populated with barbarians of many nationalities 
but predominantly by Phoenicians. 109 Silius Italicus names the city 'Phoenician 
Ebusus', suggesting that some form of Phoenician settlement predated the 
Carthaginian. llo Archaeological evidence is evident from the mid seventh century 
onward at Sa Caleta and Puig de Vila.11l Quantities of pottery from the seventh 
century and a necropolis at Puig des Molins also attest the Phoenicians' presence. 112 
Again it is likely that Phoenician settlement on the island was considerably later than 
initial activity. Even if Carthage officially settled Ebusus in the mid-seventh century, 
Carthage was still a Phoenician city. It is not until later that we see the development 
105 See Niemeyer, Vas frilhe Karthago, pp.24-26. 
106 Basic settlement remains on and around Ibiza document Phoenician settlements on offshore islands 
or dominating harbours from headlands. The settlement around Ebusus is the most obvious, but we find 
others on islands at Tagomago and Espalmador and coastal areas of S. Antoni and Sa Caleta. For 
Mallorca see Victor M. Guerrero Ayuso, Colonizaci6n punica de Mallorca. La documentaci6n 
arqueol6gica y el contexto hist6rico (Palma 1997) pp.231-236. 
107 Diod. V.16. 
108 Diodorus names the island Pityussa (Ihtuoucrcrcx,) owing to the multitude of pines on the island. 
109 V.16.2-3. 
110 Pun. III.362. 
111 Carlos Gomez Bellard et al., La colonizacionJenicia de la isla de Ibiza (Madrid 1990) pp.173ff. 
112 Aubet, The Phoenicians and the West, pp.272-3. For a more comprehensive archaeological record of 
Phoenician settlement on the island see Gomez Bellard et al., passim. 
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of Punic culture on the island.l13 The Balearic Islands would have been vital trading 
posts in the Western Mediterranean. It gave the trade routes from Spain and the 
Atlantic direct access to Sardinia and Sicily as an alternative to the North African 
coastal route. 
The Phoenicians' presence in the Western Mediterranean was a vital aspect in 
the function of their entire 'empire'. Although they were active in Cyprus, North 
Africa, and the Central Mediterranean, their settlement network in the West brought 
them silver and gold in large quantities which funded their activities and placated 
their overlords in the East. The pattern of Phoenician settlement in the Western 
Mediterranean corresponds to that in other regions, with its networked settlements 
with good access to both sea-lanes and the interior. Despite the importance of the 
western supply of precious metals, the Phoenicians did diversify into other types of 
localised industry. The importance of fisheries in settlements such as Mogador, 
Gades, and Malaga is testament to this. Luxury items from Atlantic North Africa such 
as ivories and types of monkeys would also have been desirable, especially in the 
East. The western Phoenician settlements in Spain, Atlantic Africa, and the Balearic 
Islands were established by the eighth and seventh centuries, however, literary 
tradition has dated Phoenician contact with these regions as far back as 1100 BC. We 
have seen the Phoenician propensity to found seasonal trading ports which leave little 
or no trace today. It would seem feasible that Phoenician contact would have predated 
permanent settlement, however, its chronology can only be supposed. 
THE CENTRAL MEDITERRANEAN 
Phoenician contact with the islands in the Central Mediterranean presumably began 
early en route to the West. These islands became vital territories and ports for 
Phoenician trade and eventually settlement. Although often overshadowed by later 
Punic occupation and subsequent contact with other peoples, the Phoenicians 
established their presence on Sardinia, Sicily, and Malta to extend their influence 
throughout the area. 
113 KAI. 72, this fifth century inscription to Tanh and Rasaf-Melqart suggests the arrival of Punic 
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SARDINIA 
Phoenician contact and settlement on Sardinia appears to have begun at an early stage. 
In the foundation myth of Sardinia provided by Pausanias, we see an aetiological 
narrative according to which Sardinia was originally settled by sailors from Libya 
under Sardus, who settled alongside the native population. This was then followed by 
the Greeks under Aristaeus who failed to found a city. Pausanias then claims that 
Iberians under the command of Norax sailed to the island and founded Nora.114 
Although this account is based on legend it does provide us with some useful 
information. Sardus' surname was Heracles who was assimilated as a major 
Phoenician divinity in the West, Melqart. Norax who gave his name to the settlement 
of Nora provides a link to the western sphere of Phoenician settlement in Spain. 
Solinus also suggests such a connection when he specifically states that Norax came 
from Tartessus, which as we have seen witnessed Phoenician contact and 
settlement.115 Otherwise, Pausanias makes an interesting comment regarding the 
Phoenicians and their amicable relationship with the native Sardinians. As we have 
seen previously, the Phoenician traders and settlers used native peoples to extract 
valuable resources from the interior and also traded with them. 116 The most valuable 
literary source we possess, however, is the Nora inscription.1l7 Although brief, it has 
been dated to the ninth century BC and offers a number of valuable historical points: 
"Temple on the cape of NGR which lies in Sardinia. Praise to him. Praise to Tyre, the 
mother from Kition .... which NGR had built for PM]". Although fragmentary, the 
inscription mentions Tyre as the likely metropolis of Nora attesting another western 
Tyrian foundation. The text also mentions Kition on Cyprus which suggests contact 
with Cyprus. This is also affirmed by the presence of imported Cypriot wares on the 
island.u8 Finally there is the mention of the divinity Pumay (cf. Pygmalion). Evidence 
of this Cypriot male divinity has been found in both the West and the East, however, 
culture; also see Gomez Bellard et at. pp.183-185. 
114 Paus. X.17. For a more detailed discussion of this passage see Chp. V, ns.59-69 and text. 
115 Solinus IV.l. 
116 Sulcis and Monte Sirai were settled in a rich silver and lead producing area, while the pre-eminence 
of bronze artefacts is testament to the copper mines in the region. Later during the Punic period, the 
production of iron also increased. The policy of maintaining an amicable relationship with the native 
Sards was not adopted by the Carthaginians and the Romans. Both implemented a more rigorous rule 
over the local Sards and as a result the respective histories of both on the island were characterised by 
war and uprising. 
117 KAI. 46, ,~.h (8) ',l p III (7) ll'l n" (6) OK ,~ 0 (5) 'lll Ki1 0' (4) III l"lll:l (3) Ki1 III 'll (2) III lll' n:l (1) 
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his connection to Cyprus seems to imply direct contact with Sardinia.1l9 Other 
archaeological evidence places a settled Phoenician presence on the island from the 
eighth century.120 
The Phoenicians' settlement of Sardinia seems to have been based according 
to their standard model. Original Phoenician settlement was specifically located on 
the southern and western coasts of the island. Between CaraUs and Tharros there were 
dozens of small Phoenician emporia dominating coastal traffic and trade. In the 
subsequent centuries, Phoenicio-Punic contact with the Etruscans on mainland Italy 
also pushed their interests to the east. 121 As we have seen in Spain, many of these 
Phoenician settlements were based around rivers and therefore contact with the 
interior. Tharros was situated on a promontory and dominated the Tirso River valley 
which offered rich agricultural lands. Most of the coastal Phoenician settlements in 
Sardinia were founded on promontories or offshore islands with access to the interior 
and often with access to agricultural land. The other obvious prerequisite for a 
Phoenician settlement was a serviceable harbour. Caralis had a harbour lagoon and, 
situated at the tip of the Campidano plain, was well placed for trade with the 
interior.122 Sulcis, with its artificial isthmus had two protected harbours much like the 
topography of Tyre. Tharros also had multiple harbours suitable for trade with the 
interior as well as abroad. 123 
118 Ferruccio Barreca, La civilta fenicio-punica in Sardegna (Sassari 1986) pp.139, 270f. 
119 Ibid, p.IS1; Markoe, The Phoenicians pp.129, 177-8. 
120 It is often difficult to distinguish the pre-Punic Phoenician presence on Sardinia. Owing to the lack 
of early literary sources we are forced to rely on archaeological data. Often pre-Punic evidence is 
indistinguishable from the longer and better attested Carthaginian presence on the island. For analysis 
ofPhoenicio-Punic archaeology on Sardinia see Barreca, La civiltafenicio-punica in Sardegna; Piero 
Bartoloni, Sandro Filippo Bondi, Sabatino Moscati, La penetrazione fenicia e punica in Sardegna 
(Rome 1997); Moscari, The World of the Phoenicians pp.211-228. 
121 Phoenician interest in Etruria was based around its rich mineral potential and commercial potential 
with Etruscan ports. Rich deposits of iron, lead, and copper, much like those in Sardinia, would have 
attracted Phoenician traders. Phoenician contact with Etruria is evident from archaeological data and 
the orientalising influence on eighth century Etruscan art. Phoenician contact with Pithecussae is also 
evident during the late eighth century (see Aubet, The Phoenicians and the West, App. IV, pp.314-6; 
Moscati, ltalia Punica pp.343-346). It is possible that the Etruscans and Phoenicians had a clear 
understanding regarding territory as there is evidence suggesting an Etruscan presence on Corsica at 
least as early as the seventh or sixth century. Strong Phoenicio-Punic-Etruscan ties are evident in later 
centuries when the two combined against the Phocaean settlement of Alalia on Corsica in 535 BC and 
Hieron at Cumae in 474 Be. Both matters will be discussed further during the Carthaginian period. For 
a brief overview of Phoenicio-Etruscan relations see Enrico Acquaro, "Phoenicians and Etruscans", 
The Phoenicians, Sabatino Moscati (ed.), (New York 1999) pp.61l-617. 
122 Markoe, Phoenicians p.178. 
123 See Barreca, La civiltafenicio-punica in Sardegna, pp.15-30; Moscati, The World of the 
Phoenicians, pp.208ff. 
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During the seventh and sixth centuries a second wave of Phoenician 
settlements appears in Sardinia. Foundations like Bithya and Bosa were settled on the 
Sardinian coast extending the reach of Phoenician influence. Such settlements were 
characteristically Phoenician: with access to trade courtesy of safe harbours and 
interior rivers. During this period, however, we find Phoenician settlements appearing 
in the interior. Sites such as Othoca, Monte Sirai, Nura, and Macopsisa were 
established to consolidate Phoenician trade and contact with the interior. Monte Sirai 
appears to have been established near Sulcis and was little more than a fortified 
hilltop settlement. It would have monitored movements around the Iglesiente region 
and Campidano Plain while upholding Phoenician interest in the silver bearing and 
agricultural region it dominated.124 Its extensive doubled walls and towers, which 
dominated a narrow gate, suggest that the Phoenicians were eager to protect their 
interests in this region. 125 It also would have proved a useful outpost to ward off the 
potential Greek or Sardinian threat. 
A number of the Phoenician sites contained several common attributes. The 
Phoenician habit of constructing harbours and wharves apparent in Tyre, Carthage 
and Motya is evident in Nora and Tharros. It also appears that most of the larger 
Phoenician settlements had fortification walls. We will see the defensive importance 
of such walls at Monte Sirai, however, there is also evidence of Phoenicio-Punic walls 
at Nora, Tharros, Sulcis, and Caralis.126 There is extensive Phoenicio-Punic 
architecture evident in several of these sites. Phoenician temples similar to those 
found on Cyprus have been discovered at Tharros and Monte Sirai. 127 This is also 
emphasised with Phoenician religious iconography and evidence of topheths at a 
number ofthe sites. 
The economic value of Sardinia to the Phoenicians cannot be underestimated. 
We have seen the pattern of Phoenician settlements dotting the coastlines and how 
important the island was for contact with Italy, Sicily, Spain, the Balearic Islands, and 
North Africa. The position, natural attributes, and nature of the Phoenician 
settlements, both coastal and interior, suggest that their presence on Sardinia revolved 
124 Markoe, Phoenicians, p.l79. 
125 Moscati, The World of the Phoenicians, p.213. 
126 Barreca, La civilta fenicio-punica in Sardegna, pp.55ff. 
127 Moscati, The World of the Phoenicians, p.214; For evidence of Phoenician temples on Sardinia see 
Barreca, La civiltafenicio-punica in Sardegna, pp.107-185; Gennaro Pesce, Sardegna Punica (Nuoro 
2000) pp.105-158. 
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around the coastal contact and trade network while looking toward the interior which 
produced an abundance of valuable minable ores. Through trade originating from the 
island and surrounding areas, Sardinia remained one of the most important areas of 
Phoenician settlement and economic activity. 
SICILY 
The Phoenicians' presence on Sicily was significant not only for their own seaborne 
empire, but also for its interaction with the Greeks. Early Phoenician settlement on 
Sicily is generally poorly attested, however, Thucydides offers insight into some 
Phoenician activity: 
There were also Phoenicians living all round Sicily, occupying the headlands 
and small islands off the coast using them as emporia with the Sicels. But when the 
Hellenes began to come by sea in great numbers, they abandoned most of their 
settlements and concentrated on the towns of Motya, Soloeis, and Panormus where 
they lived together in the neighbourhood of the Elymians, partly because they relied 
on their alliance with the Elymians, partly because from here the voyage from Sicily 
to Carthage is the shortest.128 
Thucydides' account, although brief, offers us a valuable insight into the 
probable trading and settlement pattern of Phoenician Sicily. Regarding the 
chronology of the Phoenician presence on Sicily, it appears much the same as other 
areas in the Phoenician world: namely initial contact through trade before a concerted 
effort at establishing permanent foundations. It is conceivable that the Phoenicians 
were active in Sicily from ca. 1100. If present at Utica, Lixus, and Gades by this time, 
Sicily, lying en route to these western settlements is a natural port-of-call. This is 
affirmed by Thucydides, who claims that initial Phoenician settlement was restricted 
to offshore islands and promontories, which were abandoned at the arrival of Greek 
colonisation. The first Greek colonies on Sicily at Naxos, Syracuse, and Zancle were 
128 Thuc. VI.2.6, qJKOUV OE Kat <l>oiV1KEe; 1tEpt 1t(Xcrav ~EV 'tl)V L1KEAiav aKpae; 'tE E1tt 'til 8aAacr<Yf\ 
a1toAap6v'tEe; Kat 'ta E1tlKei~Eva Vllcriola E~1topiae; EVEKEV 'tile; 1tpOe; 'toue; L1KEAOUe;. E1tE10T) oE 01 
"EAAllVEe; 1tOAAot Ka'ta 8aAacrcrav E1tEcrE1tAEOV EKAt1tOV'tEe; 'ta 1tAeiro MO'tullV Kat LOAOEV'ta Kat 
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founded during the second half of the eighth century. This in itself suggests a 
Phoenician presence predating Greek colonisation and does not discount a possible 
Phoenician arrival date of 1100. Nonetheless, as we have seen in other known 
Phoenician settlements, the archaeological record does not extend further back than 
the eighth century. Most of our evidence regarding pre-Punic Phoenician settlement 
on Sicily comes from the small coastal island of Motya, which has revealed 
occupation from the later eighth century.129 Unfortunately relatively little pre-Punic 
evidence has survived from both Panormus and Soloeis (Soluntum).13o Thucydides' 
account seems to be accurate here also, as the archaeological data confirms that the 
Phoenicians settled these towns in Western Sicily around the same period as Greek 
colonisation in the east of the island: both coincide with the second half of the eighth 
century. 131 
The pattern of Phoenician settlement on Sicily resembles that in the other 
known Phoenician areas. Originally, as Thucydides claims, the Phoenicians were 
rravop~ov e:yyuc; trov 'EAUJ.1rov St)vOtK~craV1:E<; EVEI-WV'tO ~t)J.1J.1aX{1t 1:1', 1t{crt)VOl ttl 1:rov 'EAUJ.1rov Kat 
Ott EV1:EU9EV v.aX1m;ov 1tAoUV Kap)C11ocbv ktKEA,tac; U1tEXCl. 
129 The importance of Motya was considerable in the Phoenicians' activity in Western Sicily. For tbe 
foundation of the site see Gioacchino Falsone, "The Bronze Age Occupation and Phoenician 
Foundation at Motya", BIAL XXV, 1988, pp.31-53; For some evidence of the archaeological record see 
B.SJ. Isserlin and Joan du Plat Taylor, Motya, A Phoenician and Carthaginian City in Sicily (Leiden 
1974). There is evidence from the site which suggests it was a cosmopolitan trading centre during the 
Punic period and presumably the proceeding Phoenician period. The later distribution of coinage shows 
a larger variety of sources at Motya than other contemporary settlements, see Giuseppina Mammina, 
"Le presenze monetarie", Mozia, Gli scavi nella "Zona A" dell'abitato, Maria Luisa Fama (ed.), (Bari 
2002) pp.341-351. This is further testified by the considerable quantities of imported ceramics from 
Greece from the eighth century. 
130 For evidence, albeit mostly Punic see: for Panormus: Palermo Punica, Carmela Angela Di Stefano 
(dir.), (Palermo 1998) passim; Moscati, ltalia Punica, pp.106-114; for Soloeis: Moscati, Italia Punica, 
pp.115-122; Caterina Greco, "La necropoli di Solunto: problemi e prospettive", Archeologia e 
territorio (Palermo 1997) pp.25-33. 
131 It is relevant here to comment on a possible interaction between Greek and Phoenician colonial 
models. Although we have previously made admonitions about the common conception of describing 
Phoenician settlement in Greek colonial terms, on Sicily the two cultures were in close contact with 
each other. Cultural diffusion between Greeks and Phoenicians is well documented from Homeric 
times through the Orientalising period in the East and the later Phoenicio-Punic desire for a variety of 
Greek goods. Whether this extended into more mainstream social spheres as colonisation is not as 
clear. It is certain that both cultures were actively settling during this period. Comparisons between 
such basic activities as settlement are naturaL It is likely that both Phoenicians and Greeks fed off each 
other's success and possibly mistakes. Although working within a similar system, as we have 
witnessed, the basic purpose of their respective settlements was different. Phoenician settlements 
appear more superficial and less official, and geared more for the main purpose of trade. They usually 
possessed little hinterland and relied on any number of similar settlements and seaborne traffic for 
communication and basic survival. The Greeks, as we well know, established new replicas of their 
mother cities in Greece, as independent and fully functioning civic entities. The distinction between the 
two later fades during the Punic period, when under Carthage, new settlements appear as almost a 
hybrid between the two systems. Although several comparisons can be drawn between the two, the 
Phoenician and Greek settlements, at this stage at least, remain distinctive and must be treated 
accordingly. 
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content to trade with the locals (the Sicels and Elymians) while establishing 
themselves on promontories or offshore islands.132 This would have been the case for 
Phoenician trading posts, most likely throughout Sicily. As we have also seen 
elsewhere, it was not until the eighth century that the Phoenicians began to establish 
themselves permanently on coastal sites. Thucydides claims it was the onset of Greek 
colonists that saw the Phoenicians' withdrawal to the west of the island. This is 
possibly true, however, the Phoenician withdrawal to Western Sicily may have had 
other motives. Thucydides claims that from their bases on the west coast of Sicily, the 
Phoenicians had the closest route to Carthage. This would certainly have been the 
case during the seventh century and beyond when Carthage was developing into a 
major economic power in the West. During the eighth century however, Carthage was 
still basically a trading settlement. Western Sicily was a strategic and lucrative base 
for Phoenician interests. The Phoenicians were concerned with the under-developed 
Western Mediterranean, and Western Sicily was a useful position from which to 
exploit this area. From here the Phoenician traders had direct access not only to North 
Africa, but also Italy and Etruria, Sardinia, Spain, and the other western Phoenician 
settlements. 
The final aspect of Thucydides' account worth mentioning is the Phoenician 
relationship with the pre-existing Sicilians. Initially the Phoenicians traded with local 
peoples from their temporary bases. Thucydides makes specific reference to the 
Elymians, a native people who dwelt in Western Sicily. Thucydides claims that they 
lived together with the Phoenicians and shared an alliance. We have seen other 
Phoenicio-native relationships develop in Sardinia and Spain. It appears that the 
Phoenicians had a good rapport with the local population (probably based around 
mutual trading interests), which according to Thucydides resulted in an alliance. From 
other sources, it appears that Thucydides was not overstating their relationship. 
Archaeological evidence shows co-existence between the Elymians and the 
132 The locations of these original trading posts are unknown although Markoe (The Phoenicians, 
pp.175-6) suggests the islet of Vindicari above Cape Pachynos, the island of Ortygia opposite mainland 
Syracuse and finally the site of Naxos which the Greeks colonised. TJ. Dunbabin, The Western Greeks 
(London 1948) pp.326-7, believes Thermae, Mazara, and Minoa may also have been possible 
Phoenician outposts, which were deserted after the establishment of Greek colonies in their respective 
vicinities. 
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Phoenicians (and later Carthaginians). 133 Otherwise there is the account of Dorieus' 
attempt to found Heracleia at Eryx at the end of the sixth century. Herodotus claims 
that he was killed along with his followers by the Phoenicians (presumably the 
Carthaginians) and people from Segesta, the principal city of the Elymians. 134 It 
appears that Thucydides was correct in claiming that a formal alliance existed 
between the two parties, which contained some political and military clauses.135 
The three main attested Phoenician settlements in Western Sicily, Motya, 
Soloeis, and Panormus afford us the best detail of Phoenician activity in the area. 
Motya is the best attested of the three sites, settled on a small offshore island 
resembling the sites of Tyre and Gades. It had a natural harbour but its most 
prominent feature is a Punic cothon or manmade harbour similar to that at Carthage. 
Motya was a strategic trading port with access to all the vital areas of the Western 
Mediterranean. Further evidence shows that the small island (2 km. perimeter) was 
ringed with a wall dating from the sixth century. This wall was dotted with towers 
suggesting Motya was a highly prized and thus well-defended site. 136 This attitude is 
probably best highlighted by the role Motya must have played in thwarting the 
attempt of Pentathlus to found a colony at Lilybaeum ca. 580. Diodorus claims that 
Selinus and Segesta were at war. Pentathlus sided with the Greeks of Selinus. They 
were defeated and he was killed.137 Pausanias claims that it was the Phoenicians and 
the Elymians who defeated and killed Pentathlus and destroyed his colony.138 The 
Segestaeans were Elymians who were probably supported by the Phoenicio-Punic 
element at Motya.139 The settlement developed into an important Punic site during the 
sixth and fifth centuries before Dionysius of Syracuse destroyed it in 397 Be. 140 The 
133 This relationship, which Carthage later enjoyed, seems to have existed from an early period. 
Elymian settlements such as Eryx, Segesta, and Monte Polizzo show early contact between the 
Phoenicians and the Elymians. 
134 Hdt. V,46. 
135 Although several centuries later, the treaty between Carthage and Dionysius of Syracuse of 405 
(Diod.xIII.114) demonstrates a possibly legacy of this relationship. The Elymians and Sicanians are 
named alongside the Carthaginians and their original colonists on the same side. Although the presence 
of the Elymians in this treaty has been questioned, it appears as though they were active allies of 
Carthage. This is a likely continuation of an earlier relationship between the Elyrnians and the 
Phoenicians. 
136 Isserlin and du Plat Taylor, pp.3lff, 81-89. 
137 Diod. V.9. 
138 Paus. X.11.3. 
139 Pentathlus' attempt to settle at Lilybaeum would have placed a Greek wedge in the Phoenicio-Punic 
territory of Sicily. Lilybaeum (Marsala) lies only 8 km. from Motya and would have been a rival to its 
trade franchise while giving the Greeks a foothold in Western Sicily. 
140 Diod. XIV,47-53. 
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site was not repopulated. Instead the Carthaginians founded Lilybaeum nearby on 
mainland Sicily shortly thereafter. 
The site of Phoenician Soloeis has revealed relatively little detai1. 141 The main 
reason for this dearth of information was the town's destruction by Dionysius in the 
early fourth century and it subsequent relocation. 142 Originally the town stood on the 
promontory of Solunto and the adjacent plateau. However, it was then transferred to 
Monte Catalfano and fortified. 143 Much like Motya, Soloeis was a trading city. It was 
probably a Phoenician foundation datable to the mid to late seventh century as 
Thucydides states. However, after its repopUlation by the Greeks in a notably Hellenic 
style, it had a mixed Punic and Greek character evident in its material remains. 144 This 
would suggest that as at Motya, Greek and Phoenicio-Punic trade and influence was 
visible in Soloeis. 
Panormus (Palermo )145 was the final of the three Phoenician towns mentioned 
by Thucydides. We possess little literary evidence regarding the town before the wars 
against Dionysius. Originally the site was walled and stood atop a hill beside an inlet 
itself within a bay. Phoenician Panormus was designed for both defence and trade. 
Form the archaeological evidence we possess, Thucydides' dating of the foundation 
of Panormus seems to be vindicated with a necropolis at the site dating to the seventh 
century.146 What is of interest is the obvious connection Panormus had with the Greek 
colonies in Sicily. A great deal of Greek material has been discovered in the 
necropolis and throughout the site.147 It seems that like Motya and Soloeis, Panormus, 
despite being ostensibly anti-Greek, had an active and prosperous connection with a 
number of Greek colonies. Again Phoenician evidence at the site is not a true 
indication of the Phoenicians' activity, although we may assume from the evidence 
we possess that Panormus was a prosperous town and an important port for 
Phoenician traders. 
Although we have concentrated on the three Phoenician colonies as listed by 
Thucydides, this was not the limit of their contact and settlement in Western Sicily. 
141 For an overview of Phoenician remains at Soloeis see Archeologia e territorio, pp.25-11O. 
142 Diod. XIV.48.5, 78.7. 
143 Markoe, The Phoenicians, p.176. 
144 Vincenzo Tusa, "Sicily", The Phoenicians, Sabatino Moscati (ed.), (New York 1999) p.239; Valeria 
Tardo, "Ceramica d'importazione e di tradizione greca", Archeologia e territorio, pp.75-94. 
145 The name Panormus is a common Greek name for a port town: naVoPIl0t; lit. 'always fit for 
landing'. 
146 Ida Tamburello, "Rinvenimenti e storia degli scavi", in Palermo Punica, pp.107-118. 
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The Elymian centre of Eryx included an important Phoenician sanctuary of Astarte. 148 
Although an Elymian town, its connection with the goddess and the Phoenicians' 
intimacy with the Elymians suggest that it was a major Phoenician area of activity. It 
is likely that the Phoenicians also operated with other native settlements in Sicily. 
Several examples of such interaction become more apparent during the Punic period, 
which probably originated with the Phoenicians. Presumably any number of 
Phoenician coastal trading ports and interior industry towns existed in parts of Sicily, 
operating in a similar fashion to other areas of their trade empire. 
Characteristically, the Phoenicians on Sicily were originally content to trade 
with the local Sicilians from coastal or offshore bases. However, with the onset of 
Greek colonists, they adopted a more defensive approach by withdrawing to the 
western parts of Sicily. Despite Greek intrusion as a primary motive for the 
Phoenician withdrawal, we have also seen that new markets and trade routes in the 
Western Mediterranean may also have been a defining factor. It appears that despite 
Greek incursion in Sicily, the Phoenician settlements welcomed Greek commerce. 
There is considerable evidence at a number of sites suggesting lively trade between 
Phoenician and Greek merchants in Sicily. Although relegated to the west of the 
island, the Phoenicians were still able to maintain their economic activity and 
energetically settle as they did elsewhere. 
MALTA, GOZO, AND PANTELLERIA 
Phoenician activity saw them settle a number of smaller islands in the Mediterranean. 
Although Malta, Gozo, and Pantelleria were limited in size with little hinterland and 
fewer resources, they were important strategic settlements in the Phoenician seaborne 
empire. 149 
Malta appears to have been the most prominent of the three islands for 
Phoenician settlement. It appears that Phoenician settlement can be dated from at least 
the eighth century, although like other areas considered, initial contact may have 
begun earlier. Diodorus provides us with a useful account of Phoenician settlement on 
Malta: 
147 For an overview of material at Panormus see Palermo Punica, pp.267-438. 
148 Diod. lV.78; Dion. Hal. 1.53. 
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The first (island) is called Melite (Malta), which lies 800 stades from Syracuse 
and has many harbours and advantages for its inhabitants and its inhabitants are 
blessed in their possessions. It has craftsmen skilled in every type of trade, the most 
important of which is linen, which is very sheer and soft .. . The island is a colony of the 
Phoenicians, who extending their trade into the western ocean, used this safe refuge 
as it had harbours and lay in the open sea. This is the reason why the inhabitants, as 
they received assistance in many respects from merchants, grew quickly in this way of 
life and grew in renown.150 
From this description we are able to assume a number of reasons as to why the 
Phoenicians settled Malta. Primarily their attraction revolved around its position 
midway between North Africa and Sicily. It contained several good harbours which 
we know attracted Phoenician settlement. Diodorus then comments on the prevalence 
of workshops on Malta, especially in the linen industry.151 Finally he mentions the 
growth of the population owing to the island's obvious importance as a port on the 
primary east-west Mediterranean trade route. 
Phoenician settlement on Malta appears to have been primarily coastal. 
Nonetheless, there appears to have been a push into the interior with at least one city 
founded probably under the modern site of Rabat-Medina. 152 Ptolemy lists four major 
Phoenician foundations on the island: Melite (Rabat-Medina), Chersonesus (possibly 
near Valleta), the shrine of Hera (Tas Silg) and the shrine of Heracles (Melqart).153 
Although these centres remain to a certain extent unknown, Phoenician settlement on 
Malta seems to have been similar to that on Cyprus. Initial coastal settlements, 
revolving around its natural harbours would have appeared first. These would have 
149 Malta has only two small alluvial plains resulting in limited agricultural development and possesses 
few mineral resources. 
150 Diod. V.12.2-3, lCal. 1tpm'tll !lEV EO"ttOl 'h 1tpoO"ayopEUO!lEV MEAttll 'troY LupalCouO"rov <X1tExouO"a 
O"'taoiou~ ro~ 6lC'talCoO"iou~ Kal. Atf..LEva~ f..LEV EXEt 1tOAAOUS lCal. otacp6pou~ 'tatS EuxPllO"'tiat~ 'tou~ oE 
Ka'totlCOuv'tas 'tat~ ouO"iat~ Euoaif..Lova~. 'tEXVtta~ 'tE yap EXEt 1tav'tooa1tOUS 'tat~ EpyaO"iat~ 
Kpa'tiO"'tou~ oE 'tOU~ 680vta 1totouv'ta~ 'tn 'tE AE1t'to'tlltt lCal. 'tn !laAalCo'tlltt Ota1tpE1til ... EO"'tt 0' 'h 
vilO"o~ aU'tll <I>OtViKOlV &1totKo~ Ot 'tatS E!lOpiatS Ota'teivoV'tE~ !lEXpt 'tou Ka'ta 'tTJV OUO"tV mKEaVOU 
Ka'taqmyTJV dxov 'tau'tllv EUAi!lEVOV 01)O"av Kal. lCEtf..LEVllv 1tEAayiav. Ot' llV ai'tiav oi Ka'tOtlCOuV'tE~ 
aU'tTJv EUXPllO"'toUf..LEVOt Ka'ta 1tOAAa OHX 'tOU~ Ef..L1tOpOUS 'taxu 'tOt~ 'tE ~iot~ <XVEOpaf..L0V Kal. 'tat~ 
06~atS llu~~811O"av. 
151 Cic. Verr. II.4.46. Cicero claims that Verres had turned the island into a factory for the weaving of 
women's dresses. 
152 Moscati, The World of the Phoenicians p.189. 
153 Ptol. IV.3. See Moscati, Italia Punica, pp.329ff, especially on Tas Silg and Valleta. 
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utilised seaborne trade, which was compelled to land on the island owing to its 
location. Phoenician extension into the hinterland certainly would have depended on 
industry. Malta was famous for its linen and there is also evidence of an olive 
industry. These interior settlements would have shifted their wares to the coast where 
it would have been exported. 
Material remains from Phoenician Malta show evidence dating from the eighth 
century with considerable Phoenician, Greek, and Egyptian remains. 154 Such items 
demonstrate the importance of the island as a port on the main trading routes from the 
East. There is also a distinct intermingling of native and Phoenician wares. This 
would suggest that the Phoenicians, just as they had in their other settlements, 
maintained an amicable and prosperous relationship with the local population of 
Malta. i55 There is some evidence of the Phoenician religious legacy on the island. The 
sanctuary of Hera as mentioned by Ptolemy and later by Cicero during the Verrine 
orations has been identified with that of Tanit. 156 There is evidence of a cult of 
Melqalt from the sanctuary mentioned by Ptolemy and a Greek-Phoenician bilingual 
inscription.Is7 
The growth of Phoenician Malta, as suggested by Diodorus, seems to have 
been considerable. Stephanus of Byzantium claims that the North African city of 
Acholla was in fact settled by the Maltese.15s Moscati suggests that it may have been 
the Phoenicio-Maltese who settled Gozo and Pantelleria.159 The possibility of 
secondary Phoenician foundations would imply that Malta prospered, buoyed by trade 
and the wealth generated by its own industries. 160 
Malta's position and abundance of natural harbours certainly justify the 
interest it held for Phoenician settlers and merchants. Despite its lack of natural 
154 The Phoenician trade in eastern wares is apparent on both Malta and Gozo with considerable 
remains of Egyptian items. For a detailed reeord see Gunther Holbl, Agyptisches Kulturgut auf den 
Inseln Malta und Gozo in phOnikischer und punischer Zeit (Wien 1989). 
155 Markoe, The Phoenicians, p.180. 
156 Cic. Verr. IIA.46. Cicero deseribes Verres pilfering an ancient temple of Juno. He claims that it 
dated baek to the days of the Punic Wars when the temple would have been dedicated to Tanit andlor 
Astarte and that Verres stole ivories with Punie inscriptions, which were given to Masinissa. 
151 KAI. 47. This inseription refers to "Our master Melqart, master from Tyre". This inscription, 
although dated to the second century Be, may imply that Tyre was also the metropolis of Phoenician 
Malta. 
158 Steph. Byz. S.v. "AXoI.M. 
159 Moscati, The World of the Phoenicians, p.189. 
160 If Phoenician Malta founded subsequent colonies, its growth must have been meteorie. If we 
consider Carthage's rapid rise, it only spawned first colony of Ibiza in 654/3 about 160 years after it 
was settled. 
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resources, which highlighted other Phoenician areas of settlement, it offered a central 
trade station on the direct route from the east with direct access to Sicily, North 
Africa, and the Western Mediterranean. 
The island of Gozo (Gaulos) to the northwest of Malta was another haven for 
Phoenician traders in the Central Mediterranean. Diodorus, in almost a footnote to his 
description of Phoenician Malta, offers this brief description: 
After this island there is another which has the name of Gaulos, lying in the 
sea with well situated harbours, a Phoenician coiony.161 
Once more we find a small island in the middle of the sea with good harbours 
colonised by the Phoenicians. The name Gozo possibly is Phoenician in origin with 
reference to a maritime theme.162 Phoenician contact and settlement was probably 
contemporary to that of Malta although there is a paucity of literary and 
archaeological evidence. 
The archaeological record of settlement on Gozo shows two major 
settlements, on the coast on the Bay of Mgarr and inland at modern Victoria. This is 
similar to the Phoenician model in Malta and Cyprus of coastal settlements being fed 
by inland centres of industry. Like Malta, Gozo shared similar primary industries of 
linen and olive oil production. Similar to Malta, the Phoenician remains on Gozo 
show a strong eastern influence.163 The religious artefacts are also similar to those 
found on Malta. 164 
Gozo was a small, but nonetheless important island which the Phoenicians 
utilised in their trade 'empire' at sea. It offered a safe haven and port to trade to 
merchants from both east and west. Although it always was secondary in importance 
to its larger neighbour Malta, the Phoenicians and later Carthaginians actively used it 
as a strategic port. 
The final Phoenician settlement in this group, Pantelleria, is unfortunately one 
of the poorest attested. Most of the scant evidence we have comes from the island's 
161 Diod. V.I2.4, !lE't'a BE 't'a:u't'llv 't'~v vllQ"6v EQ"'t'tV £'t'epa 't'1)V !lEV 1tpoQ"rryopiav ~xo,\)Q"a fauA-o-;, 
ltEA-aria oe Kat A-t!lEQ"tV EUKatpOt-;, KEKOQ"!lll!lEvll <POtv{KO)V O:1totKO-;'. 
162 Aubet, The Phoenicians and the West, p.174, believes it refers to a type of round mercantile ship 
(golah). 
163 Rolbl, Agyptisches Kulturgut auf den Inseln Malta und Gozo, passim. 
164 Moscati, Italia Punica, pp.340-342. 
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Punic and Roman phases. At least one major settlement is attested, possibly 
Phoenician in origin, but definitely Punic at some stage with an acropolis on the hills 
of St. Teresa and St. Marco.165 We are only able to assume a date of Phoenician 
contact and settlement of the island. Given its proximity to Utica, Carthage, and Malta 
and its position en route to the old Phoenician colonies in the Far West we can assume 
that if the Phoenicians followed their normal practice: contact with the island at the 
turn of the first millennium predating later possible settlement. Once again there is 
evidence of eastern influences, albeit from later stages.166 Evidence suggests a pre-
existing population would not have deterred Phoenician interests in the island and the 
latter probably would have utilised and incorporated them into their trading strategies. 
Pantelleria was certainly a prime candidate for Phoenician activity. The island 
lay en route from the Phoenician settlements in Tunisia and those in West Sicily. It 
was a perfect way station for merchants on their journeys. Pseudo-Scylax claims that 
it lay only one day's sail from Lilybaeum.167 It is a similar distance from the island to 
the shores of North Africa rendering it indispensable for a seafaring people reluctant 
to sail at night. 
These islands of the Mid-Mediterranean demonstrate several similar attributes 
when we consider Phoenician interest and settlement patterns.168 Their natural 
geography limited their exploitation but their strategic mid-sea locations in were 
utilised on major trade routes. This is proved by Diodorus' brief testimony describing 
their natural harbours as offering safe havens for Phoenician merchants. Although the 
Phoenician presence on Malta, Gozo, and Pantelleria is likely to have been 
permanent, the nature of these islands as stopovers with no real mineral resources or 
abundance of native popUlations limited expansion and possible settlement. Also 
Malta and Gozo at least had specialised industries (linen and olive oil production), 
which supplemented and enhanced trade in the islands. Certainly the Phoenicians 
would have shown interest in these islands from an early stage as strategic ports 
165 Ibid. p.136. 
166 Ibid. pp.13 7 -138, this is particularly evident in its taste for Greek materials, especially pottery. 
167 GGM. 1. 111, p.89 (ed. Muller). 
168 It is possible that the Phoenicians may have already utilised some of the islands which the 
Carthaginians later used in this way. Although they reveal Httle material evidence of the Phoenicians' 
presence, we should not rule them out as possible sites of Phoenician settlement. The Carthaginians lost 
the battle of the Aegates Islands at the end of the First Punic War. Presumably there was an established 
Carthaginian presence on the island. There are several other islands in the vicinity which may have 
seen early Phoenicio-Punic traffic based on trade routes. Ustica may have been utilised as a stop 
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between the rapidly developing areas of North Africa and Sicily on the one hand, and 
east to Cyprus and the Levantine coast on the other. 
The Phoenicians deserved their title as the merchants of the ancient world. 
This description does not do them full justice, however, as they were also active 
settlers and explorers. This image is enhanced when we consider that their cities such 
as Tyre, Sidon, and Byblos were mostly dominated and besieged by foreign invaders 
from the second millennium BC onwards. Nonetheless the Phoenicians still practised 
their skill as navigators and traders and so generated wealth. It was this skill the 
Egyptians, Hittites, Assyrians, and Persians all recognised and utilised. Thus the 
Phoenician cities were able to continue to trade freely abroad. Besides such an 
understanding, the Phoenicians were soon operating beyond the control of eastern 
overlords in the undeveloped areas of the Central and Western Mediterranean. 
In all the areas of Phoenician settlement abroad, there was a distinctive system 
of settlement often lasting several centuries.169 Phoenician exploration and trade 
predated permanent settlement. Often temporary or seasonal bases were established 
by the various cities for basic barter with native peoples. This system was probably 
established around 1100 BC and would explain the gap in traditional founding dates 
of Utica, Gades, and Lixus with their archaeological records beginning in the eighth 
century. These bases were often settled on promontories or offshore islands offering 
the Phoenicians both safe anchorage and defence. During the eighth century it appears 
that the Phoenicians became permanent settlers. Initially the Phoenician settlers 
established towns in coastal areas, usually with a good harbour and defensive site and, 
for the sake of trade, often dominating a river mouth or valley. This enabled them to 
further their interests both inland and to the sea. The Phoenicians settled areas which 
would specifically benefit their seaborne activities. As a result we find numerous 
settlements which are strategically placed on trade routes. Carthage was probably the 
best example of this, dominating the Central Mediterranean at its narrowest point. 
between Sardinia and Sicily. The same may be said of Cercina to the south. Even the Lipari Islands 
north of Sicily have an island bearing a familiar name, Phoenicusa. 
169 This pattern, although lengthy, is not unusual if we were to consider the process of Greek 
colonisation beginning in the eighth century. The Greeks had a standard system of finding a suitable 
site (coastal with good harbours, defences, and resources). An oracle was approached and an oikist 
chosen. Once the colonists were chosen and their land allotted, then the colony would be settled as a 
replica of its metropolis with similar religious and political institutions and social and cultural 
characteristics. 
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Otherwise we see foundations such as Gades, Malta, Motya, and those on the Balearic 
Islands all located to attract trade. The coastal system of Phoenician settlements also 
echoes their dependency on seaborne traffic. In areas such as Spain, Sardinia, and 
North Africa we find a networked system of Phoenician settlements often only a day's 
journey apart (often less) to facilitate coastal shipping. After Phoenician settlers were 
established in a certain area and an amicable relationship with the native population 
obtained, the settlers' interests occasionally turned toward the interior. In Sardinia, 
Cyprus, Malta, and Sicily the Phoenician settlers established interior settlements. 
Often these towns were based on both local industry and trade. By utilising such 
bases, the Phoenician merchants would have been better equipped for trade with local 
populations and increased local production of commodities. 
The Phoenicians were able to expand rapidly throughout the entire 
Mediterranean and beyond with their cities on the Levantine coast and their 
settlements abroad flourishing from trade. One of the key factors to such success was 
the wealth generated from the Phoenician monopoly of mineral extraction. Without 
the wealth from Spanish silver or Cypriot copper, the Phoenicians would certainly not 
have been able to bankroll their policy of expansion and widespread colonisation and 
trade. The Phoenicians quickly discovered the locations of important mineral areas 
throughout the Mediterranean. By extracting valuable minerals (often by utilising 
native labour) the Phoenician merchants made long sea journeys financially viable 
and could more easily afford the tribute imposed by foreign rulers in the east. 
The Phoenicians' ability to expand, trade, and settle beyond the realms of their 
contemporaries enabled them to prosper as merchants while not reverting to 
aggressive military tactics to maintain dominance. They were able to trade freely 
(especially in the West) untouched until the gradual Greek encroachments beginning 
in the eighth century. Phoenician settlements often grew wealthy and powerful with 
their greatest legacy being their colony of Carthage, which was later to eclipse their 
influence and assume their function. Their model of expansion was a template for 
Carthage which followed in the footsteps of the Phoenicians in many ways. With such 
a legacy the Phoenicians gave Carthage a number of the successful methods with 
which it would build and maintain its empire. 
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II. CARTHAGE 
The legend of the foundation of Carthage was a common tale in the ancient world. 
Elissa (or Dido according to Virgil) set out from Tyre ca. 814 BC and founded the 
colony of Carthage on a cape in the Gulf of Tunis in modern Tunisia. Although the 
subject of the foundation of Carthage has been dealt with extensively by modern, and 
to a certain degree, ancient authors, there are still various points of interest regarding 
the foundation and the initial years of the city's development. Unfortunately, there is 
no surviving literary evidence covering the period between the foundation of Carthage 
in 814 and the settlement of the colony of Ebusus on Ibiza in 654/3. The early stages 
of the development of Carthage, its empire and activities, and the Punic culture it 
spawned are somewhat mysterious. This period like several major Carthaginian social 
and cultural characteristics remain poorly understood. However, based on the 
scattered evidence we possess, it is possible to identify several major characteristics 
regarding Carthage which help place it at the centre of this discussion. 
CARTHAGE: ITS FOUNDATION AND CONTEXT 
The foundation story of Elissa fleeing from Tyre and her megalomaniac brother, 
Pygmalion has survived in some detail. Ironically, not because it told the story of the 
foundation of Carthage, but primarily because it was in essence a dramatic tale. Justin 
(abridging Pompeius Trogus) provides us with the best account detailing events 
leading up to, during, and after the foundation of Carthage.! In Tyre, Elissa married 
Acerbas (her uncle and the priest of Heracles i.e. Melqart), whom Pygmalion 
murdered on account of the former's reputed wealth. Elissa fooled Pygmalion and 
I Justin XVII13-6. Justin wrote during the fourth century AD epitormsing the accounts of Pompeius 
Trogus who had composed his history during the time of Augustus. There are several other accounts 
presumably evolving from a single original. The earliest allusion comes from Timaeus in the third 
century BC (FHG. I, F. 23 (ed. Milller). Virgil gives a lyric description of the flight of Dido and her 
foundation of the Byrsa at the end of the first century BC (Aen. 1.335-370). Silius Italicus (ca. 25-
lOOAD) likewise retells the story of Elissa and the foundation of Carthage as well as several other 
Phoenician colonies in the Western Mediterranean (Pun. DOff., m.231, also see VIII.45f., VII.200f.). 
Appian also provides a solid narrative of the foundation of Carthage, ironically as a prologue to its 
destruction (Pun. 1). Solinus (ca. 200 AD) mentions Elissa and her foundation of Carthage (XXVII.9-
10). Otherwise there are only brief allusions to the story of Elissa in e.g. Tertullian (Ap. 50.5). 
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departed from Tyre with a retinue of disaffected Tyrian nobles? The party stopped 
briefly on Cyprus where they received favourable omens from the priest of Jupiter 
(Ba'al Hammon). There they seized 80 maidens (from the temple of Venus i.e. 
Astarte) as wives. They reached Africa where Elissa supposedly purchased the land 
known as the Byrsa by cutting an ox hide in long strips and encircling the citadel.3 
Having settled Carthage, Elissa came under pressure to marry the king of the 
neighbouring Maxitani, Hiarbus, under the threat of war. Rather than remarrying or 
fighting a native war, she took her own life atop a funeral pyre. By doing so she 
removed herself as any symbol of animosity between Carthage and the neighbouring 
tribes thus ensuring the protection and survival of her new city. 
On the surface it appears that the story of the flight of Elissa is little more than 
a foundation legend along the lines of the Greek mode1.4 Nonetheless, there are 
certain elements of the story which are germane to the Phoenician (and later 
Carthaginian) practice of colonisation. For instance, the saga of Pygmalion and Elissa 
was based in Tyre, which as we have seen was the dominant Phoenician colonising 
2 Justin XVIIIA. Elissa pretended to move into the house of Pygmalion. The latter was excited 
believing she would bring the reputed wealth of Acerbas with her. However, she had her attendants fill 
sandbags and tossed them into the sea as if they were filled with gold as an offering to her dead 
husband. She then escaped with the real treasure aboard. 
3 The exact etymology of Byrsa is questionable. The name Byrsa has traditionally been interpreted as 
'Bull's hide': p{)pO'a (Hdt. m.1l0), Lat. Bursa. The etymological connection between the foundation 
myth of Carthage and this interpretation needs no explanation. The other theory as mentioned by Soren 
et at., suggests it may be a corrupted Greek form of the Phoenician word for fortress, David Soren, 
Aicha Ben Abed Ben Khader, and Hedi Slim, Carthage, Uncovering the Mysteries and Splendours of 
Ancient Tunisia (New York 1990) p.19. The Hebrew equivalent attests a root 'fortify', 1n::l (bhr, 
meaning "make inaccessible"). Unfortunately the name of the Byrsa in either Phoenician or later Punic 
remains unattested. 
4 The story of Elissa draws in several aspects of a Greek foundation myth. We find Elissa, driven by 
compulsion from her homeland with a band of outcasts. Although she has no divine approval of her 
purpose (usually granted by an oracle), she obtains it along the way: first, in Cyprus, with the priest of 
Jupiter offering himself and his family to her which was considered a good omen for their journey 
(XVllI.5). Then when digging the foundations on the Byrsa the new Carthaginians found an ox's head 
which suggested they would be laborious but enslaved, they removed it and found a horse's head which 
meant they would be warlike and powerful (XVIII.5). The figure of Elissa as oikist is also important as 
we find her replicating the political system of Tyre (a monarchy) and becoming queen. According to 
Justin (XVIII.6), even after her death Elissa was worshipped as a goddess so long as Carthage 
remained unconquered. The coneept of an oikist eult was common among many Greek eolonies from 
the eighth until the fourth century. Even with regard to the division of chora (by the demarcation of the 
Byrsa) we can refer to Greek colonies with carefully divided personal and public (i.e. sacred) 
allotments of land. If Carthage was founded in 814 BC, it is only slightly older than the first identified 
Greek colony of Pithecussae (ca. 775) and therefore more or less contemporary with the greater 
movement in Greek society. For similar Greek foundation stories see the Theran colony of Cyrene 
under Battus est. 630 (Hdt. IV. 148-159). Also for the foundation of a colony by a disaffected royal, see 
the two failed attempts by the Spartan prinee, Dorieus to found colonies at Cinyps in Libya and 
Herae1eia in Western Sieily (ironically they were both destroyed by the Carthaginians) at the end of the 
sixth century (Hdt. V.42-48). 
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state, especially in the West. 5 The party stopped in Cyprus, which by the ninth century 
was in contact with the Phoenicians, if not already containing some Phoenician 
colonies. From Cyprus, the foundation story gives no indication that the party stopped 
anywhere until it reached North Africa, although it must have been a journey lasting 
several months.6 When Elissa and her party arrived in North Africa they purchased a 
small precinct of land from the local tribes. The story of Hiarbus and the hostile tribe 
of the Maxitani is most likely legend (as is Elissa's subsequent death). Nonetheless, 
both anecdotes presuppose that the Phoenician colonists did interact with local 
peoples, as was the case in numerous other Phoenician colonies. 
THE SITE OF CARTHAGE 
The site of Carthage is characteristic of a Phoenician colony. Originally, as both the 
legend and the geographical position illustrate, the Byrsa was a citadel of rock 
dominating a strategic coastline with a natural harbour. The Phoenician settlers 
occupied this defensible headland with good access to the sea until, with the 
establishment of a settled population, they were able to expand their territory in the 
interior and along the coast. The concept of chara was present in Carthage already at 
the time of its foundation although it naturally increased over time. The establishment 
of the six pagi, or territories around Carthage, which most likely consisted of the later 
Roman province, reflected the core Carthaginian territory during its height.7 However, 
the Byrsa was the original territory of Carthage and thus the centre of the city and the 
5 The situation leading to the flight of Elissa was probably not an unusual event in the proceedings of 
the Tyrian royal house. All accounts of Elissa/Dido portray her as a tragic heroine who lost her beloved 
husband and was forced from her home. It appears, however, that political intrigue and palace coups 
were common in the Tyrian and Israelite royal houses during the ninth century. Elissa's own great-aunt 
was the notorious Biblical figure Jezebel (2 Kings 9:30-37). When we look closely at the story, her 
journey appears to be a planned action when we consider that Elissa was escaping with a great deal of 
money and a number of Tyrian nobles in support. It may be that Elissa was not the tragic figure 
originally thought, but rather a displaced royal who had backed the wrong side in a palace coup. See 
Soren et al., pp.23-25. 
6 The Phoenicians had been sailing from the Levantine coast to the Western Mediterranean and beyond 
as early as 1100. It is fair to assume that Phoenician traders and explorers would have had an 
established network of friendly ports on the main east-west shipping lanes. 
7 These territories are known as The Great Plains (the middle Medjerda Valley), Thusca (based west of 
Hadrumentum), Muxsi (the Upper Medjerda Valley around Utica), Zugei (to the southwest of 
Carthage), Cape Bon, and Byzacena (south of Hadrumentum). See lA. Ilevbare, Carthage, Rome, and 
the Berbers (Ibadan 1980) p.2l. 
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subsequent empire.8 This original chara was ironically mirrored during the city's last 
few decades when the stipulation of the peace treaty following the defeat of the 
Carthaginians after the Second Punic War dictated that they should hold no towns nor 
conduct military operations beyond 'the Phoenician trenches'.9 Even during his war 
against Carthage, the Numidian king, Masinissa claimed that Carthage had possessed 
too much territory in North Africa, referring to the original purchase of the 
Carthaginian chara of the Byrsa.10 
The natural topography of Carthage would certainly have attracted both 
Phoenician and Greek colonists. From a strategic point of view, Carthage had the 
benefit of dominating the Gulf of Tunis and in doing so, a great deal of the trade 
flowing from the Western Mediterranean to the East. As we have already seen, there 
was a Phoenician presence as well as established trade routes in many areas of the 
Western Mediterranean by the ninth century. The nascent city of Carthage grew 
rapidly owing to the high volume of trade passing through the area from the 
Phoenician settlements in the West and from the Phoenicians, Greeks, and Egyptians 
in the East. To profit from this maritime nature, Carthage had an excellent harbour, 
which by later periods could in fact be closed from the sea for the purpose of 
defence. ll Otherwise Carthage was later famous for its cathan or artificial harbour. 
The Phoenician practice of constructing such harbours was not limited to Carthage 
with several important cities constructing a cathan to increase their capability for 
8 The image of the Byrsa as the original centre of Carthage is obvious at the time of its fall in 146. 
Appian (Pun. 130-132) narrates the final scene of Carthage with the walls breached, the population 
captured, and the remnants of Carthaginian resistance besieged atop the Byrsa in the temple of 
Asclepius (assimilated as Eshmoun in the Phoenicio-Punic pantheon). Its defensible attributes must 
have been impressive as Appian claims that the garrison commander, Hasdrubal along with 900 Roman 
deserters defended the temple with ease for a long time owing to the high and precipitous nature of its 
site (o8ev eUllap&~ ad EJ.U:XxoVto lm{nep OVt~ oAiyot oux to u"'o~ tOU teilEVoUC; leat to 
O:nolePTtIlVoV). Appian then adds that they were only defeated through exhaustion and hunger, further 
suggesting a long siege. 
9 App. Pun. 32, 54, 59. 
10 App. Pun. 67, Masinissa claimed that the Carthaginian territory had once belonged to himself (i.e. 
native Berbers). Livy (XXXIV.62) states Masinissa claimed the Carthaginians had no right to their 
territory in North Africa. Masinissa made much of the Carthaginians' being immigrants to the land and 
only legally purchasing the Byrsa. He also claimed that they expanded their territory by violence and 
without right. The land under question known as Emporia (coastal towns such as Lesser Syrtis and 
Leptis Magna) was often a point of dispute (according to Livy) between the Carthaginians and the 
Numidians. The idea of the Carthaginians occupying land Berber land which had been taken by 
conquest is emphasised by another of Masinissa's demands prior to the outbreak of the Third Punic 
War. He claimed the territory known as 'the big fields' and the country belonging to the fifty towns 
known as Tysca (App. Pun. 68). Presumably this was land in the interior which Carthage had captured 
along with a number of Berber towns. Regarding the nature of Carthaginian territory in North Africa 
with reference to Berber settlements see Chp. VII, ns.26-36 and text. 
11 App. Pun. 96. 
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seaborne traffic. 12 The cothon at Carthage was by far the biggest and best equipped. 
Appian claims that during the Third Punic War it housed shipyards and 220 ShipS.13 
Although maritime trade was the mainstay of the Carthaginian economy, its 
climate was excellent for agriculture. With the later expansion in North Africa 
beginning in the sixth century, Carthage was able to develop a powerful agricultural 
base in its hinterland. From the scant literary evidence we possess, it appears that the 
Carthaginians developed a high and diverse level of agliculture. The best description 
is preserved by Diodorus describing the Carthaginian hinterland during the invasion 
of Agathoc1es in 310 BC: 
The intervening country, through which it was necessary for them to march, 
was divided into gardens and plantations of many types, since many streams of water 
were led in small channels and irrigated every part. There were also country houses 
one after another, constructed in luxurious fashion and covered with stucco, which 
represented the wealth of the people who possessed them. The farm buildings were 
filled with everything that was needed for enjoyment, seeing that the inhabitants in a 
long period of peace had amassed an abundant variety of products. Part of the land 
was planted with vines, and part grew olives and was also planted thickly with other 
varieties of fruit-bearing trees. On each side herds of cattle and flocks of sheep 
pastured on the plain, and the neighbouring meadows were filled with grazing horses. 
In general there was a diverse prosperity in the region, since the leading 
Carthaginians had established their private estates and had beautified them with their 
wealth for their enjoyment.14 
12 Other prominent Phoenicio-Punic sites with a cothon include Tyre and Motya. 
13 Lib. 96; Strabo also gives a description of the cothon although he claims it housed 120 decked ships 
during this period (XVII.3.14). Archaeological evidence has revealed it was shallow and paved 
suggesting a considerable feat of engineering. See Excavations at Carthage: The British Mission, Vol. 
II.I, H.R. Hurst et al. (eds.), (Oxford 1994) Chps. II-III. 
14 XX. 8.3-4,n 3' avu ~ecrov xropa 3t' ~~ ~v avaYKa'iov 1tOP6tJSl1Vat 31EtATjl1;'to K1'j1tEtat~ Kat 
1tav'totat~ <p\)'tOtJPY{at~ 1COAArov U3U'tOlV 8tOlX6'tEtJllevOlV Kat 1to:v'ta 't61tov Up36tJ6v'tOlV. UypolKtat 't6 
O"UVEXet~ U1tl1P:X;ov oh:030Ila'i~ 1COA'I)'tEAecrt Kat KOVtUllacrt Ota1tE1tOVl1lleVat Kat 'tOY 'trov K6K'tTj~eVOlV 
a'lhu~ 3taO'TJllaivotJcrat 1tAOU'tOV. eY6J.l.oV 8' ai. IlEV £1taUAE~ 1tO:V'tOlV trov 1tpOC; U1t6AatJ(HV cbs, (Xv 'trov 
f:vXOlptOlV EV dptWTI 1tOAtJxPovicp 't6STjcratJplK6'tOlV Y6VVl11l0:'trov u<p9oviav. il3E xropa illlEV TtV 
ull1t6A6<ptJto~ il M EAato<popo~ Kat trov aAAOlV 'trov Kap1t11l0lv 8ev3prov UVU1tA60l~, £1tt SU't6pa OE 
llePl1 'to 1t6(){OV EVellOVt areAat Kat 1tot~vat Kat 'tu 1tATjcr{OV !tATj <pOp~U30lV l1CTCOlv EYEIlE. 
KaS6A.otJ oE TCav'tOta ttC; ev 'tol~ 't61tot~ 6u8atllOVta trov Em<pav6cr'tO:tOlV Kap;mooviOlV 
3tnATj<p0'tOlV tu~ K'tncrEtC; Kat to'i~ 1tAOU'totC; 1te<ptAOKaAllKO'tOlV 1tPO~ U1tOAatJcrtV. 
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From such a description it is clear that by the end of the fourth century wealthy 
landholders who produced a variety of crops and pastured land were farming a 
considerable amount of land. Again this image struck a chord with later Roman 
writers wishing to develop a similar aristocratic system. Cato certainly agreed with 
such a system of land division and cUltivation.15 Probably the best example of the 
developed nature of Carthaginian agriculture and its subsequent influence in Rome 
comes from the Carthaginian Mago who compiled a 28-book treatise on agriculture. 16 
The Roman senate apparently commissioned a translation of this work into Latin.17 
Columella names him as Mago rusticationis parens and gives him pride of place 
among a number of other Punic writers on agriculture.18 Such an admission is further 
testament to the high level of Carthaginian agriculture, as such a literary genre could 
only exist in a rich and flourishing agricultural society. It is possible that such praise 
was due to the Roman development of several agricultural techniques which have 
similarities to Carthaginian models. One was the latifundium, or large slave-run 
estate, which began to appear in Rome from the third century BC.19 The agricultural 
15 This is reminiscent of Cato's description of an ideal farm of one hundred iugera in Rome during the 
second century BC: "If you should ask me what the best kind of farm, I should say: a hundred iugera of 
land comprising all sorts of soils, aud in a good situation; a vineyard comes first if it produces wine of a 
good quality in good supply; second, a watered garden; third, an osier-bed; fourth, an olive yard; fifth, 
a meadow; sixth, grain land; seventh, a wood lot; eighth, an arbustum; ninth, a mast grove''. Praedium 
quod primum siet, si me rogabis, sic dicam: de omnibus argris optimoque loco iugera agri centum, 
vinea est prima, si vino bono et multo est, secunda loco hortus inriguus, tertia salictum, quarto oletum, 
quinto pratum, sexto campusjrumentarius, septima silva caedua, octavo arbustum, nona glalldaria 
silva, Agr. 1.7 (cf. Varro Rust. 17). 
16 Mago probably lived during the third century BC. His treatise was used by Columella during the first 
century AD and Varro during the first century Be. 
17 Columella De Re Rust. 1.1.13. He also states that this work was translated by Dionysius of Utica, 
1.1.10. 
18 De Re Rust. 1.1.13, 11.6. 
19 It appears as though the Carthaginians first introduced a system similar to the latifulldia of Rome. 
There are several examples of large numbers of slaves in North Africa, presumably working on farms. 
Hanna attempted to rouse large numbers of slaves during his fai.1ed coup in ca. 342 (Justin XXIA.6). A 
similar revolt in 396 also saw slaves liberated and bearing arms (Diad XIV.77.3). In 307 after the 
defeat of the remaining Greek forces once led by Agathoeles, the Carthaginians rounded up the 
survivors, bound them, and forced them to redevelop the countryside they had ravaged (Diod. 
XX.69.S). During the Roman invasion led by Manlius and Regulus in 256 BC, the Romans supposedly 
freed a large number of slaves in the countryside who were Romans captured in previous encounters 
(Zonar. VllI.13). In the Second Punic War, Scipio and Masinissa freed a number of Roman prisoners 
who were working in the fields (App. Lib. 15). Even during the Third Punic War, the Carthaginian 
senate decreed that all slaves were to be freed and armed for the final defence of Carthage (App. Pun. 
93). The Carthaginians' policy of capturing slaves for menia1labour and the value they placed on such 
manpower is suggested elsewhere. After Agathocles had seized a Carthaginian camp in 310, the Greeks 
discovered some 20000 sets of manaeles with which the Carthaginians, hopeful of victory, intended to 
enslave the Greeks, before presumably putting them to work (Diod. XX.13.2). After the end of the 
Second Punic War, one of the terms offered to Carthage was, among other items such as flocks and 
herds, was that the Carthaginians were permitted to keep their slaves (Polyb. XV.18.I). Such an 
admission suggests a considerable quantity of slaves in North Africa. From such examples it becomes 
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potential of Carthage was one of the primary reasons why it later became the capital 
for the Roman province of Africa. 
Carthage was not founded owing to privation as the Elissa story would 
suggest. The site was carefully chosen along the Phoenician model of settlement. Its 
natural geography was perfect for the establishment of a maritime city. The 
Phoenicians knew about the site, especially when we consider that the neighbouring 
city of Utica was founded prior to Carthage. Even in the foundation story of Elissa the 
Uticans sent a delegation which welcomed the colonists as kin.2o Carthage was also 
settled at a distance from Utica which suggests some forethought. At a distance of 
only 60 stades (11 km.), the two sites were only distanced by a single day's travel, 
which is a common Phoenician settlement model. 21 As we have already seen in areas 
such as Spain and Sardinia, this method of networked coastal ports was a favoured 
system of Phoenician trade. Even around Carthage and Utica we find settlements such 
as Hadrumentum, Gabes, Sabratha, Leptis Magna, and Oea all within a relatively 
short distance from each other. 
THE PHOENICIAN LEGACY AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF PUNIC 
CARTHAGE 
As with the Greek system of colonial expansion, we find the direct duplication of 
several cultural, social, and political systems between the Phoenician metropolis of 
Tyre and its colony Carthage. We have already looked at the process and nature of 
Phoenician settlement throughout the Mediterranean. Carthage, despite growing more 
powerful than any eastern or western Phoenician holding, was originally founded in a 
similar manner for the same purpose. The Phoenicians had, by the end of the ninth 
century, established an efficient settlement practice rivalling that of the Greeks. 
Testament to this system was the name of Carthage itself (Qart-Hadasat). As we have 
clear that Carthage maintained a considerable number of slaves working its hinterland. As it is apparent 
that the Libyan farmers could not maintain a working population of slaves, it must have been the 
Carthaginians who utilised such labour. It is possible that the Romans were influenced by this system. 
Otherwise similar social circumstances saw them with a comparable manpower surplus, and the 
Romans developed a parallel agricultural system. It is natural that the Romans would turn to the 
Carthaginians for agricultural expertise as they had operated a similar system for some time. 
20 Justin XVIII. 5, the Uticans gave Elissa and the Tyrians presents as relatives. 
21 App. Pun. 75. 
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aheady seen, like the foundation on Cyprus bearing the same name,22 Carthage simply 
means 'new town' (much like Neapolis in Greek). The use of such a name on more 
than one occasion implies that Carthage too was designed as a systematised colonial 
foundation and named accordingly. 
THE PHOENICIAN DECLINE AND THE RISE OF CARTHAGE 
The full development of Carthage into the capital of an empire is usually dated to the 
fifth century. There has been some discussion as to the exact reason behind this shift. 
The motivating factor seems to be the decline of the Phoenician cities' presence in the 
West. It is possible that a long period of heavy-handed treatment at the hands of the 
Assyrians during the seventh century and increasing tribute damaged the Phoenicians' 
ability to operate freely. This was only a harbinger of worse to come under the Neo-
Babylonians. A thirteen-year siege under Nebuchadnezzar from 585-573/2 saw Tyre 
reduced and its independence removed.23 With this blow at least one large Phoenician 
city was now severed from its settlements, and Carthage was left as the largest 
surviving Phoenician centre in the West. The decline of the Phoenician cities' activity 
in the West may also have hastened the fall of Tartessus in Spain. Phoenicia lost one 
of the oldest and most lucrative trade relationships during the mid-sixth century. The 
exact nature of this collapse is unreported and is only suggested by the decline of 
well-established trading patterns in Southern Spain.24 There are also reports of native 
Spanish uprisings during this period, which threatened Gades and led to the arrival of 
an official Carthaginian presence in Spain.25 Nevertheless, the decline of the 
Phoenician cities' influence saw Carthage eventually supersede them as the major 
political and mercantile power in the West. 
The expansion of Carthage during this period heralded a number of distinctive 
changes. We can associate changes in government, art, and religion which 
demonstrate a social and cultural development from the old Phoenician model to the 
new Punic society. The nature of Carthage as an autonomous state began early. This 
was marked by its foundation of Ebusus on Ibiza in 654/3.26 Although mentioned in 
22 See Chp. I, ns.33-37 and text. 
23 Joseph. Ap. 1.156. 
24 Aubet, The Phoenicians and the West, p.344. 
25 Justin XLIV.4; Polyb. II.1.5; Macrob. Sat. I.20.12. 
26 Diod. V.16.2. 
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passing, and carried out under the supervision of Phoenicians, this event was a 
defining moment in the development of Carthage. It is an event from which we are 
able to discern Carthage ceasing to act as a standard settlement of Tyre, but more like 
a fully functioning and independent state. It then only was a short matter of time 
before Carthage began to introduce its own foreign policies. This is attested by the 
attempt to stop the founding of Massilia ca. 60027 and then the victory over the 
Phocaeans off Alalia ca. 535. Following this Carthage embarked on numerous 
military campaigns aimed primarily at increasing its territory. Only a century later 
Carthage was the dominant and most aggressive state in the Western Mediterranean. 
Initially, many aspects of Phoenician society would have continued as they did 
in the East. Carthage, however, grew quickly and eventually struck out on its own 
path. The early nature of Carthage is difficult to determine because of the dearth of 
both literary, and to a lesser extent, archaeological evidence. Nonetheless, several 
assumptions can be made on the evidence that remains so as to construct an early 
picture of the development of Carthage from the Phoenician colony we have 
witnessed into an independent and powerful Punic state. 
THE SEA AND TRADE 
The obvious Phoenician characteristic that was inherited by the Carthaginians was an 
affiliation with the sea. In accordance with its purpose as a Phoenician settlement, 
Carthage was primarily a maritime city even if it developed strong territorial, 
agricultural, and mercantile ties throughout North Africa and other provinces. 
Carthaginian maritime activities always closely resemble those of the Phoenicians 
even if Carthage's later political ambitions often cloud this. Although the 
Carthaginians superseded the Phoenicians in the Central and Western Mediterranean, 
little was altered. The busy emporia in Spain, Sardinia, Sicily, and North Africa still 
operated in a similar manner. Much like the Phoenicians before them, the 
Carthaginians remained interested in, and relied heavily on trade. 
This connection is highlighted by the various literary accounts which exhibit 
the similar traits of Phoenician and Carthaginian maritime activities. Polybius, for 
instance claims that the Carthaginians forbade the Romans from sailing west of the 
27 Thuc. I.13.6. 
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'Fair Promontory' so that they would not become familiar with the prosperous 
Carthaginian emporia in the Western Mediterranean.28 There was a distinctive attitude 
of exclusivity in several areas under Phoenicio-Punic control. Examples of this 
attitude were the destruction of the attempted colony of Pentathlus at Lilybaeum29 and 
that of Dorieus at Cinyps in Libya and then at Herac1eia in Eryx in Western Sicily.3D 
These tactics were also used with mixed success against other Greek states. At Alalia 
in ca. 535, a combined Carthaginian and Etruscan fleet forced the Phocaean 
settlement on Corsica to be abandoned.31 This was later followed by a defeat at the 
hands of Hieron in 474 at Cumae, when the two powers again attempted to maintain 
exclusive rights in the Tyrrhenian Sea.32 The tactics of the Carthaginians are echoed 
by the earlier descriptions of Phoenicians as pirates and brigands of the sea. Homer 
characterises the Phoenicians as untrustworthy rouges who profit by piracy and 
kidnapping at sea.33 Herodotus also narrates the Phoenicians' underhanded tactics at 
sea.34 Although piracy was by no means uncommon in antiquity, the Phoenicians and 
Carthaginians were notorious for such activity, albeit mostly through loathing Greek 
and Roman eyes. The activities of the Carthaginians in the West were earlier 
foreshadowed by the Phoenicians who also would have wanted to protect the value of 
their western trade 'empire' by excluding others completely and therefore leaving 
them ignorant of the area and its wealth?5 
An unusual aspect regarding the Carthaginians' trade, which they presumably 
inherited from the Phoenicians, was their lack of a standardised currency. The earliest 
Phoenician coinage was struck by Tyre in the middle of the fifth century, only after 
contact with Persia and more intense contact with the Greeks.36 It appears that 
Carthage did not adopt coinage until the end of the fifth century. No non-Greek 
28 III.23. This is dated to 509/8 BC as part of the first treaty between Rome and Carthage. Polybius is 
not more specific regarding the exact location of the 'Fair Promontory' , but it is either Cape Farina or 
Cape Bon, see Chp. VI, n.36. 
29 Diod. V.9; Paus. X.ll.2, this attempt is dated to ca. 580. 
30 Hdt. V,42ff. 
31 Hdt. 1.163-167. 
32 See Chp. VI, ns.29-32 and text. 
33 Ody. XIV.288f., XV,415, 455. 
34 Herodotus tells of the Phoenician capture of 10 (1.1); the oracles in Ammon and Dodona were 
established by women captured and sold by Phoenicians (II.54-57). 
35 Strabo XVII. 1. 19, quotes Eratosthenes who claims that the Carthaginians drown any foreigners they 
catch sailing to Sardinia or the Pillars or Heracles. Other similar examples describe the Phoenicians and 
Carthaginians murdering any intruders to exclusive islands (Arist. Mir. Ausc. 84, 132). An interesting 
comparison survives in Cicero (De Rep. II.9) claiming that the Phoenicians and Etruscans were 
seafaring peoples but the former was interested in trade while the latter was concerned with piracy. 
36 See Harden, pp.166-167. 
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western settlement had struck coins previously, and Carthage only adopted currency 
to cope with contact from the East, in particular with the western Greeks. Before this 
system was established the Phoenicians and Carthaginians relied on barter as the main 
method of trade in what was a massive and apparently efficient trade empire. 
Herodotus gives a description of Carthaginian bartering in Atlantic North Africa. He 
claims that the Carthaginian traders would leave their goods on the shore so that the 
natives would leave quantities of gold in exchange. It seems that quite often the 
process would take several attempts before both parties were satisfied that the trade 
was fair.37 Although this example deals with trade with one specific group of people, 
the basic system of barter is present. From the accounts of Pseudo-Scylax it appears 
that the Phoenicians practised a similar method of barter with a group of West African 
people whom he calls Ethiopians.38 Surely this method of trade was established by the 
Phoenicians and simply adopted and continued by the Carthaginians. 
GOVERNMENT 
The basic form of the Carthaginian government and social order has survived through 
a variety of ancient sources39 (although mostly through the description of Aristotle40). 
Originally Carthage would most likely have possessed the social and political system 
of Tyre. Tyre was a monarchy from an early period. There is some suggestion, 
however, that it did possess an aristocracy.41 A similar system seems to have been 
37Hdt. IV.196. 
38 GGM. 1. 112, p.93 (ed. Milller) 
39 There are still major gaps in our knowledge of the Carthaginian constitution which even 
comparatively generous sources such as Aristotle and Polybius omit. Certain aspects of the 
Carthaginian system of government will be touched upon during this discussion, which does not, 
however, intend to be an exhaustive study. For material regarding the Carthaginian constitution see 
Gsell, HAAN II, Part II, Chp. I; Werner Huss, Geschichte der Karthager, Chp. XXX; Huss, "Probleme 
der karthagischen Verfassung", in Karthago, Huss (ed.), pp.239-261; Warmington, pp.1l8-124; Gilbert 
and Colette Charles-Picard, Daily life in Carthage, pp.59-102. For related military aspects see Walter 
Ameling, Karthago, Chps. II-Ill 
40 Pol. II.8, 1272b-1273b. 
41 There is considerable evidence suggesting the presence of an aristocracy in Tyre. The idea of 
priesthoods as quasi-political offices is an obvious allusion. ill the Elissa story we see that Pygmalion 
was king, and the important priesthood of Melqart went to his uncle, Acerbas (Justin XVIlIA). Elissa 
meanwhile left with supporters who were, according to Justin's latinised account, senators in Tyre. The 
nature of the political scene on the Levantine coast with several city-states intermarrying at the royal 
and presumably the aristocratic level. The idea of aristocrats ruling Tyre is less obvious during the 
early period. We do see however, the institution of local judges governing the city under Neo-
Babylonian rule during the sixth century (Joseph. Ap. 1157). 
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established in Carthage. Elissa (if there is any truth in her story) became queen.42 
Aristotle in fact claims that Carthage once possessed a monarchy ('tyranny' is the 
actual word he uses) which was replaced by an aristocracyY At any rate, any putative 
monarchy in Carthage did not last. 44 It is possible that the displaced senators from 
Tyre and the elite merchant class assumed the role of the aristocracy and therefore the 
senate in Carthage. If Tyrian nobles did not emigrate, presumably wealthy merchants 
would have quickly assumed the role of aristocrats in Carthage. Aristotle also 
suggests such a possibility when he claims that unlike other states, Carthage did not 
forbid its 'magistrates' from conducting business.45 It is probable that the Tyrian 
aristocracy's wealth was based on trade and was the likely basis of wealth for the 
Carthaginian aristocracy. Although there is evidence to suggest that aristocratic 
wealth diversified into such areas as agriculture and industry, trade remained the main 
income of Carthage and therefore determined its optimacy. It is possible that Carthage 
initially adopted a similar constitution to that of Tyre before, as we will see, 
developing its own systems of government. This is understandable, as Carthage was 
not a breakaway foundation of Tyre, but developed under its supervision and 
maintained close ties with its metropolis. 
The development of a distinctive Carthaginian government becomes evident 
during the fifth century. The major source regarding the Carthaginian process of 
government is Aristotle who wrote during the fourth century.46 Aristotle claims that 
the Carthaginians are very successful at managing their political affairs and possess 
good institutions indicating a well-constructed constitution comparable to that of 
Sparta and Crete.47 In the fifth century we see for the first time two elected consular 
positions called suffetes.4S It appears that this office functioned similarly to the Roman 
consulship. Unlike Roman consuls, however, the suffetes did not possess automatic 
imperium, but separate Carthaginian generals were appointed for non-defined periods 
42 Duris of Samos, F.Gr.Hist. 76, FA, tells of the King of Kition, Pumiathon during the fourth century 
Be. As we know, Kition was a Tyrian colony, and as we should expect retained the monarchical 
system of its mother city. 
43 Pol. V.lO.3, 1316a. 
44 Often foreign reporters took the leading individual of state for a king. Herodotus (VII. 165) for 
example claims that Hamilcar was king of Carthage when he was defeated at Himera. For arguments 
that such a view was indeed justified (after a fashion) see Ameling, Karthago, pp. 67-71, who argues 
that the 'kingship' in Carthage was eventually limited to military (and sacral) functions. 
45 Pol. Y.1O.4, 1316b. 
46 Pol. II.8, 1272b-1273b. 
47 Pol. II.8.1, 1272b, 1(a.lnOAAa 't&v 'te'taYllevffiv EXCl nap' aU'tolC;; 1(aA&,;. This is echoed by 
Eratosthenes whom Strabo quotes as saying: KapX118ovlo'llc;; OU'tffi ea'l)llaO"t&c;; nOAl'tc'llOIl£VO'llc;;, 104.9. 
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depending on circumstance.49 There was an executive body identifiable with the 
Roman senate, which was most likely based on a qualification of wealth. Although 
later reform attempted to distribute political power more evenly, the Carthaginian 
constitution remained plutocratic in nature. Aristotle reaffirms this by stating that the 
Carthaginians chose their rulers from not only the best but also the wealthiest men.50 
Aristotle compares many of Carthage's institutions to those of Sparta. He attempts to 
demonstrate that the Carthaginian system was a mixed constitution in the manner 
Polybius later describes that of the Romans.51 Gschnitzer more recently has been able 
to demonstrate several connections between prominent aspects of the Carthaginian 
government and that of Rome, Sparta, and Athens.52 Unfortunately the majority of 
sources regarding the Carthaginian constitution stems from Greek and Roman authors 
who attempted to rationalise it to their readers. By doing so they define it in Greek 
and Roman political terms and do not express the Carthaginians' view of their own 
constitution and political institutions. 
The expansion of Carthaginian territory in North Africa and abroad during the 
sixth and fifth centuries saw a marked change in the wealth base of the Carthaginian 
aristocracy and was partly responsible for the change of political climate. The 
Carthaginian aristocracy was hitherto based on trade, but with more land available, 
the aristocrats developed agricultural and industrial estates. By the fifth century, 
revenue flowing into the treasury, like the aristocracy, was mixed: trade still 
dominated the Carthaginian economy but agriculture and other industry was rapidly 
developing into a prosperous and lucrative income. 
Probably the best indication of a new political ideology in Carthage during the 
fifth century was the beginning of more aggressive expansion. The later sixth and fifth 
centuries heralded the first major foreign interventions in which Carthage expressed a 
more active and aggressive character. Although many aspects remained relatively 
unchanged there was a decisive increase in active Carthaginian policy abroad. This is 
48 Aristotle refers to the suffetes as kings comparing them to the Spartan kings. 
49 The best example of this is Hannibal's possession of what would equate to imperium for many years 
during the Second Punic War. It appears that Carthaginian generals were appointed from the ranks of 
the aristocracy but for specific campaigns. Unlike Roman consuls, they were not bound by office. 
50 Pol. 118.6, 1273a. 
51 Polyb. VI.l1-18. 
52 Fritz Gschnitzer, "Phoinikisch-kartagisches Verfassungsdenken", Anftinge politischen Denkens in 
der Antike (Munich 1993) pp.187-198. 
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evident in both diplomatic and military actions, which would largely distinguish the 
nature of Carthage from their Phoenician predecessors. 
RELIGION 
A major social influence brought from Tyre to Carthage was religion. In Greek 
society, transporting fire from the hearth of the primary temple of the metropolis 
symbolically represented a colony's cultural origins. The duplication of religious cults 
between metropolis and colony in a Phoenician context appears to have been carried 
out in a similar fashion. The main divinity worshipped in Tyre was Melqart. Owing to 
this association, Carthage also kept a strong connection with this deity. The 
Carthaginians produced a tithe to the temple of Melq art in Tyre for several centuries 
after the foundation of the city.53 It was only halted during the fourth century when 
Diodorus states that the Carthaginians were becoming so prosperous that the tithe was 
becoming too expensive.54 Nonetheless, Melqart and his cult retained its importance 
in Carthage as elsewhere in the West for several centuries in Punic society as it had 
done in Phoenician society.55 
The other primary divinity adopted by the Carthaginians from Tyre was Ba'al 
Hammon. Assimilated as Cronos in Greek religion, he was the primary divinity of the 
Phoenician pantheon. He retained this status in Carthage at least until the fifth century 
when the female deity Tanit eclipsed his primary cult status. Nevertheless the figure 
of Ba'al Hammon retained his importance in Carthage despite his relegation to 
secondary status. There are numerous inscriptions from Carthage and other Punic 
territories which attest his continued importance.56 Otherwise his imagery is prevalent 
53 Polyb. XXXI.12.12. 
54 Diod. XX.14.1-2. 
55 There are several epigraphic texts which attest the presence of Melqart in Carthage between the 
fourth and second centuries BC, e.g. KAI. 86; Ibiza in the fifth century e.g. KAI. 72; and Malta in the 
second century e.g. KAI. 47. The main cult of Melqart in the West was at Gades, see Aubet, The 
Phoenicians and the West, pp.257ff. 
56 A number of these inscriptions (especially after the fifth century) are dedicated primarily to Tanit but 
name Ba'al Hammon directly after suggesting only a slightly inferior, but nonetheless secondary status, 
KAI. 79, 1~i1 Sl)~S l1~S, Sl)~ lEl mnS n~iS, "To the Lady Tanit, face of Ba'al and to the Lord Ba'al 
Hammon". Other examples attest the worship of Ba' al Hammon under Punic influence in Malta (KAI. 
61); on Sicily (KAI. 63); on Sardinia (KAI. 64); and even a Punic cult in Phocaean Massilia. There are 
also the accounts of Harnilcar in 480 sacrificing victims for favourable omens during the Battle of 
Himera, presumably to Ba'al Hammon. He then flung himself on the flames when his army was 
defeated as a type of symbolic sacrificial victim according to Herodotus (VII. 167) - though for a 
different interpretation see Ameling, Karthago, p.60. This is echoed in 406 by Himilcar on Sicily when 
63 
on funerary stelae from the topheth in Carthage before the spread of the cult of 
Tanit.57 Because of the Greek and Roman assimilation of Ba'al Hammon as their own 
figures of Cronos and Saturn respectively, there are numerous literary examples of his 
worship in Carthage. Coupled with this was his role of benefactor from the 
Phoenician and Carthaginian practice of molech, or ritual child sacrifice, which was 
universally abhorred by Greeks and Romans alike. 58 Despite the eventual prominence 
of the cult of Tanit, the importance of Ba' al Hammon remained strong as a 
Phoenician and Punic deity throughout the history of Carthage. 
It appears that several other Phoenician cults were also transported to Carthage 
and established in the new settlement. The prominence of Astarte in the East certainly 
would have seen her cult status observed throughout the Phoenician and therefore 
Punic world. There is evidence of her worship alongside Tanit in the third century in 
Carthage. 59 The cult centre of Eryx in Western Sicily is also evidence of her continued 
worship during Punic times. The sanctuary, although attached to an Elymian 
settlement, was both Phoenician and Punic before a Roman cult centre following the 
First Punic War.60 Eshmoun also probably had some prominence in Carthage 
considering the location of his temple on the Byrsa. Appian claims that this is where 
the last Carthaginian resistance took place. The temple was elevated and presumably 
of considerable size.61 Appian also notes that it was the richest and most renowned on 
the Byrsa, which is striking when we consider it probably stood alongside similar 
temples to more prominent deities such as Tanit and Ba'al Hammon.62 Deities such as 
he sacrificed a young boy to Cronos (Diod. XIII.86.3); and, from Canaan, by the Moabite king 
Mesha' 's sacrifice of his own son in order to obtain divine help in a desperate moment during a war (2 
Kings 3:27). 
57 Shelby Brown, Late Carthaginian Child Sacrifice (Sheffield 1991) Chp. IV. 
58 The best example of this practice to honour Ba'al Hammon is described by Diodorus (XX.14A-7). 
The Carthaginians blamed their bad fortune of 310 BC at the hands of Agathocles to irreverence 
committed against Ba'al Hammon through lack of sacrifice. They atoned for their previous religious 
negligence by sacrificing 200 noble children to a brazen effigy of the god in Carthage. Otherwise we 
see Greek authors such as Cleitarchus (Schol. Plato Rep. 337a), Dionysius of Halicarnassus (1.38), and 
Plutarch (De Super. 171 c-d) all mention the human sacrifice to Cronos. Several Roman authors also 
criticise this practice of sacrificing humans to Saturn: e.g. Augustine (De civ. D. VIlA) and Quintus 
Ennius (P. 4). 
59 KAI. 81. 
60 Polyb. 1.55.6-7. The Romans captured and occupied Eryx and the sanctuary of Venus (Astarte) in 
248, before losing it to Hamilcar Barca. However, it fell to them again with the rest of Western Sicily. 
Diodorus gives an insightful description of the cult of Eryx, its use, and importance to Elymians, 
Phoenicians, Carthaginians, and finally Romans (IV.83). 
61 Pun. 130. The cult of Eshmoun was present in the Punic pantheon and throughout the Punic world. 
See P. Xella, "Aspects du culte d'Eshmoun a Carthage", Histoire et archeologie de l'Afrique du Nord 
(Paris 1990) Vol. I, pp.131-139. 
62 Pun. 130, 't60E yap ~v 'to iEPOV EV (h:po1t6AEt ~aA10''ta 'trov {fAArov Emq>ave<; Kat 1tAOUO'lOV. 
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Resef and Anat, which were prominent in Phoenicia, are so far unattested but may 
have been a part of the original Phoenician pantheon at Carthage.63 Otherwise a deity 
identified in Greek sources as Poseidon appears in a number of texts as important to 
both Phoenicians and Carthaginians.64 
The best indication of the Carthaginians' adopting the ways of Tyre, and 
indeed of the Phoenicians as a whole, was their continuation of Phoenician religious 
practices: namely human sacrifice. This practice earned the Carthaginians as much 
animosity from the Greeks and Romans as it had once the Phoenicians. In the East 
several Biblical citations criticise the Phoenicians' practice of sacrificing humans, in 
particular children to Ba'a1.65 The Carthaginians continued this grisly rite to Ba'al 
Hammon, Tanit, and Melqart.66 
It is interesting that Phoenician religious practice was a fundamental 
characteristic of Carthage, but was also to act as an indicator of a shift from original 
Phoenician culture to distinctive Punic culture. This change was heralded by the 
introduction and eventual dominance of the female deity, Tanit. By the fifth century, 
the figure of Tanit had assumed the role of primary divinity in the Punic West. She 
did not represent the entire Phoenicio-Punic pantheon however, but evolved to 
become the primary divinity as the consort of Ba'al Hammon. It appears her creation 
and meteoric rise in Carthage was due to the changing nature of Carthaginian society. 
The once Phoenician Carthage had developed into an ethnically diverse centre, 
subject to influence from, and intermarriage with native North African cultures, and 
through trade with Greeks, Etruscans, and other Western Mediterranean peoples. The 
figure of Tanit seems to be a hybrid of a fertility deity and 'mother goddess'. Her 
name is possibly Libyan in origin67 and would explain her syncretic adoption by Punic 
Carthage as a new state deity common to all. 68 
63 For a brief overview of Phoenician divinities see Harden, Chp. VII; Moscati, The World of the 
Phoenicians, Chp. III. 
64 There appears to be a connection between the worship of Poseidon and North Africa. It seems logical 
that such a seafaring people would adopt a maritime divinity. A good example of this occurs in 406, 
when Hamilcar drowned cattle in honour of Poseidon (Diod. XIII.86.3). Another is the so-called 
temple of Poseidon established by Hanno during his periplus (GGM. 1. 4, p.3 (ed. Muller). See Mh. 
Fantar, Le dieu de la mer chez les Pheniciens et les Puniques (Rome 1977) pp.27-42. 
65 e.g. Jer. 18:4; 1 Kings 18:16-40; 2 Kings 10:18-27, 16:3, 17:16-17. 
66 Plut. De superstit. 171C-D; Pliny NH. XXXV1.39. 
67 Gilbert and Colette Charles Picard, Carthage - A survey of Punic history and culture from its birth to 
its final tragedy, pp.151-154. The Picards offer several possible hypotheses on the origins of Tanit. One 
possibility is that she was based on the eastern goddess Asherat, but the Carthaginian Tanit was 
distinguished from any in the East. There is some evidence to suggest that the figure of Tanit existed in 
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There are various explanations as to why Tanit assumed the role of primary 
divinity in the Punic world. Her possible Libyan nature appears to link her strongly to 
the native Berbers, who had mingled with the original Phoenician settlers and traders 
to help create Punic culture. By the fifth century, Punic settlements in such places as 
Western Sicily and Sardinia had been in regular contact with the Greek settlements of 
Sicily and Italy. The fertility association of Tanit to certain aspects of Demeter is a 
possible hint that Tanit was a hybrid of diverse theological creation. This is 
emphasised by the fact that cults of Demeter and Core were present in Carthage 
especially after the fifth century when there was constant contact with Greek Sicily.69 
This type of divinity seems a popular choice in Punic society. Another idea, which 
may explain the adoption of the goddess in Carthage, is that it was a more socio-
politically motivated than theological shift. Changes in Carthage's political structure 
may have triggered such a major theological shift.70 
The adoption of Tanit as the primary Punic divinity was widespread. To make 
her figure identifiable to the new Punic empire she was modelled and worshiped in 
the traditional Phoenician manner. This is best demonstrated by her role as the 
primary recipient of molech sacrifices. Her imagery dominates topheth stelae and 
inscriptions in Carthage from the fifth century. Her association with child sacrifice is 
Phoenicia, however, her role was not as prominent as it was in Punic Carthage and the examples of her 
presence there postdate those in the West, Robert R. Stieglitz, "Die Gottin Tanit im Orient", Antike 
Welt XXI.2, 1990, pp.106-109. 
68 The adoption of Tanit as the primary deity in Carthage was probably a result of a steady growth of 
her popularity throughout Carthage and its territory. There is the possibility that her prominence was 
encouraged as a policy of social cohesion. The concept of a state-deity was well understood in the 
Greek system of colonisation. Often a colony would consist of several distinct ethnic groups with 
different social and cultural practices. This could lead to division and stasis among rival factions in a 
new colony. One of the best examples of such civil strife among colonists was Gela, which was settled 
by Cretans and Rhodians ca. 690. Civil discord was only diffused by the introduction of Demeter as a 
common cult figure (Hdt. VII. 153). In Thurii, a mixed colony of mostly Athenians and Peloponnesians, 
stasis erupted regarding who was the actual founder of the city. It was only resolved when a delegation 
sent to Delphi returned claiming that Apollo himself was the founder (Diod. XII.35.3). In Amphipolis, 
another Athenian colony with a mixture of settlers, the oikist Hagnon tried to unite all under a common 
cultic identity by returning the supposed bones of the Homeric hero Rhessus (Polyaenus VI.53). Also 
in Heracleia Trachinia, a Spartan colony with a mixed population, there appears to have been an effort 
for establishing Heracles as a common cult figure to all. 
69 Marfa Jose Pena, "El culto a Demeter y Core en Cartago. Aspectos iconognificos", Faventia 18.1, 
1996, pp.39-55. There is evidence of the Carthaginians worshipping the two deities as early as the first 
part of the fourth century (Diod. XN.77.5). 
70 Such a radical move to implement a new divinity for political gain and consolidation is unusual but 
not unheard of in the ancient world. The Egyptian divinity Serapis was used by Augustus to help 
implement Roman rule in Ptolemaic Egypt. Some may say the same regarding Constantine and his 
adoption of Christianity in the fourth century AD. 
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not limited to Carthage, but has appeared in several other areas of Phoenicio-Punic 
settlement. 71 
The adoption of Tanit in the Punic world is difficult to describe in detail, as 
her evolution went hand in hand with the greater social and political developments of 
the sixth and fifth centuries. Her role is important as it signified that there was a 
distinct difference between the old Phoenician and new Punic culture. Her exact 
ancestry is difficult to trace owing to several possible influences and motives toward 
her creation and implementation. What seems likely is that Tanit was worshipped as a 
Phoenician-type divinity, but possessed several aspects both influenced by and 
endearing her to the ethnic diversity of Carthage and its empire. Tanit was a creation 
of the development of Punic culture and in turn part of its development. Her presence 
in the Punic world heralded the change from the long-standing Phoenician culture to 
the new Punic culture of the West. 
THE PEOPLE OF CARTHAGE 
One common aspect of Phoenician colonies was their connection and often amicable 
interaction with the native populations. Nowhere is this more evident and dynamic 
than in Carthage. In the case of Carthage, the Phoenician settlers under Libyan and 
other influence formed a distinct Punic culture and society. Although we are 
constantly hindered by a scarcity of written evidence, the new Punic identity of 
Carthage quickly evolved from the original Phoenician culture. 
It appears that a Carthaginian identity quickly developed in Carthage and 
eventually its surrounding territories. This becomes evident in 654/3, when Diodorus 
reports the Carthaginians founded Ebusus on Ibiza. He reports that although the 
islands are filled with barbarians, the Phoenicians preponderate.72 It is interesting that 
Diodorus, certainly copying Timaeus, distinguishes the Phoenicians and 
71 Although the figure of Tanit would primarily have been identified as Carthaginian, it is also present 
in areas of North Africa, Herodian (V.6.4) claims that the statue of Caelestis in Carthage was held in 
high regard throughout North Africa. There is also evidence of her presence on Malta (Moscati, World 
of the Phoenicians, pp.193-4) and Sardinia (Barreca, La civiltafenicio-punica in Sardegna, Chp. IV, 
passim). 
72 V.16.3, KU1:OlKO\)(H (5' U'll'tnv ~&p~Upot 1tuvoarmt 1tAEtO''tOl oe <POiVtKES. 
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Carthaginians as two separate ethnic groups only 160 years after Carthage was 
founded.73 
It may appear that a Punic and therefore Carthaginian people was developing 
as a homogenous group, but this was not the case. The Carthaginians were a 
distinctive majority in the city but not the surrounding areas. By the mid-fifth century, 
one's identity as a Carthaginian rather than a Phoenician or in fact a Libyphoenician 
was more recognisable. This shift is best attested by Dio Chrysostom who claims "and 
the Carthaginians Hanno (son of Hamilcar) made Libyans instead of Tyrians and 
forced them to live in Libya instead of in Phoenicia". 74 Citizens of Carthage, like the 
Romans in Central Italy, dominated subsidiary peoples and were the dominant group 
in immediate civic centres. This cosmopolitan environment naturally increased with 
Carthaginian expansion. Evidence of ethnic diversity of Carthage includes the social 
conflicts throughout its history. By the fifth century, Carthage and its growing 
hinterland were a mix of different nationalities. In the city and its surrounding 
agricultural regions there was a large slave population most likely of mixed origins.75 
During the mid-fourth century, Hanno the Great attempted a revolution by enrolling 
the support of these urban slaves as well as African subjects and a Mauritanian 
chieftain.76 Hanno' s attempt at installing himself as tyrant failed and he was executed. 
Although he failed, Hanno obviously had an insight into the size and diversity of the 
slave popUlation in Carthage. Evidently he misread their loyalties, but the attempt 
itself suggests a large ethnic slave popUlation in the city.77 
Another distinct class in Carthage at various times was mercenaries. Carthage 
was famous for its reliance on and constant financial ability to afford foreign 
73 During the mid-seventh century there was probably very little which could distinguish Carthaginian 
from Phoenician. Although Carthage is named as the founder of Ebusus, it was still a Phoenician city. 
There were likely developments underway but at this stage Carthage was still recognisably Phoenician. 
Unfortunately this early period of Carthaginian history is not covered well by Timaeus and he offers 
few points of comparison. He distinguishes the Phoenicians and he Carthaginians when discussing a 
mysterious island in the Atlantic probably during the sixth or fifth century (V. 20. 3-4). The next 
chronological event in his account is the invasion of Sicily in 480. This takes place in Book XI when 
Diodorus shifts in sources from Timaeus to Ephorus. There is generally marked difference between the 
identification of Carthaginians and Phoenicians during his accounts thereafter. 
74 Or. XXV. 7, KapXlloovlouC; OE I1ev "Avvrov I1ev uv'tt Tuptrov £1tolae A{~uac; Kat A t~UllV Ka'CotKelv 
uv'Ct <llowh:llC;. 
75 See n.19. As in the case of Rome, these were not only presumably purchased, but also captured 
during campaigns in a number of areas throughout the Mediterranean. 
76 Justin (XXI.4) claims that this was his second attempt at seizing power in the state, the first time he 
attempted to poison the entire senate during a banquet; Arist. Pol. V.6.2, 1307a. 
77 This is later echoed in 149 BC when the Carthaginian senate enrolled the slaves of the city to bolster 
the defence of Carthage (App. Pun. 93). 
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mercenaries. A passage reported by Diodorus at the end of the fifth century provides a 
picture of the variety and prevalence of mercenaries in Carthage.78 Before the invasion 
of Sicily, the Carthaginians enrolled Iberians, Balearians, Libyans, Phoenicians, 
Maurusians, Numidians, unknown peoples from the area of Cyrene, and 
Campanians.79 Although this example was exceptional, it does hint at the diversity 
and potential size of mercenary armies in Carthaginian North Africa. This 
Carthaginian policy demonstrated its shortcomings in 240 when the Mercenary War 
erupted.8o This brutal and drawn-out conflict nearly destroyed Carthage shortly after 
its defeat during the First Punic War. 
The real agrarian ethnic minority was the Libyan farmers. Along with the 
wealth stimulated by trade, tribute and the food produced by these farmers ensured the 
survival and prosperity of Carthage. Evidence suggests that these farmers lived very 
poorly and had no political rights in Carthage, reducing them to levels of effective 
serfdom.81 It is little wonder that there is evidence for a major revolt against Carthage 
involving elements of the Libyan farmers during the early fourth century.82 
Presumably the motives behind such revolts were common. At the outbreak of the 
Mercenary War in 240, Polybius touches upon some of these grievances against 
Carthage.83 He claims that during the First Punic War the Carthaginians had exacted 
heavy tribute from the Libyan peasants, including half the crops of farmers and the 
unconditional doubling of taxation of those lived in the towns. Apparently this was 
made worse by the unscrupulous nature of a number of Carthaginian administrators 
(presumably in charge of tax collection), who were praised for their actions in 
78 Diod. XIII.SO. 
79 Diodorus (XIII.SO.S) cites both Timaeus and Ephorus for this account. He follows the former's figure 
of men while the latter claims an improbable 300000 men. This Carthaginian army is earlier described 
as comprising of 100000 men by Timaeus and 200000 men by Ephorus (Diod. XIII.S4.S). The figure of 
120000 can be seen during the siege of Himera when Hannibal left 40000 men encamped, while he 
took SOOOO (60000 of his own and 20000 Siceli and Sicanians) to attack the city (Diod. XIII.59.6-60.3). 
80 Polyb. 1.6Sff. The Carthaginian practice of hiring mercenaries has drawn a great deal of ancient and 
modem criticism. All the same, by the third century the use of mercenaries was a well-established 
practice in the Hellenic world. The emphasis placed upon the Carthaginian dependence on mercenaries 
is excessive. Carthage still placed military levies on its own citizens, in Carthage and presumably 
throughout the empire in addition to levies from such groups as Libyan farmers, see Chp. VII, n.78. 
Otherwise during times of great need the Carthaginians could muster large citizen armies such as the 
30000 who rallied to the defence of Carthage in 146. The Phocians during the Sacred War in the mid-
fourth century and the Persians also employed foreign mercenaries en masse. It was natural for an 
affluent state both to protect its own citizen body and to enhance its military by hiring mercenaries; 
Carthage was no different. See G.T. Griffith, The Mercenaries of the Hellenistic World (Groningen 
1965) pp.207-234. 
81 Picard, Daily Life in Carthage, p.122f. 
82 Diod. XIV.77.3. 
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Carthage. From such an account, although based on wartime taxation, it is apparent 
how the Carthaginians treated their Libyan subjects and is little wonder why they felt 
such a degree of resentment and revolted on a number of occasions. It is likely that 
the generic description of the Libyan farmer class included a variety of peoples. The 
expansion of Carthage throughout North Africa saw it subdue a number of native 
peoples. Carthage forced pastoral and semi-nomadic peoples to settle into subsistence 
agriculture in areas which remained under Carthaginian rule until the rise of Numidia 
under Masinissa during the second century.84 
It is also likely that at any given time in Carthage there was a constant 
temporary population of visitors. The position and nature of Carthage and especially 
its economy would suggest large numbers of merchants, sailors, farmers, and visitors 
from throughout the Punic world, the Levantine coast, and other trading nations. 
Although Carthage maintained a guarded attitude to its territory, Carthage was not 
likely a consideration. The quantities of Greek, Egyptian, and Etruscan material at 
Carthage and a number of its North African settlements suggest trade was flowing 
freely in both directions. The first two treaties between Rome and Carthage in 509/8 
and ca. 306, suggest the open nature of activity in both Western Sicily and the area of 
North Africa around Carthage. 85 
The growth and development of Carthage until the fifth century saw it grow 
into a cosmopolitan centre of the West. The Phoenician system was replaced by a 
Punic system but retained control of state and trade and agriculture. Despite the 
egalitarian allusions a united Punic people may conjure up, it was a tightly controlled 
class system. Large ethnic minorities remained politically disenfranchised. Ethnic and 
class diversity played a major part in the history and civil strife of Carthage. The city 
of Carthage suffered several ethnic-based revolts during the fourth century, which had 
their origins in earlier Carthaginian expansion. Carthage always remained an 
ethnically diverse centre, with a constant mix of Phoenicio-Punic, North African, and 
foreign elements. 
83 Polyb.I.72.1-5. 
84 Ilevbare, pp.53ff. There is evidence of pastoralism in North Africa predating the arrival of the 
Phoenicians, Gsell, HAANI, pp.236ff. Herodotus in his catalogue of North African tribes claims that 
the tribes west of Lake Triton practised settled agriculture while those to the east were pastoral nomads 
(IY.191, 187). 
85 Polyb. IIl,22-24. 
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TERRITORY 
Gaining strength they (the Carthaginians) ruled Libya and much of the sea, from 
home they conducted war in Sicily and Sardinia and the other islands in the sea and 
also in Spain and sent out many colonies. Appian Pun. 2 
The most notable physical development of Punic Carthage was its expansion both by 
land and sea. Its growth coincided with the power vacuum left by the decline of 
Phoenician activity in the West. The ambitious Carthaginians quickly assumed control 
of government over the western Phoenician settlements in addition to their own 
colonies and settlements. 
Evidence suggests that the territory of Carthage did not expand until the 
second half of the sixth century. It occupied a small headland and relied heavily on 
contact with the sea. The one solid example of the foundation of Ebusus does not alter 
this. Although founding a settlement is usually the action of an active established city-
state, Ebusus was an island settlement made possible by access and familiarity with 
the sea within the Phoenician 'Empire'. The expansion of Carthaginian power along 
the coast of North Africa is more identifiable. Carthage controlled much of the 
coastline through a networked system of emporia stretching from Leptis Magna in the 
east, to and beyond the Pillars of Herac1es. The only border Carthage encountered in 
North Africa was that of Cyrene to the east and Berber tribes to the south.86 The major 
check on North African expansion remained natural geographic and climatic 
boundaries. Even though the Carthaginians subjugated much of their immediate 
hinterland, their North African territory was still dominated by the sea. There was 
little point in expanding further into Africa when their empire and trade interests were 
mostly seaborne. As a result we find Carthage initially satisfied by maintaining a 
86 Strabo, XVII.3.20; SaIl. lug. LXXIX. There is a legendary story regarding the boundary between 
Punic territory and that of Cyrene in the east. After a dispute (with possible conflict) the two powers 
sent out representatives from Cyrene and Leptis Magna on the understanding that the place where the 
two parties met would designate the border. The Carthaginians sent two brothers, the Philaeni, who 
moved quickly compared to the leisurely pace set by the Cyrenaean delegation. The two parties met 
and the Cyrenaeans, realising they had been tricked, demanded that the ordeal be replayed or the 
brothers could be buried alive on the spot instead. The Philaeni agreed to be buried alive for their 
country. It is then claimed thereafter that the Carthaginians dedicated altars to the brothers on the same 
spot acting as an official boundary marker. 
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North African hinterland and preferring to use the more remote interior reaches of 
North Africa only for trade. 87 
From the evidence we possess it seems as though Carthage governed its North 
African territory as a tributary province. From fragmentary information, it appears 
that Carthage and its North African subjects were accustomed to predetermined 
boundaries.88 The rich agricultural lands, farmed by mainly ethnic Libyan peasants, 
were taxed in order to finance the ever-increasing needs of the capital. As with 
Roman Italy, the farms of the North African hinterland were used as a means to 
provide income and food for the growing population of Carthage.89 
The once independent Phoenician settlements along the coast were also 
controlled by Carthaginian rule. As Carthage was the most prominent and prosperous 
Phoenician city in the West, it was likely that a transition from Phoenician to Punic 
society would also develop in these settlements. The North African cities were subject 
to the same influences as Carthage and most likely developed contemporaneously 
along similar lines. Scanty literary evidence suggests that they retained their political 
systems on a local level, but it is likely that Carthage governed any foreign policy.9O 
This system was similar to that employed by Rome with its Italian allies beginning in 
the fourth century. For these North African cities, aspects of Carthaginian influence 
87 For aspects of the Trans-Saharan trade routes see Chp. VI. 
88 See Chap. IV, ns.145-152 and text. 
89 The early popUlation of Carthage is unattested and even the figure during the final centuries is 
difficult to gauge. Strabo claims the urban popUlation reached the unlikely figure of 700000 
(XVll.3.15). Only brief allusions to the actual urban population are ever suggested. During the final 
siege of Carthage in 149, the walls were defended by 30000 men including the slave population which 
had been mobilised (App. Pun. 93). Presumably Carthage maintained a reasonably large population of 
at least 200000 people during its height. 
90 Several Phoenicio-Punic cities retained aspects of their political and social identity. Allegiance of 
older Phoenician cities to Carthage was probably based more on common kinship and culture 
stemming from a common Phoenician origin. Such cities retained some independence or were duly 
recognised as original foundations. In the second treaty between Carthage and Rome (Polyb. Ill.24), 
Utica is specifically named alongside Tyre as being included by the Carthaginians. However, this was 
probably more of a ceremonial recognition describing certain aspects of local government. In the treaty 
between Hannibal and Philip V, Utica is named alongside others as a Carthaginian subject state (Polyb. 
VII.9.7). Sallust claims that Leptis Magna was still Tyrian in nature even during the first century BC 
(lug. LXXIX.1). A number of sizeable Punic cities appear to possess a senate (named by Greek and 
Roman sources), or the Punic equivalent of an executive body. These are particularly evident during 
the Neo-Punic period in Numidian towns once under the control of Carthage. We see Vaga described 
as possessingprincipes civitatis during the lugurthine War (Sail. lug. LXVL2). This site is also attested 
as having a ~OtlAft during the same period (App. Num. F. 3). Similar offices can be seen in other North 
African towns. Livy (XXX.12.8) describes the principes Cirtensium demonstrating that Cirta had 
similar institutions in the third century. Otherwise we find Diodorus (XXIV.1D.2) describe the 
npecrp-6'tepot of Hecatompylus (Theveste) also during the third century. These examples suggest that 
coastal and provincial towns maintained local political bodies. These would most certainly have been 
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would not have been a great transition from that of the Phoenicians. Trade was still a 
primary purpose. Although their attention was drawn more toward Carthage than the 
East, their function would not have changed a great deal. 
From the fifth century onwards, other Phoenician settlements in the West 
would also have gradually developed into Punic centres. Like the North African 
centres, settlements elsewhere would not have undergone a rapid redevelopment 
under the Carthaginians. The assimilation of Phoenician settlements under 
Carthaginian influence was a natural process. By the fifth century many Phoenician 
cities in Spain, Sardinia, Malta, and Sicily were already under varying degrees of 
Carthaginian influence. There is little obvious evidence to suggest that Carthage 
needed to force its domination on the majority of its Phoenician settlements. By 
accepting the dominion of Carthage these settlements were simply moving from the 
old Phoenician trade network controlled in the East to a new but similar system based 
in Carthage. Very little would have changed in the function of Phoenician cities in the 
West by becoming Carthaginian.91 The new Punic settlements of the West would have 
continued to govern themselves at a local level with foreign and economic policies 
administered by Carthage. The Phoenician centres Carthage inherited were to act as 
the basis of its new empire, which would see it develop into a major power in the 
Central and Western Mediterranean. 
The rapid development of Carthage from a mere Phoenician port during the 
late ninth century to the capital of the Punic world by the fifth century is usually 
attributed to the city's ability to trade and conquer. However, its ability to reach such 
a level initially was dependent on several other factors from the time of its foundation. 
The Phoenician legacy to Carthage cannot be underestimated. Ultimately it 
provided Carthage with a prefabricated empire in the West with an advanced trading 
network which monopolised trade throughout the Western Mediterranean. The large 
number of coastal ports stretching from Spain, North Africa, Sardinia, and Western 
developed on Carthaginian models and probably operated under their control We will look further at 
such examples in relation to Carthaginian influence at a later time. 
91 Several areas in the old Phoenician 'Empire', especially Spain, underwent what could be termed a 
redevelopment or streamlining following this period of transition. It is understandable that with the faU 
of Tartessus and the subsequent decline of a centralised Phoenician trading network in the area, that the 
closely packed trading settlements along the Southern Spanish coast would suffer. Several appear to 
have been permanently abandoned during the sixth century, see Aubet, The Phoenicians and the West, 
pp.273-276. 
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Sicily poured trade-based wealth into the port of Carthage. Following the collapse of 
Phoenician influence in the West, Carthage assumed the role of cultural and economic 
leader in its stead and with it control of the Phoenician holdings in the West. The 
primary Phoenician legacy to Carthage was the basic nature of its society and culture. 
It was the Phoenicians who created the Carthaginian political, social, and religious 
systems and most importantly their connection with the sea especially based around 
trade. 
What distinguished Carthage from the other Phoenician states in the West was 
its own development. Although it was content trading for the first phase of its history, 
by the sixth century we find that Carthage had developed into an independent state 
with its own policies abroad. The notion of 'Carthaginian' as distinct from Phoenician 
is first reported at the time of Carthage's first colonial establishment of Ebusus in 
Ibiza. This process rapidly developed until by the dawn of the fifth century, Carthage 
had matured as a Punic state. The evolution of Punic culture is difficult to trace owing 
to its mixed nature and the lack of a preserved Carthaginian literary tradition. The 
increase of contact with a number of foreign influences fostered the growth of Punic 
culture in Carthage and was to have a continual influence on its development and 
activities. 
The culmination of the Punic culture in Carthage during the fifth century saw 
a marked change from the previous Phoenician-based culture that existed before it. 
Changes are evident in theology, political life, the nature of expansion and activities 
abroad, and Carthaginian demography and society. Its society and culture were 
distinct and its power abroad was constantly developing with a largely unchallenged 
monopoly in most of the Western Mediterranean. Carthage commanded a large 
population and from its mercantile nature it controlled a strong economic base. 
Carthage's beginnings as a small Phoenician colony disguised its potential: it grew 
rapidly, assuming the vast western 'empire' of the Phoenicians and becoming the 
capital of its own empire and the Punic world. 
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III. THE CARTHAGINIAN COLONIES 
The Phoenicians transferred a number of their traditions to their Carthaginian 
successors in the West. Seafaring and trade were important to Carthage, as they had 
been for Tyre and the other Phoenician cities in the East. Appian describes the 
situation appropriately by stating, "(The Carthaginians,) acting like Phoenicians, 
conducted business on the sea with their ships."l Carthage adopted and developed pre-
existing Phoenician policies. It is natural that upon inheriting the legacy of a 
colonising state that Carthage should also demonstrate similar tendencies. Similar to 
Greek colonies such as Corcyra and Massilia, Carthage continued the traditions of its 
metropolis and actively colonised on its own. Although there are several definite 
Carthaginian settlements attested, we are hindered by the paucity of literary and 
archaeological detail. Carthaginian settlements are often unidentified or 
indistinguishable from earlier Phoenician foundations. From the information we do 
possess, it is possible to reconstruct several of these original Carthaginian colonies 
and to deduce certain others. Like the Phoenicians before them, the Carthaginians 
embarked on an active and expansive colonial policy. The Carthaginian system of 
settlement and colonisation developed its own characteristics over time to better suit 
its needs abroad and the development of its empire. 
THE PROBLEMS OF CARTHAGINIAN COLONISATION 
The major problem regarding Carthaginian colonisation is the difficulty in 
distinguishing original Carthaginian foundations from those of the Phoenicians with 
any certainty. When we consider such North African settlements as Oea, 
Hadrumentum, and Leptis Magna, it is nearly impossible to separate their colonial 
identities. The Phoenicians established these three centres permanently during the 
eighth or seventh century. They subsequently developed into Punic centres and their 
remains exhibit considerably more Punic material. Such evidence suggests that these 
sites were small coastal Phoenician port towns until the Carthaginians established 
more permanent centres. The Phoenician presence, however, is attested by centuries 
of activity in the area based around trade and settlement. The Phoenicians were 
1 Pun. 2, vo:uO't 'tE XproJ..lEVOt Ko:t 'tTJV e&AO:O'O'O:V 010: <I>OtVtKEC; epyo:S6J..lEVOt. 
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known for their temporary, seasonal, or even superficial settlement of sites orientated 
toward trade. It is therefore likely that such settlements, not only along the North 
African coast, but also in Sardinia, and Spain which were later considered 
Carthaginian, were in fact originally (and therefore essentially) Phoenician and were 
either redeveloped or later populated by Carthaginians. 
This confusion is due to the rapid rise of Carthage and its inheritance of 
extensive pre-existing networks of Phoenician settlements. With the decline of 
Tartessus and the waning presence of the Phoenicians from the sixth century, 
Carthage assumed sovereignty over the old Phoenician 'Empire' in the West. As a 
result, Carthage was not obliged to found further settlements within pre-established 
areas. This is possibly one of the reasons why there are a remarkably small number of 
original Carthaginian settlements attested for such a powerful and active state. 
The other predominate factor in attempting to distinguish Carthaginian 
settlements from Phoenician is before the fifth century there is often little major 
distinction or division between the two identities. Punic society was rapidly 
developing, but still primarily Phoenician. This change is not well documented by 
contemporary sources. Often in later sources there is an indistinct line drawn between 
Phoenician and Carthaginian, especially when discussing the origin of settlements. 
Considering such factors, we turn to the few distinctive Carthaginian colonies 
attested. 
THE EARLY STAGES OF CARTHAGINIAN COLONISATION 
Much like the traditional literary date of the foundation of Carthage in 814 BC, the 
year 654/3 BC holds a similar tradition as being the year in which Carthage sent out 
its first colony to Ibiza. Thanks to Diodorus we receive a reasonably firm date and 
some brief information regarding this colony. This is the only evidence we have for 
Carthaginian colonial policy before the fifth century. With this expedition, it can be 
argued that Carthage became a fully developed (if still Phoenician) political entity. 
The dating of the colony of Ebusus is not too early when we consider the rapid growth 
of Carthage. Several Greek colonies were also able to establish subsequent colonies 
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within a short period of their own foundation. 2 Carthage is comparable to such sites, 
and it is possible that it could establish a colony only 160 years after its own 
foundation. 
EBUSUS 
The Carthaginian colony of Ebusus on Ibiza ushered in Carthage as a developing but 
potentially powerful state in the Western Mediterranean. The account of its 
foundation is preserved in Diodorus: 
After those which have been mentioned, there is an island named Pityussa, named so 
from the large number of pine trees which grow there. It lies in the sea, three days' 
and nights' sail from the Pillars of Heracles; one night's and one day's from Libya; 
and one day's from Iberia. It is as large as Corcyra. It is reasonably fertile possessing 
limited land for growing vineyards, but has olives which are grafted upon the wild 
olives. Of the products there, they say the softness of the wool is the best. It is broken 
up by notable plains and hills and has a city named Eresus, a colony of the 
Carthaginians. It has fine harbours, large constructed walls, and many well-built 
houses. The inhabitants are barbarians of every nationality, but Phoenicians 
preponderate. Its settlement took place 160 years after the establishment of 
Carthage? 
The first Carthaginian colonial foundation of Ebusus4 on the modern island of 
Ibiza provides useful insight into the contemporary Phoenicio-Punic system of 
colonisation. Normally sending out a colony was a dangerous undertaking especially 
2 Cyrene, probably founded in 630, colonised Barca in ca. 560. Corcyra, traditionally founded in 664, 
colonised Epidamnus (albeit with Corinth) in 625. Massilia founded in ca. 600, colonised numerous 
sites down the coasts of Southern Liguria and Eastern Spain within a century. 
3 V.16, lle1:a yap 1:as rcponpllllEvus vilO'os EO''tt ovolluSEVll IlEV IIt1:uouO'O'u 1:l)V oE rcPOO'llyoptUV 
EXOUO'U arco 1:0U rcATjeouS 1:rov KU1:' UU1:l)V !pUOIlEVroV rct1:UroV.rceAUytU 0' o-OO'u OtEO'1:11KeV arco IlEV 
'HpUKAEOUS O'1:11Arov rcAoUV l)lleproV 1:ptrov Kut 1:rov lO'roV VUK1:roV arco oE AtpUllS l)IlEPUS Kut VUK1:0S, 
arco 0' 'IPllpius Ilt&'S l)IlEpUS. KU1:a oE 1:0 IlEyeeoS rcupurcA,TJO'tOS EO'1:t KOPKUPIt. KU1:a oE 1:l)v ape1:l)v 
o-OO'u lle1:ptU 1:l)V IlEV allrceAO!pU1:0V xropuv OAtYllV EXet 1:aS 0' EAUtuS Ellrce!pU'teUIlEVUS EV 1:0tS 
K01:tVotS. 1:rov oE !pUOIlEVroV EV UU1:n KUAAtO'1:eUnV !puO't 1:l)v IlUAUK01:111:U 1:rov EptroV. OtetAllllEVll oE 
rceOtOtS aStoAOYotS KUt YEroAO!pOtS rcoAtV EXet 1:l)V ovollusollEVllV "EpeO'ov arcotKOV KUPXllOOVtroV. 
EXet oE Kut AtllEVUS astoAOYouS KUt 1:etxmv KU1:UO'KEUaS eUlleYEeetS KUt OtKtroV rcAileos e-o 
KU1:UO'KeUUO'IlEVroV. KU1:0tKOUO't 0' UU1:l)V pappupot rcUV1:oourcOt rcAetO'1:0t oE <l>OtVtKeS. 6 0' 
arcotKtO'IlOS uU1:ilS YEYOVeV UO'1:epOV E1:eO'tv EKU1:0V ESTjKOV1:U 1:ilS KU1:a 1:l)V KuPXll06vu K1:tO'eroS· 
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for a new metropolis. However, the Phoenician presence in the Western 
Mediterranean and in the Balearic Islands certainly facilitated Carthage's 
establishment of Ebusus. The colony itself seems more like an apprenticeship as 
Diodorus claims, for the Phoenicians were the largest group on the island and it is 
possible that the Phoenicians were active in the foundation itself.5 
From the description of Ebusus we can assume several common characteristics 
which identify it as a typical colony. Primary to Phoenicio-Punic colonisation was a 
good harbour, and Ebusus was no exception. Beyond this the settlement of Ebusus lay 
on the exclusive trade routes between the Atlantic and Spain on the one hand, and the 
major Phoenicio-Punic ports in North Africa, Sardinia, and Sicily on the other. 
Ebusus, like so many other Phoenician colonies in the West, was designed as a trading 
port, which would benefit from such prosperous and established routes. 
The island of Pityussa offered more to Carthage as a colonial site than a mere 
trading depot. From its very name: nl-tUC;, and Diodorus' description, the relevance of 
pine trees to the island is evident.6 This commodity would certainly have been 
attractive to the Carthaginians as a sea-faring people. The natural resources certainly 
would have been a secondary benefit from establishing Ebusus as the major port on 
the island. Diodorus informs us of the production of high-grade wool and also of an 
active olive industry. Other sources such as Pliny tell of abundant supplies of fish in 
the waters around Ibiza? The general fertility of the island's soil would have 
encouraged agriculture, especially since it was apparently a haven from noxious pests 
such as snakes and rabbits, which beset the other Balearic Islands. 8 The island of 
Ibiza, along with Mallorca also possessed resources of silver and lead. Given the 
Phoenicio-Punic proclivity for exploiting such natural resources, this may also have 
been a motive behind the settlement of the island. As with several other earlier 
Phoenician settlements, the location of Ebusus was based primarily on strategic trade 
4 There is a distinct divergence in the ancient sources over the exact spelling of Ebusus, interpreted as 
Eresus by some authors. 
5 There is Greek precedent for metropolis and colony co-founding a subsequent colony: Corinth and 
Corcyra cooperated in the founding of Epidamnus (Thuc. 1.24.1) and Cyme and Chaleis founding 
Naxos in Sicily (Strabo VI.2.2). The Phoenicians' presence on the island before the arrival of the 
Carthaginians and the former's probable dominance implies that they may have provided the 
Carthaginians with the site of Ebusus and initial protection from the notorious native barbarians. 
6 There are two islands in this group: Ibiza and Formentera. lbiza is by far the larger of the two 
covering 570 km2 compared to Formentera's 83 km2• 
7 NH. IX.32, I1L79. 
s Strabo III.5.1,2; Pliny NH. III.V, vrn.83. 
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routes. Similarly it possessed several local industries which could supply the main 
population and compliment its mercantile nature.9 
Material remains from Ibiza emphasise its role as a strategic and busy trading 
port. There are remains demonstrating heavy Phoenicio-Punic trade with Southern 
Spain as well as North Africa, Sicily, and Sardinia. There is also considerable 
evidence of trade of foreign commodities originating from Greek centres and 
Etruria.1O The variety of materials suggests Ibiza was a popular trading port servicing 
several Phoenicio-Punic territories in the vicinity. 
An aspect fundamental to larger Phoenicio-Punic settlements was their 
defensive capabilities. Tyre, Carthage, Motya, and Gades were all typically fortified 
harbour towns capable of repelling or enduring prolonged sieges, and Ebusus was no 
exception. Diodorus describes the walls of the site (certainly from the description of 
Timaeus) as eUlleye8etc;. The Carthaginians, in the Phoenician manner, took strategy 
and fortification seriously even for what appears to be a trading port in an area already 
dominated exclusively by Phoenician activity. There are several later accounts which 
demonstrate the defensive character of Ebusus. During the Second Punic War, the 
Roman fleet under Scipio failed to capture Ebusus until it later sued for peace.ll Later 
during the Roman period, Pompey in 46 BC captured the Balearic Islands with ease 
except for Ebusus which he finally took with some degree of difficulty. 12 
The general position of Ebusus as a strategic naval and mercantile base en 
route to both Spain and the Pillars of Heracles from the Phoenicio-Punic settlements 
to the east certainly explains its foundation. The original Phoenician practice of 
founding strategic mercantile bases was simply transferred to the Carthaginians. Such 
a characteristic is evident in early Carthaginian history. Later as Carthaginian foreign 
policy grew more aggressive, the role of Ebusus as a strategic base for the 
Carthaginian Empire developed accordingly. The best evidence of this role comes 
during the Second Punic War when Mago landed there with the fleet in 206. Livy 
states that Carthaginians inhabited the island, and therefore the fleet was well received 
and refitted. 13 The island offered the Carthaginians a strategic base from which they 
9 For a basic geographical and topographic description of Ibiza see Carlos Gomez Bellard, "The first 
colonisation of Ibiza and Formentera (Balearic Islands, Spain); some more islands out of the stream?" 
World Archaeology 26.3,1995, pp.442-457. 
10 Gomez Bellard et al., La colonizacion fenicia de la isla de Ibiza, pp.123ff. 
11 Livy XXIl,20.6-9. 
12 Casso Dio XLIII.29. 
13 XXVIII.37.3-5. 
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could monitor, and if necessary dominate the eastern Spanish coast. With a strong and 
permanent base on Ibiza, the Carthaginians were also able to exploit the Balearics' 
other main material: manpower, in particular slingers. The reputed fierceness and skill 
of Balearic slingers in addition to the Carthaginian proclivity towards hiring 
mercenaries worked well for the Carthaginian imperial machine. On several occasions 
we see the Carthaginians employing Balearic slingers in their armies. 14 
The role of Carthaginian Ebusus developed like its metropolis, primarily 
relying on mercantile activity, but in time assuming a more expansive and aggressive 
appearance. Originally Carthage was in no position to form its own foreign policy, 
and with the Phoenicians present, it had no need. Ebusus functioned as an 
intermediary port between its metropolis and other allied territories in the West. It 
retained such an important function throughout the period of Carthaginian control. 
With the onset of a more concerted and aggressive Carthaginian foreign policy, 
Ebusus became a strategic port functioning as a link between trading ports in the 
Western Mediterranean. Although Ebusus remains the only original Carthaginian 
settlement during this period, it demonstrates several Phoenician characteristics and 
later Carthaginian motives behind colonisation, trade, and expansion. 
CARTHAGINIAN COLONISATION IN THE FIFTH AND FOURTH 
CENTURIES 
Traditionally the fifth and fourth centuries BC are considered the period in which 
Carthage matured as a major power and became more politically active and 
aggressive abroad. This period coincides with Carthage becoming regularly entangled 
in the affairs of the western Greeks and thus receives more coverage courtesy of 
Greek and Latin authors. As a result there is more information concerning the 
Carthaginians' colonial policies. In addition to this Carthage was now firmly 
established in the West and entered into an epoch of more intensive expansive activity 
abroad. Its policies developed accordingly, with several attested Carthaginian 
settlements and colonial enterprises dated to these two centuries. 
14 e.g. Strabo III.S.l; Livy XXVIII.37.S; Polyb. 167, III. 113. 
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LILYBAEUM 
The most successful Carthaginian colony of this period was Lilybaeum on the west 
coast of Sicily. Its foundation date is placed firmly in 396 BC as it replaced the older 
island-colony of Motya which had been destroyed by Dionysius of Syracuse the year 
previous. The interesting aspect of Lilybaeum as a Carthaginian colony is that had not 
Motya (a Phoenician colony under Carthaginian control) been destroyed, Lilybaeum 
would never have been founded owing to the short distance between the two sites (8 
km.). Under normal circumstances, a colony founded from the ruins of another would 
consist of the survivors. In the case of Motya, Diodorus is quite specific in stating that 
the population was partly killed during the siege and the rest sold off by Dionysius,15 
although he later claims that Lilybaeum was founded with the remnants of Motya.16 
Pausanias offers a similar opinion, claiming that after the fall of Motya, the Libyans 
and Phoenicians combined in a Carthaginian expedition of colonisation. 17 Although it 
is likely that a certain number of Motyans would have settled in Lilybaeum, there 
would certainly have been a strong Carthaginian contingent and as Pausanias claims, 
the colony was officially Carthaginian. The population and therefore the nature of 
Lilybaeum must be assumed as primarily Carthaginian.1s 
The geography of Lilybaeum was predisposed to the Phoenicio-Punic model 
of settlement. Even though Motya as a traditional Phoenician island-colony was 
destroyed, the Carthaginians adopted another preferred geographical configuration of 
founding a colony on a headland. Situated on Cape Boeo, Lilybaeum possessed 
several natural attributes which aided Carthaginian interests. Primarily it possessed a 
15 XIV.53A. 
16 XXII. lOA. 
17 Paus. V.25.5-6. 
18 The idea of a mixed population of colonists in Lilybaeum is similar to several Greek examples. Often 
Greek colonies with mixed populations broke down and fell into stasis. Colonies such as Gela (Hdt. 
VIL153), Amphipolis (Polyaenus VI.53), Heracleia Trachinia (Diod. XII.59A; Livy, XXXVI.30.3; 
Soph. Trachiniae, Ll.1252-1278) and Thurii (Diod. XII.35) all experienced civil unrest owing to a 
mixed ethnic background. However, the relationship and kinship between the Phoenicians and 
Carthaginians has shown itself as superseding such division in colonial, political, and social spheres. 
Although originally Phoenicio-Punic, the population of Lilybaeum, owing to its position in Sicily 
would probably have developed into a cosmopolitan centre. It was located in Elymian territory with 
which both Phoenicians and Carthaginians maintained amicable relations. The Carthaginians often 
employed mixed settlers when founding a colony. It is possible that this phenomenon was a result of 
Greek influence. It is possible a sizeable Greek population resided in Lilybaeum especially after 250. 
Before being besieged by the Romans, the Carthaginians, after razing Selinus to the ground, moved the 
remaining popUlation and resettled it in Lilybaeum (Diod. XXIV .1.1). 
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good harbour. l9 The best account of this harbour comes from Polybius when 
describing the protracted Roman siege during the Second Punic War. The 
Carthaginians were able to run the Roman blockade of the harbour almost at will 
owing to its large size and depth.20 The size of this harbour made it useful for large 
volumes of traffic at any given time?l The position of Lilybaeum was also naturally 
advantageous for the prevailing winds. Ancient authors remarked on the geographical 
position of Lilybaeum and its gentle westerly wind.22 Such a favourable wind 
certainly would have been an incentive for the Carthaginians' settlement at Lilybaeum 
regarding their seafaring activities. The position of Lilybaeum also provided the new 
colony with some natural defensive attributes. Even before the Carthaginians 
embarked on fortifying the town with extensive walls and a moat, Lilybaeum was 
well defended. Polybius informs us of lagoons, which protected the harbour from the 
seaward side.23 These lagoons restricted any land-based attempt at molesting traffic in 
the harbour. The landward side also offered Lilybaeum natural defence. Much like 
other Phoenician colonies (including Carthage) founded on a headland, Lilybaeum 
was mostly surrounded by the sea, and therefore land access was limited. 
The geographical and strategic position of Lilybaeum was paramount in the 
considerations of the Carthaginians who certainly would have been looking at re-
establishing a stronghold in Western Sicily. Cape Boeo had probably been under 
Phoenician and then Carthaginian dominance since the eighth century and was not 
permanently settled. Lilybaeum possessed the natural attributes which would attract 
Phoenicio-Punic settlement, however, there was no need to settle the site with the 
island stronghold of Motya dominating the west coast of Sicily until 397.24 The 
importance of the area to the Carthaginians' interests is demonstrated by their rapid 
19 For a detailed description of Lilybaeum's harbour and its general topography see G. Schmiedt, 
"Contributo della fotografia area all ricostruzione della topografia antic a di Lilibeo" Kokalos 9, 1963, 
pp.49-73. 
20 1.44, 1.46 
21 As mentioned previously, the Carthaginians used Lilybaeum as a staging point for invasion and a 
harbour for their large military fleets. 
22 GGM. II Dionys. Per. Ll.469-470, pp.131-132 (ed. Milller), axpex oe ot I1axuv6<; 'teI1EAropi<; 'tE 
AtA{)~l1 'tE 'exAA' f\'tot AtA{)~l1 IlEV E1tt Pt1tl)V ~E<p{)pOW; Ovid Met. XIII.726, mollibus expositum 
Zephyris Lilybaeon. Polybius also mentions the favourable westerly wind, which by all accounts would 
blow ships into the harbour at Lilybaeum. Hannibal when reinforcing the besieged garrison, waited for 
the contrary wind to blow his fleet past the Roman blockade and directly into the harbour at Lilybaeum 
(1.44). 
231.42.7. 
24 There is some evidence, which although scanty, suggests the site of Lilybaeum was inhabited in 
prehistoric times, however, there appears to be no permanent settlement there until 396. 
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response in founding Lilybaeum only a year after the destruction of Motya. The 
continued threat of Dionysius would suggest that the Carthaginians were eager to re-
establish their influence in Western Sicily. The immediate settlement of the adjacent 
headland clearly shows the importance of dominating the region and traffic around 
Cape Boeo. It also implies that the Carthaginians were aware of this potential new site 
previous to the destruction of Motya, and especially its military and mercantile 
potential. 25 
The position of Lilybaeum en route from Carthage to Sicily and beyond was 
vital to Carthaginian interests in the area. Lilybaeum was able to monitor traffic and 
potential threats in Western Sicily. Although anecdotal, there is the story of a man 
named Strabo (lit. the squint-eyed), who was able to see ships leave Carthage from a 
watchtower in Lilybaeum.26 Strabo (the geographer) gives the distance at 1500 stadia, 
some 275 km. Although this account is exaggerated, the position of Lilybaeum in 
relation to Carthage is of interest. There was an obvious established sea-lane between 
Lilybaeum and Carthage. Ironically the best evidence we have for this is when the 
colony and then the metropolis fell under Roman rule. During the Second and Third 
Punic Wars the Romans utilised Lilybaeum as an important intermediary base of 
operations against Carthage,27 wintering their fleet there28 and even holding 300 
Carthaginian nobles there during the Third Punic War.29 In light of such examples we 
are not only able to discern the importance of Lilybaeum to Carthage, but also the 
existence of a recognised route between the two sites. 
The Carthaginians held Lilybaeum until the close of the Second Punic War. 
During that time, although largely neglected in our sources, it grew extremely 
important to the Carthaginians and their developing empire. It appears that Lilybaeum 
became the most important Punic city in Sicily during this period. The Greek wars in 
Sicily saw Lilybaeum used as a staging point for military operations. The 
Carthaginian invasion against Timoleon in 341 landed there and naturally, after the 
Battle of Crimisus, the remnants fled there. 3D The fortifications that confronted 
25 A precedent of this strategy and Carthaginian knowledge of the site is apparent in 409 when 
Hannibal landed his invasion of Sicily there (Diod. XIII.54). This is interesting as Motya and Panormus 
were not used as they had been on other occasions. 
26 Strabo VI.266; Val. Max. n.8 ext. 14; Pliny NH. VII.85; Cic. Acad. 11.81; Ael. Var. Hist. XI. 13 
27 Polyb.III,41, 61, 68, 96; Diod. xxxn.6. 
28 Polyb. III. 106. 
29 XXXVI. 6. 
30 Plut. Tim. XXV.1; Diod. XVI.80.2. 
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Pyrrhus in 276 would presumably have taken some years to complete. Considering 
the fate of Motya at the hands of Dionysius, the Carthaginians would have been eager 
to construct expansive fortifications as soon as possible.31 
The mettle of Lilybaeum and its image as a n6A.v; an6perrco~32 were first 
tested properly when Pyrrhus besieged the settlement in 276.33 It was the only 
Carthaginian town which resisted his invasion despite his best efforts. During the First 
Punic War the Romans fared little better against Lilybaeum. According to Polybius 
the Romans desired the site of Lilybaeum as it was a perfect base for waging war in 
North Africa: on Kpo:'t~cr<XV'tE~ 't<xu'tll~ p~8iro~ /lE't<X~t~&cro'\)crt 'tov n6A.E/lov Ei~ 'tTJv 
At~UllV.34 The Roman siege of Lilybaeum began in 250, and despite several attempts, 
the Carthaginian stronghold only became a Roman possession as a result of the peace 
treaty sworn in 241. Following this in 218 the Carthaginians were unsuccessful in 
their attempts to recapture Lilybaeum from Rome.35 It is ironic that under Roman 
control, Lilybaeum grew to a high level of prosperity and importance based on the 
qualities which saw it prosper as a Carthaginian colony.36 
Lilybaeum was a product of the new expansive nature in Carthaginian 
settlements abroad. Although it resembled and functioned as a Phoenician-type 
settlement of old, its foundation mirrored the growing and changing political climate 
of its metropolis. The eagerness of Carthage to possess an unassailable stronghold to 
31 The fortifications of Lilybaeum included great walls with towers in place, natural lagoons protecting 
the harbour from land and a massive moat some 30 m. wide and 20 m. deep. See Diod. Xxn.lO.5, 
XXIV.1.2; Polyb. 1.42; Moscati, ltalia Punica, pp.93f. 
32 Diod. XXXV1.5.3. 
33 Diod. XXII. 1 Off. 
341.41.4. 
35 Polyb. XXl.49-50. 
36 Like so many areas of Carthaginian settlement, our literary, and to an extent archaeological record 
improves vastly during the Roman period, and Lilybaeum is no exception. The position of Lilybaeum 
became vital to the Romans when waging war against Carthage. Furthermore its position certainly 
would have been of use when Rome annexed the territory of Carthage as part of Africa Proconsularis. 
Beyond such an application, Lilybaeum became the chief city of Western Sicily and second only to 
Syracuse on the island. The seat of the second quaestor of Sicily was based in Lilybaeum after its 
submission to Rome. It was a civitas decumana from at least the early first century BC, as an important 
civil and administrative centre (Cicero was present in 75 BC during the governorship of Sex. 
Peducaeus (Verr. II.V.lO). Lilybaeum evolved during the empire into a municipium during the reign of 
Augustus (ClL. X.7223) and then a colonia under Pertinax or Septimius Severus (ClL. X.7205, 7228). 
Lilybaeum retained its reputation as a wealthy city under Roman rule and remained an important 
trading port. Cicero described it as splendidissima civitas when staying there in 76 Be (Verr. V.lO) and 
became embroiled in the infamous Verrine scandal thereafter (Verr. II.63, III.38, V.lO, 69,140,141). 
Archaeological evidence from the later Roman period suggests an opulent and flourishing society. For 
basic indications of wealth based on material remains see Babette Bechtold, La necropoli di Lilybaeum 
(Palermo 1999) pp.214ff. For the earlier Punic period see A.M. Bisi, "La cultura artistica di Lilibeo nel 
periodo Punico", Oriens Antiquus 7, 1968, pp.95-115. 
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dominate Western Sicily after the fall of Motya is obvious. The immediate reaction of 
sending out a colony in what can only be described as a volatile climate expresses 
Carthaginian interests in Western Sicily. The very nature of Lilybaeum as a strategic 
provincial capital and as an important trade port is obvious in both Punic and Roman 
times. From Lilybaeum, the Carthaginians were able to oversee their activities in 
Sicily while monitoring those of their allies and enemies. The massive fortifications, 
which thwarted both Pyrrhus and the Romans, emphasise the importance of 
Lilybaeum to Carthage and its primary purpose. Lilybaeum developed into the centre 
of Punic interests in Sicily, both mercantile and military. 
THE PER/PLUS OF HANNO 
One of the most celebrated and discussed accounts of Carthaginian history is the 
account of the periplus of Hanno ca. 480-450 Bc.37 His account was apparently 
inscribed on a tablet and stored in the temple of Cronos (presumably in Carthage)?8 
Although the text has been preserved only in Greek, it is an invaluable insight into 
contemporary Carthaginian territory, expansion, and colonial plans. The account 
describes the voyage of Hanno, which was primarily aimed at founding colonies and 
exploration. However, it also details the geography of the journey along the west 
coast of Africa.39 
1. EOO~t: KapXl1ooVlot<; "Avvrova 1tAetV £~ro L'tl1AroV 'HPa1(At:lrov Kat 1tOAt:l<; K'tist:tv 
At~'D<POtvlKroV. Kat E1tAt:'DO't: 1tEV'tl1KOV'tOPOtl<; e~T)Kov'ta a:yrov Kat 1tAf)8o<; avoprov 
Kat yovmK&v d<; apt81lov ll'Dpuxorov 'tpt&v Kat O't'ta Kat TIJV aAAl1v 1tapaO'Kt:'DT)v. 
37 GGM. I, pp.1-14 (cd. Muller). 
38 The authenticity and date of the text has been questioned in modem scholarship. For some 
discussions see R. Rebuffat, "Les penteconteres d'Hannon", Karthago 23,1995, pp.20-30; Gilbert 
Picard, "Le Periple d'Hannon", in Phonizier im Westen, pp.175-180; G. Germain, "Qu'est ce que Ie 
Periple d'Hannon? Document, amplification litteraire ou faux integral?", Hesperis 44,1957, pp.205-
248. 
39 There have been several discussions regarding the text and what geographical facts can be drawn 
from the description of the periplus. Hanno notes geographical descriptions of islands, mountains, 
rivers, and even volcanoes while also describing wildlife and native inhabitants. As a result there have 
been various attempts to connect such detail with modem geography. The possible terminus of the 
journey has been suggested between such regions as Guinea to as far south and east as Cameroon. 
Given the literary tradition of Phoenicians and Carthaginians circunmavigating Africa, it is often 
difficult to distinguish any possible fact from possible literary exaggeration. Even Pliny claims that 
Hanno was ordered to explore the circuit of Africa (NH. V.8, also see Hdt. IV.42-43). It is possible that 
Phoenician and Carthaginian ships sailed to equatorial Africa based on the account of Hanno and the 
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The Carthaginians commissioned Hanno to sail past the Pillars of Heracles and 
found cities of the Libyphoenicians. He sailed out with sixty ships of 50 oars and a 
multitude of men and women 30000 in number, provisions, and other equipment. 
It is obvious that the voyage of Hanno was a full-scale mission of colonisation. 
If accurate, sixty penteconters carrying 30000 colonists certainly surpasses any 
contemporary Greek colonial expedition.40 This figure suggests a large number of 
organised Carthaginian (and possibly allied) settlers. The selection process for settlers 
for this expedition and indeed other Carthaginian settlements may be attested by 
Aristotle. He claims that Carthaginian citizens were chosen to populate their cities so 
that Carthage would not become plutocratic.41 This idea of sending out specific groups 
of the community as settlers has examples in Greek colonisation.42 The mission of 
colonisation was to begin beyond the Pillars of Heracles and, judging by Hanno's 
subsequent route, then to head south. Hanno's mission to found several colonies on 
the West African coast suggests an interesting conclusion. There was already some 
form of Phoenician presence in the area at least at Lixus and Mogador. By their 
standards however, the Phoenicians had not fully exploited the area as they had in 
areas of North Africa and Southern Spain. It is quite possible therefore that the 
Carthaginians wished to increase their presence in the area and create a trade network 
along the coast in a Phoenician manner. Some aspects of Hanno's journey seem to 
imply that such a system of colonisation was being put in place:43 
II. roc; 3' O:VCXX9EV'tEC; 'tCx,C; L'ttlACXC; 1tcxprH.lei<pcxflEV KCXt ESro 1tAOUV ouolv nflEprov 
EnAeUO'CXflEV EK'tiO'cxflEV 1tPro't'llV 1tOAW llv'ttvcx cOvoflaO'cxflEv 8UfltCX'ttlPwv. nEoiov 0' 
possibility of an interior trade route linking the two areas by land, see Chp. VI, regarding Trans-
Saharan trade. 
40 Most contemporary Greek colonies are reported to have had settler populations between 1000 and 
10000. 
41 Pol. II,8.9, 1273b, OAtyapXt1ci)<; 8' OUOi\<; 't11<; 1tOAl/tela<; aptO''ta h:q>euyo'UO't 'tqJ1tAO'U'tetV ad 'tt 'tou 
8fJf,lo'U IlEPO<; e1<1tEf,l1tOV'te<; em 'ta<; 1t6AEt<; 
42 The Athenians chose the colonists for Brea (est. ca. 445) from the two lower citizen classes, the 
Thetes and the Zeugitai (IG2• 1. 45). This has an earlier precedent in Greek colonisation when the 
settlers of Cyrene were chosen according to lot in order to relieve Cyrene of over-population (Hdt. 
IV.151.l; IG. IX. 1. 867). 
43 Only passages including relevant infonnation to the colonial aspect of the voyage have been 
included. As a result, several other descriptive passages have been omitted. 
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Having put out and sailing past the Pillars for two days we founded the first city 
which we named Thymiaterion. At its feet there was a large plain. 
III. K(XnEt'ta 1tpO~ hmepav avaxSev'tE~ E1tt LOA6Ev'ta At~'\.lK6v aKpco'tT)ptov AacrtoV 
8ev8pEcrt cr'\.lvf)ASO~EV. IV. EvSa ITocrEt8rovo~ tEPOV t8p'\.lcra~EVot ... 
Sailing west we came to Soloeis, a Libyan promontory covered with trees. We founded 
a temple to Poseidon there ... 
V. 'tT)V 'tE Ai~vTlv 1tapaAAa~av'tE~ ocrov iwepa~ 1tAOUV Ka'tq>Kicra~Ev 1t6AEt~ 1tPO~ 'tU 
SaAa't'tTI KaAO'\.l~eVa~ KaptK6v 'tE 'tEtXO~ Kat rU't'tTlV Kat "AKpav Kat MeAt't'tav Kat 
"Apa~~'\.lv. 
Crossing back across the lake as much as a day's travelling by sea we founded cities 
on the coast called Karikon Teichos, Gytte, Akra, Melitta, and Arambys. 
VI. KaKEtSEV 8' avaxSev'tE~ ilA8o~EV E1tt ~eyav 1to'ta~ov Ai~ov a1to 't1l~ At~uTl~ 
peov'ta. ITapa 8' a\)'tov vo~a8E~ av8pco1tot At~i'tat ~ocrKT)~a't' £VE~OV 1tap' ot~ 
E~Eiva~Ev axpt 'ttvo~ <piAOt YEv6~EVOt. 
Moving on from there we came to the large river, Lixus, flowing from Libya, beside 
which the nomads called Lixitae grazed their flocks. We stayed some time with them 
and became friends. 
VIII. Aa~6v'tE~ 8E 1tap' a-\)'trov £p~Tlvea~ 1tapE1tAeO~EV 'tllv EPT)~TlV 1tpO~ 
~EcrTl~~piav 8uo ,,~epa~. EKEteEv 8E 1taAtv 1tpO~ +lAtoV avicrxov'ta ,,~epa~ 8p6~ov. 
EvSa d)PO~EV EV ~'\.lX<P 'ttvO~ K6A1tO'\.l Vllcrov ~tKpaV KUKAOV EXO'\.lcrav cr'ta8icov 
1tev'tE. llV Ka'tq>Kicra~Ev KepvTlv 6vo~acrav'tE~. E'tEK~atp6~ESa 8' mhllv EK 'tOU 
1tEpi1tAO'\.l Ka't' EUSD KEtcr8at KapXTl86vo~. ECPKEt yap 8 1tAOU~ £K 'tE KapXTl86vo~ E1tt 
~'tT)Aa~ KaKEtSEV E1tt KepvTlv. 
Taking interpreters (from the Lixitae) we sailed south along the desert shore for two 
days, then for one day eastward and found a small island, 5 stades in circumference 
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in a bay of a gulf. We made a settlement there and called it Cerne. We believed from 
our periplus that it was directly opposite Carthage, for the voyage from Carthage to 
the Pillars andfrom there to Cerne seemed alike. 
Hanno's own account admits to founding seven settlements and one temple. It 
appears that the Carthaginians were attempting to create another area of emporia 
along the west coast of Africa much like those in North Africa, Southern Spain, and 
Sardinia. The voyage of Hanno is unique in a Carthaginian context and is unlike other 
examples of their colonisation. Normally Carthage sent out well-planned individual 
colonies to dominate a specific area or shipping lane. Usually this was conducted 
within its own spheres of influence or contact within the boundaries of the old 
Phoenician 'Empire'. At this stage however, Western Africa had only a limited 
Phoenician presence concentrated around Lixus and Mogador (that we know of) on 
the west coast. There was no existing network of settlements in this area. Carthage 
was therefore colonising a pristine area and did not have the luxury of establishing a 
major settlement in the area without an extensive pre-existing infrastructure. Hanno's 
expedition therefore was to explore and then to settle a new network of coastal towns 
based on the Phoenician model. 
The west coast of Africa had several obvious attractions for Carthaginian 
interests, especially mercantile. The large expanse of coast offered access to various 
commodities and even more through penetration of the hinterland. The general area 
specified in Hanno's journey contains several navigable rivers, which certainly would 
have kindled Carthaginian trading interests with the hinterland.44 We know already 
from Herodotus that the Carthaginians were bartering for gold with an unspecified 
people in Libya beyond the Pillars of Herac1es.45 The large area settled by Hanno 
coupled with the difficulty of identifying specific settlements leaves us with little 
evidence as to what commodities particularly attracted the Carthaginians. Certainly 
timber would have been an incentive to them along with some deposits of limestone 
and sandstone, which were mined in antiquity. Ample supplies of fish are known in 
various areas along the coast in addition to sections of arable land for agriculture and 
pastoral grazing. There were also supplies of carbuncles in the interior, which the 
44 Within the probable area of Hanno's settlement there are several navigable rivers north of Mogador 
including the Oued Oum er-Riba and the Oued Tensitt. 
45 Hdt. IV.196. 
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Carthaginians also accessed through their Trans-Saharan trade routes.46 Otherwise the 
capture of exotic animals (such as the apes and baboons which the Phoenicians had 
earlier brought back from the West47) and slaves are possibilities. Besides the account 
of Herodotus we are unable to state with any certainty which resources primarily 
attracted the Carthaginians. Nonetheless the large expanse of coast and its connecting 
hinterland possessed several natural resources, which we know captured Carthaginian 
interest elsewhere. 
The eight foundations (seven colonial, one religious) of Hanno enable us to 
discern a number of typical Phoenicio-Punic patterns of settlement.48 The main pattern 
of settlement is already obvious: a chain of coastal ports to facilitate movement and 
trade. The first settlement is named as Thymiaterion and was supposedly only two 
days' sailing past the Pillars of Heracles. Although not proven, it is possible that this 
settlement may in fact be Tingis (modern Tangiers).49 This is a likely site for a 
Carthaginian settlement especially on this journey placing it relatively close to Lixus 
to the south and Gades to the north.50 
The next settlement was the temple of Poseidon on Cape Soloeis. Although 
not stated, this temple may have been another coastal establishment in the network 
Hanno was attempting to create. 
The next grouping of settlements emphasises the Phoenician practice of 
settlement which Hanno appears to be using. After establishing the Temple of 
Poseidon, the text states that he founded the five settlements of Karikon Teichos, 
Gytte, Akra, Melitta, and Arambys. The text states they were all settled between Cape 
Soloeis and the Lixus River and the Phoenician settlement of Lixus, which although 
not explicitly mentioned, was already well established. Five Punic settlements within 
46 See Chp. VI, n.192. 
471 Kings 10:22. 
48 It is difficult to connect the settlements mentioned in Hanno's account to the remains of attested 
Punic settlements. Several attempts have been made, but remain questionable. For an insightful listing 
of Punic settlements in modern Morocco (of which several show possible resemblance to those in the 
periplus) see Michel Ponsich, "Territoires utiles du Maroc punique", in PhOnizier im Westen, pp.429-
445. 
49 The uncertainty behind such a claim is primarily because of a lack of evidence. Pliny (NH. V.2) and 
Mela (1.5) claim Antaeus founded the site. Neither provides a satisfactory account. The area of western 
coastal Mauretania in question was in constant contact with and technically under Phoenician and 
Carthaginian control during this period suggesting a possible motive behind settlement. The first Punic 
evidence from the site is dated to the fifth century although there is no physical evidence Carthage 
actually settled the site itself. 
50 Michel Ponsich, Recherches archeologiques a Tangier et dans sa region (Paris 1970) p.169. The 
short distance to Lixus is attested by Pseudo-Scylax (GGM. I. 112, p.93 (ed. Muller) who names 
Thymiaterion as the next settlement north of Lixus. He attests it as a Phoenician settlement. 
89 
a geographical coastline of about 70 km. is an obvious attempt to create a coastal 
network much like the earlier examples of the Phoenicians.51 
Presumably the Carthaginians used the permanent Phoenicio-Punic site of 
Lixus from which they could settle and further explore. It is obvious that Hanno and 
the remnants of his fleet disembarked at Lixus and were well received by its 
inhabitants. The text states that the Carthaginians remained there for some time and 
befriended the Lixitae (Berbers). If we consider the standard Phoenician policy of 
maintaining amicable relationships with local inhabitants bordering their settlements 
this is understood. If the residing inhabitants of Lixus maintained a good relationship 
with the surrounding Lixitae, it is reasonable to assume that Hanno and his entourage 
would also. The extent of Lixitan territory is unknown, and it is possible that Hanno 
used their local knowledge for a considerable distance south of Lixus itself. Finally, 
departing from Lixus, Hanno took Lixitae as interpreters south with him. 
Hanno finally settled a small island named Cerne supposedly three days' 
travel south and east. This final settlement is possibly connected with the old 
Phoenician settlement of Mogador. The island (around one km. in circumference) is 
possibly that of Mogador. The island in question is similar in size to the one described 
by Hanno and has produced archaeological evidence showing sporadic settlement 
since the seventh century including both a Phoenician and Punic presence. 52 This 
island is also attested by Pseudo-Scylax as lying twelve days' sail past the Pillars of 
Heracles.53 He also claims that from this island, the Phoenicians traded with the 
Ethiopians on the mainland.54 It is possible that the Carthaginians were attempting to 
51 It is possible that Phoenicians once dwelt in the area, possibly on a seasonal basis. Strabo claims that 
there were many Phoenician settlements in a bay called Emporicus near Lixus (XVII.3.2, 3.8). He also 
states slightly later that Artemidorus censured Eratosthenes for claiming that many Phoenician cities in 
the area were destroyed by the Pharusii and the Nigritae and of which there is no trace (XVII.3.3). It 
appears that there was some form of Phoenician presence along the West African coast north of Lixus. 
Whether these emporia were present during the time of Hanno' s periplus is unknown. If these sites 
were destroyed as Eratosthenes claims, it is possible that part of Hanno' s mission was to restore a 
network of settlements in this region. As we will see, the text specifically states that Hanno founded 
five settlements between Cape Soloeis and Lixus, the exact area in question. There is no evidence for 
any existence of a network of settlements in this area. 
52 Andre Jodin, Mogador comptoir Phenicien du Maroc Atlantique (Tangier 1966) pp.3ff, 47-52. Jodin 
provides an in-depth archaeological and topographic description of Mogador and the surrounding area. 
There is evidence of Phoenician, Cypriot, Greek, and Punic remains in Mogador attesting constant and 
varied contact with various areas of the Mediterranean. 
53 GGM. 1. 112, p.93 (ed. Muller), 
54 He claims that the Phoenicians traded Attic pottery, Egyptian stone, and perfume. Palaiphatos (F. 31) 
claims that those on Cerne were very wealthy and built a golden statue of Athena (assimilated as Anat). 
This certainly connects Cerne with the more developed Mediterranean world and is reminiscent of 
Herodotus' story of the Carthaginians trading with an unknown group in the area for gold. 
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settle a more permanent base there or to re-establish the old Phoenician port on the 
mainland. The text comments on the distance from Carthage to the Pillars of Heracles 
and from the latter to Ceme as about the same based on the time of the voyage.55 
Although several of these sites remain unknown, a number of standard 
colonial Phoenicio-Punic topographic features become evident. The first example is 
that of Thymiaterion (possibly Tingis). The text specifically states that below the site 
was a large plain (mootov 0' aU'tn /leya imfjv). This suggests the settlement was atop 
an elevated position: a promontory, hill, or plateau. If we assume this was Tingis, the 
site was originally settled on a plateau, elevated around sixty meters above the bay. 
Tingis also possessed a reasonable harbour based in a wide bay. Two such factors are 
prerequisites for permanent Phoenicio-Punic settlement.56 
The next foundation is that of the Temple of Poseidon on Cape Soloeis. 
Although this is not a standard colony, it probably did possess a permanent 
population. According to the text it was founded on a wooded promontory (AtB1YKOV 
a:Kpa't1!ptOV ",acnov O£vOPfcn). Promontories were favourite geographical options for 
both Phoenicians and Carthaginians when settling an area. This site shares the name 
of Soloeis with one of the three original Phoenicio-Punic settlements on Sicily. It is 
possible, like a number of other examples, that this was a common name for a new 
settlement.57 Otherwise the presence of large numbers of trees in the immediate region 
also would have attracted the attention of a sea-faring people such as the 
Carthaginians. 
55 It is difficult to assume where these settlements lay through distancing them by estimating a day's 
sailing. It is likely that the text's division of distances is arbitrary as it is difficult to place on a 
geographical map. Mogador is far enough from the Pillars of Herac1es to make it appear a similar 
distance from Carthage to latter, although it is considerably further than three days' sailing from Lixus. 
This is difficult to gauge owing to factors including prevailing winds and sea currents. The distance 
between settlements also depends on a similar flawed system. It is therefore more profitable assuming a 
settlement's position on the order of its mention while using the time of sailing as more a basic 
supplementary guide. Ponsich, "Territoires utiles du Maroc punique", pp.420ff., gives a good 
indication of the distances between the attested Phoenicio-Punic settlements in the region. Often, like 
in other areas of Phoenicio-Punic settlement, they are often only twenty kilometres (a day's sailing) 
apart. Although the modern settlements remain largely irreconcilable with those settled by Hanno, both 
networks are remarkably similar and typical to Phoenicio-Punic patterns of coastal foundations. 
56 See Ponsich, Recherches archeoiogiques a Tanger et dans sa region, Chp. V. There is early 
Phoenicio-Punic evidence from Tingis dating from the seventh century. Hanno's foundation may have 
been the first permanent settlement of the site or a possible resettlement of an earlier foundation. 
51 Thuc. V12.6. This is probably from the Phoenician 11"0 (sing. sela) or ~'11"0 (plur. sela'im) literally 
meaning rock or cliff. Such a name further emphasises the Phoenicio-Punic practice of founding 
standard settlements on defendable sites. For several Phoenician and Punic examples see Muller, GGM. 
I. p.3, n.3. Ps. Scylax (GGM. I. 112, p.93) also attests this headland along from Phoenician 
Thymiaterion. 
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Although we do not know the exact position of the next group of settlements, 
the etymology of their respective names offers possible reference to their character 
and topography. Karikon Teichos (KaplK6v 'tetXo~) translates simply as Carian walls. 
The presence of the word walls may hint at some form of defence either based on its 
natural geography or actual manufactured city walls. Gytte (ru't'tll, m) is based on a 
Phoenician word basically meaning 'town', although it is normally distinguished by a 
suffix. It may seem unusual to name a settlement 'town', but when we consider 
Carthage in Cyprus and in Libya and New Carthage in Spain simply mean 'New 
Town', and the use of the name Soloeis, it is possible that Gytte may have been a 
foundation along similar lines, i.e. part of a settlement plan of replicating the 
metropolis in the new settlement. The next settlement Akra ("AKpa) is simply 
translated as hill or point. This suggests the site was similar to that of Thymiaterion: 
namely dominating a defensible high ground close to the coast. Melitta (MeAl't'ta) is 
probably from the Phoenician word for mortar or cement (~"~). This also appears to 
contain some defensive connotation. It is possible that the name Melitta is based on 
Melita (Malta), an earlier Phoenician colony. Either possibility or both together 
identify Melitta as a Phoenicio-Punic settlement. Arambys ("Apa~~'\)~) is the final 
example in the group. It is also based on two possible Phoenician terms r:Jll1 i:"1 (har-
anbin), 'the mountain of grapes' or the more likely :Jll1 i:"1 (har-anbi), 'the cluster of 
mountains' .58 Either translation includes a mountain, or at least raised ground of some 
description, which was a preferred location for a Phoenicio-Punic colony. 
Finally there is the island settlement of Cerne (Kepvll). Like several other 
western foundations, such as Motya and Gades, Cerne was settled closely adjacent to 
the mainland. If in fact it was the small island associated with Mogador, it would 
certainly have been founded as a defendable off-shore base for the mainland. If it lay 
in between Mogador and any other Phoenicio-Punic settlement, its distance from the 
mainland would certainly have attracted Hanno as a safe offshore foothold from 
which to trade with and to expand into the mainland. 
The description of Cerne in the text is important in attempting to understand 
Hanno's journey in its entirety. It receives brief, but in the context, detailed 
geographic description. The text describes three other separate islands in a lake as 
58 MUller, GGM. I. p.S, n.S. 
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being bigger than Cerne (IX. dXE V~CiO'Us Al/-LVl1 'tpets /-Lci~ous 'tlls KSpVl1S).59 From 
this brief description, it appears Cerne was proposed to be a Carthaginian port, which 
was recognisable to the rest of the empire. An admission in the text claims: "We 
believed from our periplus that it was directly opposite Carthage, for the voyage from 
Carthage to the Pillars of Herac1es and from there to Cerne seemed alike" (VIII). This 
appears to be a statement detailing the basic geographical position of Cerne and 
indicating it as the final Carthaginian settlement on the West African coast. If 
Hanno's periplus was primarily aimed at founding settlements, Cerne was both the 
terminus and the completion of this primary objective. From the remaining text we 
find Hanno exploring the region surrounding Cerne and using it as a base of 
operations (X. oeeV O~ 1taAlV eX1tOCi'tpS'I'av'tEs eis Kspvl1v e1taV~AeO/-LEV). The first 
action of exploring the Chretes River, a lake, and an anonymous river, before 
returning to Cerne seems rather cautious. It appears that Hanno only sailed for one or 
two days from Cerne and was careful to retreat when confronted with hostile native 
peoples (IX. /-LECi'tO: eXvepamcov eXyplcov Osp/-La'ta e~pEta eVl1/-L/-LEVCOV ot 1ts'tpots 
~aAAov'tEs eX1t~pa~av 'Was KCOAUOV'tES £K~llVat). This would suggest that Cerne was 
not only the limit of Carthaginian settlement, but also that of Carthaginian 
geographical knowledge. The emphasis placed on the foundation of Cerne and its 
position implies that beyond it lay terra incognita to the Carthaginians, and 
presumably the Phoenicians before them. 
With the foundation of Cerne, it is logical that the vast majority of the 30000 
supposed colonists who departed from Carthage were already settled along the West 
African coast. The absence of a large and cumbersome civilian contingent and cargo 
enabled Hanno to embark on his second objective: exploration. The text up to this 
point is rather a dry narrative, concentrating primarily on naming settlements. 
Geographical description is basic or non-existent, making exact identification nearly 
impossible. Cerne is afforded a slightly better description, probably because it was the 
terminus of Carthaginian settlement. The text continues, however, in a completely 
different vein to coincide with the change of Hanno's voyage from colonisation to 
59 Moscati, The World o/the Phoenicians, p.183, believes the three larger islands correspond to those in 
the mouth of the Senegal River near St. Louis. Hanno's description of Ceme and its surrounding 
islands has an obvious resemblance. However, the mouth of the Senegal is several hundred kilometres 
south of Mogador. It is possible a Carthaginian settlement was established here considering the 
expedition probably travelled past this point, although no other Phoenicio-Punic ports are mentioned 
suggesting it was isolated. The other possibility is that Ceme linked with an interior land route. This is 
a possibility, however, it is likely that Ceme was Mogador or at least a site well to the north of Senegal. 
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exploration. It becomes more descriptive, including geographical descriptions of 
lakes, volcanoes, mountains, and forests. We also find descriptions of 'savage' 
natives, gorillas, crocodiles, and hippopotami. The narrative reads like an explorer's 
journal intended to enlighten others at home (i.e. Carthage). It is obvious Hanno had 
no idea what to expect on this leg of the voyage. From the account it appears that 
Hanno was extremely cautious and somewhat nervous during this expedition, relying 
on interpreters and soothsayers. The trepidation, which the Carthaginians experienced 
adventuring into the unknown, is a constant theme on this leg of the journey (XIV. 
<po~o~ oi)v eAa~Ev 'hlla~ Kat Ot llaV'tEt~ fX£AEUOV £KAd1tEtV 'tllV vllcrov; XV, 'taxu 0' 
£K1tAEuO'aV'tE~; XVI. 'taxu 01)V KaKEl:8Ev <po~,,8£V'tE~ a1tE1tAEucraIlEv). 
Probably the best known aspect of Hanno's voyage is his crew's encounter 
with 'gorillas' (rOpiAAa~). The text is ambiguous regarding the exact genus of these 
simian creatures. What is interesting however, is the fact that Hanno and his crew 
captured three females, who while the crew carried them off, bit and tore at them. As 
a result they were slaughtered and skinned with their hides being brought back to 
Carthage (XVIII. 1tOAU oE 1tAdou~ ~O'av Y\)ValKE~ oaO'Elm 'tOl~ 0'00 Ilacr tV . 1i~ Ot 
EPlll1V£E~ £KaAouv rOpiAAa~. OtOOKOV'tE~ oE avopa~ IlEV O'uAAa~Elv OUK 
ftouv"8,,IlEV aAAa 1tav'tE~ (IlEV) E~£<PU'Yov Kp"IlVo~a'tm OV'tE~ Kat 'tOl~ 1t£'tpOt~ 
alluvollEVOt 'YUVatKa~ OE 'tPEl~ at OaKVouO'ai 'tE Kat O'1tapa't'toucrm 'tou~ a'Yov'ta~ 
OUK fl8EAOV £1tEcr8m. a1toK'tdvav'tE~ IlEV'tOt aU'ta~ E~EodpallEv Kat 'ta~ oopa~ 
EKollicrallEv Ei~ KapXl1oova). The notion of capturing unknown creatures alive and 
attempting to carry them off as specimens, and when failing to do so, taking their 
hides back to Carthage, suggests that this was also a mission of quasi-scientific 
exploration. Unfortunately the text finishes after this encounter as with the supplies 
running low, Hanno and his remaining ships returned (presumably stopping at the 
new settlements en route) to Carthage. 
The final leg of exploration poses the question as to why Hanno and Carthage 
in general were interested in the unknown lands to the south of Mogador and/or 
Cerne. It is possible that Hanno had specific orders to explore further south to 
ascertain the viability of further Carthaginian expansion in regard to both trade and 
settlement. The cautious yet curious nature of Hanno and his expedition implies that 
they were attempting to gain a thorough picture of the area, including geography, 
topography, native flora and fauna, and of course potential natural resources. The 
hostile country and inhabitants described in the text coupled with no surviving 
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evidence of settlement south of Cerne suggests that Carthage left its expansion 
southwards there and may not have pursued it further. 
The periplus of Hanno is a unique text in the classical world. The magnitude 
of the journey in both size and distance surpasses any reported contemporary voyage 
of exploration or colonisation. Hanno's voyage took place during a heightened period 
of Carthaginian activity ca. 480-450 and in many ways embodies its new and 
aggressive attitude toward expansion which is noticeable in several areas of 
Carthaginian foreign policy including settlement. 
LATER CARTHAGINIAN COLONISATION 
The final phase of Carthaginian colonisation coincides with the city's most 
tumultuous period starting in the third century and lasted until its destruction in 146. 
The dominating factor during this period was war with Rome. Despite its horrendous 
cost to the Carthaginian coffers, Carthage still managed to continue its policy of 
colonisation. Brief periods of peace allowed Carthage to settle abroad. Although very 
few Carthaginian colonies are attested or even suggested from this period, some exist, 
and afford us insight into contemporary Carthaginian policy and interest abroad. 
CARTHAGONOVA (NEWCARTHAGE) 
New Carthage (modern Cartagena) was to emulate its metropolis in the West. Situated 
on the south-eastern coast of the Spanish peninsula, it was to ensure Carthaginian 
interests and hegemony on both the Atlantic sea-lanes and interior Spain. As its name 
suggests New Carthage was intended to be what Carthage had once been for Tyre: a 
new capital in the West. Founded in 228 by Hasdrubal Barca, it was a testament to the 
Carthaginian ability to recover from defeat during the First Punic War and to repay 
Roman war indemnities.60 Its rapid rise and importance (especially leading up to and 
during the Second Punic War) is relatively well documented in both literary and 
archaeological form. Polybius emphasises the importance of New Carthage when 
60 New Carthage was, to a certain extent, a personal foundation of the eminent Barcid dynasty which 
dominated Carthaginian politics following the First Punic War. Although Hamilcar Barca, his son-in-
law Hasdrubal, and son Hannibal treated the Spanish peninsula as their own private theatre of 
operations, they still answered and looked to Carthage as the capital. It is therefore more prudent to 
consider New Carthage as a Carthaginian and not simply a Barcid foundation. 
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outlining the major causes of the Second Punic War. His third reason for the outbreak 
of war was the success of the Carthaginian enterprise in Spain.61 New Carthage 
continued the Carthaginian trend of frugal colonisation, i.e. sending out very few 
colonies compared to the Phoenicians. However, in committing to a foundation, 
Carthage spared no expense, and New Carthage was an excellent choice of location. 
Unfortunately for the Carthaginians, they were unable to secure their colony for any 
length of time, losing it to Scipio Africanus and the Romans in 209. 
Like other Carthaginian colonies, the real value of New Carthage lay in its 
geographic position and its natural topography. Strabo gives a brief yet good 
summary of the site and its obvious attraction to the Carthaginians: 
It is by far the most powerful city of the country, decked out with formidable 
fortifications with well-built walls, harbours, and a lake, besides the aforementioned 
silver mines. Areas in the vicinity have an abundance of salted fish, and it is a great 
emporion of the sea merchandise for the interior and likewise for the merchandise 
from the interior for exportation.62 
This basic description of the site, and indeed how the Carthaginians developed 
New Carthage, provides us with an array of primary reasons for founding any colony. 
Certainly all would have attracted Carthaginian attention, but naturally, some did 
more so than others. 
The geographic position of New Carthage afforded the Carthaginians with a 
strategic stronghold on the Mediterranean side of the Southern Spanish coast. 
Although Phoenicio-Punic influence still dominated both sides of the entrance to the 
Pillars of Herac1es, Carthage still desired a strong base to entrench its interests in the 
area. The foundation of New Carthage offered a myriad of strategic and economic 
possibilities. As usual the best evidence for the primary motive for founding a colony 
is its immediate historical application; New Carthage is no exception. Diodorus 
provides a basic introduction to events in Southern Spain under the command of 
61 III.10. Polybius claims that the Carthaginian prosperity in Spain filled them with confidence and 
strength. It is more likely that the strength was based on the volume of Spanish silver being used to 
raise an invasion force. 
62 IIIA.6, KpattO'tll1tOA:O tOW taUtn 1tOAEWV. Kat yap EPUf.lVOtll'tl Kat tElXEt KatEO'KEuaO'f.lEVql KaAros; 
Kat Atf.lEO't Kat AtllVn KEKOO'f.llltat Kat tots; trov eXpyuptWV IlEteXAAotS; 1tEpt ci)v Eipl]KaIlEV. KeXVtaUOa 
DE Kat EV tOtS; 1tAllO'tOV t01tOtS; 1tOAAl) iJ taptxEla. Kat EO''tl tOUto Ildt;ov EIl1tOPtoV trov IlEV EK 
OaAeX't'tllS; tOtS; EV tD f.lEO'oyata trov D' EKdOEV tOtS; E~w 1taO'tv. 
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Hamilcar and then Hasdruba1.63 After the death of the former, his son-in-law 
proceeded to defeat any Spanish resistance. Hasdrubal defeated the king of the Orissi, 
captured the twelve cities of Iberia and married the daughter of an Iberian prince. 
Once this was settled, he then founded New Carthage in 228. In this aspect we can see 
the role of New Carthage as a provincial capital. Hasdrubal had captured the main 
centres of Southern Spain and married into royal blood. With the establishment of 
New Carthage, his immediate plan (and certainly that of Hamilcar before him) was to 
establish a settled and quasi-legal reign in Spain based in a new capital. New Carthage 
offered Carthage a provincial capital overseeing the territory of Southern Spain and 
the vital revenue it produced. 
With the subjugation of the Spanish tribes we can see a more aggressive form 
of Carthaginian colonialism. Previously the Phoenicians and, to an increasingly lesser 
degree, Carthaginians established and maintained amicable relationships with native 
populations. The removal of native populations to found New Carthage was a 
complete departure from Phoenician precedent. The Carthaginians were becoming 
increasingly hostile toward troublesome native peoples, but in the case of the Barcids 
in Southern Spain we have an insight into the escalation of this policy. The 
Carthaginians waged war on a presumably allied neighbour for the sole purpose of 
dominating a strategic territory and its mineral wealth. There is no evidence to suggest 
the Spanish tribes invited conflict in an area in which we know of no other hostile 
encounter between the two groups since the end of the sixth century. 
Once Carthaginian dominion was secure in Southern Spain, New Carthage 
assumed its more notable role as a strategic base for military operations. Hasdrubal 
and then Hannibal used their secure base at New Carthage to push northwards and to 
extend their dominion south of the River Ebro. It is interesting that we can identify 
New Carthage rather than Carthage as the more obvious launching pad for Hannibal's 
invasion in 218. Carthage seems a distant influence and almost detached from 
relevant affairs for several years. The use of New Carthage as a base for invasion 
appears as one of its primary military functions. There are several examples of forces 
rallied or wintering there in both the Carthaginian and Roman periods.64 It appears 
that this role of New Carthage became standard for any campaign in the region. 
63 e.g. Diod. XXV.12. 
64 Po1yb. III.l3, III.76, XI.31. 
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Probably the most strategic motive behind the establishment of New Carthage 
was its ability to dominate the rich silver producing areas of Baetica and Andalusia. 
Although Phoenician and subsequently Carthaginian influence in the region saw large 
quantities of bullion extracted from the region, the Carthaginians had shaken off the 
earlier Phoenician reluctance of dominating localised peoples for economic gain. 
Carthage was able to extract large quantities of wealth from the area, rebuilding its 
economy and paying off Roman war indemnities. The value of these mines became 
vital to both Carthage and Rome as valuable sources of income to finance their 
common appetite for expansion. 
If we were to take a basic look at the Carthaginian Empire abroad following its 
defeat in the First Punic War it would appear in decline. Carthage had lost Sardinia 
and Sicily, two regions of vital importance to its power and trading network. The loss 
of Sicily must have hurt the Carthaginian Empire. They had been forced from the 
strategic island on which they had fought to maintain and increase their presence 
since the late sixth century. As a result Carthage no longer dominated the important 
straits between North Africa and Sicily. It is therefore logical that Carthage should 
tum to Spain and found New Carthage in the manner they had founded Lilybaeum in 
Sicily at the beginning of the fourth century. Phoenicio-Punic influence held sway 
over a relatively underdeveloped and potentially valuable territory. Carthage needed 
to reverse the trend of losing provinces of its empire by incorporating a new and 
extensive area of control. New Carthage and the territory it dominated offered 
Carthage an exclusive area of operations, which at least temporarily was beyond the 
interests of the Greeks and Romans. 
The general position of New Carthage also emphasises a greater potential 
which mostly went unfulfilled under Carthaginian control. The rapid growth and 
importance of New Carthage within a few years of its foundation is reminiscent of 
other Carthaginian sites such as Ebusus and Lilybaeum. Its strategic position, good 
harbour, and formidable defences characterised it as a standard Carthaginian-style 
foundation. The position of New Carthage, dominating the northern coastal entrance 
to the Pillars of Heracles indicates a new network of Carthaginian, or at least 
Carthaginian controlled strongholds in the area. The Phoenician colonial network 
(especially in Southern Spain) had never become fully entrenched with an attached 
hinterland. Carthage now sought permanent foundations, which would dominate both 
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coast and interior. With New Carthage established, a line of coastal settlements was 
complete. From Gades, possibly to Tingis, to Malaca, to New Carthage, and finally 
Ebusus, there was a distinct line of Carthaginian power. The importance of New 
Carthage to its surrounding strongholds is evident in our sources. After the loss of 
New Carthage to the Romans, Mago attempted to recapture it. He set out from Gades 
and moved along the coast (Le. past Malaca).65 He returned there after failing, and 
upon being shut out from Gades, he proceeded to the island of Pityussa and 
presumably the settlement of Ebusus.66 Sertorius attempted a similar journey during 
the Roman period in the first century Be. Plutarch claims that he attempted to capture 
New Carthage, and upon being repulsed, he attacked Pityussa. He failed in that also 
and retreated past the Pillars of Herac1es to Gades.67 Pompey, during his campaign in 
the West also attacked Ebusus before moving on to New Carthage.68 This network of 
strong coastal foundations seems to have outlived its purpose under Carthaginian 
control. 69 
The topography of New Carthage bears witness to its purpose as a 
Carthaginian colony and strategic base in Southern Spain. Although looking at its 
geographical position in a broad context hints at its strategic value and application, the 
foundation itself and its surrounding topography demonstrates several of its purposes. 
Like any Phoenician or Carthaginian settlement, a site needed a serviceable 
harbour. New Carthage possessed one of the best harbours in antiquity. Several 
ancient commentators remark on the layout of the harbour and its benefits in 
antiquity. Polybius and Livy describe the harbour itself as a broad gulf (KOA.1tO';;) 
which is protected from the open sea by an island resulting in a large and calm 
harbour almost landlocked.7o Naturally, during his account of the Second Punic War, 
Polybius tells of its military application as it could accommodate an entire £leet.7l 
Both the Carthaginians and Romans employed the harbour of New Carthage as a 
naval base for various operations, but in particular as an invasion point for Spain. 
65 Livy XXVllI.36-38. 
66 Livy (XXVllI.37.3) claims that at this time the Carthaginians (i.e. not Phoenicians as earlier 
described) populated the island. 
67 Plut. Ser. VII-VIII. 
68 Casso Dio XLllI.29-30. 
69 It appears that the Romans also used the Carthaginian method of networked coastal bases. This 
becomes obvious in their occupation of the territory around the Ebro to the north of New Carthage and 
their foundation of Tarraco by the Scipiones. It is interesting that Pliny claims Tarraco was founded by 
the Scipiones in the same manner that New Carthage was by the Carthaginians (111.21). 
10 Polyb. XI.10; Livy XXVI.42 
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Strabo writes of the harbour of New Carthage and its other important use of trade. 
Although brief, he emphasises the role of New Carthage as a centre for the emporia72 
in both importing produce from the sea and foreign goods into the interior and 
likewise exporting goods from the interior abroad. Naturally this system was based 
largely on maritime traffic and therefore needed a functional harbour, which New 
Carthage certainly possessed. Much like the old Phoenician colonies, New Carthage 
assumed the role of an intermediary coastal trading establishment which interacted 
between the Carthaginian controlled coast (and beyond) and the native populations 
and industries of the interior. Although only existing as a Carthaginian settlement for 
less than twenty years, New Carthage and its harbour assumed their dual mercantile 
and military role in accordance with Carthaginian policy. 
The basic position of New Carthage on land is testament to its importance as a 
Carthaginian provincial capital and defensive stronghold. Naturally it stood on a 
promontory, which was a Phoenicio-Punic norm. The town itself was flanked by 
several hills and an extensive lagoon.73 This lagoon protected the western approach 
and bounded the northern side of the city as the sea did the east and south. There were 
several high hills, which guarded the entrance to the city and gave it the impression of 
impregnability.74 In true Phoenicio-Punic fashion, the Carthaginians were quick to 
augment the defences of New Carthage by constructing perimeter walls. These walls 
were high and particularly difficult to breach.75 The natural terrain and man-made 
defences of New Carthage made it a formidable target for attack. Its rapid capitulation 
to Scipio in 209 belies its defensive strength. It was rather Scipio's military ingenuity 
mixed with Carthaginian lethargy which saw New Carthage fall into Roman hands so 
rapidly. 
The site of New Carthage was the paragon of Carthaginian expansive 
colonisation. It was positioned to augment the Carthaginian chain of strategic seaports 
7lX.8. 
72 This term is generically applied to the network of mostly Phoenician sea-ports along the coast of 
North Africa (Polyb. III.23). During this period however, the networked coastal ports along the 
southern coast of Spain were remarkably similar in configuration and purpose. 
73 Polybius gives a detailed account of its topography having visited the site some time in the second 
half of the second century. (X.l 0). 
14 Polybius (X. 10) names the hills: Asc1epius was the largest and protected the eastern side of the city 
(it also had a temple to the god on its summit); on the western side stood the Arx Hasdrubalis which 
contained the Punic palace (and was the last pocket of resistance against Scipio in 209); there were 
three smaller, but rugged hills to the north named Hephastion, Aletes, and Cronos. The only level 
approach to New Carthage was from the south (i.e. from the harbour). 
75 X.l3; Livy XXVI.4S. 
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in the area. It could link with its metropolis easily with other Carthaginian towns and 
had access to the interior. New Carthage retained a Phoenician character by 
possessing a good harbour and defences while dominating a strategic headland. In 
Phoenician times this would have been normal but with a purely mercantile purpose. 
By the later stages of the third century, Carthaginian colonisation still sought potential 
trade, but was also geared for dominance at sea and on land. New Carthage is 
testament to this change exercising its role as a strategic base for invasion and 
expansion.76 
The final aspect of New Carthage of obvious importance is its natural 
resources. In the case of New Carthage it is a special circumstance that (unlike the 
majority of other Phoenician and Carthaginian colonies) it commanded vast resources 
of silver and to a lesser extent other metals such as gold and copper. Polybius once 
again provides the best account of the scale of the silver production around New 
Carthage claiming that the silver veins lay just over 3.5 km. from the town and 
occupied a circuit of some 73.5 km. He claims 40000 men worked the mines, which 
yielded 25000 drachmae per day during the Roman period.77 Polybius is certainly 
providing numbers from the Roman period when he visited the site. The only 
evidence of the amount of bullion extracted during Punic times is the amount of booty 
Scipio captured at New Carthage in 209. If we were to calculate the surviving figures 
of precious metals from our sources we begin to grasp the potential wealth of New 
Carthage. Polybius reckons 276 gold platters and over 8318 kg. of silver. The silver 
extracted (based on the figures of the Roman period) was about 108 kg. per day. 
Scipio's hoard of 8318 kg. would have required about 77 days' labour to extract.78 
76 The image of New Carthage as a base of operations is shown after its capture by Scipio. Both Livy 
(XXVI.47) and Polybius (X.19.2) remark on the tremendous amounts of booty seized from the 
captured town. Livy lists this as 120 heavy catapults, 281lighter catapults, 75 ballistae, a large quantity 
of scorpions, and large amounts of ammunition. He also claims that 276 gold platters and 8318 kg. of 
silver (in various form) was taken. Finally 400000 measures of wheat, 270000 measures of barley as 
well as 63 merchantmen with full cargoes of grain, arms, rope, bronze, iron, and sail-cloth. This 
captured booty, whether accurate or not, is interesting as it also shows New Carthage as a possible 
storehouse for invasion. The majority of heavy weaponry attested is for siege warfare, by that stage 
vital in any offensive land campaign. The large quantities of foodstuffs identify New Carthage as a 
clearinghouse to keep Carthaginian armies supplied. The vast amounts of moveable bullion present in 
New Carthage shows its importance to the Carthaginian economy and that of the silver mines it 
dominated, but also its function as a type of depository. The wealth resting there had not been exported 
back to Carthage. This suggests that it was earmarked to finance the war effort especially when we 
consider the Carthaginian and indeed Hannibal's reliance on mercenaries. 
77 Polyb. XXXIV.9; Strabo III. 147. 
78 The figures provided by Polybius are based on unleaded silver. He provides a description of the 
filtering process required to remove lead in order to create pure silver. The ore is broken up and sieved 
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Although we have no definite figures during the Punic period, the amount of 
moveable wealth sitting in the treasury of New Carthage coupled with the 
Carthaginian ability to pay the Roman war indemnity and start a full-scale invasion 
implies that they were ruthlessly mining the surrounding territories.79 
Phoenicio-Punic interest in the rich silver and gold producing areas of 
Southern Spain was established from an early period. The Phoenicians were probably 
trading with Tartessus and the rich areas around the Guadalquivir River from Gades 
since pre~classical times. Although they grew extremely wealthy from such trade, it 
never presumed anything more. The growth of an expansive nature in Carthaginian 
society and colonisation took the process a step further to include settlement, 
expansion inland, and domination of every aspect of production: from extraction to 
export. 
Besides the obvious attraction of gold and silver-rich territories, New Carthage 
possessed other natural resources useful to its economy. The area surrounding the 
town abounded in esparto grass.80 Among its many uses as bedding, fuel, clothing, 
and fodder, it was woven into rope. This was a useful commodity to a primarily sea-
faring people. In its raw form, Pliny claims the grass was too expensive to export, 
probably to North Africa, which he previously states had very sparse supplies. It is 
possible however, that New Carthage was exporting woven rope abroad to 
Carthaginian and foreign states alike. Scipio's captured booty from New Carthage 
includes 63 merchant ships, which had at least some cargoes of esparto for rope-
making.81 It is possible that the purpose of this captured fleet was trade and the 
presence of esparto grass suggests it was an exportable commodity. 
Another natural resource, which New Carthage could, and most certainly did 
exploit, was its natural fisheries. Although typical of a number of settlements (both 
through water three times before it was finally melted and the lead poured off. This process would have 
required a great deal of labour as Polybius states. The quantities of silver produced in Roman and 
Carthaginian periods respectively must have required huge workforces. This may also help explain the 
enormous quantities of foodstuffs in New Carthage. If these mines produced state funds they certainly 
would have been worked by state labour andlor slaves, which would have been fed from state-owned 
reserves. 
79 Much like the hinterland surrounding Gades, that adjoining New Carthage was rich in deposits of 
silver. It also had various deposits of lead, tin, copper, and iron. The whole south-eastern portion of the 
Spanish peninsula, especially Baetica and Andalusia, abounds in alluvial deposits of silver brought 
down from the Pyrenees (see Diod. V.3S.4-S). For an overview of Phoenician silver extraction in the 
region see Aubet, The Phoenicians and the West, pp.236-241, 249-266. 
80 Pliny NH. XIX. 26-27 , claims that the mountainsides around New Carthage were covered in a strip 
around 160 lan. long by 48 km. wide, also see Livy XXII.20.6. 
81 Livy XXVI.47. 
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Phoenicio-Punic and Greek), New Carthage and its ready supply of salt-pans enabled 
it to create a prosperous fish-curing industry. Strabo remarks on the importance and 
abundance of the salted fish industry.82 The production of garum (fish oil) was 
facilitated, and New Carthage became noted as a major centre of export.83 
The benefits of the site of New Carthage and the natural resources it oversaw 
were certainly an incentive for Carthaginian settlement. Even if we were to subtract 
the wealth produced from its silver trade, New Carthage had an industrial and 
mercantile potential from its other resources, which it possessed in abundance. 
The Carthaginian foundation of New Carthage was the greatest of all its 
colonies. Although not even lasting twenty years under Carthaginian control, it had 
the potential to rival Carthage as a capital in the West. The rapid eminence of the 
settlement emphasises this claim. If the Carthaginians had realised its true potential 
perhaps they would have taken greater care to defend it. 
Although New Carthage stands as the only well-documented Carthaginian 
colony during this period, it characterises the shift in Carthaginian foreign policy. 
New Carthage was settled to dominate. This is shown in its initial foundation after the 
sUbjugation of native Spanish tribes. The site was then organised to maintain 
Carthaginian dominance in Southern Spain while actively reaping the mineral wealth 
from its surrounding areas. Unlike other Phoenician settlements, New Carthage came 
with an established hinterland, which had been cleared in advance. New Carthage was 
nearly a complete departure from the older standard Phoenician model of settlement -
though topography and an innate mercantile nature still show strong connections to 
older traditions. Otherwise it shows a new style of Carthaginian colony, settled and 
maintained in an aggressive manner. Later Carthaginian colonialism had, like other 
aspects of society, become distinctive from earlier precedent and was now discernable 
as characteristically Carthaginian. 
OTHER CARTHAGINIAN COLONIES 
One curious aspect of Carthaginian colonisation is the small number of identifiable 
Carthaginian colonies. Although we have several solid examples, when we compare 
82 III.4.6. 
83 Pliny NH. XXXI.94. During Pliny's time the best and most expensive garum was made from the 
scomber (mackerel) in New Carthage. 
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the expansive and mercantile nature of Carthage to similar states such as Corinth, 
Miletus, and Phocaea, the number of its known colonies pales by comparison. In 
addition to this, if we look at Carthaginian attempts at colonisation with examples 
such as Lilybaeum, New Carthage, and Hanno's periplus, it appears that Carthage was 
a highly developed and experienced colonising state. There is some scanty evidence, 
however, suggesting Carthage did found a number of its own colonies or settlements 
in addition to those better attested. Unfortunately such evidence is often hearsay, 
passing reference, or otherwise dubious, providing extremely limited information. As 
a result, the position, nature, and even date of these foundations are often unknown. 
At least such examples suggest that the extent of Carthaginian colonisation was 
possibly larger than previously thought. 
The first type of Carthaginian colonies mentioned are those, which although 
remain unclear, offer us insight into one form of Carthaginian colonisation, or perhaps 
better, recolonisation. According to Claudian, the Southern Sardinian stronghold of 
Su1cis was founded by Carthage (pars adit antiqua ductos Karthagine Sulcos).84 We 
know with a degree of certainty that the Phoenicians originally founded Sulcis. 
Claudian's claim may seem incorrect, but evidence from the site suggests that it was 
later heavily influenced by the Carthaginians owing to the latter's longstanding 
occupation of the site. Both Pausanias and Strabo make the same mistake and claim 
that the site (along with neighbouring Caralis) was populated (and presumably 
founded) by Carthaginians. 85 A similar example survives in Stephanus of Byzantium 
regarding the island of Melita (Malta). He states that the city on the island was 
colonised by the Carthaginians (MtAl-tll, EO''tt Kat 7t6At~ a7tOtKO~ KapX1l8ovtrov).86 
Although the city on Malta is not specifically named, we know that the island was 
colonised by the Phoenicians in several locations and was once identified as a 
Phoenician island. 87 Once again we have direct conflict in our literary and 
archaeological sources. It is possible that both Su1cis and the unknown settlement on 
Malta were in fact original Phoenician colonies, which appear as being resettled by 
the Carthaginians or had developed into Punic centres. As we will see, the 
Carthaginians often preferred more unorthodox methods of settlement including re-
establishing older sites. With this in mind, it is easy to forgive our sources for 
84XV.S18. 
85 Paus. X.17.S; Strabo V.2.7. Pausanias states that both cities were in fact on Corsica. 
86 Steph. Byz. S.v. MEAl-tll. 
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attributing such foundations to the Carthaginians, whereas they were actually original 
Phoenician settlements. 
There are other examples of possible Carthaginian settlements courtesy of 
brief accounts in Diodorus and Stephanus of Byzantium. Unfortunately both authors 
provide only a brief account of the supposed settlements leaving us scant information 
with which to identify them. Stephanus provides two such examples. The first is the 
town of Akkabikon Teichos (s.v. 'AKKa~lKov 'tEtXO';) which was apparently near the 
Pillars of Heracles and in the vicinity of Salmuka (s.v. "LaAl-LuKa, possibly identified 
with Salduba in Baetica). Both Phoenician and Carthaginian activity is well known in 
the region. It is possible that Carthage may have established a settlement in the area or 
refounded an existing Phoenician site. The other possible settlement attested by 
Stephanus is that of Charmis (s.v. Xapl-Ll<;) in Sardinia. He simply states K'ttcrl-La 
KapX1100Vtrov, giving us no further information. Once again we are aware of the 
strong Phoenician and Carthaginian presence on the island and it is conceivable a 
Carthaginian colony was founded there or an older Phoenician settlement was 
redefined as a Carthaginian settlement. Diodorus provides even less information in his 
account of Carthaginian colonies in Spain. He states that Hamilcar Barca founded 
Acra Leuce (" AKpa AEUKI1) or modern Alicante.88 Although the site is described as a 
large city, the site was Phoenician in origin dating from as early as the ninth century.89 
Its new application as a military base rather than a trading port certainly altered the 
nature of the site and goes some way in explaining Diodorus' source's oversight. 
Continuing, Diodorus then claims that Hasdrubal Barca, after founding New 
Carthage, founded another city wishing to outdo his father-in-law Hamilcar (OSEV 
EK'ttcrE napaSaAaO'crtaV n6Aw ~v npocrl1yopeuO'e Neav KaPXl100va Kat f:tepav 
1t6AW UO''tEPOV SeArov 't'hv 'Al-LtAKa ouval-Lw {)1tEP~f1Vat).90 Unfortunately that is all 
the information regarding this settlement. Although completely unknown otherwise, it 
is possible a second, certainly minor colony or settlement was founded near New 
Carthage. The Carthaginians were certainly active in this area of Spain and their 
contemporary aggression coupled with their interest in the area may have encouraged 
them to settle an additional site to assert their new dominance. 
87 Diod. V.12.2-3, and Chp. I, n.149-160 and text. 
88 xxv. 10.3. 
89 Maria Eugenia Aubet Semmler, "Phoenician trade in the West: Balance and Perspectives", in The 
Phoenicians in Spain, p.106. 
90 Diod. XXV .12. 
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It is possible that the Carthaginians founded numerous other colonies and 
settlements. If we look at the voyage of Himilco along the North Atlantic coastline as 
a voyage of exploration and trade, it is possible that he may have founded, visited, or 
paved the way for one or several Carthaginian coastal settlements. This becomes a 
distinct possibility when we consider the periplus of Hanno earlier in the same 
century and possible trade with Southern Britain and Europe, which would require 
ports en route. Also within the Mediterranean there is ample scope for additional 
Carthaginian settlements. A prime example is that of the Aegates Islands off the west 
coast of Sicily. Valerius Maximus claims that during the final stages of the First Punic 
War, Q. Fulvius Flaccus ravaged the wealthy Aegates Islands in full view of Carthage 
(nam ab altaribus patr<i>s profectus Egadas opulentissimas in conspectu 
Carthaginis populatus est}.91 Whatever stood on the Aegates Islands must have been 
worth a great deal to affect the Carthaginians. Although little is directly stated, the 
Carthaginian presence in the area coupled with this reference suggests the possibility 
of some form of Carthaginian settlement there.92 A similar scenario can be applied to 
Lipara to the north of Sicily. The Carthaginians occupied the site some time around 
288 and were finally expelled by the Romans in 252.93 The Carthaginians occupied 
the island for over thirty-five years. Presumably they maintained some form of 
settlement, most likely military.94 The potential of any number of unknown 
Carthaginian settlements existing, like Phoenician settlements before them, must 
remain a possibility, although with the evidence we have, little more. 
The possibility of original Carthaginian colonies being founded is definitely 
worth mention. Unfortunately, like so many other aspects of Carthage, we are 
hindered by a lack of solid evidence. Basic literary allusion hints at possible 
911.3.2. Valerius Maximus is probably referring to either the Carthaginian fleet, Drepana, or Lilybaeum 
on mainland Sicily. 
92 Carthaginian settlement, or at least activity is possible on other smaller islands in the area, Chp. I, 
n.168. We find further literary evidence of possible Carthaginian activity on the Aegates Islands. 
During the First Punic War, Polybius (1.44) claims that a fleet under Hannibal were anchored off the 
island of Aegusae, which lie between Lilybaeum and Carthage. Presumably the island (which can only 
be the one of the Aegates Islands) had some form of Carthaginian presence deterring Roman 
intetference. A further possible example is that the Aegates Islands were abandoned by Carthage in 
accordance with the peace terms following the First Punic War. The peace terms simply state that 
Carthage was to evacuate all islands between Sicily and North Africa, presumably the Aegates Islands 
were understood as part of this arrangement (Polyb. 163). 
93 Diod. XXIII.20; Polyb. I.21, 1.39; Zonar. VIII. 12. 
94 An anecdote surviving in Diodorus (V. II) tells of an island named Osteodes (,Oa1:I':OOO'l1';) to the west 
of Lipara which gained its name ('Bony') owing to the large number of Carthaginian mercenaries 
abandoned their who perished. Although fanciful, it does connect the Carthaginian activity with such 
islands. 
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settlements but offers little further information, especially if the sites are otherwise 
unidentified. Whether the examples discussed were Carthaginian settlements or not is 
difficult to decide with any degree of certainty. Probably the strongest evidence in 
their favour is the other, better-attested colonial activities of Carthage, which show it 
as an active colonising state over a long period of time. Otherwise the examples we 
have seen are all geographically consistent with Carthaginian territory and activity. 
There is a strong likelihood that these colonial foundations and a number of other 
original Carthaginian settlements were established but are not attested by our sources 
and thus remain unknown. 
The original nature of Carthaginian colonisation was certainly developed from 
the Phoenicians. The Phoenicians settled an array of sites both temporary and 
permanent to facilitate trade. The earlier Carthaginian colonies were obviously 
influenced by this and continued to function in a typically Phoenician manner. As 
Carthage developed its own nature and foreign policies, we find obvious departures 
from the original Phoenician model. As a result we find Carthaginians settling sites in 
order to fulfil different functions. As a result, the Carthaginians settled various types 
of foundations, which cannot be categorised as strict colonies or emporia. Sites such 
as New Carthage and Lilybaeum were settled primarily as strategic capitals in 
important provinces. The founding of Ebusus reflects the nascent expansionist state of 
Carthage settling abroad under the protection of the Phoenicians. The extravagant 
periplus of Hanno reflects the contemporary confident mood of Carthage to expand its 
trade and settlement patterns in an undeveloped area. 
Carthage was fortunate to inherit much of the old Phoenician 'Empire' in the 
West, enabling it to use colonisation as an important but periodic tool for expansion 
abroad. With territory dominating much of the Western Mediterranean's coastlines 
and shipping lanes, it possessed an empire based on extensive coastal networks. As a 
result, the expansive nature of Carthage was continually looking for further foreign 
territory both for trade and to dominate. With little opportunity within the 
Mediterranean proper, Carthage sent out such expeditions by Hanno and later Himilco 
to colonise, trade, and explore. 
With considerable areas under its control, Carthage was able to choose its 
settlements carefully. Carthage founded few original large settlements, but when it did 
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so, they were highly strategic and well executed. This is a contributing factor to the 
small number of original Carthaginian colonies attested. Such a policy is 
demonstrated by the cities of Lilybaeum and New Carthage, which were situated on 
excellent sites with good harbours and were well defended. Often the Carthaginians 
would settle an area to increase their influence and either create or maintain a strong 
coastal network. The periplus of Hanno is a perfect example of such a policy. If the 
figures are accurate, he embarked with 30000 settlers on sixty ships, which would 
have cost a fortune and taken years to organise. Within more congested areas of the 
Mediterranean, Carthage often capitalised on opportunities to settle and increase their 
influence in a given area. This can be seen after the destruction of Motya and the 
subsequent settlement of Lilybaeum. 
Although we have looked at three specific periods, taken as a whole, Carthage 
settled abroad for over four centuries. Unlike the separate Greek states, which 
colonised for shorter periods, Carthage used forms of settlement as a specific tool of 
foreign policy, along with expansion and trade. Only employing colonisation when it 
suited them, the Carthaginians were able to send out carefully selected expeditions 
over sustained periods. With only several properly attested settlements over its entire 
history, it emphasises the careful and deliberate nature of the Carthaginians in regard 
to colonisation and settlement abroad. 
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IV. CARTHAGINIAN DEVELOPMENT: 
POPULATION, SETTLEMENT, AND TERRITORY 
One of the unique and perhaps underestimated aspects of the Carthaginians' foreign 
policy was their habit of developing settlements and areas under their control. The 
Phoenician system of settlement comprising large coastal networks of varied centres 
was designed to dominate local and seaborne trade and worked well for the 
Phoenicians in the West where they could operate exclusively. The absence of 
Phoenician interest in conquering territory coupled with the lack of any competitive 
state in many areas facilitated this system for several centuries. The advent of 
Carthage and its annexation of this old Phoenician-style empire in the sixth and fifth 
centuries coincided with several defining factors in the Western Mediterranean. 
Carthage was under increasing pressure to defend its new empire against the 
interests of foreign rivals such as the Greeks and to a lesser extent the Etruscans and 
Romans.' Attempting to drive off rivals by acts of random piracy such as capturing 
ships and drowning foreign sailors as the Phoenicians had once done was no longer 
going to deter foreign powers. Within the boundaries of the old Phoenician Empire, 
but without the steadying influence and traffic of the Phoenicians, areas with once 
prosperous and lucrative trade routes were becoming decrepit and obsolete. Carthage 
needed to assert itself in areas such as North Africa, Sardinia, and Southern Spain to 
secure its influence. Probably the most influential factor was the growing 
Carthaginian desire for a more 'orthodox' empire. Although owing much to their 
Phoenician origins and culture, they were not content to continue a settled mercantile 
empire. They departed from the Phoenician precedent and were willing to employ 
various methods to dominate foreign territory and to create a more conventional 
empire based on conquest and subjugation. Trade was still paramount to the 
Carthaginians' interests and they remained, like the Phoenicians before them, eager to 
expand their mercantile interests abroad and the subsequent income it accrued. The 
Carthaginians, however, rightly supposed that a strong military presence rather than 
more laissezjaire tactics would facilitate such trade and influence. 
1 Carthage fought several campaigns to halt the spread of Greek expansion into the Far West. The 
Etruscans were steady allies and trading partners with Carthage, although the Carthaginians were alert 
to their own interests. Polybius (III.22-23) discusses the treaty sworn with Rome in 509/8 BC which 
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Carthage was now forced to adopt varied methods of foreign policy to deal 
with the changing social and political climate in the West in order to maintain its 
influence. Major factors such as trade, conquest, and settlement all became standard 
staples of Carthaginian policy abroad. More specifically, depending on circumstance, 
the Carthaginians pursued active policies of redeveloping older settlements, 
streamlining or reorganising entire coastal networks, and relocating entire populations 
to suit their needs. Often these activities coincided with internal or external pressure 
forcing the Carthaginians to adopt methods not standard to most Greek 
contemporaries. Naturally, factors such as economic pressure, conflict, and expansion 
often dictate such movements. Like other aspects of Carthaginian foreign policy, 
these activities were sporadic and often appear over broad chronological periods 
suggesting that they were solutions for temporary events rather than a standard or 
universal trend. Unlike the Greeks or Romans for instance who colonised profusely 
according to standard models, the Carthaginians employed such unconventional 
tactics in addition to more standard colonial and military activities. 
POPULATION MOVEMENT 
One of the more unusual activities of the Carthaginians was their tendency to remove 
and resettle entire populations from one established town or city to another, usually 
under their own control. This is not entirely unprecedented in Greek society with such 
examples including the removal of the population of Attica to Troezen, and also to 
Aegina and Salamis in the face of the oncoming Persians in 480.2 However, we also 
see Hieron's resettling of Catana as Aetna with the original population of the former 
and his moving of Naxos to Leontini? Meanwhile the Sicel King Ducetius moved the 
population of Menai to Palice in 453.4 These examples, however, were more the 
exception than the rule with only the Syracusan tyrants regularly using such a tactic.s 
There are several surviving instances in our sources detailing the Carthaginians' 
removing entire (or partial) populations to suit their needs. Like the Greek examples, 
forbids the Romans to pass the Fair Promontory (see Chp. VI, n.36). It is likely that this clause was 
consistent with that which Carthage had sworn previously with the Etruscans. 
2 Hdt. VIII.41.2. 
3 Diad. XI.49. 
4 Diad. XI.88.6. 
5 e.g. In 476 Hieron, after removing the local popUlations from Naxos and Catana, settled the site of 
Aetna with ten thousand chosen colonists (Diod. XI.49). 
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such an action was usually employed during times of war or upheaval. This method of 
population movement became particularly favoured during the Punic Wars when 
troublesome, defeated, or even allied towns could be monitored, neutralised or 
protected accordingly. Although these accounts are often brief they do allow insight 
into a distinctive Carthaginian tactic. 
The earliest example of Carthage literally relocating a population is that of the 
evacuation of the civilian popUlation of Tyre in 332. Carthage came to the aid of its 
besieged metropolis and evacuated an undisclosed number of women and children.6 
Diodorus initially claims that only part of the popUlation was removed to safety but 
later contradicts himself by stating the majority had been removed to Carthage and 
presumably resettled.7 This instance is an exception compared with other examples of 
Carthaginian population resettlement. Normally Carthage was the aggressive state 
deliberately choosing to relocate a subject or defeated city. In the case of Tyre, 
however, Carthage was fulfilling filial ties with its metropolis and saving a portion of 
its population from the army of Alexander. 
The first and more typical examples of the Carthaginians relocating entire 
populations date from the First Punic War. Preceding the protracted Roman siege of 
Lilybaeum in 250, the Carthaginians sought to abandon non-essential or unpractical 
military sites and maintain and fortify a few enclaves in Western Sicily. The first 
example was the resettling of the popUlation of the old Megarian colony of Selinus to 
Lilybaeum.8 After the defeat of Hasdrubal at Panormus and the arrival of a large 
Roman fieet,9 the Carthaginians retreated from Selinus, took its population to 
Lilybaeum, and then razed the old city to the ground.1o Selinus was traditionally a 
well-fortified city possessing a good harbour, however, its fortifications and power 
had waned since 409 when it had been defeated by Carthage. The Carthaginians 
deemed it more strategic to remove the allied population to safety in Lilybaeum and to 
leave nothing for the oncoming Roman forces. 
6 Diod. XVIl.41.1; Justin XI.I0.14; Curtius IV.3.20. 
7XVIl46.4. 
8 Diod. XXIV.l.l, tnV oe LeA.tVoUVt{rov 1tOA.tV KapXT\06vtot Ka'tucrKa'l'UVtes ,.1IonpKtcrav d s to 
A1A.Upatov. 
9 Polyb. I.40-41. 
10 SeHnus and Carthage had a long and often changeable relationship. Originally Selinus was allied to 
Carthage and supported it prior to the Battle of Himera in 480. Despite Hannibal's destruction of the 
city in 409 (Diod. XIlI.54), it was repopulated and remained a relatively peaceful ally of Carthage. 
After its destruction in 250 it remained uninhabited during antiquity. 
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The Carthaginian evacuation of non-essential civilian sites continued in 
Western Sicily. Preceding the Roman naval defeat at Drepana in 249,11 Diodorus 
claims that the Carthaginians removed the population of Eryx, replaced it in Drepana, 
and destroyed the former site except for the Temple of Venus and its surrounds. 12 The 
Romans proceeded to occupy the abandoned site, installing a garrison. Although an 
important sanctuary of Astarte, the Carthaginians were forced to sacrifice the site in 
the face of Roman land and naval forces. The fortification of Drepana proved 
successful, as it remained the only free Carthaginian port in Sicily along with 
Lilybaeum. 
The two examples of resettling the respective populations of Selinus and Eryx 
during the First Punic War demonstrate an intentional Carthaginian tactic. The fact 
that in both cases the population was removed and the site destroyed shows the 
Carthaginians were right to fortify a few specific sites in Western Sicily to suit their 
strategy, on the assumption that it would be easier to concentrate their forces instead 
of spreading them over large areas of operation. Another point of interest is that 
neither site was strictly Carthaginian. Selinus was a long-time ally of Carthage but 
remained Greek; Eryx was an important Punic sanctuary, but remained an Elymian 
site. Although the Carthaginians were protecting themselves and their allies, 
ultimately they were not surrendering their own foundations. Carthage was eventually 
defeated in the First Punic War, however, neither Drepana nor Lilybaeum were 
captured by siege despite constant Roman interest, partly justifying this Carthaginian 
tactic. 
Despite the defeat in the First Punic War, the relative success of employing 
population movement and resettlement as a defensive tactic encouraged the 
Carthaginians to continue it during the Second Punic War. Hannibal found himself 
confronted with several fickle Greek states in Southern Italy in 215. The two states of 
Locri and Croton were eventually convinced to accept to similar peace terms. 
Hannibal decided to evacuate the population of the well-defended site of Croton to 
Locri.13 The removal of the threat of Croton offered a number of benefits to Hannibal. 
By removing a possible threat and combining it with a similar town such as Locri, the 
threat of possible insurrection was lessened. Also, gaining the site of Croton appeased 
11 Polyb. 1.49-52. 
12 XXIII.9.4, 'to O{: LlpE1tayOY 'tE1Xtcra<; Kat 1tOA,tV Ka'tacr'tTJcra<; IlE'tCPKWE 'tou<; 'EPUKtYOU<; Kat 'tOY 
"EpUKa l«X.'tEcrKa'l'E 1tA,fJY 'tou 1tEpt 'to lEpOY 't01tOU. 
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Hannibal's Bruttian allies. This not only pleased them but handed Hannibal a safe 
allied base of operations. Locri proved to be a defendable site for Hannibal just a few 
years after when it was besieged by Lucius Cincius in 208.14 Although it was nearly 
taken during this siege, it proved to be a solid and strategic fortified town for the 
Carthaginians in Bruttium. 15 
Hannibal employed a similar tactic in Herdonea in 210. Confronted by the 
proconsul Gaius Fulvius, Hannibal defeated the Roman army. The neighbouring town 
of Herdonea, which had been an ally of Carthage, was allegedly prepared to change to 
the Roman side if the Carthaginians had left Lucania. Hannibal promptly burnt the 
town to the ground and resettled the population in Thurii and Metapontum. 16 The 
motive behind such an action is obvious, as it was in Croton five years previous. 
Hannibal was removing the population of a potentially perfidious ally and relocating 
it to a more secure site. Like the examples during the First Punic War, the site was 
razed so as to prevent it from being utilised by the Romans.17 The destination of the 
exiled population of Herdonea was Thurii and Metapontum, two Carthaginian allies, 
which would serve as virtual internment camps to monitor any possible uprising. 
In the later stages of Hannibal's Italian campaign there is evidence to suggest 
that he continued the Carthaginian policy of actively removing and resettling entire 
populations to suit his strategies. By 204, Scipio Africanus had crossed into North 
Africa and was threatening Carthage itself. In Italy, Hannibal was struggling to 
control several towns and tribes in revolt. Hannibal had besieged the town of Petelia 
for several months in 215 and when it was captured, Hannibal gave it to the Bruttians 
to occupy.18 Appian claims that the Petelians had been expelled after the siege but 
gives no further hint as to where. 19 It is possible that Carthaginians installed the 
defeated Petelians in another allied town so as to ensure no further disruption on their 
part. Appian describes Petelia as one example of several cities in open stasis against 
the Carthaginians which Hannibal visited in turn and suppressed. He makes specific 
13 Polyb. XXIVA. 
14 Livy XXVII.28. 
15 Livy states that the Romans had constructed siege-works and artillery and were on the brink of 
capturing Locri. Hannibal became aware of the danger and dispatched his Numidian cavalry against the 
besiegers who were caught unawares and fled abandoning the siege. 
16 XXVII.l. 
17 There is also the aspect of revenge for which Hannibal was renowned. In a similar example he burnt 
the wife and child of Dasius of Arpi in Danuia for abandoning the Carthaginians and changing sides to 
Rome CAppo Hann. 31). 
18 Livy XXIII.30. 
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mention of Thurii, which although is not made explicit, also seems to have revolted. 
Hannibal apparently took 3000 trusted citizens and 500 others from the countryside 
and resettled them at Croton.20 Hannibal left a strong garrison in Thurii and from then 
on most likely stopped considering it a safe ally as he had once done. The choice of 
Croton becomes obvious as Appian claims that Hannibal considered it well situated 
and a good base for military operations against the other towns?l The 3500 
Carthaginian allies were physically resettled in the new Carthaginian command centre 
at Croton. By removing them from the remainder of the anti-Carthaginian element in 
Thurii, Hannibal ensured their safety and continued support while re-establishing 
authority by replacing them with a strong garrison. 
From this brief account and the greater events occurring in the war, we are 
able to discern a familiar motive behind population resettlement in Hannibal's 
campaign. The example of Thurii and possibly other towns in Southern Italy is 
reminiscent of the examples of Selinus and Eryx during the First Punic War. Carthage 
was on the back foot on both occasions and decided on defending a few well-chosen 
and strategic bases rather than spreading its forces over a wide area. By relocating 
allies, Carthage both ensured their continued support and that they would not be 
captured or subverted by the Romans. Whether this tactic would prove successful is 
unknown as Hannibal, Mago, and the remaining Carthaginian forces withdrew to 
North Africa the following year to face Scipio. 
The Carthaginians pursued an obvious policy of forced population 
resettlement during the First and Second Punic Wars. Much like their policy regarding 
colonisation, they only exercised such an activity under certain circumstances. From 
the examples we have seen, resettlement usually occurred during periods of 
heightened military activity. The Carthaginians used population resettlement as a 
standard practice during the third century. For various reasons they moved large 
bodies of sedentary peoples to suit their own needs. If the strategic or demographic 
configuration of an area did not suit them, they altered it accordingly. Although 
unorthodox in a classical sense, the Carthaginians pursued this policy with some 
success enabling them better to manipulate and to extend their influence. 
19 Hann. 57. 
20 op. cit. 8ouplcov oE 'tptcrXtA10ue; KapXT\ooVloUe; I-UxAtcr'ta eUVoue; ESeAOlleVOe; Kat 1tev'taKocrioue; 
aAAOUe; a1tO 'trov ayprov 'ta AOt7ta 'til cr'tpanq, otap1t(H~etV EOCOKeV. 
21 Op. cit. 't~V 1t6AtV eUKatpOV 'hYOUlleVOe; etVat Kat 'talltetoV au't'hv eau'tcpKat oPIlT\'t~PtoV E1tt'tae; 
aXAae; n8ElleVoe;. 
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REDEVELOPMENT AND RESETTLEMENT 
Carthage maintained and extended its influence by various means. One of its more 
traditional methods was colonisation. However, vast existing networks of Phoenician 
trading ports and colonies left Carthage with little opportunity or in fact need to 
embark on full-scale missions of colonisation within the Mediterranean. Traditional 
views such as Warmington's place Carthaginian colonisation of emporia as similar to 
that of the Phoenicians, i.e. massed networks of small trading ports.22 It is possible 
that Carthage founded numerous original sites, which are now lost. However, it is also 
likely that any number of these simply took the place of existing Phoenician sites.23 
With the collapse of a structured Phoenician presence in the West, and the decay of 
several of these coastal networks, Carthage assumed control over such areas and 
sought to rebuild them under its own control. One of the ways Carthage sought to 
achieve this was by simply moving into older Phoenician settlements and resettling 
them itself. On most occasions there was no need to expel pre-existing populations as 
over time they often developed into Punic subjects. These were not standard missions 
of colonisation, but more like a simple transference of control, culture, and population 
in some cases. Often this was inadvertently achieved by constant Carthaginian 
influence and activity. It is probable that such foundations did not occur immediately, 
but more likely, a slow transfusion of Punic culture and the impact of Carthaginian 
control simply displaced the old Phoenician identity of many of these sites. 
Like so many aspects of Phoenicio-Punic history, especially in the West, the 
lack of solid literary evidence and varied archaeological data makes any effort at 
interpretation difficult. The nature of Phoenician settlement was often temporary or 
superficial leaving few physical and no literary remains, whereas Carthaginian 
settlement was more permanent and pervasive providing more materiaL Whether or 
not many Punic sites were older Phoenician settlements becomes pure guesswork. As 
a result it is difficult to discern whether a site was originally Phoenician or 
Carthaginian. 
22 Carthage, p.55. 
23 Naturally the Phoenicians before them did not have such a lUXUry although they settled several 
known pre-existing or shared sites in North Africa and Sardinia. The extent to which the Carthaginians 
resettled pre-existing sites was a new departure. 
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Before discussing possible examples of Carthaginian resettlement, it is useful 
to view such a process in light of contemporary comparison. Both the Greeks and 
Romans often resettled pre-existing sites superimposing their own society and culture 
over that of the previous inhabitants. One of the better examples was the colonisation 
of Thurii on the old site of Sybaris. The supposed Panhellenic colony of Periclean 
Athens simply resettled the old and strategic site of Sybaris in 443 after the latter had 
been worn down by Croton over several decades. 24 Camarina, on the south coast of 
Italy was founded and refounded three times. Originally settled by Syracuse ca. 598, it 
revolted, was evacuated and then resettled by Hippocrates of Gela. After its 
inhabitants were again driven out, Gelon settled it once more.25 This tactic of the 
Sicilian tyrants continued during the fifth century when Gelon removed the people of 
N axos and Catana and resettled the site of the latter as Aetna. 26 Although these Greek 
examples were mostly imperial projects, they do offer some good examples of a state 
actively resettling an older or still-occupied site for its own benefit. Probably the best 
and most ironic example of resettling an older site during the Roman period is that of 
Carthage itself. Despite cursing the site as the source of so much historical turmoil for 
Rome, the Romans themselves could not pass over such a strategic vacant site. Within 
only a few decades of Carthage's destruction, Gaius Gracchus had attempted to 
resettle the site unsuccessfully, and within a century Caesar and later Augustus 
permanently resettled it. 
NORTH AFRICA 
Demarcating original Phoenician and later Carthaginian foundations is probably most 
difficult in North Africa than anywhere else in the West. This area evolved into the 
core of Punic civilisation from that of Phoenician origin mingling with native Libyan 
culture and foreign influences. The relative speed of this transformation of culture 
(literally over a couple of centuries) makes for an often-indistinct historical or 
chronological narrative. 
24 Originally Sybaris was an Achaean colony which grew to a great size and prosperity (Strabo 
(VI.1.13). In 510, the Sybarites were defeated by the Crotoniates (Diod. X.23, XII.9). Some fifty-eight 
years after this defeat the remaining Sybarites gathered and founded the city anew between the Sybaris 
and Crathis rivers (XI. 90 3-4). Shortly thereafter the Crotoniates drove them out again (XII. 10). 
25 Thuc. VI.5; Hdt. VII.156. 
26 Diod. XI.49.1. 
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Several sites in North Africa demonstrate obvious signs of Carthaginian 
redevelopment. Utica, the oldest Phoenician foundation in the region retained some 
form of independence after the growth of Carthage. Although it most likely retained a 
degree of Phoenician character, its propinquity to Carthage would suggest it 
developed along with it. This is reinforced by the remains of its Punic legacy, which 
are naturally more prominent than the pre-existing Phoenician.27 The prominent site of 
Leptis Magna also presents a similar problem. Sallust claims that it was founded (by 
the Tyrians) in a manner similar to Carthage and that even in the first century BC its 
laws and culture were like that of Tyre.28 The archaeological record, however, attests 
a strong Punic culture, assuming that there was a concerted shift and redevelopment 
of the site.29 Likewise Hadrumentum was permanently settled by the Phoenicians 
around the eighth century but probably remained fully independent until the sixth 
century. The Carthaginian expansion throughout North Africa seems to have brought 
Hadrumentum under Carthaginian influence to a large degree dominating the cultural 
and political history of the site.3D Such sites as Utica, Leptis Magna, and 
Hadrumentum are good examples of the uncertain nature of the Phoenicio-Punic 
presence in North Africa. Literary accounts hint at a Phoenician settlement, whereas 
archaeological evidence mainly shows a strong Punic presence. With Utica, Leptis 
Magna, and Hadrumentum it is probable that these sites remained Phoenician 
colonies, but were dominated politically and culturally by Carthage and thus 
inadvertently developed into Punic settlements. 
Other Phoenician cities leave less doubt that they were physically and 
culturally redeveloped by Carthage. Sabratha was originally a mere Tyrian trading 
outpost that evolved into a permanent Punic city during the fifth and fourth centuries. 
Again Punic evidence dominates the pre-Roman period of Sabratha. The fact that the 
Phoenicians employed the site as a temporary trading post suggests that the Punic 
redevelopment of the site into a permanent municipality was wide reaching.3! Oea 
probably developed along similar lines to Sabratha. Although there is evidence 
27 See Lezine, pp.134ff; see Chp. I, ns,46-53 and text. 
28 lug. LXXVn.l, XIX.l. 
29 Carter, pp.l26ff. 
30 This is evident in the epigraphic remains at the site. There are several inscriptions detailing religious 
connections to Tanit alongside Ba'al Hammon in addition to a number of Punic style names, see KAI. 
97-99. Also see Foucher, pp.78-96. 
31 It appears that Sabratha maintained a Punic-style government as even during Roman period it 
retained its two suffetes until the second century AD. See Chp. I, ns.57-59 and text. 
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suggesting that it was founded by the Tyrians, Punic remains preponderate.32 Coupled 
with this was its position between Leptis Magna and Sabratha, both of which 
underwent a high degree of Punic redevelopment. Unlike the older and more 
established Phoenician foundations east of Carthage, these two were not well 
established or firmly settled as other Phoenician centres. Carthage probably assumed 
control of such basic settlements and developed them further itself. 
The possible examples of similar North African settlements to the west of 
Carthage are not as well established or attested as the other examples. The 
Phoenicians had previously settled the area to the east of Carthage more heavily than 
the west. Although not as heavily settled, this did not hinder the progress of Punic 
expansion in the area including redeveloping or settling existing settlements. 
Although evidence is often unclear, it appears that Thugga was heavily 
influenced and redeveloped by Carthage. Originally a Berber andlor Phoenician 
trading settlement, there is a quantity of Punic remains at the site including religious 
iconography.33 During the invasion of Agathocles in 310, a town called Tocai was 
apparently occupied by Carthage.34 The geographical position and similarity of the 
name to that of Thugga implies that they were the same site.35 Diodorus specifically 
states that Carthage had occupied the town, and therefore was not originally their 
settlement. Evidence suggests it was annexed and redeveloped almost as a Punic town 
and was ruled by Carthage for a considerable period.36 Hippo Diarrhytus (Bizerte) 
seems to have been utilised from early times and maintained a Phoenician-style 
layout. Although the matter is slightly ambiguous, it is likely that this Hippo is the 
town Sallust refers to as being settled by the Phoenicians.37 This claim is feasible 
although there is no Phoenician evidence at the site - only Punic remains attesting 
Carthaginian presence. The exact origin of Hippo Regius even is less certain. It is 
possible that this seaport was first visited by Phoenicians. Its position along the North 
African coastal route coupled with its nature makes it a prime candidate for 
32 See Chp. I, ns.63-65 and text. 
33 There is a surviving inscription from Carthage detailing a votive to Tanh and Ba'al Hammon 
originating from a Libyan town called Thubursicu (CIS. 1.309). Gsell, HAANII, pp.llO-lll has 
identified this site as Thugga suggesting a close religious connection with Carthage. 
34 Diod. XX.57.4. 
35 Gsell, HAAN II, p.95. 
36 Beyond archaeological remains there are two Neo-Punic and Numidian bilingual inscriptions at the 
site from the time of Micipsa. These demonstrate a strong Punic presence at Thugga both linguistically 
and demographically again suggesting intense Carthaginian influence. 
37 lug. XIX.l. 
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Phoenician settlement. There is a certain Punic presence at the site before the Romans 
developed the town further. Hippo Regius is probably most like Sabratha and Oea to 
the east: a temporary or seasonal Phoenician port resettled permanently by Carthage. 
There are a number of settlements to the immediate west of Carthage or in the 
interior which attest some form of Carthaginian resettlement or refoundation. It 
appears that a number of sites in the vicinity of Carthage were not original 
Carthaginian foundations but previously occupied by the Phoenicians or Berbers. 
Several sites such as Theveste38 and Sicca in the interior and Thapsus, Chullu, 
Ruscidae, and Saldae on the coast were most likely settled before the arrival of the 
Carthaginians. This Carthaginian influence is proved by the existence of Punic 
suffetes in several of these towns including Thugga, Cirta, Mactar, and Calama.39 It 
appears that the native towns in this area were either under direct control from 
Carthage and were heavily influenced by their neighbour.40 
Further west between Oued el Kebir and the Pillars of Heracles there is only 
scanty evidence of Phoenician and Carthaginian ports along the coast. It is likely 
Phoenician and Carthaginian settlement along this coastline was not as intense as in 
other areas. The natural geography did not accommodate permanent settlement with 
an attached hinterland. It is more likely that the Phoenicio-Punic presence along the 
northern coast of Algeria and Morocco remained mercantile. Sites such as Cartennae, 
Siga, Russaddir, Portus Magnus, and Tamuda were probable original Phoenician 
foundations. However, we later find characteristic Punic material remains at these 
sites especially in tombs.41 Like similar examples of redevelopment in North Africa, it 
appears that these sites, linking a long trading route, were original Phoenician ports 
which were redeveloped as Punic sites as a result of Carthaginian expansion. 
Carthaginian resettlement of Phoenician and local sites in North Africa is 
paradoxically both the most believed and least demonstrable in detail in the west. The 
growth of Carthage presumed that its surrounding hinterland was the first area to fall 
under its influence. Older and well established towns such as Utica and Hadrumentum 
38 Picard suggests the native town described as Hecatompylus by Diodoms (XXIV.1O.2) and Polybius 
(1. 73.1) was Theveste. Its council of elders suggests that it maintained some degree of local autonomy 
during the third century, see Chp. II, n.90. 
39 Ilevbare, p.23. 
40 For a basic overview of Carthaginian presence in this area see Gsell, HAAN II, pp.146-154. 
41 Tarradell, pp.38ff. Several sites along the coast west of Tunisia reveal typical Punic remains 
including ceramics, some basic architectural elements, and metals. This suggests habitation at a number 
of smaller sites, which were smaller permanent trading ports. Also see Gsell, HAANII, pp.162-169. 
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maintained some form of their respective identities and basic autonomy but gradually 
assumed a more Punic-style culture. It is unknown whether or not such sites were 
officially resettled by Carthage. It was more a cultural and political eclipse of older 
social and municipal identities. Other less well established sites such as Hippo Regius, 
Sabratha, and possibly Tingis were simply made permanent by Carthage and thus the 
superficial Phoenician occupation of these sites was replaced. There appear to be 
varying degrees of Carthaginian intrusion into pre-existing sites in North Africa. 
Primarily Carthage annexed them rendering them officially powerless and removing, 
or perhaps better, super-imposing older cultural, social, and political characteristics. 
SICILY, MALTA, GOZO, AND PANTELLERIA 
Sicily, Malta, and the surrounding islands, like North Africa, were in early contact 
with the Phoenicians and Carthaginians. Unlike other regions of Phoenicio-Punic 
dominance, Sicily was continually divided amongst Phoenicians, Carthaginians, 
Greeks, and to a lesser extent the existing Sicilian peoples. As a result neither the 
Phoenicians nor Carthaginians had the lUxury of settling sites unopposed as they did 
elsewhere. Their sites were fewer and more prominent than in other regions of 
settlement. Within some of these settlements a distinct redevelopment of old 
Phoenician colonies by Punic settlements stemming from Carthage is evident. The 
smaller surrounding islands such as Malta and to a lesser extent Gozo and Pantelleria 
also exhibit a distinctive change in character from Phoenician to Punic nature, which 
suggests a change in social and cultural association. These smaller islands remained 
exclusively Phoenicio-Punic and it is often difficult to make such a distinction based 
on little evidence. However, their propinquity to Carthage coupled with their 
importance to the surrounding Mediterranean trade routes made them essential to 
Carthaginian interests in the area. 
Sicily contained several sites which were redeveloped as Carthage centres. We 
can discern several sites that were founded by the Phoenicians as well as some that 
were possibly founded by the Greeks and Elymians. Phoenicio-Punic involvement on 
the island was rarely static, and it thus displays a mutable settlement pattern. 
Carthaginian interest in Sicily developed following the collapse of the Phoenician 
Empire and can first be identified in the early stages of the fifth century. Carthage 
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assumed control over the old Phoenician territory and was able to gradually 
acculturate once Phoenician settlements by various means of influence. 
According to Thucydides there were three main Phoenician settlements in 
Western Sicily: Motya, Panormus, and Soloeis.42 These three coastal ports enabled the 
Phoenicians to dominate trade along the northwest and west coasts of Sicily as well as 
to interact with the Elymian and Greek settlements in the area. It appears from the 
scant archaeological evidence that these sites were permanently settled during the 
eighth or seventh century, in agreement with the account of Thucydides. Although 
originally Phoenician, these sites reveal evidence that there was a concerted phase of 
Punic influence which implies a form of Carthaginian redevelopment. 
Although Lilybaeum is an attested Carthaginian colony, in many respects it 
was a re-establishment of the older site of Motya. The presence of an unknown 
quantity of Motyans present in the original colonists of Lilybaeum suggests a 
continuing legacy of settlement.43 Another relevant factor is that Lilybaeum was 
founded only one year after the destruction of Motya only 8km. away. Previous to the 
destruction of Motya, there already appears to have been a developing Punic influence 
eclipsing its original Phoenician nature. The first Carthaginian treaty with Rome in 
509/8 shows Western Sicily as an open Carthaginian territory.44 It is likely that the 
onset of Carthaginian interests in Sicily saw its influence grow at Motya. There are 
several phases of destruction and rebuilding of various parts of Motya prior to 397. 
An official Carthaginian presence may have been there during the later stages of the 
sixth century or at least by the first half of the fifth century, although a more 
concerted presence developed thereafter.45 At least by the time of its destruction it was 
most likely considered, in many respects a Carthaginian settlement. 46 
Soloeis was probably destroyed by Dionysius in 396 and was re-established 
shortly thereafter by the remainder of its inhabitants.47 The original Phoenician 
Soloeis most likely stood on Cannita Hill and, like Lilybaeum, the replacement 
Carthaginian site was founded a slight distance away. Although the destruction of 
42VI2. 
43 Diod. XXII.lO.4; Paus. V.2S.5-6. 
44 Polyb. I1I.22. 
45 Archaeological evidenee from Motya is often problematic. There are several possible historical 
events whieh may havc ushercd in the Carthaginian period. This is emphasised by cvidence of several 
phases of destruction. For such evidenee see Isserlin and du Plat Taylor, Chps. VII-XI. 
46 Diod. XlV.47.4-S. Diodorus specifically calls Motya a Carthaginian colony, distinguishing it from 
what he calls the Phoenician presence over the Greeks in Sicily. 
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Soloeis is not explicitly documented, it appears from the account of Diodorus that it 
was a less significant site than Motya and Panormus. What is interesting is that like 
Motya it was refounded immediately after with remnants of its original population. 
Soloeis was probably a developing Punic settlement by this stage, and the new site on 
Monte Catalfano is also distinctly Punic. There is evidence of Punic necropoleis 
dating from as early as the mid-sixth century with an increase in the fifth century.48 
Much like Motya, the Phoenician nature of the original Soloeis was subsumed when 
Carthage resettled the remnants of the town.49 
Panormus is the final town of the original trio of Phoenician settlements in 
Western Sicily as mentioned by Thucydides. Although originally Phoenician, it also 
appears to have undergone a Punic redevelopment. Its importance to Carthage as a 
strategic base is well documented. This is best attested during the First Punic War 
when Polybius describes it as the strongest Carthaginian site in Sicily.50 Panormus 
shows a distinctive Punic character in both literary and archaeological sources. 
Carthage was forced to defend its strategic harbour town from Dionysius, 
Hermocrates, and Pyrrhus before finally losing the site during the First Punic War. 
There are several accounts consistent in showing Panormus as a strategic 
Carthaginian base used for staging invasion and managing retreat. Much like Soloeis, 
Panormus demonstrates a distinctive mix of Greco-Punic culture from an early period. 
There appear to be several occupied Punic sites around Panormus especially in the 
immediate interior suggesting Panormus developed into a coastal site with access to 
its hinterland. 51 Panormus appears to have enjoyed a major period of growth from the 
sixth century, possibly coinciding with the establishment of Carthaginian influence.52 
The importance of the site to Carthage for both trade and strategic purposes implies 
that it would certainly have developed into a Punic settlement under Carthaginian 
control. 
47 Diod. XIV.48.5, 78.7. 
48 Caterina Greco, "Anfore puniche", in Archeologia e territorio, pp.57-69. 
49 It is appropriate to mention the later nature of Soloeis, or Soluntum as it became. After its 
refoundation the site became remarkably cosmopolitan with obvious naturalised Punic and Greek 
elements. Evidence of both cultures' coexistence is apparent from bilingual coinage, religious 
iconography, pottery fragments, and grave goods. Soloeis became one of the most obvious examples of 
Greco-Punic interaction in Sicily over a considerable period of time. 
50 I.38. This is interesting considering the presence of Lilybaeum and Eryx to the west. 
5! Carmela Angela Di Stefano, "Presenze archeologiche nell' area della Conca d' oro tra il VI e ill sec a. 
C.", in Palermo Punica, pp.56-61. Interior sites such as Monte D'Oro, Cozzo Paparina, and 
Castellaccio di Sagana were inhabited from the sixth century and appear to show an intensive period of 
activity. 
122 
There is evidence to suggest Carthage also redeveloped some Greek and 
Elymian towns in Western Sicily. The Greek presence was the defining factor in 
limiting Phoenicio-Punic expansion in Sicily. A number of Greek colonies fell under 
Carthaginian control for various periods of time from the fifth century onward. 
Selinus was probably the most affected by Carthaginian influence. Lying close to 
Carthaginian territory, Selinus was often the object of Carthaginian interest especially 
in regards to its traditional enmity with Segesta. It is implausible to claim that Selinus 
was ever officially refounded as a Carthaginian settlement; however, it was re-
established after its destruction in 409 as a Greek centre under Carthaginian rule and 
was subject to tribute.53 Previous to this event, Selinus had maintained a lengthy and 
often amicable relationship with Carthage dating to the Battle of Himera. It is likely 
that Selinus displayed both Punic and Greek influence based on such a relationship as 
well as on its position at the border of Greek and Carthaginian territory. We can 
assume that after the site of Selinus was resettled by some of its inhabitants, that a 
greater Carthaginian influence was not entirely foreign. After this period and until the 
evacuation of the site during the First Punic War, there is a distinctive Punic element 
in the character of the town. After the refoundation of Selinus, several characteristic 
Punic architectural types appear coupled with larger quantities of Punic remains.54 It is 
unusual to see such a prominent Greek colony exhibit so much Carthaginian material 
influence. 55 The final aspect advocating Punic redevelopment is that Carthage 
removed the population to Lilybaeum in 250.56 If Carthage considered Selinus a 
normal Greek city, it probably would have been abandoned to the Romans. Instead 
the Carthaginians took great care removing the population to safety and razing the 
site. This implies that Selinus was closely connected to Carthage during this period. It 
is likely that Selinus had become an important settlement along the southern coast of 
Sicily. It had direct access to Carthage and maintained an internal trade route to sites 
such as Colle Madore and Thermae to the north, and Acragas to the east. Although 
traditionally considered a Greek colony, Selinus seems to have stood under 
Carthaginian dominance until its final evacuation and destruction. 
52 Rossana De Simone and Gioacchino Falsone, "Ceramica Punica", in Palermo Punica, pp.306-309. 
53 Diod. XIII.59.3. 
54 Moscati, Italia Punica, pp.123-129. 
55 This is more obvious in the East during this period when the Phoenicians captured several Greek 
towns on Cyprus, see Chp. I, ns.38-42 and text. 
56 Diod. XXIV.l.1. 
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Another Greek colony seems to have been officially re-established by 
Carthage during this period. Himera, after its destruction at the hands of the vengeful 
Carthaginian army led by Hannibal in 409, was refounded as Thermae.57 Apparently it 
was settled with Carthaginian citizens and other inhabitants of Sicily nearby the older 
remains of Himera, although it is suggested that the older Greek element made up a 
considerable part of the new citizenry.58 Its subsequent history still assumes a Greek 
character as do its remains, but like Selinus, it often remained on amicable terms with 
Carthage. Himera was an integral part of Carthaginian plans on the island, especially 
in light of the destruction of the Carthaginian army there in 480. Its destruction and 
resettlement as a Carthaginian stronghold would hopefully ensure its loyalty. 59 Himera 
is named as one of the Carthaginian tribute states along with Selinus and Acragas at 
the end of Hannibal's campaign.60 It is presumably referring to Thermae its old, 
familiar Greek name. Although the Greeks in Thermae did not necessarily consider 
itself loyal to Carthage,61 at least the Carthaginian population remained faithfuL In 
396, Himilco was on good terms with the Himeraeans and presumably used it as a 
base of operations.62 It was lost to Carthage after Dionysius liberated the site, but by 
317 had once again become part of Carthaginian territory. 63 The mixed reception of 
the Carthaginians suggests that Thermae was not as receptive as other Greek centres. 
Naturally the site was an important trading port and maintained a link to other Greek 
and Carthaginian ports as well as with the interior.64 Himera, like Selinus to the south, 
was supposed to be an important settlement for the Carthaginians in Western Sicily. 
Although officially resettled by Carthage, it remained a Greek settlement with an 
obvious Carthaginian element. 
57 Diad. XIII.79.8; Cic. Verr. II.2.35. 
58 Cic. Verr. II.35. It was later thc birthplace of Agathoc1es. 
59 For the strategic importance of Himera to the Carthaginians see Chp. VII, ns.38-40 and text. 
60 Diod. XllI.114.1. 
61 Diodorus XIV.47.6, claims the Himeraeans, along with other Greek cities which detested Phoenician 
(Carthaginian) rule sent levies to aid Dionysius outside Motya. 
62 Diad. XN.56.2. 
63 Diad. XIX.2.2. 
64 There are far fewer Punic remains in Thermae compared with Soloeis which lay only 20 km. to the 
west and also experienced heavy Punic and Greek settlement and trade. Himera often changed hands in 
the numerous conflicts between the Sicilian Greeks and the Carthaginians especially during the fourth 
century. Presumably Carthage used its influence at Himera as at Acragas, which also demonstrates 
evidence of a considerable-Carthaginian presence. Himera also probably acted as an important port for 
trade with the interior, linking sites such as Colle Madore. This site has revealed influence from 
Himera before and after its destruction and also some Punic remains, see Tardo, pp.75-94; Constanza 
Polizzi, "Anfore da transporto", in Colle Madore, pp.221-232. 
124 
Further evidence suggests that the Carthaginians also redeveloped a number of 
interior sites in Western Sicily.65 The main group of people influenced by this 
Carthaginian expansion in Sicily was the local Elymians.66 As was the case in several 
western territories, the Phoenicians established a long and amicable relationship with 
the local population, which was continued by the Carthaginians. As a result of 
protracted contact between Phoenicio-Punic and Elymian cultures we find a high level 
of interaction in various settlements. The Elymian capital of Segesta attests this well 
with a distinctive mix of Elymian, Punic, and Greek cultures over several centuries. 
Probably the site of most interest to us is the old sanctuary of Eryx. This site and the 
neighbouring town was originally Elymian but was soon utilised by Phoenicians and 
Carthaginians as the primary cult of Astarte in the West.67 Although originally 
Elymian, the site was soon redeveloped into a Phoenician sanctuary and then a 
Carthaginian base. Punic influence in Eryx is widespread and dates from the mid-
sixth century to the mid-third century. The persistent evidence of Punic habitation and 
culture implies that Eryx was, in many respects, a Punic settlement. Eryx's 
importance to Carthaginian interests, and in this case culture, certainly assumes much 
of the site's identity as Punic, which was gradually superimposed over the existing 
settlement. Like Selinus, the Elymian foundation was abandoned and razed during the 
First Punic War.68 The fact that the popUlation was removed to Drepana further 
suggests that Eryx was no longer an Elymian town and that the inhabitants were 
mainly Phoenicia-Punic. The Romans captured the site in 249, before Hamilcar Barca 
liberated it for a few years in 244.69 Although a tactical move on Hamilcar's part, it 
does demonstrate continued Carthaginian interest in the site both as a strategic base 
and as an important Punic cultural centre. Unlike other examples of sites populated by 
local peoples, which temporarily came under Carthaginian influence, Elymian Eryx 
demonstrates a considerable Punic influence. This resettlement as a Carthaginian site 
would most likely have been amicable and prolonged based on the sheer weight of 
Carthaginian interest in the area. 
65 This aspect of specific Carthaginian influence on local Sicilian peoples will be discussed in further 
detail Chp. V. 
66 It is unknown whether or not the Elymians were indigenous to Sicily. Thucydides claims that they 
were Trojan refugees (VI.2). Whether this claim is true or not, the Elymians, like the Sicels and 
Sicanians, possibly migrated to Sicily some time before Greek contact with the area. Often all three 
groups are described as native odndigenous Sicilians which is possibly incorrect. 
67 Diod. IV.78; Dion. Hal. 1.53.1. 
68 Diod. XXIIl.9.4. 
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Beyond the main areas of control, Carthaginian influence and possible forms 
of settlement appear probable. We have seen the importance of Colle Madore acting 
as a centre of trade. Presumably several waves of Punic invasions saw the site often 
become part of Carthaginian territory. The same may be said for the Punic settlement 
on Monte Adranone near Selinus, which shows Punic settlement during the fourth 
century.70 Monte Castellazzo demonstrates similar changes, but like Segesta remains 
heavily influenced by Greek culture.71 This coincides with the general reorganisation 
of settlement patterns in Western Sicily during this period and the appearance of more 
Punic hilltop forts. The exact nature and extent of Carthaginian settlement in the 
interior remains largely unknown. However, the general increase of Carthaginian 
interest in Sicily during the fifth century implies that Carthage came into contact with 
many similar settlements. Whether or not several Elymian and possibly other Sicilian 
towns were resettled officially is unclear, however, it seems that a number fell 
Carthaginian influence during this period and demonstrate signs of redevelopment. 
Carthaginian resettlement on Sicily presented a different social and political 
pattern than in other areas. Carthage expanded and assumed sites of Phoenician, 
Greek, and Sicilian origins. Its absorption and redevelopment of the old Phoenician 
sites of Motya, Soloeis, and Panormus is obvious and was certainly aided by the 
destruction of the two former sites, enabling it to re-establish the sites anew as Punic 
settlements. We also find Greek settlements such as Selinus and Himera destroyed 
and then resettled supposedly by the remnants of their original popUlations. Otherwise 
several native settlements reacted to regular Phoenicio-Punic contact developing 
obvious Punic characteristics. Carthaginian resettlement and refoundation took 
several forms in Western Sicily. The unstable political climate and the Carthaginian 
inability to conquer the island often forced Carthage to redirect its interests and often 
forms an inconsistent narrative of events. Nonetheless there is some evidence 
demonstrating Carthage moving into pre-established sites and influencing, if not 
altering their respective social and political characters. 
The islands lying between Sicily and North Africa are testament to some of 
the earlier stages of Carthaginian expansion and Punic influence. Although smaller 
and more isolated, there is evidence of certain sites being redeveloped by Carthage. 
69 Polyb. 156ff. 
70 Moscati, Italia Punica, pp.132-135. 
71 See Rosa Maria Albanese Procelli, Sicani, Siculi, Elimi (Milan 2003) pp.209, 240. 
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These islands were established as important intermediary ports in Phoenician trading 
strategies. They continued such a role in Carthaginian mercantile and imperial 
polices. The location of islands such as Malta, Gozo, and Pantelleria exposed them to 
regular contact and influence from Carthage. 
The largest of these islands, Malta (Melita) was the most significant and 
strategic to Phoenicio-Punic activity. Although originally settled by the Phoenicians 
as a trading outpost, Carthage rapidly assumed sovereignty and influence over the 
island probably during the late sixth century. Diodorus describes the island as a 
Phoenician colony possessing safe harbours and a number of local commodities and 
industries.72 Initially the Phoenicians operated Malta as a strategic trading outpost 
between North Africa and Sicily. The rise of Carthage during the sixth century saw 
various marked changes in the role and nature of Phoenician Malta. The small island 
was ultimately resettled as a Punic territory under the direct control of Carthage. A 
good indication of this transformation is the aforementioned citation from Stephanus 
of Byzantium claiming that Melita was colonised by the Carthaginians.73 Whether an 
official Carthaginian resettlement occurred or not is debatable, as is Stephanus' claim. 
However, it is interesting that the island, although known as a Phoenician settlement, 
was later considered and accepted as Carthaginian in origin. There is an obvious 
change in opinion regarding the origin of Phoenicio-Punic settlement on the island, 
which must be based on observable fact. Stephanus' misinterpretation is also 
supported to a certain degree by archaeological evidence, which suggests an obvious 
shift in nature Phoenician to Carthaginian. First, the position of the primary harbours 
on Malta implies an obvious shift in purpose for the island within the Carthaginian 
Empire. Originally the primary harbour was located on Marsascirocco Bay in the 
south so as to service traffic originating from the east and North Africa. By the third 
century however, Carthage and its constant interaction with Sicily and Southern Italy 
saw the development of the so-called Grand Harbour on the north-eastern coast of 
Malta. This development illustrates a changing emphasis on Malta from the older 
Phoenician trading routes to those established by Carthage for trade and expansion?4 
72V.12.2-3. 
13 Steph. Byz. S.v. MeA.t'tTj ean lCal1toA.v; anotKoc; KapX1130vlrov. 
74 Quantities of Egyptian remains have been discovered on both Malta and Gozo. It appears that earlier 
remains dating from the Phoenician period resemble types in the East from areas such as the Levantine 
coast, Cyprus, and Rhodes. Later remains from the Punic period track a distinctive shift in trade routes 
with similar Egyptian items found in North Africa, Sardinia, Spain, and the Balearic Islands. These 
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Looking further at the physical remains on Malta there is a natural shift from 
Phoenician to Punic influence in the forms of common wares, buildings, and religious 
practice and iconography. 75 Coinage is evidently Punic further emphasising economic 
connections with Carthage.76 It appears that in one sense at least Stephanus' statement 
was correct. It is unlikely that Carthage would have officially resettled Malta. More 
likely it was a process of initial political influence during the sixth century triggering 
a longer process of social and cultural absorption of Punic culture under Carthaginian 
influence. 
The island of Gozo (Gaulos) lies only a short distance to the northwest of 
Malta and in many ways is distinguishable as a satellite to the main island. This 
becomes more obvious when considering its history during both the Phoenician and 
Punic periods. Like Malta, Diodorus describes Gozo as a Phoenician colony situated 
mid-sea with serviceable harbours.77 It is likely that the historical narrative of Gozo is 
similar to that of Malta. The sixth century seems to have ushered the arrival of Punic 
influence on the island. Again there is a later testament to an obvious shift in the 
character of Gozo, this time in Pseudo-Scylax who claims both Malta and Gozo as 
Carthaginian.78 If we were to apply a similar formula to Gozo as to Malta, there 
appears to have been a Punic redevelopment of the pre-existing Phoenician settlement 
on the island. The main site at Ras-il-Wardija demonstrates a similar pattern of 
Carthaginian influence as seen on Malta, although on a smaller scale. Epigraphic 
evidence also suggests Gozo possessed a cult to Astarte and B a 'al and suffetes. 79 
There is also distinctive Punic numismatic evidence from Gozo from the first century 
BC. Although no longer a Carthaginian settlement, the image of Astarte still features 
on coinage recognising an obvious past influence. 8o Although small, Gozo seems to 
have figured as an important centre for Carthaginian interests. 
The final island of consideration is Pantelleria (Cossura). This small island is 
placed en route between Carthage and the west coast of Sicily. It is possible that the 
Phoenicians settled there in a manner similar to that on Malta and Gozo. 
remains are mostly dated to after 600 BC. See Gunther HOlbl, Agyptisches Kulturgut auf den Inseln 
Malta und Gozo, pp.42ff. 
75 Moscati, Italia Punica, pp.333-339. 
76 HN-p.883. Coin legends are Punic while iconography is also influenced with Egyptian images and 
also Heracles. 
77 V.12A. 
78 GGM. I. 111, p.89 (ed. Muller). 
79 KAi. 62. 
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Unfortunately it is not well attested by ancient authors with only small consideration 
afforded by Pseudo-Scylax who claims that the island was one day's sail from 
Lilybaeum.81 It is interesting that Lilybaeum is mentioned in connection to the island 
being an original Carthaginian colony. Pseudo-Scylax may have been applying 
Carthaginian distances to the island based on the latter's sea routes. Coupled with this 
was the island's position close to Carthage and therefore obviously prone to its 
political and cultural influence.82 The Romans briefly captured the island during the 
First Punic War in 254 before Carthage Ie-established its authority there.83 Pantelleria 
was finally lost to Carthage in 217 when Gnaeus Servilius captured the island.84 It 
appears as though Carthage assumed contIol over this small island as a strategic base 
between the Sicilian settlements and itself. 
The islands between Sicily and North Africa offer a useful insight into the 
spread of Carthaginian power and Punic influence. Positioned relatively near to 
Carthage, and being relatively small and isolated, Malta, Gozo, and Pantelleria 
demonstrate obvious signs of Carthaginian redevelopment. From literary and 
archaeological evidence it appears as though these islands became subject to Carthage 
during the sixth century and then over the immediate centuries developed more 
obvious Punic societies. Carthage had need for such mid-sea ports, as did their 
Phoenician predecessors. Strategic expansion in Sicily saw these islands employed as 
useful ports-of-call en route to the southern and western coasts of Sicily. With the 
redefinition of their political and mercantile roles, these islands' respective cultures 
developed with constant interaction with Punic culture. The near-complete 
transformation from Phoenician to Punic is well attested on these islands and is 
evidence of the ability of Carthage to influence existing settlements. 
SARDINIA 
The Phoenician presence on Sardinia is identifiable from the ninth century BC 
originating directly from Phoenicia or possibly from Phoenician Cyprus. As usual the 
80 HN2p.883. 
81 GGM. 1. 111, p.89 ( ed. Muller). 
82 Moscati, ltalia Punica, pp.136-138, there are several obvious Punic influences on the island 
including a necropolis and a variety of material remains. 
83 Zonar. VIIl.14. 
84 Polyb. m.96.13. 
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Phoenicians developed and maintained good relations with the native population to 
promote trade. 85 Their standard pattern of settlement saw numerous coastal emporia 
dotted along the southern and western coasts of the island around larger coastal 
centres. Carthaginian influence spread to Sardinia in the sixth century, rapidly 
overshadowing the earlier Phoenician presence. The importance of the island to 
Carthaginian foreign policy is obvious, forming a northern boundary to the empire 
excluding Greeks and possibly Etruscans and Romans, while connecting the northern 
east-west trade route between the Balearic Islands and Western Sicily. The major 
Phoenician settlements on Sardinia demonstrate a marked change in political and 
cultural identity during the sixth century to a Carthaginian dominated society. 
There is an amount of literary evidence attesting a determined Carthaginian 
effort to annex and dominate Sardinia. Justin claims that during the sixth century 
Ma1chus and then the sons of Mago, Hasdrubal and Hamilcar led expeditions to the 
island against the native Sard population.86 Although these invasions met with failure, 
Carthaginian supremacy in at least the south and west of the island is obvious by the 
time of the first treaty with Rome in 509/8. 87 The Carthaginian's influence spread 
inland until they controlled much of the south and west of the island by the fifth 
century. It would seem logical that by the end of the sixth century, the Carthaginians 
had already gained control over the Phoenician coastal cities and were confident to 
subjugate part of the native population. Diodorus claims that the Carthaginians never 
subdued these people owing to the rugged and mountainous terrain of the interior.88 
This statement is later confirmed by the evidence of a chain of interior Carthaginian 
fortifications designed to protect Carthaginian territory in the west and south of the 
island.89 This conquest never appears complete, however, as Diodorus states that the 
Libyans and Sardinians revolted against the Carthaginians in 379 after plague had 
ravaged the latter's army outside Syracuse.90 Although never subduing the island as a 
85 This is best attested by the fact that several Phoenician settlements on Sardinia were original 
nuraghic settlements. Some examples include the major centres of Caralis, Sulcis, and Tharros. 
86 XVIII.7.1-2; XIX.l.3. These defeats are also implied by Diodorus (IV.29.6). 
87 Sardinia is mentioned alongside Libya as areas of exclusive Carthaginian economic activity (Polyb. 
III. 22). Although the references are chronologically unclear, both Diodorus (IV.29.6) and Strabo 
(V .2. 7) claim that Carthage either fought for or was master of Sardinia. 
88 V.15.4-5. 
89 Ferruccio Barreca, "Le fortificazioni fenicio-puniche in Sardegna", Orientis Antiqui Collectio XIII, 
1978, pp.115-127; Robert J. Rowland, "Beyond the Frontier in Punic Sardinia", AJAH VII, 1982, 
pp.20-39. 
90 XV.24. 
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whole, at least Carthage managed to gain control over the older Phoenician network 
of settlement, which remained the basis of its own settlement on the island. 
It is difficult to presume exact histories for separate Phoenicio-Punic 
settlements on Sardinia as there is only a limited literary tradition attesting their 
presence on the island. However, from the scant literary, and archaeological evidence 
we possess, we are able to discern several centres of Carthaginian redevelopment. 
Caralis (Cagliari), the most prominent ancient settlement on Sardinia, was 
probably the capital of the Phoenician settlements on the island.91 Its original 
Phoenician legacy is distinguishable from that of the later Punic period with varying 
material remains often including distinguishable Phoenician, Sicilian, and Cypriot 
items.92 This is understandable, as it was the easternmost major Phoenician settlement 
on Sardinia and maintained direct links to Carthage, Sicily, and the East. The earliest 
Phoenician evidence at Caralis are the necropoleis datable to the seventh century. As 
is the case in other areas of Phoenician influence or settlement, it is likely that 
permanent settlement was not established for a considerable period of time after using 
temporary or seasonal facilities. The ninth century, as based on the dating of the Nora 
inscription, is most likely applicable to some Phoenician settlement, or at least a 
presumed presence at Caralis. It seems likely that Caralis would have been one of the 
first, if not the original Phoenician settlement on Sardinia annexed by Carthage and 
would show signs of redevelopment. Punic penetration in Caralis appears widespread, 
with varied remains including walls, housing, iconography of Tanit, and a topheth.93 
Remains of a number of tombs and religious structures are decidedly Carthaginian.94 
Caralis assumes the role of the main Carthaginian settlement on the island. It 
remained one of the primary ports on the island, which became particularly strategic 
to Carthage for both war and trade, especially in regard to the export of commodities 
from its surrounding territory and the interior.95 It seems likely that the local 
91 Along with Sulcis, it is named as the main settlement on the island in antiquity (Paus. X.17.9; Strabo 
V.2.7). 
92 Enrico Acquaro, "Sardinia", in The Phoenicians, Sabatino Moscati (ed.), p.264. 
93 For some examples see Serena Maria Cecchini, I ritrovamenti fenici e punici in Sardegna (Rome 
1969) pp.33-38; Ferruccio Barreca, La Sardegnafenici e punica, pp.200-203; Moscati, The World of 
the Phoenicians, pp.211-228. Cecchini has provided a useful overview as well as a bibliography of 
many Sardinian sites and their Phoenicio-Punic remains. 
94 Ferruccio Barreca, La Sardegnafenici e punica (Sassari 1974) pp.153-155. 
95 There are reports of grain being-exported from Sardinia to Sicily in times of need. In 480, Hamilcar 
dispatched part of his fleet there to fetch grain (Diod. XI.20A); and in 396 Sardinian supplies aided the 
Carthaginian troops besieging Syracuse (Diod. XIV.77.6). Hamilcar was based at Panormus on the 
north coast of Sicily and therefore the closest Carthaginian base in Sardinia was Caralis. Although not 
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government at Caralis was modelled on the Carthaginian system. A Punic inscription 
from Caralis mentions the presence of two suffetes in the third century.96 The presence 
of such a characteristically Carthaginian government, coupled with the archaeological 
remains and fragmentary literary tradition suggests that Caralis was quickly 
developed into a Punic centre on Sardinia. 
The second major Phoenicio-Punic settlement on Sardinia was Sulcis, located 
on the south-western coast. The archaeological record attests Phoenician settlement at 
Su1cis to the ninth century when the site with its twin harbours attracted merchants 
and settlers with a strategic harbour and defensible topography. Positioned on a small 
island connected to the mainland by a partially artificial isthmus, Sulcis offered the 
Phoenicians the lUXUry of seaborne traffic and also monitored connections with the 
mainland. The slightly later foundation of Monte Sirai in the hinterland as a trading 
post and industrial settlement connected with the native population attests the role of 
Sulcis as a major port for the export of natural resources especially lead and silver. 
The strategic value of Sulcis can be demonstrated by its subsequent annexation by 
Carthage and the Punic redevelopment thereafter. Much like the other major centres 
on Sardinia, Carthaginian influence is datable to the sixth century. Again, 
Carthaginian resettlement of Sulcis is suggested, this time by an error in Claudian, 
who claims that the site was originally founded by Carthage.97 As in the case of Malta, 
a later ancient author believed that an original Phoenician settlement was actually 
Carthaginian. This is an important distinction as Sulcis is one of the two major centres 
on Sardinia along with Caralis and was well recognised by several authors in 
antiquity. The Punic remains at Sulcis attest some of its main functions. Carthaginian 
roads near Sulcis granted easy access to large volumes of traffic and were possibly 
useful for trade movement and even troop deployment when necessary.98 There are 
several examples of a strong Punic culture evident in Sulcis, which helps corroborate 
Claudian's suggestion of a Carthaginian settlement. Fortunately there is a relevant 
abundance of surviving evidence at the site showing various types of Punic temples, 
tombs, and a well-preserved topheth. Coupled with these aspects are the Punic stelae 
stated, it seems logical that the supplies were coming from Caralis when we take into account both 
geographic and historical considerations. 
96 KAi. 65. 
97 XV.518,pars adit antiqua ductos Karthagine Sulcos. 
98 The latter is suggested by Moscati, The Phoenicians, p.213. Such a use is likely considering the 
Carthaginian invasions during the sixth century and later uprisings, which would have required strong 
coastal bases with good access to the interior. 
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and other distinctive religious iconography.99 On a more basic level, we find everyday 
items such as Punic lamps, statues, and building fragments. It appears that Sulcis was 
literally transformed from a Phoenician settlement into a fully-fledged Punic site 
under the influence of Carthage. 
The elevated settlement of Monte Sirai is closely located and connected to 
Sulcis and is important as a different type of Phoenicio-Punic settlement. Originally 
settled in the seventh century by the Phoenicians, Monte Sirai is a good example of an 
interior settlement geared at interacting with local peoples for both industry and trade. 
The concept is not unique, with similar Phoenician operations discernible in Cyprus, 
Sicily, Spain, and North Africa. What makes Monte Sirai different is its appearance 
and function as a fortified trading settlement. Original Phoenician interests would 
certainly have recognised the defensible potential of the site especially in relation to 
Su1cis on the coast. However, it was not until the Punic period that it was fully 
developed and fortified. 1OO The importance of the site attracted a Carthaginian garrison 
in order to protect Carthaginian influence in the area and the interior trade routes from 
the indomitable Sards.101 The development of Monte Sirai is typical of Carthaginian 
policy throughout Sardinia at the time by establishing a frontier of fortified positions 
to enhance and protect their influence and activities in the area. Despite Monte Sirai's 
bellicose nature, we must not forget its purpose as an intermediary station to Su1cis, 
with a thriving industrial base and importance to trade. There is evidence of 
workshops in Monte Sirai producing various wares including sculptors, goldsmiths, 
and potters. The site also possessed a thriving Punic culture similar to that at Su1cis. 
Remains of several temples, tombs, and a topheth suggest it was more than just a 
Carthaginian garrison or industrial town but in fact a developed and self-contained 
Punic settlement.102 
Nora is one of the most significant Phoenician sites in Sardinia. Settled as 
early as the ninth century on the south coast of Sardinia it is attested both 
mythologically and epigraphically as the oldest settlement on Sardinia. It also attests a 
99 KAI. 172, a dedication to 'the goddess': presumably Tanit. On the site itself, see Cecchini, pp.93-98. 
100 Barreca, "Le fortificazioni fenicio-puniche in Sardegna", pp.120-121. 
101 The amicable relationship between the Phoenicians and the native people as deduced from 
analogical examples and as implied by Pausanias (X.17) seems to have eroded by the time Carthage 
annexed the old Phoenician areas of ~ettlement. Several invasions and revolts attest the new style of 
Carthaginian expansion preferring domination rather than association. Trade and industry between the 
two parties would certainly have continued, but presumably under different forms of control. 
102 Barreca, La Sardegnafenicia e punica, pp.199ff. 
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wide variety of influence with evidence of contact with Spain, North Africa, Cyprus, 
and Etruria. 103 Like many other Phoenician sites on Sardinia, Nora fell under the 
dominion and influence of Punic Carthage during the later sixth century. This is best 
attested by the fortification of the site during the sixth and fifth centuries.104 The 
changing role of Nora as a protected port is not only attested by developments at the 
site but also by the new expansive and aggressive policies of Carthage. Punic 
influence seems to have eclipsed the original Phoenician culture of Nora. There is a 
prevalence of Punic religious iconography from the site with distinctive depictions of 
Tanit. Otherwise tombs, architecture, and evidence of a topheth suggest the 
prevalence of Punic culture. Despite being attested as the oldest centre of Phoenician 
settlement on Sardinia, Nora fell under Carthaginian influence. Although evidence of 
its varied and unique culture during the Phoenician period remains, Punic ascendancy 
soon ushered in the end of the original Phoenician control and nature of the site. 
Another Phoenician settlement, Tharros was probably founded during the 
eighth century on the northern cape of the Gulf of Oristano on the west coast of 
Sardinia. The site was well positioned for access to Tyrrhenian trade routes from Italy 
and Corsica. Originally a basic Phoenician trade enclave, Tharros was drastically 
redeveloped during the later sixth century with the onset of Carthaginian dominance 
in the area. It is natural that Carthage would take such an interest in Tharros during 
this period, not only to continue trade with Etruscan and then Roman Italy but also 
with the Phocaeans based in Massilia and along the coasts of Southern France and 
Eastern Spain. Evidence suggests that Tharros grew rapidly into a substantial 
Carthaginian port and in several aspects a redeveloped colony. During the sixth 
century there were major developments made in the site including fortifications, a 
water supply, and monumental temples. lOS The remains of the site are mostly Punic 
with two distinctive necropoleis and evidence of a topheth. 106 Evidence of a complete 
overhaul of the site during the sixth century coinciding with Carthaginian expansion 
!O3 Cecchini, pp.60-68; Aubet, The Phoenicians and The West, pp.241-242; Barreca, La Sardegna 
fenicia e punica, pp.134f., I71f., 237ff. 
104 Aubet, The Phoenicians and the West, p3I3. This possibly coincides with the fortification of Motya 
in Sicily. 
105 Acquaro, "Sardinia", pp.271-276. 
106 KAl. 67. 
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in Sardinia implies that Tharros was annexed by Carthage and redeveloped as a Punic 
settlement.107 
A final Phoenicio-Punic site of consideration on Sardinia is Bithya, situated on 
the south coast just down the eastern shore of the Chia Basin from Nora. The ancient 
site dominated the mouth of the Chia River and two natural inlets. Originally founded 
during the eighth century, the site was developed during the seventh and sixth 
centuries. lOS As to be expected, the settlement fell under the influence of Carthage 
thereafter and rapidly developed into a Punic settlement. Evidence suggests that 
Bithya was a major producer and exporter of votive statues with large caches 
discovered at the site.109 There is obvious Punic influence at the site with the usual 
necropolis and topheth present. Otherwise there is an inscription from the second 
century AD which refers to the existence of suffetes. 110 Although there had been 
Roman control over Sardinia for several centuries, it is possible that they left the local 
Punic government in place and that suffetes had presumably been used during the 
Punic period. The location of the settlement in the midst of several important 
Carthaginian settlements and its access to the hinterland would have made Bithya a 
useful site for Carthaginian interests in Sardinia. 
Carthaginian expansion and influence into areas of Sardinia seems to have 
been considerable. Although we have looked at several separate examples of 
Phoenician settlements becoming Punic, in many respects, Sardinia seems to have 
been resettled as a whole. Sardinia appears to have been a single Carthaginian 
province and was governed in such a manner. In every major centre discussed, there is 
graphic evidence of Punic culture and society eclipsing the existing Phoenician 
model. The Carthaginians' economic interests saw the coastal ports, industries, and 
trade routes all being incorporated and redirected for their own benefit,1l1 This would 
have benefited from a unified political system in Sardinia. It is likely that most major 
centres possessed a local government based on the Carthaginian system of suffetes, 
which were answerable to a capital (i.e. CaraUs) or directly to Carthage itself. The 
fortification of many sites and the establishment of a line of interior forts protecting 
107 Barreca, "Le fortificazioni fenicio-puniche in Sardegna", pp.117-118; La Sardegnafenicia e punica, 
passim; Cecchini, pp.102-108. 
108 Cecchini, pp.26-31. 
109 Moscati, The World of the Phoenicians, pp.222-223. 
110 KAI. 173. 
111 This is best attested by the large amount of Punic coinage evident by the fourth century in Sardinia 
suggesting a strong local economy, see Acquaro, "Sardinia", p.277. 
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the coastal settlements and the trading routes also implies that Sardinia was being 
operated as a province and not just as a conglomeration of independent settlements as 
the Phoenicians had once done. Sardinia underwent a full-scale redevelopment from 
the late sixth century. Carthaginian rule saw the old Phoenician settlements evolve 
into Punic dependencies with a new culture, society, and political institutions. 
SPAIN 
The arrival of Carthaginian power in Southern Spain is heralded by marked change in 
several older Phoenician sites. Much like the process in Sardinia, Carthage assumed 
the older Phoenician sites, often redeveloping them, and later pushed into the interior. 
Like other areas of Carthaginian expansion, Spain seems to have been annexed 
officially or at least influenced by the sixth and fifth centuries although most sites 
demonstrate obvious Punic changes in the fourth century. Carthage saw great 
financial and strategic value in Spain as the Phoenicians had done before. Control in 
the area meant control of its lucrative trade routes and territory. The result of this was 
a distinctive change in the original Phoenician settlements of Southern Spain into 
Punic centres subordinate to Carthage. 
Gades was the most prominent Phoenician settlement in the area. The site 
became renowned for several reasons including trade, fishing, and its general 
prosperity. The Phoenician foundation of Gades was based on economic motives. 
This specifically revolved around the extraction of silver from its hinterland and trade 
with Tartessus. The silver, which later funded both the Carthaginians and Romans, 
was originally used by the Phoenicians to build their 'empire,.112 Although 
archaeological records only attest Phoenician presence in Gades from the eighth 
century, it demonstrates contact with Etruria, Tartessus, Greece, and naturally 
continued contact with the East.1l3 The collapse of both Phoenician and Tartessian 
power during the first half of the sixth century saw a rapid decline in Gades from its 
former prominence owing to the breakdown of the settled infrastructure. This period 
also coincides with Phocaean expansion down the eastern coast of Spain. The 
112 Diodorus claims that the foundation of Phoenician colonies in the West was funded by the export of 
Tartessian silver. He also emphasises the importance of this by claiming that Phoenician merchants 
would replace their lead anchors with silver ones for the return journey to utilise their ship's capacity 
(V.35.4-5). 
113 For the function and evidence of Phoenician Gades see Aubet, The Phoenicians and the West, 
pp.257-291. 
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recession ended later during the sixth century with the arrival of Carthage. As it had 
done in settlements in both Sicily and Sardinia, Carthage actively assumed control 
over Gades, its territory, and its trade routes.114 The first hint at a possible 
Carthaginian redevelopment of Gades comes from its own name. According to 
Solinus and Pliny the Carthaginians named the site Gadir (Gdr, "l) meaning redoubt 
or fence. 1l5 Whether this claim is true or not, it demonstrates that there had been 
obvious Punic infiltration in Gades to the point that two later authors made an obvious 
connection between Carthage and Gades post-dating Phoenician presence. Evidence 
of subsequent Carthaginian control of Gades is obvious from the late sixth century 
until the fall of the site to the Romans in 206 BC, although like other prominent 
Phoenician centres, it maintained a degree of local autonomy.116 Carthaginian 
occupation of Gades may have begun shortly after the withdrawal of traditional 
Phoenician and Tartessian influence. Justin reports that the Carthaginians arrived in 
Spain for the first time at the request of the Gaditani, who were under attack from 
neighbouring peoples. l17 The timing of such attacks following the collapse of 
Phoenician power and the Tartessian monarchy is a possibility. The invitation of the 
Gaditani to the Carthaginians as kindred suggests that Carthage faced no Phoenician 
protest to its arrival. This smooth transition is later contested by Vitruvius who 
discusses the Carthaginian siege and presumable capture of Gades.118 However that 
may be, the result remains the same: Carthage took control of the site and its territory 
thereafter. Following the Carthaginian takeover we find the gradual increase of Punic 
necropoleis and religious connections.119 A general shift in remains to specific Punic 
types also shows a cultural development. l20 The Carthaginian possession of Gades did 
114 Gades controlled the hinterland adjacent to the island including the original Tartessian settlement of 
Dona Blanca and possibly other settlements in the Guadalquivir Valley, Aubet, The Phoenicians and 
the West, p.230. 
115 Pliny NH. IV. 120; Solinus XXIII. 12. The later more common form Gades most likely originates 
from the Greek rendering of the name (see Hdt. IV.8). 
116 This is demonstrated in 205 Be when Mago was barred entry from the city and was forced to appeal 
the resident suffetes to enter (Livy XXVllI.38.1). 
117 XLIV.5, Post regna deinde Hispaniae primi Karthaginienses imperium provindae occupavere. Nam 
cum Gaditani a Tyro, unde et Karthaginiensibus origo est, sacra Herculis per quietem iussi in 
Hispaniurn transtulissent urbemque ibi condidissent, invidentibus incrementis novae urbis finitimis 
Hispaniae populis ac propterea Gaditanos bello lacessentibus auxilium consanguine is Karthaginienses 
misere. Ibi feUd expeditione et Gaditanos ab iniuria vindicaverunt et maiore iniuria partem provinciae 
imperio suo adiecerunt. 
l1S De Arch. X.13.1-2; Athenaeus Poliorcetus 9, see Chp. VII, n.16. 
119 KAI. 71; Moscati, The World of the Phoenicians, p.241. 
120 Diego Ruiz Mata, "The Ancient Phoenicians in the Bay of Cadiz", in The Phoenicians in Spain, 
pp.192-196. 
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not affect the mercantile nature of the site as it remained active and wealthy during 
the Punic period. Gades became vital to Carthaginian revenue collection and Atlantic 
trade especially from the fifth century onward with constant interest and activity in 
the area as attested by the journeys of Hanno and Himilco. Evidence of distinctive 
Punic coinage at Gades suggests that the settlement was both prosperous and later 
able to strike its own coinage to assist trade. 121 The resilience of the Phoenicians in 
Gades is difficult to guess. The supposed antiquity of the site as a Phoenician colony, 
the continuation of the temple of Melqart, and several later references to Gades 
identifying it as Phoenician, all give the impression that, like Utica, Gades remained 
in several ways a Phoenician settlement. By the time of the Carthaginian arrival, 
Gades had long been a Phoenician capital with well established relations with the 
interior, its own sphere of influence, and considerable prosperity. The fact that 
Carthage simply assumed control of the site politically and eventually culturally does 
not imply that the previous Phoenician legacy was simply erased. We should consider, 
for example, the continued use and importance of the temple of Melqart on the island. 
It remained a Phoenicio-Punic cult until the Roman period.122 Although Melqart was 
an important divinity in the Punic pantheon, the continued use of the temple in a 
similar manner remains a direct link to the Phoenician settlement and nature of the 
site. The origin of Gades as a Phoenician settlement was not in doubt in antiquity. 
Both Strabo and Velleius Paterculus state specifically that Phoenicians founded the 
site. 123 It appears that despite constant Punic influence from the sixth century onwards 
and cultural changes, Gades remained an identifiably Phoenician settlement. 
East of Gades lies a network of several closely placed Phoenician coastal 
settlements. From Malaca to Abdera there is a clear pattern of settlement. Although 
these settlements appear as independent trading centres, it is difficult to separate them 
owing to their proximity to each other. It is interesting that these sites reveal common 
settlement topography in that they are all situated on coastal promontories usually at 
the mouths of rivers. 124 Several better attested colonies survive in this small area and 
121 HN2 p.3, such depictions include Herac1es and tunny fish. It is interesting that their coinage standard 
was later the same as Emporion and Rhoda suggesting a strong trading link with the Greeks to the 
north. 
122 Diod. XXV.1O.1; Sil. Ital. Pun. III.1; App. Hisp. 65. 
123 Vel. Pat. Hist. Rom. I.2.3; Strabo III.5.5. 
124 Aubet, The Phoenicians and the West, p.25lff. 
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run, from west to east: Malaca, Toscanos, Sexi, and Abdera. 125 These settlements, 
among others, remained important centres of trade during the Punic period and exhibit 
evidence that they were redeveloped after the arrival of Carthage. 
The first of these settlements, Malaca (Malaga) is a good example of Punic 
redevelopment of a site. Literary evidence suggests that the Carthaginians founded the 
site during the fifth century. Traditionally the residents of Malaca were recognised as 
Libyphoenicians and therefore identified as colonists from Africa. 126 However, Strabo 
claims that the site was typically Phoenician in configuration and A vienus adds that 
the Phoenicians once frequented the area.127 Archaeological evidence also shows 
Phoenician settlement in Malaca with evidence of an early necropolis dating form the 
eighth century.128 Punic involvement saw a redevelopment of the site with emphasis 
on urbanisation. Punic coinage was struck and the general nature of archaeological 
evidence alters significantly. There is a difference in opinion regarding the origins of 
Malaca. The mixture of literary and archaeological evidence suggests that it was 
originally a Phoenician site which was then redeveloped during a distinctive Punic 
phase. The Phoenicians may have only used Malaca as an emporion whereas the 
advent of Carthage brought a more settled and permanent presence at the site. As a 
result of this redevelopment, Malaca became the most prominent Punic site in the 
area. If this is the case, it demonstrates Carthage's ability to assume control of an 
existing site and redevelop it to suit its needs. 
Only a few kilometres east of Malaca is the site of Toscanos. Recent and 
extensive archaeological excavations have revealed nearly the entire history of the 
site. 129 Phoenician settlement began ca. 750-720. The site grew considerably 
incorporating a market, an industrial area, and a warehouse facility. Toscanos also 
dominated a hinterland suitable for grazing and agriculture. The Phoenician period of 
Toscanos can be tracked until the mid sixth century when, like several other 
Phoenician sites in the region it was abandoned. The Punic redevelopment of 
Toscanos was not considerable enough to consider it a replacement of the former site. 
There is evidence of early Carthaginian influence in a necropolis nearby at J ardfn 
125 There are also several smaller Phoenician settlements in this area which deserve mention. These 
include Guadalhorce, Cerro del Villar, and Chorreras. 
126 Avienus OM. L,421. 
127 Strabo III.4.2; Avienus OM. Ll,440, 459-460. 
128 Aubet, The Phoenicians and the West, pp.307-314, 326-330. 
129 Aubet, The Phoenicians in the West, pp.257-264; Hans Geog Niemeyer, "Die ph6enizische 
Niederlassung Toscanos: eine Zwischenbilanz", in PhiJnizier im Westen, pp.185-206. 
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suggesting the site was starting to show some forms of influence. l3O However, the hill 
of Toscanos remained uninhabited until the Roman period. The Punic restructuring of 
Toscanos is evident: after the Phoenician evacuation of the site and the Carthaginian 
annexation, Toscanos remained little more than a Punic coastal area of low standing 
owing to a Carthaginian policy of preferring new urbanisation rather than the older 
tactic of settling networked trade centres. 
Heading east, the next settlement for consideration is Sexi (Almunecar). 
Strabo claims that along with Malaca and Abdera, Sexi was founded by the 
Phoenicians and can be dated to the eighth century. 131 Sexi was most likely important 
not only as a trading port but also for its fisheries. l32 Quantities of murex shells at the 
site attest such activity. Evidence from the area shows distinctive connections with 
eastern influences, especially Egyptian. l33 Remains also show that Sexi produced and 
exported/imported high quality products suggesting a surprising degree of wealth. 
Painted ostrich eggs originally imported from Africa have been revealed in the Punic 
necropolis in Sexi demonstrating a continuation of refinement in local taste and a 
certain amount of prosperity. Like other settlements in the area during the sixth 
century, however, Phoenician presence in the site waned and was eventually replaced 
by Carthaginian. Sexi was obviously still in existence after Punic influence spread to 
Southern Spain as it is named alongside Malaca and Abdera as a Phoenician 
settlement in the region. l34 Further Punic remains from the site are not abundant but 
show a distinctive change originating in the late sixth century to the full development 
of a Punic society during the fourth century.l35 Additional evidence shows Sexi struck 
coinage during the Punic period. This is likely a connection with the ore producing 
areas of the interior. 
Abdera (Adra), mentioned by Strabo as a Phoenician foundation, is similarly 
dated to its surrounding settlements in the eighth century and is positioned in a 
corresponding topographical manner. Phoenician Abdera most likely enjoyed trade as 
130 c.R. Whittaker, "The Carthaginians in Ancient Spain - from Administrative Trade to Territorial 
Annexation", Studia Phoenicia X, 1989, p.150; Aubet, The Phoenicians in the West, p.345. These 
examples survive from the mid-sixth century, presumably shortly before the site was abandoned. 
131 IlIA.2. 
132 Strabo (III.4.2) and Mela (II.94) claim that the Phoenician settlements in this area were noted for the 
production of salted fish. 
133 Aubet, The Phoenicians in the West, p.270; Pellicer Catalan, pp.65f. 
134 Strabo IlIA.2; Mela II.94. 
135 HN2 p.3. 
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well as the benefits of the salt-fish industry, which was widespread in the area. 136 The 
Carthaginian intrusion into the area saw certain marked changes in the nature of 
Abdera. Naturally the salt-fish industry and connections with the interior, which saw 
such sites grow wealthy, remained during the Punic period. Other changes were 
characteristic for sites in Southern Spain: Punic necropoleis and economic alterations 
such as the locally produced coinage.137 Influence from Carthage only saw the nature 
of Abdera change but not its purpose. It remained an active and moderately important 
port among the other emporia in Southern Spain. It was redeveloped by Carthage into 
more of a Punic centre rather than a Phoenician trading port allowing it to prosper 
beyond the sixth century when several similar towns were financially ruined and 
subsequently abandoned. 
Beyond the close-knit grouping of Phoenician colonies between Malaca and 
Abdera lies Baria (Villaricos) positioned just to the southwest of the site of New 
Carthage. Originally a Phoenician settlement of the eighth century, it grew to some 
prominence owing to its access to the rich silver-producing mines of Herrerias. The 
importance of Carthaginian control at the site is evident in a considerable growth in 
population after the Phoenician decline in the sixth century. 138 Evidence of intense 
Punic development at Baria (especially during the fourth century) suggests its 
importance to Carthage's interests (especially economic) in the area. Large quantities 
of Punic material are evident at the site. Remains of a topheth with accompanying 
Punic stelae show that Punic culture, and in particular religion, had become 
entrenched at the site. Like Sexi, there are also remains of decorated ostrich eggs in 
tombs demonstrating a reasonable level of wealth in the citizenry. There is also 
evidence of coinage struck at the site showing its importance and connection to the 
ore producing areas in its hinterland.139 Baria remained an important Punic site until it 
was eclipsed by the foundation of New Carthage in the third century. Like Malaca, 
Baria was heavily affected by the arrival of Punic culture on the back of Carthaginian 
power in Spain. Carthage moved into a floundering Phoenician settlement and 
redeveloped it as a Punic foundation under the influence of Carthage. 
Another site of notable Carthaginian redevelopment was the site of New 
136 Aubet, The Phoenicians and the West, pp.314-316. 
137 HN2 p.3. 
138 Aubet, "Spain", in The Phoenicians, Sabatino Moscati (ed.), p.297. This is attested by a steep 
increase in Punic inhumations at the site after the sixth century. 
139 Barcelo, pp.34-37. 
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Carthage itself. Although we have discussed it some detail as an original Carthaginian 
foundation, which essentially it was, the site was occupied previous to the arrival of 
the Barcids in 228. After subjugating the Orissi and capturing the twelve cities of 
Iberia, Hasdrubal settled New Carthage on the old capital of the Masieni, Mastia. 140 
Hasdrubal recognised the potential of the site and instead of troubling himself with 
founding an entire new settlement, he simply redeveloped an existing site. It is 
possible a similar process took place at Acra Leuce.141 The site is described as a large 
city, but may have been Phoenician in origin dating from as early as the ninth 
century.142 By the third century the political picture was vastly different from that of 
the sixth. Carthage was more powerful and aggressive in its settlement patterns. 
Evidence of early Carthaginian involvement in Spain is poorly attested. This 
was often due to the nature of Phoenician settlement (especially along the southern 
coast) as a close-knit network of settlements which left little opportunity for original 
Carthaginian settlement before the third century. More often than not, Carthage 
simply assumed sovereignty over sites such as Malaga, Sexi, and Abdera, and 
redeveloped them as Punic settlements. Despite some opinion suggesting that 
Carthaginian expansion in Spain was slight before the Barcids, evidence shows that 
this area was little different from North Africa, Sicily, and Sardinia in accepting 
Carthaginian dominance. The older Phoenician system of independently linked 
settlements gave way to a new Carthaginian provincial system. Carthage resettled and 
redeVeloped sites to suit its own interests in Spain and especially with regard to the 
revenue it could draw from the region. 
Evidence for suggesting a Carthaginian policy of resettlement and 
redevelopment throughout its empire is considerable. Throughout several regions 
there is obvious change in settlement structure and character following the arrival of 
Carthaginian control and the introduction of Punic culture. This phenomenon was by 
no means homogeneous, often displaying several marked differences in specific areas. 
Nor was this process entirely deliberate with single settlements and entire regions 
140 Diod. XXV.lO.4. Mastia is presumably the site mentioned by Polybius in the second Carthaginian 
treaty with Rome (III.24). 
141 Diod. XXV.1O.3. 
142 What Phoenician presence existed at the site in the third century is negligible. As we have discussed 
before, it is probably best to categorise this site as a new Carthaginian foundation, see Chp. III 
regarding the Carthaginian foundation of the site. 
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experiencing marked social and cultural change owing to nothing more than periods 
of Carthaginian control and trade with Carthage and its territories. This resulted in 
Punic-type settlements, which, although retaining some autonomy, maintained overall 
allegiance to Carthage. By controlling old Phoenician or indigenous settlements on a 
political level, Carthage was able to assert its dominance and influence and develop 
its subject states. This process was often dictated by the changing nature of the 
Carthaginian Empire. Carthaginian resettlement and redevelopment is evident in 
isolated settlements and entire regions. The transformation of pre-existing sites into 
Punic centres under Carthaginian control assumes several different appearances. It is 
further testament to the adaptability of Carthaginian expansion. The collapse of 
Phoenician power in the West gave Carthage the opportunity to build an empire of its 
own. Although a lengthy process, Carthage was able to assume this established base 
of power, and by redeveloping it and eventually adding to it, was able to establish its 
own distinctive empire. 
CARTHAGINIAN PROVINCIAL REORGANISATION 
Carthaginian expansion into various areas of the Western Mediterranean was carried 
out in several ways. Their proclivity for altering demographic and social structures of 
single settlements and entire regions is relatively well documented. The real skill by 
which Carthage pursued such methods was its ability to adapt to different 
circumstances. From this approach, the Carthaginians did not pursue a general policy 
of colonial or provincial expansion, but rather acted according to separate situations. 
This is easily seen in another facet of Carthaginian expansion: a tendency to 
reorganise the settlement of entire regions to better suit Carthage's specific strategies. 
This policy is obvious in several provinces during the Punic period. Depending on 
factors such as trade, mineral extraction, defence, and sea-routes, Carthage would 
quite often streamline existing settlements or reorganise entire districts to suit its 
needs better. 
NORTH AFRICA 
North Africa was the first region to fall under Carthaginian influence. As in other -
areas, Carthage expanded by assuming control over pre-existing towns and 
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settlements along with their connected hinterlands. Carthaginian North Africa had 
previously been composed of a mix of native Berber and Phoenician settlements.143 
The expansion of Carthage did not differentiate between such ethnic divisions and 
conglomerations. Carthage, like any expansive metropolis needed a solid hinterland to 
provide for its foreign policy and the capital itself. By the sixth and fifth centuries 
when Carthage expanded into its North African hinterland, the region was 
distinguished by networked coastal settlements founded by the Phoenicians and 
numerous interior sites of varied origin. The long relationship between the 
Phoenicians and native Berbers had effectively produced a mixed Libyphoenician 
ethnicity. Carthage underwent a similar process also evolving into a type of 
Libyphoenician city which helped developed its distinctive Punic culture. 
The advent of Carthaginian power in North Africa brought considerable 
changes to the region, or perhaps more appropriately, it turned it into a united 
political, and in varying degrees, cultural region. The natural order of events saw the 
rise of Carthage subordinate the other North African towns. Old and distinguished 
settlements such as Utica and Leptis Magna were mostly stripped of their respective 
independence and answered officially to Carthage. l44 The capital needed to oversee 
the running of its hinterland and primary territory in order to assure a constant supply 
of food, manpower, and income to operate the city and its increasing empire. 
Therefore Carthage needed to redesign this area into a provincial territory which it 
could govern efficiently. 
Probably the most sweeping change effected by Carthage was to divide its 
hinterland and possibly the entirety of its North African territory into districts. This 
division was probably made during the fifth century, however, most of our evidence 
dates from later periods. During the third century we find distinctive Punic coins 
143 There are several major ethnic Berber groups situated along the North African coast and the interior. 
There are also a number of smaller groups located throughout this area. Situated around Carthage the 
main group was the Massylii. To the west dwelt the Gaetuli, the Massaesylii, and the Mauri. To the 
east and south of Carthage dwelt the Arzuges and Garamantes. Several of these larger groups, along 
with a number of the smaner groups were influenced by or had some contact with Carthage. See Gsell, 
HAAN I, passim; J.A. llevbare, Chp. I. 
144 Certain settlements retained limited autonomy although likely at a local level. Utica is specifically 
mentioned by Polybius as a separate entity in the second treaty with Rome in 306 (III.24). However, its 
true status is probably that stated in the treaty between Hannibal and Philip V where Utica is named 
alongside Carthage but included among other states controlled by Carthage, Polyb. VII.9.7, (J(pt;;6JleVOl 
'Kat <j>\lAa't't6r.tevo1 \)1\:0 KapXT\oovtrov 'trov (j\l(j'tpa'teuo!1E.vrov Kat \)1\:0 '!'tUlmtrov Kat \)1\:0 1ta(jrov 
1\:6Aerov Kat ~evrov ocm eo't!. KapX11SoVtot<; \)1t11'Koa. Other settlements are attested as retaining local 
governing bodies usually under the Punic system of suffetes, e.g. in Thugga, KAI. 101. 
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struck with the legend: n::t'iK::l, "in [the] lands/districts",145 Although these coins were 
Sicilian in origin, it is possible that they were for exclusive use in North Africa. l4Q 
This legend may define a recognised area of Carthaginian control and a formal 
Carthaginian territory characterised by a division into districts. We have already seen 
the evidence of the six distinct geographical pagi, which covered Carthage's 
hinterland as far south as Sufetula and as far west as the modern Algerian/Tunisian 
border. 147 Beyond this immediate area, Carthaginian territorial control extended 
further to at least Cirta and naturally considerably further along the coast to the west 
and the southeast. There are basic literary allusions to these pagi,148 although there is 
scant evidence for how this system actually functioned. It is likely that Carthage 
divided its territory further into arbitrary districts149 and established a number of towns 
and fortified outpostS.150 There is a surviving Neo-Punic inscription from the reign of 
Micipsa. 151 Although fragmentary it details a 'land overseer' (nll::lWn n::t'iK ~ll, literally 
"[the one] over the lands/districts") and a non-specific measurement of '200' between 
a marker and a boundary. It is interesting that a similar Punic phrase is used to define 
this position as is used on the coins defining territory in North Africa. Although this 
inscription was written some twenty years after the fall of Carthage, the Numidian 
kingdom was heavily reliant on Punic influence. Strabo claims that Masinissa and his 
heirs advanced Numidian society by introducing settled agriculture and rule; however, 
it was based on the Carthaginian system.152 It seems likely that Micipsa simply 
continued the Carthaginian model of district division. Although information regarding 
both Phoenician and Punic territory and regions in North Africa is scant, it appears to 
have held some distinction and importance. 
During the encroachments of Masinissa, which precipitated the outbreak of the 
Third Punic War, the former mentions the existence of 'the Phoenician trenches' and 
145 Hans Roland Baldus, "Unerkannte Reflexe der romischen Nordafrika-Expedition yon 256/255 y. 
Chr. in der karthagischen Miinzpragung", Chiron XII, 1982, p.178. 
146 Baldus, p.178, Ameling, Karthago, p.ll0. 
147 See Chp. II, n.7: The Great Plains, Thusca, Muxsi, Zugei, Cape Bon, and Byzacena. 
14& GIL. VIl.14445; App. Lib. 68. 
149 There is a possible reference to Carthaginian districts based on tax collection. Polybius, during his 
account of the outbreak of the Mercenary War, describes Carthaginian administrators in North Mrica 
as crtpatrrfol (1.72.3). It is possible that these individuals had specific areas of jurisdiction within 
Carthaginian territory in North Mrica. 
150 Picard, The Life and Death of Carthage, pp.89-90, has suggested a number of these towns were 
developed accordingly such as Leptis Minor and Hippo Regius. 
151 KAI. 141. 
152 XVII.3.15. 
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'the big fields' and the country of Tysca.153 These unknown geographical entities and 
their importance in this context suggest either a district or the original border of 
Phoenicio-Punic Carthage. The original site of Carthage on the Byrsa also emphasises 
the importance of chara and exact borders in the area. 154 There is the legendary story 
behind the Arae Philaeni which describes the foundation of a border marker between 
the territory of Carthage and that of Cyrene.155 In the dramatic narrative of the tale 
there is an allusion to a standard border suggesting Carthage's North African territory 
was well defined. 156 This evidence coupled with that of the six pagi and other 
examples suggests Carthage had divided its territory in North Africa into several 
distinctive administered areas. 
A subdivided and mapped province offered Carthage benefits which were not 
previously obtainable in North Africa. The most considerable of these was a stable 
base of economic administration. Carthage was able to glean better income from its 
hinterland in an organised manner. Carthage rapidly developed into a powerful 
provincial capital relegating all other settlements to subsidiary feeder states. The 
development and exploitation of the Libyan farmers and the development of large 
slave-run agricultural estates are prime examples. From the sixth century onwards, 
Carthage, much like Rome only a few centuries later, was able to marginalise and tax 
the Libyan farmers into near serfdom. This is most evident on the eve of the 
Mercenary War when heavy-handed Carthaginian tax officials (probably regional 
administrators) were named as the Libyan farmers' main grievance.157 As we have 
witnessed previously, the Libyan farmers were considerable in number and resented 
the strict domination of Carthage. The growth of large slave populations in 
Carthaginian North Africa probably developed from this period when Carthage began 
to subdue territories and their populations.158 The urbanisation and development of 
Carthage saw a polarisation between the city and the rural society of North Africa. 
153 App. Pun. 32, 54, 59, 68, see Chp. II, n.lO. 
154 The growth and nature of Carthage is hinted at by Diodorus when reporting the invasion of 
Agathoc1es in 308 (XX.44.1). He states that the new city of Carthage was separate from Old Carthage. 
Presumably the growth of Carthage precipitated the expansion of the city which brings into question 
the exact territory. Justin states that the reason behind the conflict between the Carthaginians and the 
Africans during the fifth century was to regain money paid to the latter for the previous purchase of the 
land on which Carthage stood (XIX. 1-2). Presumably this tribute covered the Byrsa and the original 
site of Carthage. 
155 Strabo XVII.3.20; San. Jug. LXXIX. 
156 See Chp. II, n.83. 
157 Polyb. 1.72.1-5, see Chp. II. n.83 and text. 
146 
With an organised region, Carthage was able to extract tax more easily and 
efficiently. One surviving inscription from as early as the fourth century gives 
detailed tariffs placed on temple sacrifices in Carthage.159 Although it was the temple 
taxing separate individuals, the nature of the decree, which describes a body, or 
council of thirty men, is likely an official decree legislated by the state. 16O Such an 
example in addition to more standard taxation and tariffs suggests that Carthage was 
aware of the benefits attached to such an administrative model and was willing to 
extract as much as it could from its subjects. 
The spread of Carthage throughout North Africa saw marked changes in the 
pre-existing settlement patterns in the area. Carthage united the entire region into a 
province subordinate under a capitaL Other settlements were disenfranchised and 
assumed the role of secondary allied and tribute states to Carthage. Older ethnic 
distinctions remained but were subject to Carthaginian control and Punic influence. 
The obvious physical development in the region was the integration of demarcated 
borders of the province and of interior districts. By accurately dividing this province, 
Carthage could manage and utilise its resources much more effectively. Although 
often considered an extension of the city, the territory in North Africa, which 
Carthage ruled, existed as a carefully governed province. It developed considerably 
from the sixth century onwards from a once divided conglomeration of ethnic 
settlements, into a prosperous and organised region. 
SICILY 
When discussing Carthaginian territory in Sicily we must first look at the Phoenicians 
as a precedent. It was Thucydides who stated that the Phoenicians once dominated the 
entire island before the arrival of the Greeks. The advent of the latter saw the 
Phoenician traders withdraw from the promontories and small coastal islands and 
retreat to the west to settle primarily in Motya, Soloeis, and Panormus. He also 
mentions that originally the Phoenicians traded with the Sicels, the predominate group 
158 This population is evident working the large slave-run estates in the Carthaginian countryside, see 
Chp. II, n.19. 
159 KAI. 74. 
160 This decree is comparable to the more detailed Punic inscription found in Massilia (KAI. 69). This 
inscription, dated by eponymous suffetes also describes temple tariffs and mentions a similar body of 
'thirty men'. It appears that at least in this instance, Carthaginian taxation policies were possibly 
standardised throughout the empire. 
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on Sicily during this period, and that the Phoenicians settled in the west of Sicily 
because of an existing alliance with the Elymians. The aggressive arrival of the Greek 
settlers forced the Phoenicians to make a tactical withdrawal to the west of the island 
alongside the Elymians. Thucydides also adds the other reason for the choice of 
Western Sicily, as it lay closest to Carthage. During the eighth century Carthage 
would still have been a Phoenician settlement and therefore part of the Phoenician 
trading network. This retreat to Western Sicily certainly shows the Phoenicians had 
some forethought in the abandonment of the larger part of the island. This is possible 
when considering why the Phoenicians did not attempt to ward off the Greeks 
especially with aid their Sicilian allies. 
We have looked at some basic examples of the Carthaginians reorganising 
settlement on Sicily to suit their needs. In some respects, the Phoenician retreat is a 
precedent for later Carthaginian actions. There are several examples of Carthage, 
either through its own initiation or because of invasion, was forced to resettle a 
number of their sites. Motya, Soloeis, Himera, and Selinus were all resettled in such a 
manner. The First Punic War saw a further shift in Carthaginian settlement plans in 
Western Sicily much like those which confronted the Phoenicians during the eighth 
century. The advance of the Romans saw Carthage redefine its settlement pattern in 
the island, abandoning several of its possessions in favour of fewer well-defended 
sites. We have seen the significance of the abandonment of Selinus with its population 
relocated to Lilybaeum in 250.161 In addition to this there is the similar example of the 
population of Eryx relocated to Drepana in 249.162 In both situations, the Phoenicians 
and Carthaginians thought it better in the face of a presumably more powerful enemy 
to abandon current settlements and retreat to areas which were more suited to their 
strategies. Although the Carthaginian example is not so clear as the earlier 
Phoenician, the concentration of Carthaginian forces in two strongholds in 
expectation of a siege, show obvious parallels. In some respects the Carthaginian 
withdrawal on Sicily is similar to that of the Phoenician: a tactical manoeuvre based 
on defensive and strategic considerations. 
The changing Carthaginian presence on Sicily also influenced basic settlement 
patterns. Naturally their contact with the local Sicilian settlements had a profound 
effect. We have seen the Carthaginians establishing further sites especially around 
161 Diod. XXIV.1. 
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settlements such as Panormus and Soloeis. A number of smaller settlements, either 
orientated for trade, industry, or for military purposes suggests that the Carthaginian 
presence in Western Sicily could be maintained more efficiently. Despite the 
fluctuating nature of Carthaginian territory from the fifth century, it appears that 
Carthage may have recognised its territory on Sicily as a separate area. The Romano-
Carthaginian treaties of 509/8 and 306 twice refer to Carthaginian territory on Sicily 
with the term ~<; ErcapxO'l)crt KapXl1bovtQl., '[what] the Carthaginians rule over.'163 
From the repetition we can discern a Carthaginian terminus technicus for what they 
considered their territory on Sicily. The term itself seems to follow other formulaic 
Punic titles. We have already discussed a similar phrase when looking at the 'land 
overseer' in Carthage during the reign of Micipsa: nli~wn n'l!i~ 'li, "[the one] over the 
lands".l64 In both cases the designation is not so much a title as a brief phrase to 
describe the official concept involved. The formula itself has obvious precedents in 
the East, especially Biblical.165 From this terminus technic us we can probably 
conclude that Carthage had specific terminology for defining its territory, and 
therefore that a specific demarcated territory existed. 
On Sicily, Carthage physically redesigned settlement patterns in specific areas 
for different reasons. The examples from Sicily show how both the Phoenicians and 
Carthaginians on separate occasions remodelled their settlements by retreating and 
resettling rather than risking conflict. Phoenician Sicily was based entirely on trade 
and so settlement patterns (both before and after the eighth century) were geared 
accordingly. Owing to the populated and changing nature of Sicily during this period, 
Carthage was often forced to use several techniques to establish either a physical 
presence or influence in foreign towns. We also know that like North Africa, Carthage 
had established specific territory on the island and likely used this as a basis of 
administration. The advent of Carthage and their annexation of Phoenician Sicily saw 
them remodel and develop certain aspects of settlement to better suit their own trade 
and expansive strategies. 
162 XXIII.9.4 
163 Polyb. 1lI.22.l0, 1lI.24.11. Linda-Marie Hans, Chp. V, has provided a comprehensive overview of 
the idea of Carthaginian territory on Sicily including the significance of these passages in Polybius. 
164 For discussion ofthese 'lands/districts' see ns.145, 151. 
165 There are a number of Biblical references which employ a similar formulaic construction - see for 
example the list of King Solomon's high officials, 1 Kings 4:1-6: e.g. the O~i1-Sl!, '[the one] over the 
forced labour' . 
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SARDINIA 
Pre-existing Phoenician settlement patterns in Sardinia saw a close-knit network of 
connected coastal, and to a lesser extent, interior settlements all geared for trade and 
industry. Such a system developed well in a peaceful climate between Phoenician 
traders and the Sards exploiting commodities such as silver and lead. 
The advent of Carthage on Sardinia brought a new political and aggressive 
situation. The Phoenician settlements were developed into Punic centres under the 
political dominion of Carthage. The obvious change in settlement in Punic Sardinia 
was precipitated by the breakdown of an amicable relationship with the Sards of the 
interior. This is first demonstrated by the arrival of Carthage on the island, which 
came in the form of successive invasions during the sixth century.166 Despite fierce 
resistance from the Sards, Carthage captured much of the southern and western areas 
on the island. Evidence of later upheavals caused by the rebellious Sards shows that 
the Carthaginians did not enjoy or attempt to maintain a friendly relationship as the 
Phoenicians had once done. 167 The relationship is best reported by Diodorus who 
states the Carthaginians never subdued the entire island despite repeated attempts with 
sizeable armies.168 It is ironic that when the island was captured by Rome in 238 BC, 
the new invaders had just as much trouble with the rebellious Sards, finally 
suppressing them in the early empire. 169 
The Carthaginians' reaction to a number of failed attempts to quell the Sards 
in the interior and to protect themselves and their settlements from their intrusions 
was to construct an interior network of Punic fortifications in addition to fortifying 
existing sites. Recent archaeological excavations have revealed a number of Punic 
sites in the interior dating from the fifth century. 170 These sites act like an interior wall 
beginning in the southeast of the island near the Flumendosa River (Muravera) and 
continuing along a general northwest line to the La Nurra in the Gulf of Asinara 
166 Justin XVIII.7.1-2, XIX.1.3. 
167 The Sards revolted in 379 against the Carthaginians when the latter was beset by plague outside 
Syracuse (Diod. XV.24). 
168 V .15.5, 'trov of. KapXT\oov{rov 1tOA.A.UKtI; a~tOA6yot<; OUVUIlEO't O''tpa'tEuO'uv'trov E1t' au'to\)<; . 
169 The Romans disliked the Sards and treated the island as a conquered territory. Festus (p. 428 L.) 
describes them as Sardi uenales: ali us alia nequior. Several revolts broke out on Sardinia until 114 BC 
and open brigandry continued before finally being suppressed during the first century AD (Tac. Ann. 
11.85). 
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(Bonorva or possibly Bosa). The presence of over a dozen strategic interior forts 
stretching in a relatively straight line suggests an obvious border of demarcation 
between the Carthaginian settlements it the south and west and the interior Sards. It 
appears that the Carthaginians' reaction to the constant trouble caused by the Sards 
was simply to exclude them from their territory. By creating this fortified line across 
the island, Carthage could protect its coastal network and its interior industries and 
infrastructure. The line itself is heavily dominant on terrain, which is rugged in the 
interior of the island, governed by rivers and mountains. Evidence from several of 
these forts is scant but distinctly Punic with pottery, coinage, and jewellery suggesting 
that these sites were permanently inhabited. l7l 
The line of interior forts certainly helps us define Carthaginian territory on 
Sardinia.172 We have already witnessed obvious examples of Carthage defining and 
developing provinces in North Africa and Sicily. In many respects, this action of 
literally excluding the northeast of the island defines the province of Carthaginian 
Sardinia. Carthage was obviously aware of this division and went to great lengths to 
maintain it. 
The Carthaginians were faced with an obvious dilemma in Sardinia. They 
were not willing to continue good relations with the Sards, preferring to conquer and 
to subdue them rather than to coexist. Unfortunately for the Carthaginians, they were 
unable to achieve this. Therefore rather than continuing to attempt to conquer the 
island by force, which they had failed to do so on several occasions, they devised a 
strategy to defend their settlements and their valuable trade routes by simply 
excluding the Sards in the manner reminiscent of Hadrian's Wall. Although this 
network of garrisoned forts was both protection from and a deterrent to the Sards from 
invading or rebelling, it was not an impregnable barrier, which is proven by revolts 
still on the island from time to time, although most likely more rarely. 
The construction of a line of interior forts in Sardinia is another example of 
170 See Barreca, "Le fortificazioni fenicio-puniche in Sardegna", pp.115-128; Rowland, pp.20-39. 
Barreca has identified a series of interior sites which were either fortified or established with an 
emphasis on defence. 
171 Rowland, pp.24-26. 
172 The Sardinian line of defence did not entirely separate the southern and western areas of the island 
from Carthaginian activity settlement. A few Phoenicia-Punic settlements existed along the northern 
and eastern coasts of the island. The best example of this is Olbia. This Phoenician settlement was near 
the northern tip of Sardinia on the eastern coast. It is located in a gulf and dominates two river mouths 
and access to the interior. This settlement proved a vital link to the Tyrrhenian Sea, Corsica, and Italy. 
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Carthage actively redeveloping settlements in one of its provinces. Initially Carthage 
wanted to conquer the entire island and to establish exclusive rights to its natural 
resources. When this policy was met with stiff resistance, Carthage reassessed the 
situation on the island and saw it better to exclude the Sards by constructing an 
interior and fortified border. This new settlement policy saw Carthage benefit by a 
more stable and therefore prosperous province acting as a lucrative mercantile and 
industrial base and a strategic possession abroad. 
SPAIN 
Carthaginian expansion into Spain was precipitated by the downfall of centralised 
power in the area with the collapse of Tartessian and Phoenician dominance. The 
arrival of the Carthaginians later in the sixth century enabled them to fill the void left 
by the Phoenicians and to continue the exploitation of the valuable resources in the 
hinterland. Although Carthage assumed power over a faltering coastal network, it 
redeveloped the area into a viable and prosperous region. 
The settlement pattern that faced Carthage when it began to expand into Spain 
was not functioning well. A number of the original Phoenician sites had been 
abandoned, the capital at Gades was possibly being harassed by the native Spaniards, 
and the remaining settlements were generally in decline. Carthaginian intervention 
and settlement patterns departed from that previously employed by the Phoenicians. 
Instead of repopulating lagging or abandoned settlements, they chose a few major 
sites and urbanised them further. The nature of Phoenician settlement saw a number 
of coastal settlements abandoned. Carthage selected certain sites, leaving smaller 
intermediary sites such as Toscanos and Chorreras mostly abandoned. 173 Carthaginian 
bases stretched from Gades, in the west through, Malaca, Sexi, Abdera, and Baria to 
the east. Gades was already a well established urban centre and therefore was not 
affected in this manner. However, several other centres displayed marked changes 
with the arrival of Carthage. As we have seen Strabo names Malaca, Sexi, and Abdera 
along the central southern coast as Phoenician cities worth mention. 174 These sites 
were preserved and protected by Carthage for several centuries enabling them to 
Although beyond the main concentrations of Carthaginian settlement, it remained an important 
strategic port which flourished as a Punic settlement, see Cecchini, pp.70-73; KAI. 68. 
173 Aubet, The Phoenicians and the West, pp.317-321. 
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remain settled and prosperous until Strabo described them in his day. 
Originally it appears that the Carthaginian system remained similar to that of 
the Phoenicians in the maintenance of an exclusive coastal presence in Spain, content 
with trade and exploiting the lucrative metal industry. Although basic evidence of a 
Carthaginian presence is evident from the sixth century, this is not well attested until 
the fourth century when we finally see greater evidence of Carthaginian goods in 
Spain and likewise Spanish goods in Carthage. 175 Following this period we find an 
increase in Carthaginian interest in Southern Spain. The construction of several forts 
and defensive towers some time between the fifth and third centuries in eastern 
Andalusia known as the 'Towers of Hannibal' suggests that the Carthaginians were 
willing to increase their influence in the area and to protect the lucrative mines.176 The 
Barcid invasion of the third century suggests that prior to this the Carthaginians had 
not (or possibly attempted) extended their territory far into the interior of Spain. 
Carthaginian policy in Southern Spain witnessed several changes in the 
settlement patterns of old. Although it can be argued that the Phoenician system was 
no longer existent, its closely linked coastal emporia were still evident during the 
Punic period. Carthage often left sites vacant, preferring instead to choose a handful 
of settlements to develop to and urbanise as Carthaginian provincial towns. Punic 
Spain developed into a major area of income for Carthage and by redesigning its 
settlement patterns, it was able to benefit further from its interests in the Far West. 
Carthaginian settlement patterns within the provinces of the empire were 
neither standardised nor consistent. Carthaginian foreign policy can be witnessed in 
this regard as quite flexible and adaptable. Separate regions often required diverse 
settlement and operational strategies. The Phoenicians had no need for provincial 
organisation as they contented themselves with a seaborne empire with relatively little 
territory. The expansion of Carthaginian interests into these areas and beyond 
precipitated the need for change and especially to develop the mechanisms to deal 
with it. North Africa was essentially the hinterland and therefore the base of power for 
174 III.4.2-3. 
175 e.G. Wagner, "The Carthaginians in Ancient Spain from Administrative Trade to Territorial 
Annexation", Studia Phoenicia X, 1989, pp.150-151. Even sites such as Baria, which experienced 
considerable Carthaginian activity from an early period, did not show signs of a more intensive 
Carthaginian presence until the fourth century. 
176 Bhizquez, pp.77-78. 
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Carthage and its empire. Carthaginian policy saw the region developed into an 
organised area divided into types of districts from which revenue could be gleaned 
more easily and funneled to the capital. Naturally the once independent towns were 
disenfranchised and became Punic feeder-states to the capitaL Patterns in Sicily were 
altered somewhat differently. The Carthaginians, like the Phoenicians had before, 
limited the number of functional settlements in the area. By consolidating power and 
defining a core territory in the west of the island, they could better protect their 
interests and influence in the island while maintaining important trade routes. Sardinia 
presented a different scenario to Carthage. With its powerbases located in the south 
and west of the island opposed to the troublesome Sards of the interior, Carthage 
needed to protect its coastal dominance and its settled trade. From the fifth century 
onwards, Carthage built a border of interior fortifications practically excluding the 
unconquered northeast of the island from its own territory. Settlement in Spain was 
organised into fewer sites, abandoning a number of smaller settlements. The 
Carthaginians resolved to develop and urbanise only selected sites from which they 
could still operate the coastal routes and ensure the extraction of metals in the interior. 
From such examples it appears that Carthage applied different solutions to develop its 
provinces and maintain them in a changing, but distinctly Carthaginian manner. 
154 
v. DIFFUSION OF CULTURE 
One of the enduring legacies of Carthage was its impact on a number of peoples with 
which it came into contact. The effect of Punic culture and Carthaginian rule can also 
be discerned in certain areas bordering their territory. The geography of the 
Carthaginian Empire in the West saw it dominate areas largely unaffected by other 
developed cultures. More often than not those groups bordering Carthaginian territory 
were less developed peoples and scattered tribes rather than, for example concentrated 
settlements of Greeks or Romans.1 There are several areas demonstrating an obvious 
diffusion of Punic culture or social influence on surrounding peoples. There is 
copious archaeological evidence demonstrating trade between Carthaginian centres 
and those beyond their control. This is a natural phenomenon, which is further 
heightened by the gap between the developed Carthaginian centres and the less 
developed surrounding peoples. There is also evidence suggesting that Punic culture 
survived in areas once governed or occupied by the Carthaginians. Carthage often 
supplied a constant and steadying influence in several areas of its empire. Its removal 
often had little immediate effect with evidence of continued aspects of culture and 
social and political developments. There is other evidence which implies that 
Carthaginian influence on certain surrounding areas was more than simply culturally 
cosmetic. This often demonstrated sweeping social and political changes emphasising 
intense contact with or even reliance on Punic Carthage. 
NORTH AFRICA 
The group most prevalent in North Africa and that most directly affected by the rise 
of Carthage were a number of the native Libyan tribes or Berbers. Although the 
growth of Carthage into the North African hinterland saw many incorporated as 
subjects, those groups located in areas beyond the direct control of Carthage also were 
subject to obvious Carthaginian influence. Original Berber territory in the vicinity of 
Carthage and further settlements such as Cirta and Thugga fell under Carthaginian 
1 There are a number of examples where Carthaginian territory technically bordered developed areas. 
Sicily is an obvious example. The major Greek cities in the area of Selinus and Himera lay in the 
western half of the island in relative proximity to known Carthaginian settlements. In Southern Spain, 
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control and were influenced by Punic culture.2 The problem with identifying Punic 
culture is its rapid spread and acceptance by several known towns in this region 
forcing us to assume Carthaginian sovereignty. It was natural for a less developed and 
settled society such as the Berbers willingly to accept the profits and to a certain 
degree, the culture of Phoenicio-Punic Carthage.3 
We can (paradoxically) discern the influence of Punic culture after the demise 
of Carthage during the Punic Wars. Precisely this period saw a dramatic revival of 
Numidian power under individuals such as Syphax, Masinissa, and later Micipsa, a 
revival in which there is an obvious influence from Phoenicio-Punic culture.4 Syphax, 
king of the Massaesylii, became an ally of Carthage after his marriage to the Punic 
woman Sophonisba. Although notably influenced by Hellenism and demonstrating 
Carthaginian tendencies, Syphax is identified as a Numidian King. His capital of Cirta 
(or Constantine)5 was heavily influenced by Punic culture and Punic was the official 
language of court.6 
Masinissa, King of the Massylii became a fully developed Punic-Numidian 
monarch. As one who grew up in Carthage and was presumably educated in such a 
manner, he emerged from the Second Punic War as King of Numidia.7 It was he who 
was instrumental in redesigning Numidian society by making nomads into farmers 
and creating a settled state.8 Masinissa also was known to hire Punic artisans who 
helped develop the basic Berber settlements into permanent and functional 
foundations. 9 Despite the waning power of Carthage, Masinissa developed Numidia 
Phocaean encroachments along the east coast saw Greek and Carthaginian settlements in close 
proximity. 
2 See Chp. IV, ns.33-40 and text, regarding the original conception of Carthaginian and Numidian 
territory in North Africa. Masinissa used Carthaginian occupation of original Numidian settlements as 
a reason for war. (App. Pun. 67-70; Livy XXXlV.62). 
3 This is best demonstrated in the story of Elissa in Justin (XVlIl.6). Here we find Elissa spuming the 
advances of a number of local chieftains. Hiarbus, King of the Maxitani supposedly asked for 
Phoenician teachers to instruct his tribe how to live in a more civilised manner: Justin XVIII.6.2-3, 
nuntiantes regem aliquem poscere qui cultiores victus eum Afrosque perdoceat sed quem inveniri 
posse, qui ad barbaros et ferarum more viventes transire a consanguine is velit? Whether this story is 
factual or not, it does demonstrate a possible allegory explaining Numidian acceptance of Carthaginian 
culture. 
4 For further reading on the Berber kings around this period see Fran~ois Decret and Mhamed Fantar, 
L'Afrique du Nord dans l'antiquite - des origines au Ve siecie (Paris 1981) Chps. III-IV. 
5 Livy XXX.12. 
6 KAl. 102-116, there are remains of hundreds of Punic stelae from Cirta dating from the third to the 
first centuries BC. 
7 App. Pun. 10. 
8 Strabo XVIl.3.1S. 
9 One inscription describes a Carthaginian overseer supervising Numidian workers in Thugga during 
the second century BC (KAl. 100). 
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into a developed sovereign state based on the Carthaginian model with which he was 
most familiar. Ironically, like Carthage before him, he then set about claiming the 
North African hinterland as annexed territory. Masinissa never witnessed the fall of 
Carthage, his social and cultural model and great foe, since he died in the first year of 
the Roman siege aged 91. 
Finally, under Micipsa (148-118 BC), the Numidians reclaimed their lost 
territory in North Africa. Even without the steadying influence of Carthage as the seat 
of Punic society, its culture remained obvious in the Neo-Punic period down until the 
first century BC. lD According to Strabo, Micipsa also used Cirta as a royal residence, 
even going so far as to settle Greeks there presumably to boost his cultural image 
further. ll It is during the reign of Micipsa we can see the best example of Punic 
culture surviving among independent Numidians not only in the period before the 
advent of Rome, but well into the empire. 
During the Neo-Punic period, there are several indications that the Numidian 
Kings modelled a number of political and official positions and organisation on the 
Carthaginian precedent. Numidian coinage from the second century BC onward 
shows a good deal of similarity to that of the Carthaginians suggesting not only 
economic interaction, but also influence. 12 A number of Neo-Punic inscriptions have 
survived testifying that Punic remained the official Numidian language of court for 
some time. These examples enable us to witness the continuation of various Punic 
social patterns under the Numidians. We have already looked at the fragmentary 
inscription describing a 'land overseer' and detailing a precise measurement of land. 13 
Such an official inscription describing land ownership is characteristic of a relatively 
advanced and settled society. The language and purpose of this document appears 
adopted from the Carthaginian period and points toward the Numidians simply 
continuing established and proven administrative practice. The inscription also shows 
that aspects of Carthaginian policies continued into the Neo-Punic period. The 
detailed land division in Carthaginian North Africa with the existence of six pagi 
10 After Micipsa the advent of Roman interests in the area saw a distinctive change to a Roman 
influenced society culminating during the reign of Jugurtha. Despite this trend, some aspects of Punic 
culture continued. Probably the best example was during the reign of Juba n who allegedly possessed a 
Punic library: hoc adfirmant Punici libri: hoc Iubam regem accipimus tradidisse, Solinus XXXII.2. 
Although aspects of Punic culture continued in the region, it was gradually marginalised under Roman 
influence. 
11 xvn.3.13. 
12 Hans R. Baldus, "Die Mtinzpragung der numidischen Konigreiche", in Die Numider, pp.187-208. 
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probably continued in some form under Numidian control. With the official arrival of 
Roman power, the six pagi were used as the basis of Roman provincial control. 14 A 
political position which survived demonstrating the continuation of Carthaginian 
political influence was that of the suffet. On several occasions during the Neo-Punic 
period this position is mentioned in a number of towns. One such honorary inscription 
from Leptis Magna reads: Flamen, Sufes, Praef( ectus) sacr( arum). 15 It is interesting 
we find the position of suffet named alongside other Roman positions. Otherwise we 
still find eponymous suffet dating elsewhere testifying its continued importance in 
Numidian centres. 16 It is hardly surprising that the Numidians maintained a number of 
political practices once used by Carthage. We have already looked at native towns in 
North Africa possessing executive political bodies. These are described in familiar 
terms in our Greek and Roman sources. 17 It is likely that any number of these towns 
maintained their local governing bodies under the Numidian Kings as they had once 
done under Carthaginian control. Although the Numidians were governed by a 
succession of kings, there is evidence to suggest that aspects of the Carthaginian 
political and administrative system remained in a number of Numidian centres. 
We already know that several aspects of Punic religion continued well into the 
Roman period with a number of divinities converted to a Latin form. From several 
inscriptions during the Neo-Punic period we find Punic divinities honoured in the 
same manner as previously in Carthage. Naturally the primary divinities at Carthage 
such as Tanit and Ba'al Hammon maintain their precedence and appear as primary 
divinities of the Numidians. 18 Even during the period of Romanisation following the 
first century BC, we find the Romans adopting and encouraging worship of Ba'al 
Hammon as Saturn and Tanit as Ceres. 19 
If we look at other epigraphic evidence we can see aspects of the continuation 
and diffusion of Punic culture. Naturally Punic-type names continue well after the fall 
of Carthage. A number of inscriptions show typical Punic names in official positions 
13 KAI. 141. 
14 Ilevbare, p.22. 
15 KAI. 121. 
16 e.g. KAI. 101. 
17 For examples of several North African settlements possessing such political bodies under the control 
of Carthage see Chp. II, n.90. 
18 KAI. 137,159,162,167. 
19 See J.B. Rives, Religion and Authority in Roman Carthage from Augustus to Constantine (Oxford 
1995) pp.153-169. 
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or of obvious wealth dating to the Roman period.20 Such evidence is testament to the 
resilience of N eo-Punic as an important language to the people of North Africa. It is 
also attested during the Roman period as we find Roman officials named in several 
Neo-Punic inscriptions.21 Finally we see the slow decay of the importance of Neo-
Punic during the Roman period with the growth of bi-lingual inscriptions in Neo-
Punic and Latin, and then finally the total adoption of Latin as the official language of 
state.22 This demise was not felt amongst the local populations of North Africa. Saint 
Augustine, writing during the fourth century AD, comments on the survival of Punic, 
and mentions on several occasions that the Punic language was still in use. 23 Such 
statements suggest that Punic was deeply set among the remnants of Carthaginian and 
Numidian peoples on a large scale and was in common use outside official spheres. 
Those directly subject to Carthage seem to have accepted its social and 
cultural dominance as well as its political techniques over time and adopted much of 
them as their own. This is reflected in the growth of the kingdom of Numidia under its 
tribal kings and then united under one crown. The literary evidence we possess shows 
various aspects of Carthaginian society continuing after 146. From archaeological 
remains it appears that the Numidians were dependent on the Phoenicians and then 
the Carthaginians for material goods and influence. Naturally this continued and 
developed after the fall of Carthage. North Africa, and in particular the native 
Numidians, were exposed to Punic culture the longest and most intensely. After the 
fall of Carthage, and with it their cultural centre, the Numidians created, or perhaps 
better, reclaimed their own kingdom based on the culture of their old teachers. 
SICILY 
The Phoenicio-Punic influence on the pre-existing Sicilian populations was noticeable 
in the west of the island. Centuries of settled activity on Sicily saw regular contact 
with various ethnic groups. The Elymians were the group most influenced by the 
20 KAI. 145, 128, 135, 159. 
21 KAI. 120, 126, 142. For examples of the survival of Punic during the Roman period see Wolfgang 
Rollig, "Das Punische im Romischen Reich", Die Sprachen im Romischen Reich der Kaiserzeit (Bonn 
1980) pp.291-295. This continuation can be compared with the Phoenician east where Fergus Millar 
has tracked the survival of Phoenician on the Levantine coast during the Roman period, The Roman 
Near East 31 Be -AD 337 (Cambridge 1994) Chp. VIII. 
22 KA1. 152, 160, 165. 
23 e.g. Ep. 66.2, 209.2, 17.2; Serm. 167.4; Quaest. hept. 7.16. 
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Phoenician and particularly the Carthaginian presence, positioned in the west of the 
island alongside the Sicels and Sicanians.24 
Little is known of the Elymians during the archaic and classical periods 
outside of their two main settlements of Segesta and Eryx. The relationship between 
the Phoenicians and then Carthaginians on the one hand, and the Elymians on the 
other is relatively well documented. Although closely connected, the two parties 
remained, at least officially, independent of each other. We have already discussed 
Thucydides' statement allying the Phoenicians and Elymians during the eighth 
century and the later coalition between the Phoenicians and then the Carthaginians 
and the Elymians in destroying two attempted settlements by Pentathlus and 
Dorieus.25 The relationship between the two appears to have remained for a 
considerable period. This contact transcended simple foreign policy however, as 
evidence from both Segesta and Eryx suggests that the Elymians were receptive to 
influence from more developed neighbouring states.26 
The sanctuary of Eryx and its township is testament to the influence of Punic 
culture on a less developed people. We have witnessed certain historical events 
placing Eryx as an important strategic and cultural centre in the Carthaginian Empire. 
A certain degree of control is implied by the importance of the site to Carthage and 
with it the maintenance of the cult of Astarte. An example of this at the site and its 
Punic legacy is after the fall of Sicily to the Romans. Eryx provides the best evidence 
of continuation of Punic Sicily into the Roman period. The cult remained a popular 
centre of the worship of Venus down at least until the first century AD.27 The walls at 
the site bear Phoenician mason marks and are themselves distinctively Phoenicio-
Punic.28 It appears that the site was redeveloped during this later period following 
24 There is evidence to suggest that Carthage also maintained a relationship with the Sicels and the 
Sicanians. According to Thucydides, the Phoenicians originally traded with the Sicels in Sicily before 
the arrival of the Greeks (VI.2). Although the Phoenicians retreated, it is possible that they and the 
Carthaginians still maintained trade links with certain Sicel settlements. The Phoenicio-Punic 
settlements of Panormus and Soloeis bordered the territory of the Sicanians. A number of Carthaginian 
offensives show the Carthaginians allied to the Elymians, Sicels, and Sicanians. During the siege of 
Himera in 409, Hannibal enlisted the support of both the Sicels and Sicanians (Diod. XIII.59.6). 
Following the peace treaty of 405, the Sicanians and Elymians are noted as allies of Carthage (Diod. 
XlII. 114.1). 
25 Diod. V.9; Hdt. V.42-48. 
26 There were a number of other smaller Elymian sites in the vicinity which almost certainly would 
have fallen under Carthaginian influence, such as Entella, Monte Iato, and Monte Castellazzo 
(Poggioreale). 
27 See Diod. IV.83; R.J.A. Wilson, Sicily Under the Roman Empire - The Archaeology of a Roman 
Province, 36BC - AD535 (Warminster 1990) pp.282-284. 
28 Linda-Marie Hans, pp.19-20. 
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which there appear far greater amounts of Phoenicia-Punic material remains. 
Numismatic evidence shows that there was a mint at Eryx producing standardised 
Greek coinage but with Phoenicio-Punic imagery and legends.29 Interestingly, 
Elymian religious imagery suggests a co-habitation with Phoenicians and 
Carthaginians with coins from the site depicting such local forms as the River 
Crimisus as a dog.30 
The largest city of the Elymians, Segesta offers us an interesting comparison 
when discussing the effect of Punic society on its neighbours. There was an obvious 
element of Phoenicia-Punic influence in the city, but essentially the major influence 
was Hellenic. Although an inland settlement, Segesta was in regular contact with 
Phoenicians, Carthaginians, and Greeks. The best examples of a Hellenised Segesta 
are the striking remains of a Greek theatre and an unfinished Greek columned temple. 
It is interesting that the Segestaeans actually identified themselves with Hellenic 
culture claiming to possess a common ancestry with the Trojans and Phocaeans?l 
Coupled with this was Segesta's longstanding enmity with the Greek colony of 
Selinus. This relationship conjures up imagery of two Greek city-states jostling for 
control of a common territory.32 Although an Elymian town, Segesta developed into a 
Greek-style city. 
Despite the overall Hellenisation of Segesta, the site still maintained a close 
relationship with the neighbouring Phoenicians and Carthaginians. There is evidence 
that suggests at least some elements of Punic culture became established in Segesta. 
Like other areas in Elymian Sicily, Segesta produced Greek-style coinage with a 
Phoenicio-Punic legend.33 Presumably with such contact based on the proximity of 
Segesta with several Carthaginian sites, further influence is likely. 
There are grounds for suggesting that the Carthaginians influenced the 
Sicanians and to a lesser extent the SiceIs. The Carthaginians' expansion eastward 
saw them gain control of Greek settlements such as Selinus, Himera, and Acragas for 
often considerable periods. This control of major coastal ports and the interior 
29 R. Ross Holloway, The Archaeology of Ancient Sicily (London 1991) pp.136-138; BMC, Sicily, 
pp.62-63. 
30 H/If p.164. There are also similar examples from Panormus and Segesta. 
31 Thuc. VL2. This legend was later played upon by Virgil who has Aeneas pass through Sicily and 
establish the temple of Venus at Eryx (V.24, 759). 
32 There are countless examples of such encounters between separate Greek states. Chaleis and Eretria 
fighting over the Lelantine plain is an obvious example. A better instance between two Greek colonies 
is that between Sybaris and Croton in the sixth century. 
161 
territory and its settlements placed them deep in Sicanian territory. The Sicanian 
settlement of Mt. Adranone near Sambuca di Sicilia seems to have fallen under Punic 
influence around the time of the fall of Selinus in the late fifth century. There are 
remnants of a Punic temple (with possibly connections to Demeter and Core) and 
fortifications suggesting that Punic influence and presence at the site was 
considerable.34 The Sicels further to the east display less interaction with the 
Carthaginians, although the nature of trade on the island and the attested contact 
between the two groups certainly makes this possible. 
Unlike North Africa, the presence of Punic culture rapidly gave way to Rome. 
There is little archaeological evidence showing the continuation of a Punic population 
or influence. It is possible that some aspects of Punic culture lingered amongst older 
Punic and Sicilian settlements. Apuleius describes Sicily during the second century 
AD as trilingues, referring to Latin, Greek, and what can only be Punic.35 It is quite 
possible that in certain enclaves, presumably in the west of the island, the Punic 
language survived as the unofficial language, as it had done in areas of North Africa.36 
This may have been facilitated by the continuation of several Punic religious cults in 
Sicily such as that of Astarte at Eryx and Tanit. Overall the Punic legacy was 
officially short with only a few residual traces evident following the downfall of 
Carthage. 
The Phoenicio-Punic presence in Western Sicily had a profound effect on the 
Elymians, Sicanians, and possibly Sicels. It appears that the Elymians readily 
accepted the more developed Phoenicio-Punic and Hellenic cultures. The long period 
during which Phoenicians and Carthaginians enjoyed a settled presence in Western 
Sicily and the relationship with the Elymians and then the Sicanians suggests that all 
often lived amicably with one another. Evidence from Eryx, to a lesser extent Segesta, 
Monte Adranone, and other settlements in the area demonstrates a Punic influence in 
a number of Sicilian settlements. Although these peoples remained, at least officially 
free and independent, they relied heavily on their more developed neighbours and 
were naturally influenced. 
33 HN2 p.138. 
34 Moscati, Italia Punica pp.130-133. The relevance of this cult to Carthage is considerable. Its origins 
in the Carthaginian pantheon seem to appear in Sicily but spread to other areas, especially North 
Africa, see Pena, "El culto a Demeter y Core en Cartago. Aspectos iconograficos", pp.39-SS. 
35 Met. XI.S. 
36 For the survival of some Punic aspects in Sicily see Wilson, pp.282ff., 316-317. 
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SPAIN 
Traces of Phoenicio-Punic culture in Southern Spain are, as in North Africa and 
Sardinia, more discernible as Carthage enjoyed exclusive rights there for several 
centuries. The protracted period of almost exclusive Phoenicio-Punic contact with 
peoples in mainland Spain resulted in social and cultural diffusion. Areas surrounding 
Phoenician settlements such as those in the Guadalquivir Valley have produced 
evidence of an influence in material culture from at least the eighth century.37 Similar 
examples can be traced along the southern coastline of Spain and the interior. 38 The 
diffusion of material goods between Phoenicio-Punic settlements, Tartessus, and other 
Spanish settlements is archaeologically attested. What is of interest to this discussion 
is the natural impact of such interaction on the native Spaniards. 
If we tum from the archaeological record of Phoenicio-Punic Spain and piece 
together fragments of the literary evidence, we are able to discern Phoenicio-Punic 
culture existing and surviving in areas beyond their direct control. One such example 
regarding Southern Spain survives in Strabo who claims that even in his day, the 
cities of Turdetania (Andalusia) were still populated by Phoenicians. 39 This is 
considerable, as by this time Rome had officially controlled Southern Spain for over a 
century. If the inhabitants of Turdetania were still being characterised as Phoenician 
(or most likely Punic), it appears that even after the loss of Spain during the Second 
Punic War, elements of Phoenicio-Punic culture and society remained for some time. 
It is difficult to define what criteria Strabo is using to identify the inhabitants as 
Phoenician. Whether they still lived in the Phoenicio-Punic manner or spoke the 
language is unclear.40 The latter is quite possible, since we have witnessed the Punic 
language was in use often several hundred years after the removal of Carthaginian 
37 Aubet, The Phoenicians and the West, pp.241-247. 
38 This process is evident from initial contact between Phoenician and Tartessian settlements. For the 
basic mechanisms of this process see Aubet, "The Phoenician Impact on Tartessos: Spheres of 
Interaction", in The Phoenicians in Spain, pp.225-240. The trade between the two intensified in the 
eighth century through to the sixth. With the decline of both powers there was a natural deterioration in 
trade and interaction, which only began to show signs of recovering again between native Spanish 
settlements and the Carthaginians from the fifth century onward. 
39 Ill.2.13, Ot)'tOl yap <DoiVt~tv ou'tro~ EYEVOV'tO cr!jlo8pa \mOxclptot oocr'te 'ta~ nA.clOU~ 'troY EV 't11 
Toup81l'tavi<;>: nOA.erov Kat 'troY nA.llcriov 'tonrov un' EKclVroV vuv olxe'icr8at. 
40 There is one Punic inscription surviving from Gades dated to the second half of the second century 
BC (KAI. 71). It would seem likely that Phoenician remained the main language there especially 
concerning the temple of Melqart. 
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control in North Africa and possibly Sicily. Strabo provides another interesting piece 
of information regarding the linguistic development of local peoples in Southern 
Spain. He later claims that the Turdentai who dwelt in the Guadalquivir Valley 
(presumably by his time) had so accepted the Roman way of life and language that 
they had forgotten their own.41 By the first century, the Turdentai had only been free 
of official Phoenicio-Punic control for about a century and a half. It seems fair to 
assume that the Romans still did not remove every trace of Phoenicio-Punic culture 
immediately. If Strabo is correct, it is possible that the Turdentai had forgotten their 
own language so quickly was because they had in fact abandoned it earlier, possibly 
preferring that of their Phoenicio-Punic neighbours. Although this scenario is a 
possibility, without further evidence it remains unsubstantiated. 
It appears that Phoenicio-Punic had a longstanding effect on a number of 
Spanish tribes during the second century Be. According to Appian, there are several 
examples of supposed Spanish communities redefining their civic identity in times of 
need or opportunity by joining several tribes or communities into one larger entity. 
What makes this of particular interest is that a reasonable level of political 
development seems necessary to achieve such a goal. We must therefore turn to 
outside influence. Considering the nature and position of these examples, the only 
feasible source is Phoenicio-Punic. The phenomenon of synoikismos is best 
characterised in Greek terms by the formation of Megalopolis in Arcadia during the 
360's which comprised around forty villages.42 It is also attested, at least partially, in 
Carthaginian history. We have already witnessed related examples from the Second 
Punic War including Selinus and Eryx. Although not essentially synoikismos, the 
concerted effort of relocating of entire populations is obvious. Probably more 
germane to this mechanism was the foundation of New Carthage by Hasdrubal 
Barca.43 He defeated the king of the Orissi and then captured the twelve cities of 
Iberia. He then founded New Carthage in 228 as the provincial capital. It is quite 
possible he accepted at least some of the displaced Iberian refugees into New 
Carthage.44 Whether he did or did not is irrelevant, the overriding image we are left 
with is one of forced synoikismos: twelve smaller settlements removed and replaced 
41 III.2.1S. 
42 Paus. VIII.27.3-4. 
43 Diod. XXV.l2. 
44 Hasdrubal was perceptive by marrying an Iberian princess before founding New Carthage. By doing 
so his actions and rule would appear more legitimate. 
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by one large one. This practice in Spain is possibly demonstrated by the Carthaginian 
policy of preferring to combine and urbanise settlements as opposed to maintain many 
small centres as the Phoenicians had once done. The settlement pattern in Spain was 
obvious following the Carthaginian expansion into the area following the withdrawal 
of the Phoenicians. 
According to Appian, a number of Spanish tribes including the Lusones, for 
want of land, revolted from Roman rule in ca. 180 Be. Although they were defeated 
by Fulvius Flaccus and dispersed, several groups formed together to found a new city, 
Complega.45 This site was developed and fortified accordingly. This action is similar 
to Elis which following the Persian Wars was synoecised into one city from a number 
of small settlements.46 Later, however, Tiberuis Gracchus defeated the people of 
Complega after his troops were attacked. He then apparently established a more 
equitable class system in Complega and apportioned land accordingly. The formation 
of a citizen body from what Appian describes as tribes of wanderers is quite 
uncharacteristic. Complega was formed and fortified as an independent political 
centre. The following settlement is described as allotting land and giving a place in 
the community to the poorer classes. The allotment of land is self-explanatory, being 
both the reason for the civil unrest and a Roman gift to ensure allegiance. The giving 
of a place in the community and land to the poorer classes possibly requires further 
explanation.47 It is possible that there was a basic existing wealth-based class structure 
present in Complega. This, however, would probably not extend to the relatively high 
level of social structure that Complega had achieved.48 The Romans had not been 
active in the area nearly long enough to influence these tribes. Once again the only 
reasonable choice is Carthage and its territory in Spain.49 
Although situated along the Ebro and therefore at the limit of Punic influence, 
the tribes which settled Complega certainly would have been familiar with the Punic 
period which had only officially ended twenty years previous. This scenario becomes 
45 lb. 42, 150'01, oe llaAtO''ta rf\s Tt1tOPOtlV Kat £~ aA11S e~to't£tlOV es KOJ.l1tAE'Yav 1tOA1V O"UVEqltl'YOV 11 
v£oK'tt0"'t6s 't£ ~v Kat oxtlpa. Kat 11iS~£to 'taxEro<;. 
46 Diod. XI.54.1. 
47 lb. 43, 'tOUS oe a1topotlS O'UVCPK1~£ Kat rf\v aU'totS 01£IlEtp£t. 
48 According to Appian, Gracchus was assailed by a force of 20000, of which an undetermined number 
were killed. It is possible that if this number (presumably all those of military age) was removed, the 
Romans would have been able to enfranchise the poorer classes to fill vacancies in the social order. 
49 Similar to the account on Complega, Appian (lb. 44) discusses the later sympolitea of the Celtiberian 
Belli and the Titthi into the city of Segeda ca. 15 Be. Apparently the Belli persuaded and forced 
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even more feasible when we look at a later account of Appian describing events in 
155 BC.50 He claims that the Lusitanians under Punicus laid siege to the 
Blastophoenicians (BAacno<polvl1<:aC;). Appian claims that although they were Roman 
subjects, their settlement had been founded by Hannibal when he settled African 
colonists alongside the local people. Luisitania is in the west of the peninsula 
considerably distant to Complega in the east. This small section in Appian shows the 
Luisitanians being led by a Punic or Punic-styled ruler attacking a neighbouring tribe 
of quasi-Punic Spaniards. It appears that Punic culture may have survived the official 
fall of the Carthaginian Empire and remained a strong influence lasting into the 
Roman period. 
There are then some suggestions of contact with Spanish peoples beyond the 
immediate sphere of Carthaginian control. Trade was probably the most important 
form of interaction between Carthage and its neighbours. The role of conquest also 
played a considerable part, although the regions in question saw little Carthaginian 
impact until the third century, and even then it was brief. It is possible that a number 
of Spanish tribes became accustomed with Carthaginian society through the use of 
trade and possibly mercenaries. We have already witnessed the Carthaginian 
proclivity to use large quantities of mercenary soldiers. These quite often involved 
Celtiberian troops.51 The synoikismoi of Complega and later Segeda were in 
Celtiberian territory. It is possible that the use of mercenaries or possible trade with 
Celtiberians and other native Spanish peoples is attested by a number of Carthaginian 
coin hoards in the region dating from around 200 BC. These have been discovered in 
the hinterland of Cape Nao and to the northwest.52 It is possible that these hoards 
demonstrate not only the limit of Carthaginian trade or mercenary use, but also how 
far Carthaginian influence reached. 
It seems that Phoenicio-Punic influence survived in Spain for a considerable 
period. It is interesting that we have evidence of this from both southern and central 
regions of the peninsula. Despite only physically present in a number of locations in 
the interior for a limited period during the third century, there is obvious evidence of 
smaller tribes along with the Titthi to join them. The formation of Segeda caused some consternation in 
the Roman senate suggesting that Segeda was prospering and had acquired some prominence. 
50 lb. 56. 
51 Both Carthaginians and Romans employed Celtiberian troops on a regular basis: e.g. Livy 
XXIV.49.7-8, XXXIV. 17.4. 
52 Robert Knapp, "Celtiberian Conflict with Rome: Policy and Coinage", Actas del it coloquio sobre 
lenguas y culturas prerromanas da la Peninsula Iberica (Tubingen, 17-19 Junio 1976) pp.469-471. 
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an enduring Carthaginian legacy. It appears that some Spaniards were often eager to 
introduce aspects of the more developed Punic society. Although lasting only for a 
short period until the Romans assumed control, it appears that several quite detailed 
social processes were accepted by the local towns and in particular tribes of Spain. By 
the later stages of the Carthaginian Empire, any number of original local settlements 
had become heavily influenced by Phoenicio-Punic society. The result of this long 
connection and the subsequent invasions of the third century saw a gradual spread of 
elements of Punic society north with an obvious effect on local peoples. 
SARDINIA 
Sardinia experienced a long and intense contact with Phoenicio-Punic activity. From 
as early as the ninth century, the Phoenicians actively settled the area, which held 
discernible links with Spain, North Africa, and Cyprus among other regions. With the 
advent of the Carthaginians, we see a distinct change in policy when they forcibly 
moved into the island in the sixth century, taking over and resettling much of the 
island. Naturally the local peoples, collectively known as the Sards, interacted with 
both Phoenicians and Carthaginians and were often influenced. 
Sardinia poses a dilemma when discussing aspects of the diffusion of 
Phoenicio-Punic culture. As we have already seen, especially during the Punic period, 
there was a direct Carthaginian policy of exclusion of certain groups of Sards.53 The 
general ancient consensus held the Sards to be an indomitable and barbaric people 
occupying the mountainous interior of the island. 54 Coupled with this there is also the 
appearance of a networked system of Carthaginian fortifications excluding the interior 
Sards from the bulk of their own settlements.55 This is natural considering the trouble 
which several Carthaginian expeditions faced on the island. Remains from a number 
of these interior forts suggest trade between the two cultures existed in some 
53 Once more we are hindered by the generic description of the Sards. It is certain that like any ethnic 
group of this type, the Sards comprised any number of separate tribes. Strabo names four of these 
tribes: Parati, Sossinati, Balari, and Aconites (V.2.8); Diodorus mentions another: the Iolaean 
(IV.30.S). It is obvious that not all the tribes retreated to the interior. Presumably a considerable 
proportion maintained a relationship with the Phoenicio-Punic settlements. Most likely (as in other 
areas of the empire) the Sards were employed as the primary workforce in areas such as mining and 
agriculture. 
54 Diod. V.lS.4. 
55 See Chp. IV, ns.l66-171 and text. 
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quantity.56 However, the general nature of our evidence, both literary and to a lesser 
extent archaeological, shows there was a distinct separation between Carthage and the 
Sards of the interior. 
In light of such negative examples we may be forgiven for believing the inland 
Sards were completely cut off from contact from Phoenicio-Punic influence. 
Nevertheless, some evidence suggests the process of cultural diffusion continued 
regardless. Several Carthaginian centres were located beyond the line of interior 
fortifications suggesting that contact did exist. 57 From our archaeological record we 
have already seen a concerted Carthaginian presence in the interior.58 This record 
increases in intensity and antiquity heading toward the coastal areas of Phoenicio-
Punic settlement. In regard to Phoenicio-Punic influence on the Sards we must turn to 
our fragmentary literary record. 
Pausanias provides a cryptic and aetiological account of the settlement of 
Sardinia. He describes several waves of settlers and invaders: 
(2) The first to have crossed to the island is said to have been Libyan sailors, 
led by Sardus, son of Makeris whom the Egyptians and Libyans call Heracles ... The 
Libyan expedition did not expel the native people who admitted them as fellow 
settlers, though more by force than kindness. Neither the Libyans nor natives knew 
how to build a city; they lived scattered in huts and caves. (3) Years after the Libyans, 
Aristaeus and his companions arrived on the island from Greece ... ( 4) But they also 
built no city, as they were too few in number or weak to found one. (5) After Aristaeus 
the Iberians crossed over into Sardinia; the expedition was led by Norax, and they 
built the city of Nora. This was remembered as the first city on the island .. .laloas' 
army from Thespiae and Attica was the fourth element to land in the island; they built 
the city of Olbia ... (7) But many years afterwards the Libyans came across into the 
island again, with a larger force, and went to war with the Greeks. The Greeks were 
totally destroyed, or few survived; the Trojans fled to the high points of the island 
where they occupied the mountain fortresses made unapproachable with banks and 
56 Rowland, pp.24ff. 
57 The north-eastern settlement of Olbia is such an example (see Chp. IV, n.I72) 
58 See F. Barreca, "Nuove scoperte sulla colonizzazione fenieio-punica in Sardegna", in Phonizier im 
Westen, 1982, pp.181-184, La Sardegnafenicia e punica, passim; Cecchini,passim; Rowland, pp.20-
39. 
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palisades. They are still called Ilians even in my day, but they and their weapons and 
their whole way of life have an entirely Libyan appearance.59 
Pausanias' comment is most likely based on an account of Ephorus and one 
can instantly detect several connections in the text between Phoenicians, 
Carthaginians, and Sards. The first quasi-historical group mentioned are Libyans 
under Sardus (a fictive eponymous founder of Sardinia) son of Makeris (Melqart the 
Phoenician God60). Pausanias claims that the Libyans did not attempt to dominate the 
native tribes but dwelt with them. He also claims that neither the Libyans nor the 
native population knew how to build cities.61 This is recognisable as a common theme 
in several areas of Phoenician settlement. The Phoenicians (possibly originating from 
North Africa) established peaceful contact with the Sards and traded with them. As 
was proved Phoenician practice, they most likely constructed seasonal or temporary 
emporia rather than permanent settlements. Pausanias then claims that it was Norax 
from Iberia who founded the first city of Nora on Sardinia.62 By this stage Phoenician 
activity on the Spanish peninsula was probably established, and as we have seen Nora 
was in fact a nuraghic site resettled by the Phoenicians. The text implies that Norax 
taught the native Sards how to construct settled, functioning towns. If Norax was 
actually Phoenician, or at least Phoenician influenced, we can see a direct diffusion of 
Phoenicio-Punic culture in Sardinia. Pausanias then describes the final wave of 
bellicose Libyans arriving at an unspecified later date destroying the Greek presence 
on the island.63 The parallels from this passage to the Carthaginian seizure of Sardinia 
59 X.17.2-7, nprotOl of: ota~tlvat A.BYOV'tal vauO'tV b; t~V VtlO'ov Ai~UE<;. ljYEf.lrov 08t01<; Ai~uO'tv ~v 
~apoo<; {) MaK1lploo<; 'HpaKAEou<; OE EnovoJ.la0'8Bv't0<; uno Aiyunticov ... OU J.lBV'tOl 'tou<; yE 
au'tox80va<; E~e~aA.EV 6 trov A t~ucov 0''t6A.o<; O'UVOt KOt of: un' a:utrov ot E1tEA.8ovtE<; uvayKU J.lO:A.A.oV fj 
uno Euvoia<; £Mx8110'av. Kat n6A.Et<; !lEV OU'tE Ot Ai~UE<; OU'tE 'to YBVO<; 'to EYXroplOV TJntO''tavto 
nOl~O'a0'8at. cr1tOpaoE<; OE EV KaA.U~at<; tE Kat O'1tllA.aiot<; 01<; €KaO''tOt'tuXOlEV rPK1lcrav (3) IhEcr1 of: 
UO''tEPOV J.lEta. 'tou<; A{~uw; UIPtKOV'to £K 'ttl<; 'EA.A.aoo<; E<; 1:'~V VtlO'ov 0\ !lEt' 'AplO''tatOu ... ( 4) 1tOA.tV 0' 
01)V oix{/;'ouO'tv ouoEJ.liav OUO' o{)tDt on Upt8J.l4lt8 Kat lO'XUt £A.aO'O'OVE<; EJ.lOt OOKElV fj Ka'ta.n6A.8co<; 
~crav OlKtO'!l6v. (5) !lEta. OE 'AptO''ta10v "I~llpE<; E<; ~v ~aporo ota~aivouO'tv uno TJYE!l6vt 'tou 
0''t6A.OU NropaKl ](at ~Kicr811 Nropa nOA.l<; uno aUtrov. 'tau'tT\v npro'tllv YEVE0'8at nOA.tv 
J.lVl1Il0VEUOUO'tv EV 't'ft Vtlcrcp ... 'tE'tap'tl1 08 J.lotpa 'loA.aou 88O'1ttBCOV 'tE Kat EK'tfl<; 'A't'tlK11<; cr'tpana. 
l((X'ttlPEV E<; !aporo Kat 'OA.~{av !l8V 1tOA.tv OiK{~O'OO'tv ... (7) Ucr'tEPOV IlEV't0l1tOA.A.o1<; £'tEO'tV Ot Ai~'08<; 
EnEpmro811crav 'tE aMt<; E<; 't~v vtlcrov cr'tOA.cp !le{~OVl Kat ~p~av E<; 'to 'EA.A.llVtKOv noA.E!lo'O. 'to !l8V 
o~ 'EA.A.llVtKOV E<; anav e1tBA.a~E IP8aptlvat t]OA.tyov EYEVE'tO e~ au'to1) 'to U1toA.EtIP8EV. ot 08 TproE<; e<; 
'tTl<; v~cro'O 'ta. U'l'l]A.a. UVaIPEuyo'OO't Ka'taA.a~ov'tE<; of: OPll oucr~a'ta U1tO O'KOA.OnCOV 'tE Kat ](Pllllvrov 
'IA.let<; !lEV Qvo!la Kat E<; E!lE £'t1 Exoucrt At~'OO't !lEV'tOt 'ta.<; IlOPIPa.<; Kat 'troY 01tA.COV 't~v O'KE'OfJV Kat £<; 
'tTtV 1t&crav 8ial'tav EOtKaO'tV. 
60 J.G. Frazier, Pausanias's Description of Greece (London 1898) Vol. V, pp.321-322. 
61 X.17.2. 
62 X.17.5. 
63 X.17.7. 
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during the sixth century are obvious.64 Finally he states that the Greeks and Trojans 
that survived this invasion fled to the interior where despite still being called Ilians, 
their weapons and society are Libyan in appearance.65 The Ilians were actually the 
Iolaes, supposedly settled by Iolaiis, the nephew of Heracles.66 These people were in 
fact the Sards who fled to the interior after the Carthaginian invasions of the sixth 
century.67 Pausanias has connected the two similar names to establish a tradition of 
Trojan/Greek people on Sardinia. Now that we know these people were native Sards, 
Pausanias' next admission becomes particularly interesting. He claims that despite 
being independent, the Ilians were in warfare and appearance like the Libyans i.e. the 
Carthaginians in his day. 68 This may suggest the spread of Carthaginian culture into 
the unconquered tribes of Sardinia. Despite Roman domination of the island for 
several centuries, this suggestion is possible when considering the survival of Punic 
language and religion in North Africa and Sicily after the fall of Carthage.69 Although 
Pausanias' description of early Sardinia is legendary, it appears to be influenced by 
some actual events. These demonstrate several characteristics and changes consistent 
with our knowledge of Phoenician and Carthaginian activity on Sardinia. 
Literary accounts regarding Punic Sardinia become even more sporadic and 
fragmentary. The Carthaginians' exclusive nature regarding this important province 
means we have little evidence from the period.70 Our best indication regarding the 
survival and diffusion of Punic elements is from the period immediately after the 
64 The Greek presence on Sardinia is slightly more problematic. Presumably the Greek settlers 
mentioned by Pausanias are legendary. Nonetheless the Etrusco-Carthaginian battles at Alalia and 
Cumae against Greek encroachments coincide both geographically and chronologically with 
Carthaginian involvement in the area. 
65 X.17.7. 
66 Diod. V.IS.2. 
67 Diodorus also describes the Ioles in some detail. He claims that it was them who fled after the arrival 
of the Carthaginians (V.lS.4). He also describes their way of life and despite many attempts by both 
Carthaginians and Romans they remain unconquered (IV.30.3-6). 
68 Pausanias is most likely referring to his own time during the second century AD. It is possible 
however, that he is copying this from another source earlier than himself. Ephorus is a possibility 
writing in the fourth century BC, but his accounts are probably too early for such a comment. 
69 Such an idea may be possible when we consider the rugged, inaccessible terrain of the Sardinian 
interior coupled with the harsh treatment the Romans dealt to the Sards. This may have fostered a 
reluctance to accept Roman culture and maintain their own. 
70 The exclusive nature of Carthaginian activity on Sardinia is demonstrated by Polybius in the first 
treaty with Rome in S09/8, who claims that any merchant wishing to trade in either Libya or Sardinia 
needed to do so in the presence of a vendor of the state (III.22.8-9). The second treaty ca. 306 
specifically states that Rome was forbidden from founding a colony on the island (III.24). Polybius best 
describes the nature of the Carthaginian presence on Sardinia himself when discussing the first treaty: 
"The wording of this treaty shows that the Carthaginians consider Sardinia and Africa as belonging 
absolutely to them", eK of. 'to{YtcoV 'trov (J'uv8rpcrov 1tEpt ~f.V Lap86voc; Kat Atp{YIlC; e~<pa{vo\)(J'tV roc; 
1tEpt iotac; 1tOtoU~EVot 'tOY 'A6yov (III. 23.5). 
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Punic expulsion from Sardinia. Although the native Sards had revolted and seriously 
undermined the Carthaginian presence on the island, it was not until Rome seized the 
island in 238 that official Carthaginian authority ceased.71 
The later revolts on the island suggest Carthaginian sympathies were not 
extinguished completely. The best account is that of the Sardinian rebel leader 
Hampsicora. A revolt broke out in 215 under Hampsicora, apparently as a result of 
harsh Roman rule in the island. It appears that the Romans saw Sardinia as nothing 
more than a tribute-state populated by Barbarians and treated it accordingly.72 The 
brief history of the re~olt, as told by Livy, provides certain insight into obvious 
Carthaginian sympathies and influences remaining in Sardinia. If we look at the figure 
of Hampsicora himself, Livy claims that he was the most wealthy and influential 
individual (Le. Sardinian) on the island. It was also he that went into direct 
negotiation with the Carthaginians. It is possible that Hampsicora built or at least 
inherited his standing from the Carthaginian legacy on Sardinia. Although at best 
guess a native Sard, it is likely he had Carthaginian contacts and influences. The ease 
at which he negotiated with Carthage and succeeded in getting help from Hasdrubal 
and a Carthaginian force suggests that he was well aware of Carthaginian interests on 
the island.73 In addition to this we must consider that Carthaginian rule was preferred 
to that of Rome. Surely Hampsicora realised that if Carthage were victorious, Sardinia 
would revert to a Carthaginian controlled province. Finally there is an interesting 
description of Hampsicora recruiting from the wild 'Goatskins' of the mountainous 
interior absent during the first Roman attack.74 Although Hampsicora's force was 
probably based around the territory of Caralis in the south of the island, there is 
specific mention of the 'Goatskins' suggesting that these tribes were distinct from the 
majority of Hampsicora's forces. It is likely that these tribes were those driven into 
the interior by the Carthaginians and forced to eke out a pastoral existence.75 This 
71 Polyb. III. 27 . 
72 Livy XXIII.32.9, states that the Romans had been particularly harsh rulers in Sardinia. He claims the 
revolt was triggered off by the previous year of excessive tribute and grain requisition: ad hoc fessos 
iam animas Sardorum esse diutumitate imperii Romani, et proximo Us anna acerbe atque auare 
imperatum; graui tributo et colonatione iniquafrumenti pressos. The Roman attitude toward the Sards 
was equally harsh and is best attributed by Festus, Sardi uenales: alius aUo nequior (p,428 L.). 
73 Livy XXIII.40. 
74 XXIIIAO.3, Hampsicora tum forte profectus erat in Pellitos Sardos ad iuventutem armandam qua 
copias augeret. 
75 The Pelliti Sardi as Livy calls them appear to be the same group as the lo1aes or Ilians that fled from 
the Carthaginian invasion into the interior. Diodoms helps explain the development of the term 
'Goatskins', He claims that the lolaes fled into the interior abandoning agriculture to concentrate on 
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further suggests that Hampsicora was a 'lowland' Sard based around the old 
Phoenicio-Punic settlements of the coast. It is also interesting that although there was 
a distinction between the more civilised Sards and those in the mountains, there was 
an obvious connection. Unfortunately for Hampsicora and Carthaginian interests on 
Sardinia, the Romans put down the revolt and the Sards were dispersed. 
From these accounts of some Phoenicio-Punic activity on Sardinia, we are 
able to discern constant interaction between the Sards and a long succession of 
Phoenicians and Carthaginians. There was an obvious distinction between the Sards 
that fell under Phoenicio-Punic control and those which remained independent. From 
such evidence, it seems likely that these groups were still affected by Phoenicio-Punic 
culture either directly or more indirectly through other more 'Punicised' groups. 
Elements of Phoenicio-Punic culture are evident in seemingly remote interior regions 
and also during periods of no official contact. Although traditionally deemed as 
hostile to the Phoenicio-Punic presence, the native Sards were open to its influence. 
The concept of a developed nation, or in the case of Carthage, an empire 
imposing its own social and cultural character on its subjects is natural. This also 
applies to those states and peoples bordering these provinces. It is interesting that we 
can discern areas of influence in areas both geographically and chronologically 
distinct from Phoenicio-Punic control. Throughout its provinces, Carthage bordered 
less developed peoples. The effect of Phoenicio-Punic culture on these peoples can 
often be witnessed by their legacy. We have seen examples of tribal states embarking 
on uncharacteristic and reasonably evolved socio-political endeavours. These include 
examples of synoikismos from Spain, the use of the Punic language among the 
Numidian Kings, and the influence of a culture as seen in Elymian Eryx. Presumably 
there were countless other examples of Phoenicio-Punic influence on other cultures. 
The removal of settled Carthaginian rule in an area (usually by Rome) often left a 
residual influence on technically autonomous peoples. Often the Punic system and 
several aspects of society continued after the removal of Carthaginian power. It is 
likely that a more obvious Punic influence on neighbouring peoples would be 
raising flocks in the mountains, existing on a diet of meat, milk and cheese (V.lS.4). It is most likely 
that goats were the main animals herded in the mountainous interior, hence their identification as 
'Goatskins' . 
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apparent if not for Carthaginian territory so rapidly falling to Rome which brought 
and installed its own dominant culture. 
Carthage maintained, as it was, a political and cultural hegemony over its 
empire, which spilled over into neighbouring territory. Even within its old borders, 
Carthaginian influence remained after the destruction of centralised power. The Punic 
legacy outlived Carthage and was testament to its ability to influence various peoples 
throughout and beyond its empire. 
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VI. CONTACT BEYOND THE EMPIRE 
The nature of the Carthaginians' activity abroad saw them present in a number of 
developed states and in areas beyond the reach of their contemporaries. We have 
previously witnessed aspects of such contact within the Carthaginiau Empire and with 
those on its borders. However, Carthaginian activity in areas beyond the 
contemporary bounds of the Mediterranean community in Africa and the Atlantic add 
to our understanding of Carthaginian intention and activity. Otherwise the 
Carthaginians' interaction with other developed Mediterranean cultures is evident. 
Our literary tradition suggests that Carthage was despised by many it dealt with, and 
indeed its treatment of others presumes a mutual Carthaginian attitude. Nevertheless, 
contact through various means was essential to Carthage and also to a number of 
allied and hostile states. Carthage often maintained long and enduring relationships 
with other developed nations based on several motivating factors including trade, 
diplomacy, and cultural interaction. The Carthaginians, like the Phoenicians before 
them, were able to interact on several levels with developed states despite variable 
military policies. 1 By looking at Carthaginian activity in remote areas and contact 
with developed peoples in the Mediterranean we are better able to characterise the 
nature of Carthaginian interests and its empire 
EGYPT AND THE NORTH AFRICAN GREEKS 
Carthage inherited its relationship with Egypt as part of its Phoenician legacy. We 
have seen from early accounts that Phoenicia actively traded with Egypt from the 
second millennium onwards. We have also witnessed aspects of Phoenician activity 
within the Egyptian Empire through the Amarna letters of the fourteenth century2 and 
the accounts of Wen Ammon in the eleventh.3 Such accounts demonstrate a fair 
amount of Phoenician autonomy and a close trading relationship with Egypt. Even 
though Egyptian domination of the Levantine coast faded during the twelfth century, 
the Phoenicians still maintained a mercantile relationship with their old master. This 
1 The Phoenician states actively traded with and served several larger and officially hostile states 
including Egypt, the Hittites, Assyria, and Persia. Nevertheless, foreign policy did not usually infringe 
on financial potential, allowing relatively free trade between traditionally hostile areas. 
2 EA. 139-152. 
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relationship endured the Phoenician expansion in the West and became established in 
Carthage from an early period. 
The exact nature of relations between Carthage and Egypt is unclear. There 
was a strong mercantile and cultural connection between the two states, however, 
there is little evidence for political and diplomatic interaction. Although economic and 
political spheres were often quite separate, Egypt and Carthage (both Phoenician and 
Punic) had a long and settled relationship. Presumably there was an understanding, 
either official or otherwise, between Carthage and Egypt. There is a later allusion to 
such a relationship during the First Punic War. Appian claims that in 252 the 
Carthaginians, destitute of funds, asked Ptolemy II for a loan of 2000 talents.4 
Ptolemy was apparently on terms of friendship with both Rome and Carthage and 
preferred to attempt to broker a peace between the two sides. This reference is unclear 
regarding the exact relationship between Carthage and Egypt. There is an obvious 
friendship present, justifying the Carthaginian request for 2000 talents. It is possible 
that this may have been part of an official alliance, which was either a defensive treaty 
or possibly a military treaty negated by Ptolemy'S alliance with Rome. Although this 
relationship is attested during the third century, it is the probable nature of Egypto-
Carthaginian relations for several centuries. Their relationship was economic in 
nature, based on trade. Any further alliances were probably secondary in nature. 
Trade between Carthage and Egypt seems to have existed from an early 
period, originally under Phoenician influence. From the mid-seventh century a 
distinctive Egyptian influence on aspects of Carthaginian material culture develops. 
From this period onwards a number of Carthaginian tombs start revealing large 
amounts of Egyptian wares including quantities of Egyptian scarabs and amulets. 
Such items are common in Punic tombs and suggest a widespread Egyptian influence 
within Carthaginian funerary culture.5 Egyptian remains of this type appear 
throughout areas of Phoenician and Carthaginian territory. Temples from this period 
also appear to be of Egyptian type. As the Picards suggest, the Carthaginians became 
accustomed to making their temples the dwelling-places for the gods much like the 
3 ARE. Vol. IV, 557-59l. 
4 Sic. 1. 
5 Jean Vercoutter, Les objets Egyptiens et Egyptisants du mobilier funeraire Carthaginois (paris 1945). 
Vercoutter has collected a large catalogue of Egyptian scarabs (Chp. III) and Egyptian amulets (Chp. 
VI) discovered in tombs in Carthage. 
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Egyptian practice.6 Inscribed bands and religious urns with obvious divine depictions 
are found in some quantity in Carthage and throughout the Punic world.7 Even the 
stelae that dominate the Carthaginian topheth have common Egyptian depictions of 
the gods Horus and Ptah as well as common solar disc motifs.s There are various 
other Egyptian materials discovered in Carthage which suggest cultural interchange. 
Inscribed razors have been discovered along with rings and religious figurines for 
example. Various aspects of decor evince strong Egyptian influence. An Egyptian 
decorative idiosyncrasy also became standard in Punic architecture. The so-called 
'Egyptian throat' was a concave entablature or cornice usually above a columned 
rectangular door, which became a common aspect of Carthaginian temple 
architecture.9 
During the seventh and sixth centuries, Egyptian material goods were popular 
in Carthage. However, the fifth century saw a distinctive drop in such goods, which 
suggests a possible decline in trade. Some have surmised that the reason for this 
change may have resulted from a more xenophobic attitude in Carthage following the 
severe defeat at Himera in 480. Another possibility is the advent of Athenian naval 
superiority in the East. Such considerations are all worthwhile, but we should reflect 
that during the fifth century, Carthage entered into one of its most vigorous periods of 
activity abroad. The expeditions of Hanno and Himilco, dated to the fifth century, do 
not suggest a sullen Carthage in recession. What seems more likely, to explain the 
hiatus in Carthaginian-Egyptian trade, is that Carthage, probably owing to increasing 
competition in the East, turned to the West and developed its interests there. Besides, 
the continuation of the interior route to Egypt probably remained unmolested by 
Greek encroachments. The fourth century saw an increase of Egypto-Carthaginian 
trade once again. It is possible that the arrival of Alexander in the East saw the 
redevelopment of the old Carthaginian-Egyptian trading routes in the latter half of the 
fourth century. 10 This relationship was cemented under the early Ptolemaic Kings of 
Egypt, who seem to have traded actively with Carthage. 
6 Picard, Daily Life in Carthage, pp.35-6. 
7 Vercoutter, Chp. IX. 
8 Soren et al., p. 135. Such influence was certainly a legacy of earlier Egyptian influence on the 
Phoenicians of the Levantine coast. 
9 Serge Lancel (ed.), Byrsa : mission archeologiquefranraise a Carthage (Rome 1982) Vol. II, p.184. 
10 For a basic overview of Egypto-Carthaginian trade based on the archaeological evidence see 
Vercoutter, pp.347-348. For more specialised remains see Brigitte Quillard, "Les etuis porte-amulettes 
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The large quantity of Egyptian artefacts in Carthage enables us to discern a 
reasonable chronology of the contact and trade between the two states. Punic 
Carthage actively traded with Egypt as had its Phoenician predecessors. It abated 
briefly, perhaps as a result of external pressures or an internal redirection of 
Carthaginian energy. It is also testament to the separation between the mercantile and 
political spheres. Although Carthage was dealing with Egypt, it was often forced to do 
so with the latter under the control of Persians or Greco-Macedonians. 
There is limited evidence of Carthaginian travellers in Egypt. Siwah, the 
western interior oasis town, likely experienced the most intense travel in this regard as 
an important station on the interior route between Egypt and Carthaginian territory.ll 
Further east and along the Nile, there is Punic and Neo-Punic graffiti in Memphis 
which attest to travellers from the west. 12 Our evidence is more obvious regarding an 
Egyptian presence in the Punic centres to the West. This suggests that either Egypt 
was the dominant trading partner or Carthaginian commodities were not durable or 
obvious in the archaeological record. 
Finally, the relative geographical positions of both Carthage and Egypt 
predisposed them for contact. Originally Phoenician traffic from the Levantine coast 
would hug the North African coast, making Egypt a natural port-of-call en route to 
the West. The same would certainly have operated in the opposite direction. A similar 
process seems to exist regarding the interior route and its connection to Trans-Saharan 
routes beginning to the south of Leptis Magna and to the east. As we will see both 
Egypt and Carthage, through the use of various intermediary tribes benefited from 
such routes and were naturally brought into further contact. 
The position of Carthage and its territory in relation to the Greek settlements 
along the North African coast to the east suggests some form of contact existed. The 
eastern trade routes to Carthage, both along the coast and in the interior passed by 
these Greek settlements. Unfortunately there is little definite evidence of direct 
contact between the two states. Presumably the first area of contact would be trade. 
Possible Greek trade evident in the material remains at Carthage may have been 
carthaginois", Karthago XVI, 1971-1972, pp.1-32; Jean Lec1ant, "Egyptian Talismans in the 
Cemeteries of Carthage", Archaeologia Viva 1.2, 1968/9, pp.95-102. 
11 Siwah remains the natural point of contact between the two cultures and is likely to have seen 
considerable Carthaginian activity, see Klaus P. Kuhlmann, Das Ammoneion, Archiiologie, Geschichte 
und Kultpraxis des Orakels von Siwa (Mainz am Rhein 1988) pp.97-98. 
12 CIS. 1.197. 
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routed through centres like Cyrene or Naucratis. There is little evidence of Punic 
remains in any Greek centre. As in Siwah, there is limited evidence of Punic trade in 
the emporion of Naucratis. 13 Otherwise we must assume that Carthaginian evidence 
generally had little impact on the archaeological record. It is also likely that Carthage 
was trading with a traditional competitor, Cyrene. Although the interior route often 
bypassed Cyrene on the coast, it seems as though trade was conducted between 
merchants of both states. Strabo suggests such a connection, when during the reign of 
Ptolemy Soter, he describes an interior settlement called Charax. 14 He claims that this 
site was accustomed to trade Carthaginian wine for silphium and its juice which had 
been smuggled from Cyrene. Although the accepted relationship between Carthage 
and Cyrene is here treated as hostile, evidence of trade exists between the two states. 
There is also slight evidence of diplomatic relations between the North 
African Greeks and the Carthaginians. We have already seen a possible alliance 
between Ptolemaic Egypt and Carthage during the third century. Although we have 
placed this in an Egyptian context, technically it was an alliance between a Greek-run 
state and Carthage. There is one example from the fourth century when Carthage is 
named as an allied state of Cyrene.15 During the siege of Thibron in 322, the 
Cyrenaeans asked and received support from the neighbouring Libyan tribes and 
Carthage, which are both described as allies. There is little further evidence to suggest 
whether this alliance was temporary or had existed longer. Otherwise we only know 
of the supposed boundary war between the two states. The Ara Philaeni traditionally 
demarcated eastern Carthaginian territory from that of Cyrene.16 It is interesting 
however, that Sallust claims this boundary was put in place to settle a long and bitter 
conflict between Carthage and Cyrene. 17 This war is unsubstantiated, and although 
possible, remains doubtful. Wherever this supposed boundary lay is unclear, however, 
Carthage obviously controlled territory at least to Leptis Magna. Despite an obvious 
gap in our knowledge of relationships between Carthage and the Greek states on the 
North African coast, there is some evidence suggesting there was basic interaction 
between them. Carthage maintained relationships with most powers in its vicinity, and 
the short distance between these two parties implies active contact. 
13 Vercoutter, pp.9-1O, 354-355. 
14 XVII.3.20. 
15 Diod. XVIII.21.4. 
16 See Chp. II, n.86. 
17 lug. LXXIX. 
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THE ETRUSCANS 
Central Italy and Carthage maintained an enduring relationship which had existed for 
centuries before the two areas went to war. This relationship began with the Romans' 
predecessors, the Etruscans, incorporating both trade and foreign policy. Etruria 
played an important part in Carthaginian foreign affairs, probably resulting from 
Phoenician settlement on Sardinia. Its importance to Carthage saw it continue a 
relationship with the Etruscans' successor Rome, the very state which would later 
orchestrate its destruction. 
Official Carthaginian relations with the Etruscans were extremely close. 
Presumably the Phoenicians would have been the first to make contact with the 
western shores of Central Italy. The relationship between the Phoenicio-Punic and the 
Etruscan seems to have been based first on trade, but later extended also to a close 
alliance. The nature of the Etrusco-Carthaginian relationship is best attested by 
Aristotle who claims: 
A state, if it is not just a pact of mutual protection nor an agreement for trade and 
business; for then the Tyrrhenians and Carthaginians, and all others with agreements 
with each other, would be taken as citizens of a single state. Certainly they have trade 
agreements, non-aggression pacts, and written documents governing their alliance. I8 
From this account, Aristotle uses Carthage and Etruria as an example of two 
states with intimate ties which nonetheless retain their respective independence. It is 
an interesting account which shows a Greek opinion that the Carthaginians and 
Etruscans had well established trading ties and an official military treaty, but 
remained independent. 
The first area of contact between the Phoenicians and Etruscans was most 
certainly trade. This first becomes apparent in Sardinia. Even before the Phoenicians' 
18 Pol. III.5.lO-11, 1280a, vuv D' oille fcr'tt Dux 'to Il~ IlE't£XEtv EUDatIlOVtm; IlTJOE 'tou ~ftv Ka'ta 
1tpoatpE<1tv IlTJ'tE crullllaXtae; EVEKEV 01tCOe; U1tO IlTJOEVOe; cXom))v'tat IlTJ'tE Ota 'tae; cX'A'Aayae; Kat 't~v 
xpf\<1tV 't~v 1tpOe; cX'A'ATJ'Aoue; Kat yap &V TUPPTJvot Kat KapXTJ06vtot Kat 1taV'tEe; ote; fcr'tt crullPo'Aa 
1tpOe; cX'A'ATJ'Aoue; roe; Ilt<xe; &v 1toA'i'tat 1to'AEcoe; ~crav. dcrt youv aU'to'ie; cruv8ftKat 1tEpt 'trov dcraycoyillcov 
Kat crullPo'Aa 1tEpt 'tou Il~ cXOtKEtV Kat ypacpat 1tEpt crullllaxlae;. 
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arrival, the Etruscans and Sards actively traded. 19 The growth of Phoenician 
settlement and influence on the island saw the steady development of trade with 
Etruria. There are considerable Etruscan material remains in areas of Phoenicio-Punic 
Sardinia.20 The importance of this trade can be witnessed further afield. Remains from 
Carthage and indeed other Phoenicio-Punic settlements show a flourishing trade with 
Etruria. It appears that Etruscan traders, or at least Etruscan wares were reaching 
Carthage with some regularity.21 Likewise in Etruria, Phoenicio-Punic remains 
demonstrate Etruscan taste for various wares.22 Initial Phoenicio-Punic interest in 
Etruria was in its wealth of metals. Although the Phoenicians had settled good metal 
producing regions in Southern Spain and Sardinia, Etruria offered them a wealth of 
iron and copper. Likewise, Sardinia offered the Etruscans trade in silver and lead. 
Several Phoenician ports located on Sardinia in particular, and Western Sicily were 
well-located for facilitating trade with the western shores of Italy. 
Naturally, the Phoenicians, as they had done throughout their trading empire, 
needed a base of operations in Etruria. The southern Etrurian settlement of Pyrgi, 
connected to its port Caere, seems to have fulfilled this role. There is evidence from 
this area that Phoenician and Carthaginian traders not only traded actively, but also 
settled. The best example of a concerted Phoenicio-Punic presence are the Pyrgi 
inscriptions, two in Etruscan and the other a translation into Phoenicio-Punic dated to 
ca. 500. These inscriptions tell that the Etruscan King, Thefarie Veliunas established 
two temples, one of which was to the goddess Astarte (assimilated as Uni in 
Etruscan)?3 Although the reasons behind such a generous dedication are clouded, to 
19 There is direct evidence of contact from ca. 800 and possibly earlier. The port of Olbia on the east 
coast of the island testifies to such contact with a number of Etruscan remains present at the site. It 
appears that Etruscan contact with the local Sards influenced their own production of wares and 
architecture. According to Strabo (V.2.7), the Tyrrhenians once possessed the island, suggesting a close 
association with, and possible influence over the Sards, see Michael Grant, The Etruscans (London 
1980) pp.26-29, 183-186. 
20 For a brief description of Etruscan trade with Sardinia and examples, see Acquaro, "Phoenicians and 
Etruscans", pp.614-616. 
21 Much of our information is sporadic in nature. Early contact with the Phoenicians in the East has 
been established with the discovery of an Etruscan amphora in Syrian Tripoli. Probably the best 
example is an ivory plaque at Carthage bearing an Etruscan inscription most likely from the town of 
Vu1ci. Otherwise the most common archaeological evidence remains the black bucchero pottery which 
permeates the Mediterranean, including parts of Carthage and its empire. Most of the trade seems to 
have concentrated on metals from Etruria and Sardinia. Cultural influence is also evident based on 
trade with Carthage in fine Etruscan gold work, or at least in a decidedly Etruscan style. 
22 Two Phoenician silver bowls from the Bemadini tomb in Praeneste dated to the late seventh century 
and the sarcophagus of Laris Partunus in Tarquinia from the fourth century are good examples of the 
trade in luxury items. 
23 KAI. 277. 
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build a temple to Astarte suggests a reasonable Phoenicia-Punic population and a 
close connection between it and the local Etruscans. It is also interesting that the 
inscriptions exist in two parallel accounts in both Etruscan and Phoenicia-Punic. This 
suggests that they were accessible to populations of both groups. Therefore there must 
have been a considerable Phoenicia-Punic population either living or visiting the site. 
The area around Pyrgi attests a strong Phoenicia-Punic presence which extended 
beyond the end of the sixth century. There are Phoenicia-Punic material remains at 
the site dating from the fifth century.24 Dionysius of Syracuse attacked and plundered 
the site in 384 BC.25 Apparently his main goal was to plunder the rich temples there to 
fund a war against Carthage. Certainly such an action would have been intended 
against the Carthaginians in Pyrgi, possibly including the temple of Astarte. From the 
plunder he amassed some 1500 talents, also suggesting that the temple had grown 
extremely wealthy off trade in the area,z6 Further evidence from Pyrgi and its 
surrounds also implies a settled Phoenicia-Punic presence. The coastal town 
immediately to the north was known as Punicum during the Roman period. It is 
possible that this town retained its name based on some form of contact or settlement 
from Carthage. Both Phoenicians and Carthaginians were well adjusted to the idea of 
semi-permanent coastal settlements in foreign lands. This was most likely the case in 
parts of Etruria. The case of Pyrgi, and in particular the presence of a distinctively 
Phoenicia-Punic temple, suggests that this settlement was more substantial especially 
given the close relationship and understanding between the Carthaginians and the 
Etruscans. 
The Carthaginians and Etruscans maintained an active military alliance for a 
considerable period. This mutual assistance pact saw both states protect their interests 
surrounding the Tyrrhenian Sea, and its lucrative trade routes. The major problem 
both states faced was attempting to check the rapid expansion of Greeks north from 
Southern Italy and Sicily. With such an imminent threat, both parties actively sought a 
military pact most likely eventuating in the late seventh century. 
The first major conflict in the area which suggests such an alliance is attested 
(although not named) by Thucydides when the Carthaginians were defeated in a naval 
24 Moscati, Italia Punica, p.347. 
25 Diod. XV.14.3-4. 
26 Diodorus reckons that Dionysius took 1000 talents from the temple complex itself. The other 500 
was from selling booty in Syracuse, mostly slaves. 
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battle by the Phocaeans, who then went on to found Massilia.27 This Phocaean colony 
was founded around 600 and was the most westerly Greek foundation of the time. It 
seems likely that the foundation of a Greek colony in the area would have caused a 
great deal of concern among the Carthaginians and Etruscans. Such an event could 
certainly have precipitated an alliance between the two states, if in fact, one did not 
already exist. The natural routes linking Massilia to other groups of western Greeks 
meant passage through the Tyrrhenian Sea: an area too close to the important coastal 
areas of Etruria, Sardinia, and Corsica. 
The reason for such initial alarm was realised only sixty years later. According 
to Herodotus, the Phocaeans established a settlement at Alalia on Corsica around 
540.28 Herodotus claims that the settlement was founded twenty years previously, 
dating Phocaean settlement on the island to 560. A second wave of settlers started 
causing disruption to the trade routes in the Tyrrhenian for some five years before a 
joint Carthaginian-Etruscan fleet confronted them. Herodotus claims that the one 
hundred and twenty Carthaginian and Etruscan ships defeated the Phocaeans' sixty, 
despite suffering heavy losses themselves. The result of this battle was the 
abandonment of Alalia with the Greek survivors returning to Rhegium. 
The Carthaginian-Etruscan practice of attempting to exclude foreign 
incursions in the Tyrrhenian Sea seems to have continued. The Battle of Cumae in 
474 saw Hieron defeat the Etruscans and the Carthaginians. Although a Carthaginian 
presence is not attested in the account of Diodorus,29 Pindar cites a 'Phoenician' 
presence in his ode to honour Hieron in 470.30 By this period we would expect to see 
more of a Carthaginian presence considering that they were specifically named in 
previous encounters in the region. A scholiast to Pindar seems to correct this poetic 
oversight by claiming that Phoenicians and Carthaginians combined with the 
Etruscans at Cumae.31 Although the scholiast attests a Phoenician and Carthaginian 
presence, it is likely that, based on other examples, the Carthaginians were the official 
power. The presence of the Carthaginians at Cumae may extend hostilities with the 
Sicilian Greeks during this period beyond the defeat at Himera only six years 
previous. Based on later Carthaginian activities on Sicily it is uncharacteristic for 
27 Thuc. I.13. 
28 Hdt. 1.166. 
29 XI.Sl 
30 Pyth. I.71-72. Pindar also mentions the Carthaginian defeat at Himera in 480 shortly after (1.77-78). 
31 Schol. Pyth. 1.137a (ed. Drachmann). 
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Carthage willingly to invest in hostilities so soon after a heavy defeat. This may 
suggest that the Carthaginian contingent at the battle was not large and the fleet was 
primarily Etruscan. This may explain why the Carthaginian presence is absent from 
other reports of the battle.32 However, a larger Carthaginian presence is not 
inconceivable given Carthage's renowned ability to recover quickly from defeat. This 
is particularly obvious on this occasion as during this period, following defeats at 
Himera and Cumae, the Carthaginians commissioned two major missions of 
settlement and exploration under the command of Hanno and Himi1co respectively. 
For several decades, Carthaginian and Etruscan efforts in protecting their 
interests around the Tyrrhenian Sea seem to have been reasonably successful. 
However, they were dealt a double blow in the first half of the fifth century. First, 
Gelon defeated a large Carthaginian army at Himera in 480. This loss caused 
Carthage to reconsider its approach in the area. After this it preferred to consolidate 
its holdings in Sicily temporarily, while expanding elsewhere. Only a few years later 
in 474, the Carthaginians and Etruscans were defeated at the Battle of Cumae by 
Hieron. This loss effectively saw the end of Etruscan dominance in Campania. It 
furthermore heralded the steady decline of the influence of the Etrusco-Carthaginian 
alliance. The Etruscans were already in rapid decline after the loss of Rome in 509, 
and were proving unable to cope with continual encroachments on their territory. 
The losses at Himera and Cumae greatly altered the appearance and 
effectiveness of the Etrusco-Carthaginian alliance, although they did not completely 
destroy it. The Etruscans, no longer an equal of Carthage, would most likely have 
fallen back on their earlier agreement of trade. We have already witnessed the 
plundering of the Etrusco-Carthaginian temples of Pyrgi by Dionysius of Syracuse in 
384. These temples would have certainly continued to function as sanctuaries for both 
Etruscans and Carthaginians. The amount of bullion plundered suggests they were 
still in full operation and were being well maintained by the lucrative trade of both 
states. The final example of Carthaginians and Etruscans taking the field together is 
testament to the decline of the latter's influence. We find Etruscan mercenaries 
fighting in the Carthaginian army during the war with Agathocles in 311 and 310.33 
These were not Etruscan regular troops assisting an ally in Carthage, but Etruscans 
fighting for pay, or possibly exiles. It seems certain that by the fourth century, any 
32 Diod. XI.51; Tod, 22. 
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alliance had reverted back to a mercantile basis. After the foundation of Rome and the 
defeat at Cumae, the Etruscans had steadily lost influence in Italy, to the point where 
they were not able to maintain their position of equal partners in alliance with 
Carthage. 
ROME 
Carthage and Rome maintained a long and steady relationship from the late sixth 
century until the first half of the third century. The relationship between the two later 
deteriorated resulting in the outbreak of the First Punic War in 264. The best 
examples of the earlier peaceful relationship between the two states are the three 
Romano-Carthaginian treaties preserved by Polybius which stipulate a number of 
mercantile, political, and military agreements. It appears that Rome and Carthage 
were quite willing to recognise the other's interests from an early period.34 
The relationship between Carthage and Rome should not be viewed as a new 
era of foreign policy but rather a continuation. Although Rome became a state 
independent of the Etruscans in 509, it most likely had a pre-existing relationship with 
Carthage as an Etruscan city. Therefore the first Romano-Carthaginian treaty of 509/8 
was little more than a transition of partners rather than a new foreign alliance. The 
Carthaginians still remained allies of the Etruscans, they were just ensuring that they 
remained on good terms with all states bordering the Tyrrhenian Sea. The change of 
the political map simply saw Carthage adjust its policy to incorporate the newly 
independent city of Rome. 
The full independence of Rome in 509 heralded the first treaty between the 
new and still relatively insignificant state in Central Italy and Carthage. This treaty, 
33 Diod. XIX. 106.2, XX.l1.1. 
34 The nature of these treaties is a subject of modem discussion. Polybius claims that the treaties were 
preserved in his day on bronze tablets in the treasury of the Aediles beside the temple of Jupiter 
Capitolinus (III.26). Re claims that the existence of these tablets disputes the pro-Carthaginian and 
therefore erroneous claims of the historian Philinus. The latter apparently claimed the treaties between 
Rome and Carthage stipulated that Rome was forbidden access to Sicily and likewise Carthage to the 
whole of Italy. This is important, as according to Philinus, it was Rome who broke the original treaty 
and not Carthage. Although this may seem an attractive alternative given the unreliability of pro-
Roman accounts, especially in light of the events and positioning of Saguntum at the outbreak of the 
Second Punic War, the nature of the Carthaginians' activity in Italy and their open markets in Sicily 
suggests that Polybius' account is more likely. The most comprehensive modem work on the three 
Romano-Carthaginian treaties is that of Barbara Scardigli, I trattati Romano-Cartaginesi (Pisa 1991). 
Also see Werner Russ, Geschichte der Karthager, Chps. IX, XVII, and XXIII; Ratto H. Schmitt, Die 
Staatsvertragedes Altertums (Munich 1960) Vol. II, pp.16-20, 306-309; Vol. II, pp.53-55, 101-106. 
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supposedly the best translation Polybius was able to provide, survives extant. 
Although we have discussed some aspects of this treaty, it is useful if we look at it 
here as a whole: 
There shall be friendship between the Romans and their allies and the Carthaginians 
and their allies on these terms: 
The Romans and their allies shall not sail beyond the Fair Promontory unless 
compelled to do so by storm or by enemy action. If one of them is carried beyond it by 
force, he shall not buy or carry away anything more than is required for the repair of 
his ship or for sacrifice, and he shall depart within five days. 
Those who come to trade shall not conclude any business except in the presence of a 
herald or town clerk. The price of whatever is sold in the presence of these officials 
shall be secured to the vendor by the state, if the sale takes place in Libya or Sardinia. 
If any Roman comes to [that part ofl Sicily which the Carthaginians rule, the Roman 
shall be as everyone else. The Carthaginians shall do no injustice to the peoples of 
Ardea, Antium, the Laurentes, and the peoples of Circe ii, Tarracina or any other city 
of those Latins who are subject to the Romans. 
As regards those Latin peoples who are not subject to the Romans, the Carthaginians 
shall not interfere with any of these cities, and if they take anyone of thenl, they shall 
deliver it up to the Romans undamaged. They shall make no fortified settlement in 
Latin territory. If they enter a territory as enemies, they shall not spend a night 
there. 35 
The nature of this first treaty certainly supposes the political position of both 
Carthage and Rome. Carthage assumes the role of senior partner in the alliance and is 
therefore able to benefit more from the agreement. After all, this treaty was sworn 
35 Polyb. III.22.4-13, ent 'totO'oe qnAtaV dvat 'Pco/latote; Ka1 'tote; 'Pco/latcov O'U/l/laXOte; Kat 
KapXl1ooV{Ote; 1<:a1 'tOle; KapXTloov{cov O'u/l/laXOte;. /l11 nAetV /laKpate; vauO'1. 'Pco/latOUe; /lTloe 'tOUt; 
'Pcollaioov O'ullllaxoUe; fmEKcwa 'tou KaAou aKpco'tTlPtOU eav 1111 uno XC:t/lrovoe; t\ nOAclltoov 
avaYKaO'Srocnv. Eav OE 'tte; p{~ Ka'tcvex9ft IllJ E~EO''tCO ain!p /lTloev ayopa~£w /lTloe Aa/lpaVC1V nAlJV 
ocra npoe; nAoiou lontO'Kcu11v t\ npoc; tcpa ev nEv'tc 0' illlEpate; ano'tpcxE'tCO. 'tOte; oe 1<:a't' e/lnoptav 
napaY1VO/leVOtc; /lTloev 8O''tOO 'tEAOe; nA11v ent JdjPU1<:l t\ ypa/llla't£t. oO'a 0' av'tou'toov napov'toov 
npaSft OTllloO't~ ntO''t£t OlpclAeO'Sco 'tql anooollEv<P oO'a av t\ loV AtpuTl fl loV Lap06vt npaSfI. Eav 
'Pco/laioov nC; eie; Lt1<:eAtaV napayivTl'tat ne; KapX1106vlOt lonapxoucrw to'a ecr'too 'ta 'Pco/latcov nav'ta. 
KapXTl06vtot oe /L11 aot1<:el'tooO'av 011/l0V 'Apoca'trov 'Avtta'trov AaupEN'ttvoov Ktp1<:amrov 
TappaKtVl'trov 11110' aAAov /lTloeva Aa'ttvoov OcrOl UV un~1<:oot. loav oe 'ttvce; 1111 (hO'tV U~KOOt 'trov 
nOAccov anexeO'8coO'av. uv oe AapcoO't 'POOllaiote; anoot06'tooO'av aKepalOV. IppOUPWV IllJ 
EVot1<:OOollcl'tooO'av loV 'tft Aa'tivll. loav roe; nOAE/llOl eie; 'tTjv xropav etcreA8coO'tv Ev 'tft xropa /llJ 
, , .. .. 
evvuK'tepeuc'tooO'av. 
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within the first year of the overthrow of Etruscan rule in Rome and the formation of 
the Roman state. The first section of the treaty demonstrates this authority by stating 
that the Romans were forbidden to sail beyond the Fair Promontory (possibly either 
Cape Farina to the north and west of Carthage or Cape Bon to the south and ease6). If 
a Roman ship was driven beyond this boundary, it was to depart within five days. 
Polybius comments on this clause, claiming that it was established in order to protect 
the emporia along the coast south of Carthage. 37 The control Carthage exhibited over 
its North African settlements certainly justifies the nature of this clause. 
The second part of the section covers trade, and once again Carthage assumes 
the superior position. In both North Africa and Sardinia (two more exclusive 
Carthaginian territories), if a Roman wished to trade he would have to do so in the 
presence of a state official who also secured the price of sale.38 Polybius claims that 
Roman traders were welcome in these areas of Carthaginian control, but they had to 
trade under strict state control, thus maintaining the Carthaginian domination in the 
area. 39 
The concept of Carthaginian territory is also attested in the treaty. Polybius 
claims the Carthaginians considered Sardinia and Africa to be their sole possessions, 
Sicily on the other hand is treated differently with only mention of the Carthaginian 
controlled area.40 We have already witnessed that Polybius in this treaty and the next 
defines Carthaginian territory on Sicily probably in a manner close to how the 
Carthaginians defined it themselves. For Africa and Sardinia, we already know of the 
exclusive Carthaginian control present in these areas. Despite being a defined 
Carthaginian province, Carthaginian Sicily is mentioned in more open terms, stating 
that any Roman in Carthaginian Sicily would receive the same rights as any other 
36 See F.W. Walbank, A Historical Commentary on Polybius (Oxford 1957) Vol. I, pp.341-342. He 
argues that Polybius has misunderstood the treaty: in reality (so Walbank) the Romans were excluded 
from sailing west of Cap Farina. Ameling, Karthago, pp.142-147, has, however, argued that Polybius 
was correct in his indication of the direction: the Carthaginians wanted to exclude not Roman traders, 
but Roman pirates from Carthage itself and the African coast to the South and East of Carthage. 
37 Polyb. III.23.2. 
38 Ameling, Karthago, pp.147-151, argues that this provision was to Roman traders' benefit. In any 
case the Carthaginians themselves could only have profited from increased trade with the Romans. 
39 111.23.4-5, "To Carthage itself, and to all parts of Africa on this side (that of the Fair Promontory), to 
Sardinia and to Sicily which the Carthaginians rule over, the Romans may come for trading purposes, 
and the Carthaginian state undertakes to secure payment of their just debts.", £is OE Kapm06va Kat 
TCucrav'tTJv ETCt 'taOE 'tou KaAou aKpco'tllpio'U 'tllS At~UllS Kat ~ap06va Kat ~tKEAiav TJS ETCapxo'Ucrt 
Kapm06vtot Ka't' EflTCopiav TCAElV 'Pcoflaiots ESEO"'tt Kat 'to oiKatoV UTCtcrxvouv'tat ~E~atrocrElV oi 
KapXll06vtot Ollflocric;>: TCicr'tEl. 
40 111.23.5, Polybius claims when discussing Sicily "they use a different language to define their 
interests". 
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(presumably non-Carthaginian). The nature of Sicily meant constant trade between a 
number of peoples continued, both official allies and enemies of Carthage. Unlike 
politics, trade was not particular and permitted merchants from virtually anywhere 
access to visit and to conduct business. 
Finally, the treaty covers the area of Central Italy, in particular Latium. 
Carthage was not excluded but merely forbidden to attack several small towns and 
peoples. In addition to this the Carthaginians were not supposed to attack any non-
Roman controlled towns in Latin territory. The clauses of the treaty however, are 
dubious as while Carthage is forbidden to attack such settlements, it is still permitted 
to keep any slaves or booty captured while raiding this territory and to carry arms in 
the territory so long as they do not stay there overnight. These clauses protecting 
Roman interests are not overly concerned with Carthaginian raiding, rather they 
project a Roman fear of permanent Carthaginian occupation. The Carthaginians were 
not allowed to build a fort in the area, nor were they allowed to occupy a captured 
city, nor for armed men to spend a night. The clause forbidding the building of forts 
could allude to the Carthaginian practice of settling in fortified trade positions such as 
Monte Sirai and others on Sardinia, and Motya on Sicily. All three entries are 
designed to limit Carthaginian expansion into Latium while not necessarily forbidding 
piracy. 
When we compare the rights of Carthaginians and Romans in this first treaty, 
the Romans are definitely the junior partners. This stands to reason however, as Rome 
was still a nascent city-state with little political power or military influence enabling it 
to demand better conditions. Rome was probably more than happy to swear this treaty 
which would protect its existence from the major naval power in the area, Carthage. 
By doing this, Rome had managed to broker a treaty with the staunch ally of its 
former enemies, the Etruscans. 
The treaty of 509/8 defines a number of political and geographical conditions 
applicable to both Rome and Carthage. From it we are able to discern a relative 
Carthaginian advantage over the new city of Latin Rome. This is defined in both 
political and mercantile terms. It appears that Carthage, in particular, and Rome were 
willing to formalise a trade agreement which would benefit both parties. In the 
political sphere, Rome needed the major power in the Western Mediterranean to 
recognise it and to grant it protection from attack; Carthage on the other hand needed 
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to maintain its exclusive trading rights in Central Italy after the disruption caused by 
the expulsion of the Etruscans. For the time being, both parties literally got what they 
wanted. 
The second treaty between Rome and Carthage was probably introduced 
around 306 BC as a renewal of Romano-Carthaginian relations after two centuries.41 
In many respects it runs similar to its predecessor. All the same, we are able to discern 
several developments: 
There shall be friendship on the following conditions between the Romans and their 
allies, and the Carthaginians, Tyrians, people of Utica and their allies. The Romans 
shall not make raids, or trade or found a city on the farther side of the Fair 
Promontory, Mastia, or Tarsium. 
If the Carthaginians capture any city in Latium, which is not subject to Rome, they 
shall keep the goods and men, but deliver up the city. 
If any Carthaginians take prisoner any of a people with whom the Romans have a 
treaty of peace in writing, but who are not subject to Rome, they need not bring them 
to Roman harbours, but if one be brought in and a Roman claims him, he shall be set 
free. The Romans need not act according to the same principles. 
If a Roman obtains water and provisions from any place which is under Carthaginian 
rule, he shall not use these supplies to do harm to any member of a people with whom 
the Carthaginians enjoy peace andfriendship. Neither shall a Carthaginian act in this 
way. [If either party does so,] the injured person shall not take private vengeance, 
and if he does so, his wrongdoing shall be a public injustice. 
No Roman shall trade or found a city in Sardinia or in Africa, or remain in a 
Sardinian or African port no longer than he needs to obtain provisions or to repair 
his ship. If he is driven there by a storm, he shall depart within five days. 
In Sicily, [that part] which the Carthaginians rule, and at Carthage he may transact 
business and sell whatever is permitted to a citizen. A Carthaginian in Rome may do 
likewise.42 
41 This date is also attested by Livy who claims that in this year the treaty between Rome and Carthage 
was renewed for the third time (IX.43.26). The second renewal apparently occurred in 348 when 
Carthaginian envoys visited Rome seeking an alliance (VIl,27.2). It is possible that other treaties, or 
better perhaps, renewals, such as this did exist. See Buss, Geschichte der Karthager, pp.l67-168; and 
Robert E. A. Palmer, Rome and Carthage at Peace (Stuttgart 1997) pp.15ff; see n.43. 
42 Polyb. 1II.24.3-13, E1tt 'tolO'oE qnAtaV EtVat 'PmjlatOtl; Kat 'tOlc,; 'Pmjlatmv O'U~.L!.UXXOlc,; Kat 
KapXT\oovtmv Kat Tuptmv Kat '!'tUKatmV OTtJlfP Kat 'tOlc,; 'tou'tmv O'UjljleXXOlc,;. 'tou KaAou a,Kpm'tTjptou 
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The obvious development in the second treaty from the first is growth of 
Rome, and its importance in Italy. This is understandable, as Rome, without major 
molestation from states like Carthage, had grown strong in Central Italy, and was now 
able to negotiate better terms. Carthage was no longer dealing with a nascent city-
state which it could bully, but an established capital of an ever increasing dominion. 
The treaty stipulates a change in Carthaginian allies. We find the metropolis of 
Tyre and the city of Utica named as allies of Carthage. By 306, the role of Tyre had 
changed significantly. It was besieged and destroyed by Alexander in 332, not before 
a considerable amount of the population had been removed to safety in Carthage.43 
Although rebuilt, it lost a great deal of its influence in the East. The mention of Tyre 
as an ally of Carthage is certainly not presuming it as an equal, rather a courtesy of its 
legacy and connection to its colony. A similar courtesy most likely explains the 
mention of Utica. Although this Phoenician colony traditionally predated the 
foundation of Carthage and maintained some basic forms of independence, by the end 
of the fourth century it would certainly have been under Carthaginian influence, if not 
official control. The treaty also defines the area of Roman exclusion in better detail. 
They were literally forbidden beyond the Fair Promontory or the sites of Mastia and 
Tarsium. These last two settlements were most likely in Spain, which was by this 
period had developed into a major area of Carthaginian influence. Mastia was 
probably the old capital Masieni, which would later become the site of New 
Carthage.44 Tarsium may have some connection to the old area of Tartessus in 
Southern Spain. Otherwise the Romans were still forbidden to conduct any business 
or to settle in Africa and Sardinia although the five-day grace period was still granted. 
Macr"da~ TapOiliou J.l~ ADSEcr8at En:EKEtVa 'PooJ.laiou~ J.l1l0' EJ.ln:opEu£<J8at J.l1l0f: n:OAtV KtiSEtV. Eav 
of: KaPXll06vtot Aa/3cocrtv EV til Aativn n:OAtV nva J.l~ oi)crav Un:~KOOV 'PooJ.laiot~ ta xp~J.lata Kat 
tOU~ &vopa~ EXEtcocrav t~V of: n:OAtV un:oot06tcocrav. Eav of: nVES; KapX1l00VtooV Aa/3cocrt nva~ n:po~ 
ous; dp~Vll J.lf:V EcrttV £yypan:to~ 'PooJ.laiot~ J.l~ un:otattovtat OE n aUtol~ J.l~ KataYEtoocrav d~ toU~ 
'PcoJ.laioov AtJ.lEVas;. Eav of: Katax8EVtO~ E1ttM/3lltat 0 'PooJ.lalo~ uq>tEcr8oo. cOcraUtco~ of: J.l1l0' oi 
'PcoJ.lalot n:otdtoocrav. a.v £K nvos; xwpa~ ~~ KapX1l06vtot En:apxoucrtv uooop T! E<pOOta M/3n 0 
'Pco!lalo~ !lEta tOUtoov tON E<pooicov !l~ UOtKEhoo J.l1l0EVa n:po~ ou~ dp~vll Kat <ptAia Ecrtt 
KapXllooviot~. cOcrautco~ of: J.lllo' 0 KapXll06vto~ n:otdtoo. E{ OE J.l~ {Oi«( J.lEtaJ.l0pEuEcr8oo. Eav OE ns; 
tOUtO n:Ot~crn 01lJ.l0crtoV YtVEcr8co to uOiKTJJ.la. EV Lap06vt Kat At/3un J.l1l0d~ 'PooJ.laioov J.l~t' 
EJ.ln:OPEUE08oo J.l~tE n:OAtV KnsEtCO d J.l~ ECO~ tOU E<pOOta Aa/3£lv T!n:Aolov En:tOKEuaOat. Eav of: 
XEtJ.lcOV KatEVEYKn EV n:Ev8' fl!lEPat~ Un:OtPEXEtCO. EV LtKEAi«( ~~ KapXll06vtot En:apXOUOt Kat EV 
KapXll06vt n:avta Katn:otdtco Katn:ooAdtoo ooa Kat tcpn:oAhn £~£<Jnv. cOoaUtco~ of: Kat 0 
KapXll06vto~ n:otdtoo EV 'PWJ.ln. 
43 Diod. XVII.46. 
44 See Diod. XXV.10.3-12. 
189 
By such regulations, Carthage not only maintained its exclusive rights in North Africa 
and Sardinia, but also in Spain. 
After reconfirming Carthaginian control in traditional areas, we are now able 
to witness the growth of Roman power implied in the text. Like the treaty of 50918, 
the Carthaginians were permitted (under probable duress) to capture non-Roman 
towns in Latium but were immediately to vacate sites only taking moveable plunder. 
However, if Carthaginians captured Roman allies (not subjects), and they 
disembarked in a Roman port, a Roman could claim the captives and therefore free 
them. Apart from a rapidly developing sense of bureaucracy, we can discern evidence 
of Rome's expansion and its incorporation of allied states. Once again though, the 
Carthaginians are not specifically forbidden from plundering such sites, so long as 
they did not depart from or call in at a Roman port and so long as its expedition had 
not been provisioned in a Roman port. 
By this stage Rome was permitted to trade more actively with other areas of 
Carthaginian territory. Carthaginian Sicily was still considered an area of laissezfaire 
with Roman traders enjoying equal trading rights as citizens. Romans were permitted 
to supply themselves with water and provisions from a Carthaginian town, but they 
were forbidden to use such items to cause any harm (namely plunder) to any 
Carthaginian settlement or ally. The same clause also applied to the Carthaginians. If 
the person who is wronged should seek private vengeance, that person will be 
committing an offence. Such an admission suggests that both Roman and 
Carthaginian traffic was active throughout both territories. By forbidding both acts of 
plunder or robbery and personal revenge, this treaty is ultimately regulating trade and 
ensuring fair practice by merchants on both sides. It appears that the growth in trade 
was certainly relaxing restrictions, especially for Rome. This is emphasised by the 
new treaty granting Roman traders rights in Carthage, similar to those enjoyed in 
Carthaginian Sicily, and likewise to Carthaginian traders in Rome itself. The guarded 
attitude of Carthaginian territory was slowly lifting to accommodate the growth of 
Rome and the potential benefits from a free-trade agreement. The growth of Roman 
power was certainly starting to improve its relations with Carthage. 
The final treaty between Rome and Carthage can be dated to ca. 279 BC, only 
sixteen years before the end of amicable relations between the two states and the 
outbreak of the First Punic War. It is possible that Carthage instigated this treaty to 
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stop a possible alliance between Rome and Pyrrhus, who harboured ambitions of 
invading Africa.45 This treaty moves away from the basic non-aggression and trade 
clauses present in the first two treaties and concentrates solely on a military compact: 
If they (the Romans and the Carthaginians) make a written alliance against Pyrrhus 
they shall both conclude it in such a way that it shall be possible (jor them) to come to 
each other's aid in the land of those who are being attacked. 
Whichever party may need help, the Carthaginians shall provide these ships both for 
transport and for operations, but each shall provide the pay for its own men. 
The Carthaginians shall also give help to the Romans by sea if necessary, but no one 
shall compel the crews to land against their Will.46 
This treaty is an addendum to an earlier alliance between Rome and Carthage 
to aid each other if Pyrrhus attacked either one. Polybius' initial claim that Carthage 
and Rome agreed to maintain previous agreements is evident, although the exact 
details are not preserved. The nature of the treaty is of interest, as it appears that 
Carthage was the state with the greatest desire to formalise it. This is hardly surprising 
as after Pyrrhus defeated the Romans at Asculum, he led his force to Sicily and nearly 
drove the Carthaginians from the island. Ultimately this addendum is to ensure that 
neither party enter an exclusive compact with a third party state which ruled out 
mutual aid against Pyrrhus. Although the original treaty was most likely defensive, in 
this section we find Carthage willing to use its large naval capacity to provide ships 
for both transport and battle. The threat of Pyrrhus obviously unnerved the 
Carthaginians and a Pyrrhic-Roman treaty could prove catastrophic. Therefore 
Carthage needed to adjust its trade-based and non-aggression pact with Rome. 
However, to achieve this, it needed to make it more attractive to Rome by offering 
full naval support free of charge in return for its aid. Although short, this third treaty 
between Rome and Carthage finally saw a Carthaginian admission of Roman equality 
after more than two hundred years. Ironically, it would only take another forty years 
before Rome would not only justify this equality, but even prove its superiority. 
45 Pluto Pyrr. XIV.6. 
46 Polyb. III.25.3-5, eav crufl).W:Xio:v rcOtroVto:t rcpos Huppov eypo:rctOV rcotelO'erocro:v a.flq>OtEPot 'ivo: 
ESTI ~olJeEiv a.AA"lAotS ev til trov rcoAEflouflEVroV xropq.. cmotEpOt 0' a.v xpcfo:v EXrocrt ti1s ~OlJeelO:C; to. 
itAoio: rcO:PEXEtrocro:V KO:PXlJoovtot K0:1 tic; t~V bODV K0:1 Eic; t~V Eq>OOOV to. oE O\jlrovto: tOlC; O:Utrov 
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The Romano-Carthaginian treaties are useful in tracking the development of 
relations between the two states. We are able to discern a heavy mercantile tone in the 
first two treaties before a shift toward military matters later. Carthage maintained its 
reputation as a trading power by forbidding Roman traffic (or possibly just piracy) in 
areas such as North Africa, Sardinia, and Spain. By exerting rights in such rich areas, 
Carthage could control them and exploit their wealth better. In areas of competition 
such as Western Sicily and Carthage itself, Carthage certainly saw fit to allow 
monitored Roman trade along with that of other states in order to benefit further from 
the trade this produced. It is likely that the original treaty was based on an earlier one 
held with the Etruscans, which was simply transferred to Rome. Later when Carthage 
saw the benefits of widening access with Rome, it permitted Roman traders in 
Carthage and presumably other areas of its empire. We find this reciprocated by 
Rome allowing Carthaginian traders into the city. These three treaties allow us insight 
into how Carthage maintained its empire and had no major preference between rivals 
and allies regarding trade. Rome grew as a Carthaginian ally and trading partner. This 
growth saw it develop into a more viable partner for Carthage, which treated it 
accordingly.47 
The Romans tended to describe most Carthaginian activities in a derisive 
manner. There is, however, evidence that the treaties between Rome and Carthage 
actively protected and promoted trade between the two states. A gradual familiarity 
grew between the two cultures. Naturally, we have very little in Carthage, but from 
various Roman accounts, it appears that in times of peace, Carthaginians were present 
in Rome and its territory. Probably the best example of this familiarity is the most 
unorthodox. The Poenulus of Plautus was performed around 190 BC and provides 
h:a'tEpOl. KaPXll 06v 101 8£ Kat Ka'tlX 8aA.anav 'PO)llaio1~ ~01l8EhO)crav av xpcia U. 'tu 8£ 
1tA.1'lPcOlla'ta 1l1l8ct~ ava'YKa~e'tO) £K~aivElV aKo'\)criO)~. 
47 There were several other supposed treaties between Rome and Carthage. Two of these were sworn at 
the conclusion of the First and Second Punic Wars in 241 and 202 respectively. Others may be implied 
from the dispute over Saguntum at the beginning on the Second Punic War, see Chp. VII, ns.114-116 
and text. Polybius states that Philinus of Agrigentum claims a treaty existed forbidding Romans from 
Sicily and Carthaginians from Italy, and that it was the Romans who broke it during the First Punic 
War (III.26). This treaty may refer to the existence of Livy's treaty between Rome and Carthage in 
348, otherwise it may refer to another undisclosed treaty between the two states. A more interesting 
treaty, or at least an allusion to it, survives in Diodorus (XVI. 69. 1). He claims that Rome and Carthage 
settled a peace in 344/3 BC. It is possible this was a renewal or addendum to the first treaty of 50918, to 
establish a non-hostility pact against Timoleon in Sicily. It is also possible that this treaty, which 
Diodorus reports as the first between the two states, is a misrepresented account of the second treaty of 
306. Livy (VII.27.2) also claims a similar treaty was established between Rome and Carthage in 348. It 
is possible that either Livy has mistaken this treaty or Diodorus is misreporting the later renewal date of 
306. 
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invaluable insight into Romano-Carthaginian relations. There are several relevant 
points from the Poenulus that suggest an obvious familiarity with Carthaginians in 
Rome.48 
First, Plautus did not invent this play himself but rather developed it from an 
earlier Greek model dating from the Hellenistic period. His ultimate source remains 
anonymous, although he alludes to its original title, Carchedonios. 49 The nature of the 
characters are primarily Greek, as is its setting in Aetolia all of which suggests that 
the original Greek playwright and audience were also familiar with the Carthaginians 
and their practices. This leads us to the Roman representation of 'The Little 
Carthaginian'. The exact timing of the play is not of major importance. Any time 
during the first thirty years of the second century is possible, although it is most likely 
earlier, ca. 190. This would place the production at least a decade after the end of the 
Second Punic War. Rome had become the largest and undisputed power in the Central 
and Western Mediterranean. As for Carthage, its power and potential threat had 
waned and was therefore presumably easier to satirise. 
Various aspects of the play suggest that the Roman audience was quite 
familiar with Carthaginian culture and especially its merchants. The most notable is 
the gugga or Carthaginian merchant himself, Hanno.5o Hanno assumes a common 
Phoenicio-Punic name and is described as wearing a stereotypical tunic with no belt.51 
Automatically, the Roman audience is besieged by a range of stock Carthaginian 
characteristics, which presumably they had become familiar with over several 
centuries of contact and most likely more recently after the end of the Second Punic 
War and the resumption of trade. 
One of the more interesting aspects of the depiction of Hanno is his lengthy 
'Punic' speech which heralds his arrivaL Naturally the text is not in the Punic 
alphabet but a phonetic transliteration into Latin letters. The accuracy of the 
Phoenician in this speech has been contested, but is largely irrelevant to our 
discussion.52 The inclusion of this speech (whether accurate or not) presumes some 
48 Palmer has provided an excellent overview of the Poenulus including its representation in Rome and 
many of its finer points, Chp. III. For our discussion, we only need look at several of these examples. 
49 Poen. L's3. 
50 L.977, guggast homo. 
51 Ll. 975, 1009. 
52 There have been various interpretations of Hanno' s speech CLl. 930-950) ranging from dismissal to 
painstaking analysis. See A.S. Gratwick, "Hanno's Punic speech in the Poenulus of Plautus", Hermes 
1971, XCIX, pp.25-45; "PlautliS, Poenulus 967-981: Some Notes", Glotta 50,1972, pp.228-233, 
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Roman knowledge of the Punic language. Presumably after the first two Punic Wars, 
many Romans would be familiar with at least a phonetic recognition of a distinctive 
dialect or accent. Either way, this suggests Romans were familiar with Carthaginian 
individuals such as Hanno. 
If Punic traders such as Hanno had long been commonplace in Rome, it seems 
reasonable that their wares would also become familiar to the Romans. Although 
constructed in a comical manner, there are several stereotypical commodities which 
the Carthaginian merchant carries and with which he is associated. In his cargo, 
Hanno carries nuts and digging implements for harvesting.53 Palmer has suggested 
that these nuts possibly refer to the well-known African figs or in fact the Punic apple 
or Pomegranate.54 The digging implements are more ambiguous, but considering the 
high esteem in which Romans such as Varro and Columella held Punic agricultural 
expertise, especially with regards to writers such as Mago, this may be a direct 
attempt to associate an obvious aspect of Punic culture with the merchant Hanno. 
There appear to be other possible allusions to stock Carthaginian commodities 
and their familiarity in Rome.55 First, the term manstruea is of interest.56 Although 
unusual, it refers to a type of pelt or fleece, and in particular one from Sardinia and 
Corsica. Plautus may well be referring to a notable export from the once Carthaginian 
Sardinia.57 Although Roman traders were once forbidden from trading directly with 
Sardinia, they were accustomed to Sardinian wares and by 190 they had access to the 
island. Following this reference, Plautus uses the term hallex or allee, referring to fish 
sauce or garum.58 As we have seen in the Far West; especially around Gades, New 
Carthage, and the Balearic Islands, the production of garum was a mainstay industry. 
It is most likely that Rome, although now in control of these areas, was well aware of 
this association. Even before this more obvious connection, Plautus possibly uses a 
Gratwick claims that the speech is more a dramatic technique and is nothing more than gibberish. 
Gonzalez Lodge, Lexicon Plautinum (Hildesheim 1962) Vol. I, pp.915-917, provides a more detailed 
lexicon of Phoenicio-Punic words plucked from the text. Gregor Maurach, Der Poenulus des Plautus 
(Heidelberg 1988) pp.142-143, 146-149, provides further interpretation of the nature and context of the 
speech and the supposed Punic text. 
53 L.1014, nuces, L1.1019-20,palas vendundas sibi ait et mergas datas, ad messim credo. 
54 p. 40. 
55 Again Palmer (pp.36-39) provides a comprehensive description of these few lines, L1.1298-1314. 
56L.l313. 
57 This is a possibility as other states have become renowned for their production of such items. 
Probably the best example is Megara and its production of woollen jackets (Aristoph. Arch. 519). The 
Athenian embargo of these items threatened to wreck the Megadan economy. 
58 L.131O. 
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similar metaphor when Hanno's two daughters describe themselves as salted fish.59 
Although such examples seem little more than subtle allusion, to a knowing Roman 
audience, mercantile and geographic nuance would not go unappreciated. 
There are other obvious references of Plautus which suggest Roman 
familiarity with things Carthaginian. The background of the narrative is certainly 
germane to some notorious aspects of Phoenicio-Punic culture. We find the young 
boy Agorastodes stolen from Carthage and then later his cousins Adelphasium and 
Anterastilis abducted along with their nurse.60 Although this is a common theme for 
ancient drama and comedy, it is particularly ironic that this took place in Carthage. It 
was the Carthaginians, continuing a legacy of the Phoenicians, who were renowned 
for kidnapping unsuspecting individuals. We have seen this image present in Greek 
and Roman sources since the time of Homer. Although these abductions took place in 
Carthage, there is a strong connection between the city and such an action with which 
the Romans were familiar. 
Following this we discover the fate of the two Carthaginian maidens. They are 
to be sold as courtesans at the shrine of Venus.61 Such an image in the Phoenicio-
Punic world was common: the practice of young maidens prostituting themselves at 
the temple of Astarte (Venus).62 This religious practice was despised by Greeks and 
Romans, and the girls are, perhaps by design, presented in a sympathetic manner. It is 
their captor, Lycus who is to blame for this action.63 Naturally the Roman audience 
would be quite familiar with such an image. 
Finally there is the Poenulus himself, Hanno. His image, as constructed by 
Plautus, as a typical Carthaginian gugga suggests that such a figure was instantly 
familiar in Rome. His appearance is noted, as we have already seen, with his wearing 
59 L1.240-243, Soror cogita amabo item nos perhiberi, quam si salsa muriatica esse autumantur, nisi 
multa aqua usque et diu macerantur, olent salsa sunt tangere ut non velis. 
60 Ll. 65ff., 83ff. 
61 Ll.339-340, Quia apud aedem Veneris hodie est mercatus meretricius, eo conveniunt mercatores ibi 
ego me ostendi uolo. 
62 Along with human sacrifice, Phoenician and Carthaginian ritualised prostitution of maidens to 
Astarte (Venus) was probably their most famed and despised religious practice in antiquity. This 
practice (eastern in origin) acted as a religious rite in order to raise temple funds. Herodotus describes 
the practice of women prostituting themselves to Ishtar (Astarte) once in their life (I.199). The money 
raised from this service passed into the temple coffers. This practice appears widespread in the 
Phoenicio-Punic world. Elissa en route to Carthage stopped off at Cyprus and captured eighty maidens 
who were about to prostitute themselves for Astarte (Justin XVllI.5). According to Valerius Maximus 
(1I.6.15) there was a similar cult practice at the temple of Venus at Sicca (Cirta Nova). 
63 Ll.449-469. 
195 
a distinctive tunic and no belt.64 Even before meeting Hanno, Agorastoc1es, visually 
identifies him as a Carthaginian merchant: facies quidem edepol Punacist. 65 His 
opening speech is in Punic which, although dubious, at least aims to be recognisably 
Punic to the Roman audience. His distinctive cargo and the other references leave 
little doubt about his occupation as a Carthaginian merchant. To emphasise this 
image, Plautus has Hanno described as nullus me est hodie Poenus Poenior.66 To find 
such a stereotypical character amusing, Plautus and therefore the average Roman 
theatre patron must have had familiarity with merchants from Carthage such as 
Hanno.51 
It may seem unusual to employ a cornie text such as the Poenulus to gauge 
evidence of Carthaginian presence in Rome. However, the play was designed to be 
enjoyed by the general populace. The familiar tones and images regarding both 
Carthage and a typical Carthaginian gugga suggest that Romans were accustomed to 
seeing and hearing both on a regular basis. From such a social commentary, it appears 
that Carthaginian merchants were regular visitors to Rome. 
THE PHOCAEAN COLONIES 
From the end of the seventh century the Phocaeans began to settle a number of sites in 
the Western Mediterranean and by doing so, carne into contact with Carthage. The 
accepted date of the Phocaean foundation of Massilia is ca. 600 BC.68 This settlement 
followed a naval victory over the Carthaginians. Only forty years later the Phocaeans 
settled on Corsica and within twenty years they were apparently disrupting Etruscan 
and Carthaginian shipping in the area. The Etrusco-Carthaginian alliance managed to 
drive the Phocaeans off Corsica and maintained its collective thalassocracy in the 
Tyrrhenian Sea. Although limited from expansion in the Tyrrhenian basin, Massilia 
settled areas to its east and to the west, establishing a number of coastal settlements in 
southern coastal France and down the eastern coast of Spain. Massilia settled 
64 See n.5l. 
65 L.977. 
66 L.991. 
67 Plautus adds to these images at different points in the play. During the prologue he claims that Hanno 
knows aU languages, but dissembles his knowledge, and is therefore a complete Carthaginian, L1.112-
113, et is omnis linguas scit sed dissumulat sciens, se scire Poenus plane est. 
68 Thuc. I.13.6. 
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Emporion and several other sites down the east coast of Spain, extending its trade 
routes as far south as Cape N ao and possibly beyond. 
The documented battles between Carthage and the Phocaeans and the spread 
of Phocaean colonies along the Mediterranean coast of Spain would suggest some 
anxiety in Carthage. On a political level this may have been apparent for some time. 
During this period the fall of Tartessus and the waning Phoenician influence saw a 
power vacuum develop in Spain. The Carthaginian arrival in Spain can be dated to the 
second half of the sixth century. Initially its interests saw Carthage assume control 
over the Phoenician areas of settlement, along the southern coastal strip. The 
Phocaeans were able to push further south unopposed. By the time Carthage had 
established a more stable territory in Southern Spain, the Phocaean settlements to the 
north were also more developed. Such a situation would inevitably lead to conflict. 
Although there are some possible examples of this, the situation in Spain remained 
relatively peaceful. Carthage, which was renowned for exclusivity of territory, 
seemingly permitted the Phocaean colonies to trade in the region. 
There is evidence from the Phocaeans' settlements that they were trading with 
Carthage and its empire. It may be possible that both parties were eventually satisfied 
with their respective areas of activity and were content to benefit from trade with the 
other. This is quite plausible considering the Carthaginians' relationship with Greek 
states in Sicily, where they preferred to keep the political and mercantile spheres quite 
separate. Otherwise it is possible that a peace treaty between Carthage and Massilia 
existed at some stage. Justin, in listing several Massiliot victories, briefly mentions a 
war with Carthage, where the latter was defeated. Apparently then the Massiliots and 
Carthaginians swore an oath of peace.69 The prominence of Massilia probably meant 
that accord most likely included the other Greek colonies in the area. The exact battle 
is unclear. It is possible that it was the Carthaginian defeat before the founding of 
Massilia. It is more likely, however, that it is the Battle of Artemisium in 490. After 
this battle there is no direct evidence for open conflict between the Greeks and 
Carthaginians in the Far West before the Second Punic War.70 This treaty possibly 
69 XLIII.5. 
70 Sosylos claims that the second Battle of Artemisium in 217 saw a sound Carthaginian defeat at the 
hands of the Massiliots (F. Gr.Hist. 176, F.l; Polyb. llI.95-96; Livy XXII. 19-20). Massilia's colony 
Emporion exhibits similar allegiance to Rome and deserts the Carthaginians first by sending an 
embassy to Rome for aid against the spread of Carthaginian expansion in Spain and second by allowing 
Scipio use the town as his base of operations on the peninsula (App. lb. 6,40). 
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coincided with next peace treaty mentioned by Justin between the Greeks and the 
Spaniards. The existence of a peace might help explain the increased evidence of a 
friendly relationship between Greeks and Carthaginians in the area. 
There is evidence of such a relationship in the main Phocaean settlement of 
Massilia and in the areas surrounding the mouth of the Rhone. Although settled as a 
direct result of a victory over the Carthaginians, it appears that the latter were quite 
active in the area. Testament to a settled relationship in Massilia is the existence of a 
large Punic inscription dating from the end of the third century BC. The inscription 
itself sets forward tariffs for temple sacrifices at the Temple of Ba'al Sapon in 
Massilia: 
Temple of Ba'al Sapon. Tariff of offerings which the 30 Menfixed who were in charge 
of tariffs in the time of the N(oble) HLSB'L, the Suffet, son of 'BDTNT, son of 
'BD'SMN and of HLSB'L the Suffet, son of 'BD'SMN, son of HLSB'L and their 
colleagues. 
For an ox: for a holocaust, or a sin offering, or a substitution offering, the priests take 
10 pieces of silver for each; in the case of a holocaust they receive beyond this tariff 
300 Shekels' weight of meat,' for a sin offering, however, the knuckles and the joints. 
But the pelt and the ribs and the feet and the rest of the meat shall belong to the 
offerer. 
For a calfwhose horns ... still missing, or for a ram:for a holocaust, or a sin offering, 
or a substitution offering, the priests take 5 pieces of silver for each; in the case of a 
holocaust they receive beyond this tariff 150 Shekels' weight of meat; for a sin 
offering, however, the knuckles and the joints. But the pelt and the ribs and the feet 
and the rest of the meat shall belong to the offerer. 
For a ram or a goat: for a holocaust, or a sin offering, or a substitution offering, the 
priests take 1 Shekel and 2 ZR of silver for each; and in the case of a sin offering the 
priests receive beyond this tariff the knuckles and the joints. But the pelt and the ribs 
and the feet and the rest of the meat shall belong to the offerer. 
For a lamb or a kid or a young ram: for a holocaust, or a sin offering, or a 
substitution offering, the priests take three quarters (of a Shekel) of silver and 2 ZR 
for each; and in the case of a sin offering the priests receive beyond this tariff the 
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knuckles and the joints. But the pelt and the ribs and the feet and the rest of the meat 
shall belong to the offerer. 
For a 'GNN-bird or a SS-Bird: for a substitution offering, or a SSP-offering or a 
HZT-offering, the priest will take 3/4 (of a Shekel) of silver and 2 ZRfor each, and the 
meat will belong to the offerer. 
For another bird or holy first fruits or a meal-offering or an oil-offering: the priests 
will take 10 obols for each .... 
For each sin offering, that they bring before the god, the priests receive the knuckles 
and the joints andfor a sin offering .... 
For baked goods and milk and fat and for each offering, which somebody wishes to 
offer as a minha-offering, the priests receive ... 
For each offering which a man poor in livestock or a man poor in birds offers, the 
priest receives nothing. 
Each clan and each family and each gathering for the deity and all people who 
sacrifice... these people (shall pay) a tariff for an offering according to what is fixed 
in the document . .. 
Every tariff, which is not fixed on this tablet, shall be paid according to the document 
which the men have written who were in charge of the tariffs in the time of the N( oble) 
HLSB'L, the Suffet, son of 'BDTNT, son of 'BD'SMN and ofHLSB'L the Suffet, son of 
'BD'SMN, son of HLSB 'L and their colleagues. 
Any priest who collects a tariff contrary to what is fixed in this document shall be 
punished ... 
Every offerer, who does not give silver for the tariff which .. .. 71 
The inscription is certainly bureaucratic in nature and precise in covering a 
variety of sacrifices and temple procedures. This document presupposes some 
interesting possibilities. First, it indicates the existence of a Punic temple in Greek 
Massilia or at least a cult. This furthermore suggests a reasonable Phoenicio-Punic 
population either resident or visiting the city. For two supposedly hostile states, this 
may seem unusual. However, the presence of a large trade-based population could 
necessitate the establishment of a foreign cult in Massilia. The Massiliots presumably 
71 KAI. 69. This type of systematised listing for sacrificial quantities and protocol has an earlier eastern 
precedent. The book of Leviticus explains several types of sacrifice, both public and private in some 
detail (1:1-7:38). 
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welcomed the lucrative trade of Carthage and were willing to consent to the building 
and operation of a temple or cult. 
The suggestion that Carthaginians were active and possibly settled in Massilia 
enlightens a poor archaeological record. Few Phoenicio-Punic remains have been 
found at the site. This does not discount the existence of trade, as a similar lack of 
evidence is also apparent in other developed Greek, Egyptian, and Roman centres 
despite maintaining active trade with Carthage.72 The Punic inscription suggests that 
there was considerable Carthaginian activity in Massilia. The text also shows direct 
class distinctions among the suppliants to the temple. After distinguishing between the 
larger offerings such as oxen, calves, and rams, there is a clause protecting the poorer 
of society exempting them from taxation. Presumably, if there was a poorer class of 
Carthaginians in Massilia, there were also other classes present. The text implicitly 
mentions a priest (but presumably several were present), a suffet, and a council of 
thirty men. Whether these last two groups actually resided in Massilia or established 
the law from Carthage is unclear. Another possible interpretation of this text is that it 
is a standard Carthaginian document of which a copy was sent to Massilia as well as 
to other centres not taking local circumstances into account. If this is true it is possible 
that Carthage established any number of cults in foreign ports throughout the 
Mediterranean. In this situation, however, the text suggests a considerable population, 
either living in or visiting Massilia. 
The nature of the text also implies a high-level of Carthaginian activity in 
Massilia. It is possible that the temple was in fact managed by Carthage from abroad. 
We have a possibly earlier text from Carthage dated sometime between the fourth and 
second centuries BC defining tariffs on temple sacrifices.73 This inscription possibly 
supports the idea of Carthage manufacturing standard temple inscriptions and using 
copies throughout their empire and beyond. It is similar to the Massiliot text. In both 
72 Scant Carthaginian remains have been unearthed at Massilia but several connections can be 
supposed. As attested elsewhere, Carthaginian material remains generally do not affect the 
archaeological record of a number of known developed trading partners. Otherwise one of the main 
imports following the foundation of the site was Etruscan pottery imported by either Etruscan or even 
possibly Carthaginian merchants, see Fran~ois Villard, "La ceramique archruque de Marseille", in 
Marseille grecque et fa Gaule, pp.164ff. The lack of Carthaginian pottery in developed areas of contact 
is as evident in Massilia as elsewhere. Another connection can be witnessed in Massilia's tendency to 
be influenced by Greek states such as Himera, Acragas, and Syracuse in regard to coinage, see Claude 
Brenot, "Vne etape du monnayage de Marseille: les emissions du V· s. av. I.-Co", in Marseille grecque 
et la Gaul, pp.246-252. This can be dated to the fifth century, during which time Carthage was active in 
these states and later captured Himera and Acragas. In all three states there were constant populations 
of Carthaginian traders often regardless of the political situation. 
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inscriptions there is a 'council of thirty men' who oversee the temple regulations. This 
governing body appears to be a standard council overseeing the tax gleaned from 
temples both in Carthage and those abroad. Carthaginian officials may in fact have 
been present in Massilia. Beyond these officials, the texts and their respective tariff 
qualifications are near identicaL Another fragmentary inscription from Carthage 
dating from the same period shows precise tariffs enforced on different offerings?4 It 
appears that the Carthaginians treated temple offerings as taxable commodities and 
were willing to impose a standard on such actions. Although established in Carthage, 
it was most likely exported throughout Carthaginian territory and areas of settlement 
and trade. 
There is further epigraphic evidence from areas near Massilia which suggest 
Carthaginians were active in the area for a considerable period. A second, shorter 
Punic inscription survives from A vignon from the mid-third century BC. 
The grave of ZJBQT, the priestess of the Mistress ... , daughter of 'BD'SMN, son of 
B'LJTN, son of 'BD'SMN, wife of B'LHN, the temple overseer, the son of 
'BDMLQRT, son of HMLQT, son 'BD'SMN. Not to open. 75 
It is interesting that a Punic inscription attests some form of Punic presence in 
the interior of a supposedly hostile nation. A vignon is located over 30 km. from the 
coast on the banks of the Rhone. It is not unusual that Phoenicio-Punic interests were 
centred around a navigable river leading into the interior. We have already seen the 
important role of the Guadalquivir River in Southern Spain leading to the lucrative 
areas of trade and minerals in Baetica. Carthaginian activity along the Rhone would 
give Carthage access to commodities of mainland Europe. 
The nature of the inscription is obvious: an epitaph showing several distinctive 
Punic name-types with a priestess and priest specifically named. This leaves us with 
the impression that there was another possible Punic cult or temple present at the site. 
Donner and Rollig, however, suggest that this inscription refers to individuals in 
Carthage and the inscription was simply transported to the grave of the deceased.76 
This is a distinct possibility. However, there is no reason why such an inscription 
73 KAI. 74. 
74 KAI. 75. 
75 KAI. 70. 
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could not have come from other areas of the empire, or even from nearby, perhaps 
from a site such as Massilia. The lineage of the deceased is quite illustrious, and such 
an individual in the area possibly suggests the image of a prominent merchant. 
Whether the sacred persons were present in A vignon, and with them a permanent cult 
such as in Massilia is unclear at best. Aside from this however, we know that there 
were Carthaginians active in the area, which appears to be a destination in a 
Carthaginian trade network. 
To the west of Massilia and its surrounding colonies, the Massiliots 
established a number of colonies along the coasts of Southern France and Eastern 
Spain. Although the Tartessians were willing to trade with the Phocaeans, their 
collapse and the departure of the Phoenicians from Spain during the sixth century 
enabled the Phocaeans rapidly to expand down the coast unchecked at least as far as 
Cape Nao.77 
According to Herodotus, the Phocaeans first traded with the Tartessians under 
the rule of King Arganthonius probably during the late seventh to early sixth 
century.78 This introduced the Greeks to Southern Spain for the first time. The 
foundation of Massilia ca. 600 and the Massiliots' subsequent expansion along the 
eastern Spanish coast saw a marked change in the Greek presence in the area. The 
abandonment of Phocaea in the East some sixty years after the foundation of Massilia 
make it coincident with the expansion of Massiliot colonies along the coasts of France 
and Spain.79 
Our archaeological record attests a distinctive change in the nature of Greek 
imports into Southern Spain during the second half of the sixth century, with eastern 
Greek imports replaced by wares from states such as Athens and Corinth. It is during 
76 KAi. 70, p.87. 
77 Before progressing we should remember that the Phocaeans were not the only group of Greeks 
actively settling in Spain. The town of Saguntum was supposedly settled by Zacynthus (Strabo I1IA.6). 
The Rhodians also seem active in the area, settling Rhode across the Gulf of Rosas from Emporion. 
Rhodian material appears in reasonable quantity from the seventh century on the Iberian peninsula, see 
Benjamin Brian Shefton, "Greeks and Greek Imports in the South of the Spanish Peninsula", in 
PhOnizier im Westen, pp.337-367. 
78 Hdt. 1.163. Shefton presumes that Phocaean expansion coincides with the Persian capture of Phocaea 
in 546, which in turn was at the end of King Arganthonius' allegedly eighty-year reign. This would 
place Phocaean contact with Tartessus during the latter stages of the seventh century, Shefton, pp.346-
348. 
79 The traditional settlement date of Ampurias is 575. Like a number of other Greek colonies, an initial 
settlement on a nearby island was established first; in this case the island of Palaiapolis (Strabo I1IA.8), 
see W.E. Mierse, "Ampurias, A Greco-Roman city on the Iberian Coast",Latomus 53,1994, pp.791-
793. 
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this period that we find Greek imports arriving more steadily in Phoenicio-Punic ports 
throughout Southern Spain. Like other areas of Phoenicio-Punic settlement, Southern 
Spain provides evidence of early Greek imports dating from the eighth century.so 
There was a market for Greek-styled objects, which was enhanced by the recent 
arrival of the Phocaeans. A great deal of relevant material is evident in the emporia of 
Southern Spain and in Spanish settlements in the interior.81 
The onset of Carthaginian authority in Southern Spain redesigned the political 
boundaries in the area. From the late sixth century, Carthage moved into the old 
Phoenician settlements along the coast and was faced with the expanding Greek 
emporia. From scanty evidence, it appears that Carthage limited Phocaean interests in 
the area north of Cape Nao and established a relatively exclusive zone of activity.82 
The extent of Phocaean expansion down the east coast of Spain is not entirely known. 
There are several possible attested sites in the south. Such sites include Abdera and 
Mainake (possibly near to, if not actually either Toscanos or Malaga) have been 
suggested. It is unlikely that the Phocaeans were able permanently to settle in the 
heart of Phoenicio-Punic Spain. If such settlements did exist in this region they were 
most likely removed or resettled by the Carthaginians along with any other 
settlements during the sixth and fifth centuries.83 Another possibility is that the Greeks 
were permitted to reside in or to visit Phoenicio-Punic centres for the purpose of 
trade. If the Greeks permitted Carthaginians to reside in their settlements, it is 
possible at some stage that the Carthaginians returned the courtesy. If such a situation 
existed, presumably it predated the full establishment of Carthaginian power in the 
region and the exclusive rights it later maintained. Regarding other possible Phocaean 
80 Shefton, pp.338-339. 
81 For relevant information regarding the Greeks in Spain see Antonio Garcia y Bellido, Hispania 
Graeca (Barcelona 1948) Vol. I, Chp.llI, Vol. II, passim; Barcelo, pp.115-124; Hans Georg Niemeyer, 
"The Greeks and the Far West: Towards a Revaluation of the Archaeological Record from Spain", La 
Magna Grecia e illontano occidente: att; del ventinovesimo Convego di studi sulla Magna Grecia, 
Taranto, 6-11 ottobre 1989 (Taranto 1989) pp.29-53. 
82 This is demonstrated during the second treaty with Rome which excludes all Roman mercantile 
activity from Southern Spain. Shefton (n. 85) shows from Greek literary sources that from the first 
quarter of the fifth century the Greeks viewed areas beyond the Pillars of Heracles as forbidden. This 
would certainly coincide with the Carthaginian domination of the areas on both sides of the Pillars of 
Heracles and their policy of exclusion. 
83 Avienus OM. Ll.425-435; GGM. I, Ps. Scymnos Ll.I47-50, p.200 (ed. Muller); Hans Georg 
Niemeyer, "Auf der Suche nach Mainake: Der Konflikt zwischen literarischer und archaologischer 
Uberlieferung", Historia 39, 1980, pp .165-185, Niemeyer disputes A vienus' claim that Mainake was a 
Phocaean settlement as wen as later scholarship which attempts to place it at either Toscanos or 
Malaga; B. Waming-Treumenn, "Mainake, originally a Phoenician Place Name?", Historia 39,1980, 
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settlements in the south, Strabo claims that there were three settlements of Massiliot 
origin between the River Xucar (Sucro) and New Carthage, but nearer to the former. 84 
He only mentions one by name: that of Hemeroskopion or Dianium, which lies on the 
promontory of Cape Nao and most likely marked the boundary between Carthaginian 
and Phocaean spheres of influence. Such settlements were perhaps created after the 
Carthaginian defeat at Artemisium in 490 off Cape Nao.85 We have already seen the 
Carthaginians' exclusive policy limiting access to North Africa, Sicily, Sardinia, and 
the Tyrrhenian Sea. This formed a line extending west from Sardinia to the Balearic 
Islands and thence to Eastern Spain, with Cape Nao a likely position for a 
hypothetical boundary. 
The situation in the Far West appears at first similar to that in the area around 
Southern France. Our literary evidence would suggest an enmity between the 
Carthaginians and the Phocaean Greeks. On closer inspection, however, it appears a 
similar process occurred in both areas. After the initial period of hostility, the 
opposing sides seem to embark on a policy of active trade with each other. 
Perhaps the best way to indicate trade between the Carthaginians and Greeks 
in Spain is to look at one of the prominent Greek colonies, that of Emporion. 
Originally an early Massiliot foundation, Emporion (Ampurias) was located on the 
southern bay of the Gulf of Rosas. Of all the Greek foundations or supposed 
settlements in the region, owing to its location and importance, Emporion offers us 
the best insight into Carthaginian relations with the Greeks in the region. Emporion 
rapidly became the most important Greek settlement in the Far West, eclipsing even 
its metropolis of Massilia within a few centuries. 86 By the mid-fifth century, Greek 
wares were increasingly being imported from Greece throughout Spain. During this 
period Carthaginian settlements in Spain and elsewhere start importing such items. 
This suggests a growing demand.8? Around 350 BC a major shift of production 
occurred suggesting that locally made black-gloss pottery replaced much of that 
imported from Greek centres in the East. The latter shift is particularly important to 
pp.186-189, Waming-Treumenn assumes the supposed site of Mainake was in fact Toscanos which is a 
Semitic name. 
84 Strabo IIIA.6. 
85 See ns.69-70. 
86 Mierse, p.795. 
87 Richard J. Harrison, Spain at the Dawn of History - Iberians, Phoenicians, and Greeks (New York 
1988) p.76. Harrison describes the large influx of Greek imported wares in the East. The settlement of 
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Emporion, which became a major centre for the production of such wares and their 
diffusion throughout Spain.88 Evidence from Emporion suggests that it underwent 
large-scale development during the fourth century.89 This certainly accommodated its 
new role as a trading capital. It appears that originally Phoenicians and later 
Carthaginians were actively trading with this Greek settlement. Emporion developed 
into the main Greek centre in the area, so it is reasonable to assume that many of the 
Greek imports to the region were routed hither before being traded throughout the 
centres of the Far West. This can also be assumed for locally produced items which 
became popular throughout Spain from the roid-fourth century. 
There is no literary evidence regarding an active mercantile policy between 
the Carthaginians and the Greeks in Far West (i.e. Emporion). Fortunately there are 
several surviving artefacts which suggest trade between the two peoples. The earliest 
item is an Attic bell krater discovered in Galeria in Southeast Spain dating from the 
mid-fifth century.90 This vase contains a bilingual etching in both Punic and Greek. 
Similar bilingual examples survive from the mid-fourth century remains of the 
shipwreck of EI Sec off Mallorca. This attests a close trading system between the 
Greeks and Carthaginians, producing a number of Greek vessels inscribed in Greek 
and others with Punic names.91 The location of such remains suggests that both 
Greeks and Carthaginians were actively in contact in the areas around Spain. As we 
know, Emporion was the major Greek settlement in the area and presumably 
influenced or witnessed much of this trade. Emporion itself most likely traded directly 
with Carthaginian settlements and Carthaginian merchants much like in Massilia to 
the northeast. Testament to such a relationship was Emporion's striking of coins 
based on Carthaginian models ca. 290. These coins departed from the normal Greek 
types which had been produced in Emporion and Rhode for nearly two centuries. The 
coins themselves copied a common Carthaginian model of the head of Persephone on 
Ullastret, located only 20 km. from Emporion has revealed a huge amount of imported Greek pottery 
from this period, suggesting a considerable trade in such items. 
8& The production and export of amphorae from Emporion to sites in Southern Spain and Carthage is 
considered by David P.S. Peacock, "Punic Carthage and Spain: The Evidence of the Amphorae", CEA 
XVIII, 1986, pp.lOl-113. The nature of discerning local Punic wares from those imported wares from 
the Massiliot colonies to the north is difficult owing to the preponderance of the latter. 
89 Mierse, pp.796-797, it is during this period that Emporion constrncted considerable walls in a similar 
fashion to those at Massilia, perhaps to cope with possible threats to its prosperity. 
90 BatTison, p.77. Similar examples have also been discovered in the Punic towns of Lixus and Kouass 
in North Africa. 
91 Javier de Boz, "EI Sec: Les graffites mercantiles en Occident et l'Epave d'EI Sec", REA LXXXIX.3-
4,1987, pp.1l7-130. 
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the obverse and a standing horse on the reverse. 92 This suggests that Emporion was 
reliant on Carthaginian traffic to the point where it altered its coinage to facilitate 
trade. This change was probably due to the surge in Carthaginian activity in Spain 
during the fourth century. This change is also emphasised by the abandonment of this 
standard after the fall of Carthaginian power in Spain at the end of the century when 
Emporion fell under Roman influence. The initial change of Emporiot coinage 
emphasises the importance of Carthaginian trade in the area. Emporion no longer 
looked east for its main trading partner: Massilia and Etruria were in decline and 
during this period Carthage controlled massive areas of trade and bullion, especially 
in Spain. This also coincides with our evidence of Greeks and Carthaginians actively 
trading in the Far West as seen in Massilia and its surrounding settlements. 
GREECE 
Contact between Carthage and Greece originated between the latter and the 
Phoenicians from as early as the later stages of the second millennium. The 
importance and intensity of this early relationship continued with Carthage, albeit in 
lesser forms. This change is understandable as Greece lay beyond the primary 
Carthaginian trade routes. This was emphasised even more when the fall of Tyre to 
the Babylonians in 57312 literally severed the major point of contact with the East. 
Following this Carthage predominantly turned west for trade and expansion. 
However, it is evident that Carthage maintained links with the eastern Greeks. These 
mostly revolved around trade. We have already seen the influx of eastern Greek items 
in Punic society in the fifth century and even earlier with the Phoenicians. 93 Originally 
92 Harrison, pp.78-79; HN2 p.2. 
93 This is most visible in areas of constant Greco-Carthaginian contact such as Sicily and Southern 
Spain. However, there is ample evidence from Carthage itself. Greek influence in Carthaginian society, 
like that of Egypt, is considerable. Pottery was certainly a major export from Greece and Greek Sicily. 
Large amounts of Greek pottery are evident in Carthage during the seventh and early sixth centuries 
BC (e.g. Ju. B. Tsirkin, "The Economy of Carthage", Studia Phoenicia VI, 1988, pp.126; E. Boucher, 
"Ceramique archalque d'importation au Musee Lavigere de Carthage", Cahiers de Byrsa III, 1953, 
pp.11-37). Considerable quantities of proto-Corinthian pottery are visible at the site along with 
extensive remains of Attic pottery from the fifth century. Types include basic vase forms, lamps, and 
even decorative tragic masks. The Greek influence on Carthaginian pottery is considerable when it 
dominated local Punic styles to the point where it is often relatively indistinguishable from original 
Greek types. It is likely that Greek potters were actually residing in Carthage to fulfil demand. For 
examples see H. Hurst et al., Vol. IT.2, Chp. IT on Punic lamps; Lancel, Byrsa II, passim, on Greek style 
pottery both imported and locally produced. Similar influence on sculpture and other luxury items is 
also apparent especially from the fifth century. 
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many commodities were exported from Greece. It is likely that many of these 
products were taken to Sicily, Southern Italy, and the western colonies before being 
transported to Carthage and areas of its empire. Our evidence for such a connection is 
widespread. However, the questions of whether or not Greek states had direct 
relations with the Carthaginians and whether the latter were present in Greece still 
confront us. 
There is some evidence of Carthaginians present in Greece. Naturally, the 
majority of the evidence we possess revolves around trade and to a lesser extent 
diplomacy and military affairs.94 Although this is not always explicit, it often seems 
the likely reason for their presence. 
There are a number of Phoenicio-Punic inscriptions surviving from Athens 
and the Piraeus. Such areas connect these inscriptions to the sea and in particular 
seaborne trade. Most of these examples are banal inscriptions in Phoenician or 
bilingual with Greek and date from the fourth century.95 Most also seem to originate 
from Phoenicia itself, however, the dating of such inscriptions places them in periods 
of intense Carthaginian activity. One of these inscriptions suggests some connection 
to Carthage.96 Although the inscription tells of Phoenicians from Sidon, one individual 
is named 'BDTNT (mn':::!ll), literally Servant (masc.) of Tanit. Such a name is 
commonplace in the West, where by the fourth century Tanit was developing into the 
predominate divinity in Carthage and the Punic world. 97 The goddess did not 
command much of a following in the East. The origin of these Phoenicians is 
ambiguous, as although they are identified as from Sidon, they presumably had some 
connection to the Punic West. 
94 There is some evidence suggesting a familiarity with Carthaginian traders in Greece. We have 
already discussed Plautus' Poenulus and the Roman familiarity with a Carthaginian gugga and the 
distinctive wares he was trading. Although this play was performed in Rome probably around 190 BC, 
it was based on an earlier Greek play which Plautus himself names as the Carchedonios (Poen. L.53). 
This suggests that the Greeks were equally familiar with Carthaginian traders and their distinctive 
idiosyncrasies. Such a theme is alluded to by Athenaeus (I.28a) who has Hermippus recount a list of 
foreign luxury items imported to Athens. Within the manifest he claims that Carthage supplies carpets 
and many-coloured cushions. He then cites Antiphanes who mentions kale from Carthage (128d). 
Finally he quotes Archestratus, a writer on banquets, who praises wine from the Punic land as the best 
of all (I.29b.c). These short citations suggest that several Carthaginian commodities were highly valued 
in Greece and that there was an active trade in such goods between Carthaginian ports and mainland 
Greece. Again as in other developed areas with which Carthage traded, there is little archaeological 
evidence suggesting such a connection. If these few perishable items mentioned here are characteristic 
Carthaginian exports, this gap in the archaeological records becomes more understandable. 
95 KAl. 53-60. 
96 KAT. 53. 
207 
There are a handful of Greek inscriptions which also attest the presence of 
Carthaginians on mainland Greece. Some are little more than a short reference 
attesting the presence of a Carthaginian individual in a particular Greek state.98 One 
example survives from Boeotia, where the Boeotians are honouring a Carthaginian 
called Nuba.99 Although the man bears a distinctly Numidian name, he is praised as a 
benefactor of the Boeotians some time after 364/3 BC. The text is unclear as to how 
Nuba actually aided the Boeotians. Nevertheless, his presence in mainland Greece is 
indisputable and such an inscription suggests that Carthaginians and their subjects 
were not uncommon visitors to such important states as Boeotia. 
A second inscription from Athens dating from ca. 330 BC also attests a 
Carthaginian presence.1OO This small inscription honours a Carthaginian delegation 
which is comprised of two men: Synalos lO1 and Bodmilcar (Boi5lltAKap). 
Unfortunately, the exact nature of this delegation is not made clear, and instead we are 
left with the officious description of the writing and payment of the inscription itself. 
The interesting aspect of this inscription is that it appears that an official Carthaginian 
delegation was sent to Athens, which was received and treated accordingly. There are 
several possible motives behind such a delegation dependent on its exact dating, so 
we are left to speculate. Nevertheless, it appears that Carthage and Athens had official 
channels of diplomacy open during this period. 
It appears that Carthage became more active in the political spheres of Greek 
states from the fifth century onwards. There are several examples of delegations, 
proposed actions, or treaties between the former and several Greek states. These never 
came to fruition, but we can discern an active interest from both sides implying some 
degree of prior contact and knowledge. 
One of the better-attested states with an interest in Carthage was fifth century 
Athens. On several occasions there is evidence suggesting that Athens was definitely 
contemplating an attack on Carthage and even its empire. Although such an idea was 
sown during a time of imperial optimism, any attack was likely motivated by 
economic considerations. If Athens were to break the Carthaginian thalassocracy in 
97 The remains from the shipwreck at EI Sec contain pottery with both Greek and Punic inscriptions of 
a similar type. See n.91. 
98IG. II.3054, IG2• II.9112. 
99 SyW.179. 
100 SyllJ.321. 
101 This is possibly the same Synalos, the Carthaginian representative in Acragas who aided Dion in 
357/6, see n.142. 
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the West, it could easily extend its own reach in the area and benefit from trade. Such 
a move is not beyond the contemporary Athenian appetite for expansion. This is the 
same Athens that sent invasion forces to Persian Egypt and to Sicily during the same 
period. Although not always the strong suit of the popular democracy in Athens, there 
was presumably some knowledge of Carthage and its empire in Athens. This would 
most likely originate from western Greeks and their steady contact with the 
Carthaginians. However, Athens may also have been familiar with Carthage through 
its own first-hand contact in Greece with both Phoenicians and then Carthaginians and 
likewise from Athenians in Carthaginian ports. 102 Most evidence of Athenian interest 
in Carthage stems from the second half of the fifth century. Aristophanes claims that 
Hyperbolus was behind a plan to send a fleet against Carthage.103 Plutarch and 
Thucydides both claim that Athenian dreams of conquering Carthage were 
championed by none other than Alcibiades. The first indication of such a tactic 
appears during the time of Pericles, and despite his own record of expansive 
strategies, Plutarch claims that Pericles was constantly trying to restrain the Athenians 
from undertaking such ambitious plans. 104 From this account, the Athenians under 
Alcibiades wished to conquer Tyrrhenia and Carthage in their, or better perhaps, his 
dream of western empire. lOs Thucydides echoes a similar sentiment in 415, when 
Alcibiades is described as desiring to conquer first Sicily and then Carthage.106 
Thucydides' own statement is reinforced (naturally by himself) during the debate at 
Syracuse when the Syracusans were contemplating which states they should approach 
for aid.107 First, they name the Sicels, then the Italian Greeks, and then Carthage, as 
according to Thucydides, it was next in line for a possible Athenian attack. The final 
example of Athenian interest in Carthage is attributed to Alcibiades in Sparta 
discussing Athenian plans, and requires further discussion: 
102 From the fifth century, Greek knowledge of Carthage increases dramatically. We have already 
touched upon the presence of trade between Athens and Carthage both directly and indirectly routed 
through the Sicilian Greeks. Carthage became an important political entity to the Greeks following its 
attempt to capture Sicily under Harnilcar in 480. This is best attested during the fourth century by 
Aristotle's insightful description of the Carthaginian constitution. By the second half of the fifth 
century we may assume that Athens was in contact with Carthage, however, the extent of its 
knowledge of the latter remains unclear to us. 
103 Eq. Ll.1303-4, <paO'tV ahct8ai 'tty' ~Ilrov h:a'tov es KapXllOOva, uvopa 1l0X811pOV 1tOXhllV 6~ivllV 
'Y 1tEpPOXOV. 
104 Per. XXI. 1 , 'aXX' 6 IIEpucXllS Ka'tctXE 't~v eKopoll~v 'ta{)'tllv Kat 1tEptEK01t'tE 't~V 
1toXU1tpaYIl0<JuvllV Kat 'ta 1tXEt<J'ta 'tllS ouveXllEroe; ihpE1tEV de; <puXa~v Kat PEpato'tll'ta 'trov 
{:mapxov'trov. 
105 Per. XX.3. 
106 VI. 15.2. 
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We sailed to Sicily first, ifwe were able, to conquer the Sicilians, and after them, the 
Hellenes in Italy; then we intended to attack the Carthaginian Empire and Carthage 
herself108 
Alcibiades' supposed overview of Athenian plans in the West seems familiar. 
It appears that whenever the Athenians looked at Carthage, it was always on the end 
of a list of areas to conquer in the West. Plutarch places Tyrrhenia and Carthage 
together as possible western areas of conquest. These two states (Carthage and 
Etruria) are the same areas to which the Athenians, perhaps deceitfully, sent 
delegations preceding their attack on Syracuse. Otherwise Carthage is mentioned after 
the Sicilian Greeks, the Sicilians, and the Italian Greeks. It is possible that Plutarch 
and Thucydides are simply grouping different peoples and areas in a natural 
progression for Athenian conquest. However, it is also possible that the Athenians, 
buoyed by their recent success, did not realise the exact nature and extent of Carthage 
and its empire. It seems unusual that Carthage is simply mentioned as another city and 
territory to defeat. If the Athenians were aware of its actual size and empire, they may 
have thought differently, or at least mentioned it in more realistic detail. It is truly 
difficult to gauge Athenian and therefore eastern Greek knowledge of Carthaginian 
territory. Like the Phoenicians before them, the Carthaginians excluded any Greek 
traffic from areas under their exclusive controL However, trade and contact which 
existed between Greeks and Carthaginians would presumably familiarise both with 
each other. We probably should assume that the Athenians were reasonably 
knowledgeable about Carthage and its territory during the fifth century. However, 
their plans for a confrontation with the latter died alongside so many Athenians in the 
quarries of Syracuse. 
Even though it may seem that Athens and Carthage were potential enemies, 
they both shared the same rival at the end of the fifth century: Syracuse. There is 
some evidence to suggest that both states were at least in diplomatic contact during 
this period. Apparently during the Athenian siege of Syracuse in 415/4, the Athenians 
sent delegations to Carthage and another to Tyrrhenia for aid, although Thucydides 
107 VI.34.1-2. 
108 VI.90.2, E1tA,€ucralL€v E';; Il"K€A,laV 1tprotOV JlEV d ouvatJl€8a It"K€A,lc:Ota.;; Katacrtp€\jfOJl€VOl Jl€'tu 
0' BKEtVOU';; aMt.;; Kat 'ItaA,lc:OtW;; E1t€l't'a "Kat 'tf\.;; KapXTJooVtrov O:pxf\.;; "Kal au'trov O:1to1t€lpacrov't€.;;. 
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does not comment on any possible replies. 109 The Athenians kept their alleged greater 
plans a secret for the time being, as they were eager to gain assistance from two states 
which presumably had a known enemy in Syracuse. It would seem likely that 
Carthage especially did not wish to aid the Athenians even in what seemed an 
excellent opportunity to join forces and destroy Syracuse. This is further emphasised 
only a few years later when Carthage launched its own invasion of Sicily. This 
coincides with a further possible example of diplomacy between Carthage and Athens 
in the form of a fragmentary inscription excavated from Athens and dated to the final 
years of the fifth century. This inscription states that an Athenian delegation was sent 
to the Carthaginian forces under Hannibal and Himilco in Sicily in 406.110 The nature 
of this inscription is not overly clear, but we may assume that during this period with 
Athens faring poorly in the Peloponnesian War, it would be eager to support the entry 
of any third party against one of its own enemies. That this delegation was sent with 
official Athenian consent implies that it was a well-planned expedition with hopes of 
success. However, the presence of Athenian envoys is not mentioned in the 
corresponding section of Diodorus' account of the Carthaginian invasion of Sicily.l11 
The fact that there is no evidence of any Carthaginian action in Greece (or even desire 
for it) suggests that the Carthaginians preferred to omit states such as Athens from 
their possible strategies. Either way, like the Athenians before them, the Carthaginians 
were also defeated outside Syracuse. 
The increase of Greek mercenaries in Carthaginian armies may also have been 
a decisive factor in diffusing knowledge of Carthage to mainland Greece. ll2 From the 
fourth century we find an ever-increasing number of mercenaries used in Carthaginian 
armies. H3 The first use of Greeks actually fighting for Carthage probably came during 
the fifth century in the invasions of Sicily by Hamilcar and Hannibal. However, the 
first definite example is during the siege of Motya in 396. 114 According to Plutarch, 
Gisco commanded Greek mercenaries when he campaigned against Timoleon in 
109 V188.6. 
110 JG2• 147; also see Benjamin D. Meritt. "Athens and Carthage", Harvard Studies in Classical 
Philology, Supp. Vol. 1,1940, pp.247-253. 
111 XIII. 80. 
112 For an overview of Greek mercenaries fighting in Carthaginian armies see Ameling, Karthago, 
pp.218-220. 
113 Foreign soldiers, presumably mercenaries, are first evident in Carthaginian forces during the second 
Carthaginian invasion of Sicily under Hannibal in 409 (Diod. XII154-62). 
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338.115 Apparently, although an untested force, the Carthaginians were aware that 
Greek soldiers were the best fighters in the world. 116 It is interesting that Greeks often 
comprised considerable parts of Carthaginian armies, especially during the Punic 
Wars, frequently serving as officers. On occasion these Greeks were responsible for 
warding off disaster from the Carthaginians. An example of such comes during the 
Roman siege of Lilybaeum of 250. According to Polybius, some 10000 mercenaries 
comprised of Celts and Greeks were prepared to hand the besieged town over to the 
Romans.ll7 This plot was discovered by Alexon, an Achaean, who reported it to the 
Carthaginian commander, and the city was saved. The Carthaginian victory over 
Regulus in 255 was also thanks to a Greek. On this occasion it was the Spartan 
commander Xanthippus who led the demoralised Carthaginian army to victory.118 The 
interesting aspect of Xanthippus' presence in Carthage is that Polybius claims that he 
was present among a large body of Greek soldiers brought from Greece by a 
Carthaginian recruiting officer. 119 This suggests that Carthage was actively hiring 
mercenaries from the Greek mainland and by the third century was actively scouring 
such states as Sparta for willing manpower.120 The Carthaginian use of Greek 
mercenaries implies a closer tie between Carthage and Greece. For the first time 
outside the spheres of trade and possibly diplomacy, we are aware of Greeks spending 
considerable amounts of time in and around Carthage and its empire before returning 
home, and likewise for Carthaginians in Greece.121 
114 After the defeat the Greeks who sided with the Carthaginians and their leader, Da'imenes, were 
crucified (Diod. XIV.S3.4). The text is unclear whether or not these Greeks were mercenaries, or in fact 
from towns allied to Carthage on Sicily. 
115 Tim. XXX.2-3. 
116 The exact origin of these mercenaries is unknown. It is possible they came from mainland Greece, 
however, it is more likely that they were of western origin. 
117 1.42-43. 
118 Polyb. 1.32-36. 
1191.32. 
120 Picard, Carthage, p.204, has suggested that the Punic government avoided hiring Greek mercenaries 
in preference of cheaper labour from less developed peoples such as the Spaniards and Celts in order to 
avoid such incidents as that at Lilybaeum and during the Mercenary War. The constant presence of 
such peoples in Carthaginian armies during the fourth and third centuries certainly helps justify this 
claim. However, the presence of Greeks in Carthaginian forces during this period is also obvious and 
implies that the Carthaginians were accustomed to using experienced Greek soldiery to supplement 
their numbers. 
121 The Punic Wars also gave Greek historians access to the intimate workings of Carthaginian 
government and society. Polybius, an Achaean, gained much first-hand knowledge from his travels 
including a journey to North Africa at the time of the final defeat of Carthage in the Third Punic War. 
Hannibal employed a Lacedaemon freedman, Sosylos, as the campaign historian during the Second 
Punic War. Unfortunately, his accounts are nearly lost except those which are paraphrased and 
criticised by the pro-Roman Polybius (III.20.1-S). 
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It is also likely that Carthage maintained links with Greece during the time of 
Alexander and the Hellenistic period. There is some evidence to corroborate 
speculation that Alexander was planning to turn west to conquer Carthage and its 
empire. The natural point of contact between Alexander and Carthage was the siege of 
Tyre in 332. We have already seen how the Carthaginians rescued a considerable 
amount of the civilian population from Tyre before Alexander finally captured the 
city.122 It appears that during this incident Alexander, although freeing visiting 
Carthaginian pilgrims himself, was offended by this action of Carthage.123 According 
to Curtius, Alexander was angered by the Carthaginian involvement in evacuating 
Tyre and dismissed Carthaginian ambassadors, declaring war on Carthage (albeit 
postponed). 124 Following the fall of Tyre to Alexander, his relationship with Carthage 
remains unclear. Justin provides an interesting story, telling of the Carthaginian 
Hamilcar who pretended to act as a refugee from Carthage prepared to aid Alexander 
in an expedition against Carthage.125 Hamilcar sent back information to Carthage of 
Alexander and his intentions. Unfortunately after Alexander's death, Hamilcar 
returned home and was executed, presumably for treason. One of the interesting 
aspects of this account, if there is any truth in it, is that there was a Carthaginian spy 
active in Alexander's army for almost a decade.126 Otherwise, and probably more 
believable, is Justin's description of Carthaginian concern regarding the possible 
plans of Alexander. He had captured the Carthaginian metropolis, Tyre and possibly 
made some unfriendly overtures toward Carthage itself. His conquest of the Levantine 
coast would disrupt Carthaginian traffic with the East. This is emphasised by 
Alexander's establishment of Alexandria, which Justin claims was a direct rival to 
Carthage in North Africa. Carthage's old trading partner, Egypt was now under Greek 
control and shaping up as a potential rival in trade. The uneasy feeling Carthage had 
towards Alexander and his intentions is later revealed when the Carthaginians sent a 
122 Diod. XVllA6A; Justin XI.10. 
123 According to Arrian (II.24.5), a number of Carthaginian visitors were present in Tyre. These 
individuals were on an established pilgrimage to the temple of Melqart (Diad. XX. 14). The 
Carthaginians fled into the temple for refuge. Alexander respected their position and purpose and 
granted their freedom. 
124 IVA.I8. Curtius earlier stated that Carthage was willing to help Tyre against Alexander with 
military aid but was unable owing to the war with Syracuse (IV.2.lO, IV.3.I9). 
125 Justin XXI.6. 
126 Justin claims that Hamilcar was despatched after the fall of Tyre and the establishment of 
Alexandria in Egypt early in 331 and only returned to Carthage after the death of Alexander in 323. 
213 
delegation to Alexander seeking his friendship.127 The meeting took place in 323 
when Alexander was returning to Babylon. The Carthaginians were one of several 
delegations from the Western Mediterranean, unsure about the intentions of 
Alexander now that he was master in the East. Alexander's designs on the West, 
including Carthage, are a point of conjecture. Plutarch claims that Carthage, along 
with tracts of its empire, had been slated for invasion.128 This sentiment is echoed in 
Alexander's wishes announced after his death.129 Unfortunately, although probably 
not for Carthage, Alexander's death cast any plans for the invasion of Carthage into 
the realms of speculation. 
Regardless of whether or not Alexander planned to invade Carthage or parts of 
its empire, it appears both sides were in contact at a basic diplomatic level. There is 
evidence which attests Carthaginians present with Alexander, and likewise, from his 
contacts, he presumably possessed some knowledge of Carthage and its empire. l3O 
Diplomatic relations between Macedon and Carthage seem to have continued 
after the death of Alexander and the division of his kingdom. During the Second 
Punic War we find Hannibal in direct negotiations with Philip V of Macedon in 215. 
This treaty, as preserved by Polybius, is highly official, and includes several 
stipulations. 131 It is ultimately a mutual treaty establishing friendship between the two 
states as well as both defensive and aggressive clauses. Bickerman has established 
that this oath was eastern in origin and it is likely that Hannibal was using a standard 
Phoenicio-Punic diplomatic technique which has a number of parallels in the East. l32 
The treaty itself is rather banal, but it emphasises unfamiliarity between the two 
states. There is a standard clause forbidding any underhanded ambushes or plots 
against the other party. The inclusion of this clause is not surprising, as from Philip's 
127 Arr. VII.15.4. 
128 Alex. LXVIII.1 
129 Diod. XVIII.4.4. Although this wish with several others was supposedly put before a common 
assembly by Perdiccas, they were all rejected. Another wish in this list was the construction of a trade 
route from Libya to the Pillars of Heracles with shipyards and ports constructed en route. Such a 
suggestion seems unlikely if Alexander knew of the routes already in place in the area and run mostly 
by Carthage. It is possible, if there is any truth in this account, that Alexander wanted to construct a 
new and systematised route which he (or his successors) could control, rather than simply adopting the 
existing system. 
130 Diodorus (XIX.2.2-7) relates a story regarding the upbringing of Agathocles. Apparently his father, 
Carcinus of Rhegium asked Carthaginian envoys who were making their way to Delphi to consult the 
oracle on his behalf. Although the story is a typical Greek theme, it suggests there was a possible 
Carthaginian presence in Greece, and in particular Delphi at this time. 
131 VII.9. 
132 Elias J. Bickerman, "Hannibal's Covenant", AlP LXXIII.1, 1952, pp.1-23. 
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point of view, he would feel uneasy with Hannibal acting unchecked across the 
Adriatic Sea. If the Romans were defeated, Macedon would retain the Greek states on 
the west coast of Greece including Corcyra, Epidamnus, and Apollonia. Both parties' 
subordinate states are clearly defined, but it was only those of Philip which were 
under threat in case of a breakdown in relations with Carthage. The final part of the 
treaty states that any clause of this treaty can be removed and others added, as both 
sides may mutually desire.133 Such a statement is designed in case of any later change 
of circumstance. The treaty retains a distinctive tone of unfamiliarity and distrust 
between Macedon and Carthage in diplomatic channels, suggesting that neither side 
was inherently comfortable with the other. It seems likely that neither state would 
have pursued any diplomatic relationship in the absence of Rome. 
The same can be said regarding Epirus. Although situated on the Adriatic 
coast and a possible destination for trade, there appears to have been no physical 
contact between Carthage and Epirus during peacetime. The only obvious literary 
connection we have is that of a proposed treaty between Pyrrhus and Carthage during 
the first quarter of the third century.134 The Carthaginians apparently were quite eager 
for peace and accordingly were willing to provide money and ships. Pyrrhus, 
however, buoyed by his success, refused, stating that a peace would be considered 
only if the Carthaginians withdrew from Sicily completely and established the Libyan 
Sea as the natural border between themselves and the Greeks. Naturally the 
Carthaginians demurred and hostilities ensued. The fact remains, however, that the 
only reason for any diplomatic contact between Epirus and Carthage was that Pyrrhus 
was invading Sicily, and therefore entering a sphere of Carthaginian activity; 
otherwise we may assume that no such contact would have taken place. 
SICILY AND MAGNA GRAECIA 
For Carthage and its empire, the Greeks of Sicily and, to a lesser degree, Southern 
Italy were its primary contact with Hellenism. Contact with mainland Greece or the 
Phocaeans to the west was important, but paled by comparison to that with Sicily. The 
nature of the Carthaginian presence on Sicily renders it difficult to discuss the 
133 Vn.9.17, Eav OE ooKfi l]!ltV aq>EAEtv ~ 1tpocr9dvat 1tPO~ 'tOVOE 'tOY OP1WV aq>EAOU!lEV ~ 
1tpocr9~crO!lEV ro~ (xv l]!ltV ooKfi a!lq>o'tEpOt~. 
134 Pluto Pyrr. XXm.2. 
215 
magnitude of Greek and Carthaginian trade in this area as it was so intense. It is also 
difficult to discuss relations between Greeks and Carthaginians on Sicily without 
becoming involved with the wars fought between the Sicilian Greeks and 
Carthaginians for control of the island. The presence of Greeks in Carthaginian areas 
of Sicily or likewise Carthaginians in Greek towns on the island is also constant, 
attesting a widespread social contact between the two. These relations are defined in 
the treaties between Rome and Carthage. The defined Carthaginian territory is 
described and its open nature with free ports of trade to the Romans and presumably 
other peoples, including Greeks. Since social and economic contact was obvious for 
several centuries, let us turn to the other spheres of contact. Although the Greeks and 
Carthaginians were at war in Sicily, there is evidence which shows a number of Greek 
states were allied to Carthage, maintained friendships, or had other forms of official 
contact. 
From the fifth century Carthage's main rival on Sicily was Syracuse. A 
number of costly and time-consuming wars were fought between the two in what 
could have destroyed Greek independence on the island. Because of this intense 
rivalry, both Syracuse and Carthage opened diplomatic channels as often as they went 
to war. Following the loss at Himera in 480 and that at Cumae only six years later, it 
appears that the Carthaginians were willing to sue for peace with Syracuse. Diodorus 
is vague in his dating, mentioning that peace was concluded some time before 442 
Be. 135 Thereafter Syracuse and Carthage entertained terms for peace on a regular 
basis. With the accession of Dionysius I, Carthage and Syracuse saw a constant 
renewal of hostilities. Both sides were glad to settle for peace outside Syracuse in 
405.136 Despite an unfortunate end to its campaign, Carthage controlled Selinus, 
Acragas, Himera, Gela, and Camarina as a result of the peace settlement. The 
following treaty in 392, sought by the Carthaginians, saw Carthage cede dominion 
over Tauromenium and the Siceli to Dionysius after several years of often intense 
fighting.137 Finally Carthage gained revenge against Dionysius, defeating him at 
Cronium in 383. Carthage once again made territorial gains from the peace terms 
gaining Selinus and Acragas and an indemnity of 1000 talents. 138 Dionysius II's brief 
reign saw a further peace treaty between Carthage and Syracuse in 359/8, but it was 
135 Diad. xn.26.3. 
136 XIII.114. 
137 XIV.96.3-4. 
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not to last. 139 The advent of Timo1eon in the 340's saw Carthaginian fortunes fall once 
again. After their defeat at the Crimisus River and in other campaigns, the 
Carthaginians sued for peace with Timo1eon at his base in Syracuse. l40 Once again 
Carthaginian influence shrank into the west of Sicily, this time behind the Halycus 
River. Hostilities resumed with Agathoc1es before a peace was brokered in 307 and 
again finally in 306. 141 Although this was not the end of hostilities between Syracuse 
and Carthage, it saw the end of the concerted grappling for territory on Sicily which 
had become the norm for almost two hundred years. The Syracusan-Carthaginian 
peace treaties during this period naturally follow hostilities, but concentrate on the 
acquisition of territory. When necessary, both sides were willing to employ diplomacy 
throughout this period and presumably, it became a familiar part of their relationship. 
There is some evidence suggesting that at various times, Syracuse, or at least 
its various political factions had Carthaginian connections. Dion apparently had such 
a relationship with the Carthaginian representative in Acragas in 357/6.142 Otherwise 
during the reign of Agathoc1es we find Sostratus and a proportion of the ruling 
oligarchy ally themselves to Carthage after being forced from Syracuse.143 Carthage, 
as we have seen, maintained an active presence on Sicily and presumably was a viable 
choice as an ally. It is ironic that the final alliance between Syracuse and Carthage 
was to usher in the end of Carthaginian power on Sicily. At the outbreak of the First 
Punic War, Hieron II of Syracuse sided with Carthage in an attempt to check Roman 
power around the Straits of Messina. l44 Unfortunately the combined powers of 
Syracuse and Carthage failed to stop the advance of Rome, and in the next year 
Hieron II broke his alliance with Carthage and joined Rome. 
Beyond the diplomatic sphere, it appears that Syracuse had a considerable 
Carthaginian presence at any given time. One such example was the Carthaginian 
Hanno who married a Syracusan woman and sired the general Hamilcar. 145 The very 
general who threatened all of Greek Sicily at Himera in 480 was half-Syracusan 
138 XV.17. 
139 XVI.4.2. 
140 XVI. 82.3. 
141 Xx'69.3, XX.79.S. 
142 Plut. Dian. XXV.S; Diod. XVI.9A. 
143 Diod. XIXA.3. 
144 Polyb. I.11. 
145 Hdt. Vn.166. Dynastic marriages, or at least high-profile marriages appear commonplace in 
Syracuse. Pyrrhus, the King of Epirus took the daughter of Agathoc1es, Lanassa as his wife, who bore 
him a son, Alexander. 
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himself. This connection may be evident in other centres of Greek Sicily. Herodotus 
claims that it was the pleas of Terillus of Himera and the support of Anaxilaus of 
Rhegium that convinced Hamilcar to launch his invasion of Sicily.146 It is possible that 
the Magonid dynasty had actual blood connections to some of the ruling houses in 
Greek Sicily.147 From another example, we are able to discern the important link 
between the economic and diplomatic spheres of Carthage and Syracuse. In 398, 
Dionysius of Syracuse expelled all the Carthaginians and Phoenicians in the city.148 
This apparently included a considerable number of people with both merchants and 
private citizens specifically named. This then spread to other Greek cities under the 
influence of Dionysius. The presence of a Carthaginian community in Syracuse, and 
indeed throughout any number of Greek cities on Sicily, demonstrates, in spite of 
constant conflict, that there was a strong economic connection between both powers. 
The presence of merchants in Syracuse is hardly surprising; their expulsion is 
considerable. This mention in Diodorus implies that this had not occurred previously, 
in spite of several periods of hostility. The economic relationship between the two 
states was beneficial to both parties and often continued regardless of the political 
situation, although this example was probably more the exception than the rule. 
Apart from Syracuse we find a number of Greek cities with long and varied 
relationships with Carthage. The closest of these relationships probably existed 
between Selinus and Carthage. As the furthermost Greek outpost in Western Sicily, 
Selinus became a natural point of contact between Greeks and Carthaginians. 
Therefore it was natural for the two states to maintain official contact and relations. 
The first example of such a connection took place during the Carthaginian invasion of 
480. It is interesting that Selinus actually turned its back on its fellow Greeks and 
sided with Hamilcar in Sicily.149 All the same Selinus would have felt threatened on 
the frontier of Carthaginian territory and so close to Carthage itself. This threat 
emerged during the following Carthaginian invasion of 409. Carthage sided with 
Segesta, the traditional enemy of Selinus, whereas the Selinuntians maintained a 
146 Hdt. VIl.16S. Anaxilaus was married to Terillus' daughter Cydippe. 
147 C.R. Whittaker, "Carthaginian Imperialism if the Fifth and Fourth Centuries", Imperialism in the 
Ancient World (Cambridge 1978) p.77. This is made even more probable when we consider the 
sizeable populations of Carthaginian merchants and citizens residing in a number of Greek towns. 
Presumably they would often be quite wealthy and may have commanded some influence in certain 
centres. 
148 Diod. XIV.46. 
149 XI.21.4-S. 
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treaty with Syracuse.150 The ensuing hostilities saw Hannibal sack Selinus and reduce 
it to tributary status. Even during this period we find an existing connection between a 
remnant of the Selinuntian ruling class and the Carthaginians. When bartering for 
their freedom, the Selinuntians sent a prominent citizen, Empedion as their 
spokesperson. Although ultimately unsuccessful, he along with his kinsmen were 
granted freedom and permitted to re-inhabit Selinus because of their support of 
Carthage during this period. 151 Although officially out of favour, there was an element 
in Selinus which was in contact with Carthage and supported an alliance between the 
two states. Naturally, it was this sympathetic part of the population which was re-
installed in the new pro-Carthaginian town. The existence of a pro-Carthaginian party 
or even a sizeable Carthaginian population in Selinus, as in other Greek states on 
Sicily, is attested since it was the town where Gisco, the father of Hannibal was 
exiled. 152 Apparently he lived there because of Hamilcar's defeat at Himera, but we 
may assume the family remained influential in Carthage by the appointment of his son 
as general in Sicily in 409. The relationship between Carthage and Selinus was 
maintained as we saw earlier with close contact between the two. This was only 
officially ended when Carthage physically removed the population to Lilybaeum in 
250 and razed the town to keep it from the clutches of the advancing Romans. 
It appears that a similar relationship may also have applied to Selinus' own 
colony Heracleia Minoa. During the Carthaginian brokered peace between Agathocles 
on the one hand, and Acragas, Gela, and Messana on the other, it is stated that the 
towns of Heracleia, Selinus, and Himera were to remain property of Carthage as they 
had before (Ka8ix Kat 1t POU1tll PXov). 153 This suggests that Carthage had governed 
Heracleia for a period of time in a similar manner to its metropolis, Selinus. Such an 
example is comparable to earlier precedents on Cyprus where established Phoenician 
settlements gained control of neighbouring sites and governed them as their own.154 
Following this, during the invasion of Pyrrhus, Heracleia apparently contained a 
150 XnI.43.3-7. 
151 XIII.59.1-3. 
152 XIII.43.5. 
153 XIX. 71.6-7. 
154 See Chp. I, ns.38-42 and text. 
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Carthaginian garrison. ISS This may simply be a defensive policy of the Carthaginians, 
although it attests a continual presence much like that in Selinus.1S6 
Further along the southern coast of Sicily, the Greek city of Acragas also 
maintained ties with Carthage. A prosperous town like Selinus, Acragas was also 
situated precariously close to Carthaginian territory in Western Sicily. After the fall of 
Selinus, Acragas lay on the Greek frontier with Carthaginian territory.157 Although 
possibly never allied with Carthage, Acragas maintained certain ties. The most 
obvious connection is trade. Diodorus claims that Acragas grew extremely wealthy 
from its olive trade with Carthage. 1s8 The volume of such trade must have been 
sizeable as we are later informed that the population of Acragas numbered 20000 
citizens, which grew to a reputed figure of 200000 when including resident aliens. 1s9 
Although Timaeus, whom Diodorus claims as his source, is probably exaggerating 
such a figure, it does provide an interesting image of the population of citizens and 
non-citizens in Acragas. We may assume that like Syracuse, Acragas had a resident 
Carthaginian population of some size, both private citizens and merchants. During the 
second Carthaginian invasion of Sicily, Carthage actively sought to ally itself to 
Acragas or at least to insure its neutrality rather than to attack it. l60 The Acragantines 
refused what appears to be an optimistic Carthaginian embassy. This suggests the 
existence of sympathetic individuals in the city. The main theme of the siege, in 
which Acragas was eventually defeated and plundered, was the inability of the Greek 
commanders against the Carthaginians. The feeling was that they had been 
successfully bribed by the Carthaginians to aid their attack. The Acragantines accused 
their generals, especially the Lacedaemonian commander Dexippus of treachery, even 
stoning four of them. 161 Following this, Campanian mercenaries fighting for Acragas 
were bought by Himilcar for fifteen talents and switched sides. This was finally 
compounded by the withdrawal of the remaining Acragantine generals, under 
ISS Diod. XXII. 10.2. 
156 It appears that during this period that Carthage maintained a number of garrisons in smaller Sicilian 
towns. Enna was also garrisoned during the time ofPyrrhus' invasion (Diod. XXlI.10.1). Unfortunately 
for Carthage, both Herac1eia and Enna voluntarily went over to Pyrrhus upon his arrival. See 
Whittaker, pp.72-74. It is ironic that Herac1eia Minoa was supposedly settled by the remnants of 
Dorieus' failed attempt at settling Eryx which was destroyed by the Phoenicians (likely the 
Carthaginians), Hdt. V.46.2. 
157 Diod. XIII.81.3, 'AKPO:YO:V'ttVol oE 6Ilopouv't£~ 'tn 'trov Ko:pXT\oovlCOV bnKpo:'tElq. ol£Aall~O:vov 
01t£p ~v E1t' O:1)'tOU~ 1tpo)'tO'l)~ t]~£lV 'to 'tou 1tOAEIlO'l) ~apo~. 
158 XIII. 81.4-5. 
159 XIII. 84. 3. 
160 XIII.85.1-2. 
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Dexippus (who had also apparently been bought for fifteen talents). Most of the 
population was evacuated and the town was pillaged. Although this is not certain, the 
defence of Acragas seems to have been constantly undermined. It is possible that 
there was a well-connected Carthaginian faction in the city. A Carthaginian merchant 
population would certainly aid this theory. Unlike in Syracuse, there is no account of 
the Acragantines expelling their sizeable alien population before the siege. This is 
further emphasised later when Dion arrived at Acragas in 357/6 when it was under 
Carthaginian control. Apparently he was well received by the Carthaginian 
representative, Synalos, who stored Dion's supplies ready to dispatch them. 162 It 
would appear that certain groups in Acragas, although under Carthaginian rule at the 
time, maintained diplomatic links with sympathetic people and states. For a city such 
as Acragas we may never know the full extent of its relations with Carthage. 
Although never officially allied to Carthage, it appears to have maintained strong 
social and economic ties, which become evident in several reported encounters. 
There is sporadic yet considerable evidence suggesting that Carthage 
maintained certain links with other Greek towns in Sicily. Although often separate 
and distant examples, these diplomatic ties between several Greek towns and 
Carthage suggest that such treaties were often attractive alternatives to alliances with 
such states as Syracuse. 
One of the more important towns regarding Greco-Carthaginian relations in 
Sicily was Himera. Its position on the north coast of Western Sicily also made it a 
natural frontier between Carthaginian and Greek territory. Originally the site of the 
famous victory of Gelon over the Carthaginians in 480, it bore the brunt of Hannibal's 
vengeance in 409 and was destroyed. We have already witnessed the early connection 
between Hamilcar and Terillus of Himera in 480: an alliance based on supposed 
friendship.163 The heavy toll exacted on Himera and its people in 409 presumes that 
such ties no longer protected the city much like Selinus. Although refounded by 
Carthage, Thermae was a subject state which still retained its Greek identity. It was 
often a Carthaginian tributary state until the First Punic War, alongside such states as 
Herac1eia and Selinus in the south. 164 
161 Xm.87.5. 
162 This account is mentioned by Plutarch (Dian XXV-XXVI) and Diodorus (XVI.9.4) who names the 
Carthaginian governor Paralus. 
163 Hdt. VII.165. 
164 Diod. XlX.74.7. 
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There are several smaller examples of eastern Greek Sicilian towns 
establishing diplomatic ties with Carthage. Contact between such states and Carthage 
is naturally intermittent, with Syracuse dominating the political geography and often 
the foreign policy of the area. As a result we usually find such contact in times of war. 
The war between Dionysius and Carthage was ostensibly over the autonomy of the 
Greek cities of Sicily. In 397 Carthage ruled the towns of Gela and Camarina in the 
east of the island.165 These towns, along with Himera, Acragas, and Selinus all 
supposedly welcomed the arrival of Dionysius as a liberator from Carthage. At the 
conclusion of hostilities, both eastern towns gained their autonomy, unlike others in 
the west of the island.166 It may be that Gela and Camarina were too far beyond the 
reach of Carthage to maintain much contact. This geographical distance, however, 
does not seem to have hindered other towns from seeking an alliance with the 
Carthaginians. During the invasion of Timoleon, Diodorus states that when he 
captured Entella, he executed fifteen Carthaginian sympathisers.167 The existence of 
such a group was probably characteristic in any number of Greek towns on Sicily. 
During this time the tyrant of Leontini, Hicetas actively sought an alliance with 
Carthage. According to Plutarch, Hicetas did so for fear of Timoleon' s treatment of 
other Sicilian tyrants. 168 Diodorus relates a similar story, but claims that it was 
Carthage which sent a number of embassies to Greek cities in Sicily seeking a 
treaty.169 Such a policy would have seen a relatively busy period of diplomatic traffic 
between the Greeks and Carthaginians. It would seem moderately successful 
considering that Hicetas sided with Carthage along with the tyrant of Catana.170 
Despite their portrayal in literary sources, it appears that the Carthaginians 
were not always considered invading barbarians in Sicily. On several occasions there 
are examples illustrating a number of Greek towns on Sicily were willing to ally 
themselves to Carthage under no real threat of impending danger. This is best 
demonstrated by a number of towns deserting Dionysius of Syracuse to Carthage 
165 XIV,47.5. 
166XV.17.5. 
167 XV173.2. 
168 Tim. XXX.2. 
169 XVI. 67.1. 
170 There is a dispute in our two sources as to whether or not Hicetas sided with Carthage before Gisco 
set sail from Carthage. Plutarch claims that the alliance was settled before the invasion. Either way it 
would suggest that both parties were becoming increasingly wary of Timoleon in Sicily. 
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during peacetime in 399.171 There was no threat of an impending Carthaginian 
invasion to force these Greeks begrudgingly to side with Carthage. Although it may 
seem from a number of examples that the threat of war was the motivating factor 
behind such alliances, it was not always the case.172 It appears that Carthage was not 
always despised as an aggressive non-Greek entity on Sicily. Instead on a number of 
occasions, it was an attractive ally to possess, one which brought security and possible 
economic benefits. 
Departing from Sicily, there is evidence, albeit limited, of Carthaginian 
political contact with the Greek states of Italy. Ultimately Italy was beyond the 
Carthaginian political sphere, however, there is evidence of some contact between the 
two. Again, trade would have provided the major point of Carthaginian contact 
(passing several prominent Greek colonies) to Etruria and to the north. Beyond this 
activity there is little evidence for active political discourse between the two peoples, 
except in time of war. 
Our earliest association once again survives in Herodotus. In 480 the tyrant of 
Rhegium, Anaxilaus offered his support to the Carthaginian invasion owing to his 
connections with the Carthaginians and his marriage to the daughter of another ally, 
Terillus of Himera. The general sense of Herodotus' description implies a noticeable 
degree of diplomatic intimacy between the three states, at least during the rule of the 
tyrants. A century later we find Carthage actively courting the support of the Italian 
Greeks against Dionysius of Syracuse.173 Although non-specific as to which Greek 
states were involved, it appears that it was a considerable contingent, forcing 
Dionysius to split his defensive policy to counter both Phoenicians (i.e. 
Carthaginians) and the Italian Greeks to the north. Although Mago was killed in the 
initial defeat, Carthage gained moderate success from this brief war. Shortly after this 
the Carthaginians attempted to rally further support in Southern Italy against 
Dionysius. After the latter had captured and expelled the citizens of Hipponium in 
Bruttium, the Carthaginians later retook the settlement and restored the exiled 
population presumably to build support in the area.174 This small example suggests the 
171 Diad. XVI.40.1. 
172 There are a number of examples of Carthage canvassing Greek support before invasions of Sicily. 
This is evident from Carthage's alliances with Selinlls and Anaxilalls of Rhegillm in 480 as well as 
from Carthaginian embassies to several Greek states during the invasion of Timoleon. For more 
information regarding some of these examples on Sicily during this period see Chp. VII. 
173 Diad. XV.lS.2. 
174 Diad. XV.24.1. 
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Carthaginians considered areas of Southern Italy as potential allied states and were 
sometimes willing to negotiate terms of alliance. 
The best examples of the Italian Greeks and Carthaginians in active political 
and diplomatic discourse naturally come during the latter's most intense period of 
interest in South Italy, the Second Punic War. Hannibal's invasion saw, for the first 
time, an official Carthaginian military presence on Italian soil over a long period. No 
longer with Sicily and Sardinia as Carthaginian bases of operations, Hannibal needed 
to divide Roman Italy and to rally support for his invasion: this made the Italian 
Greeks the prime candidates for alliance. It is ironic that in one respect Hannibal at 
the head of a Carthaginian army would appear as a possible liberator for the Italian 
Greeks, considering that for over two centuries the autonomy of Greek cities on Sicily 
from Carthaginian rule had been the ostensible reason for numerous conflicts. Several 
prominent Greek cities welcomed Hannibal, with some remaining loyal Carthaginian 
supporters for several years. Hannibal's presence in Southern Italy induced Greek (as 
well as Italian and Etruscan) towns to defect to Carthage. The Greek states of Locri, 
Taras, Metapontum, Thurii, Heracleia, and Croton all defected to Hannibal providing 
him a strategic monopoly of access to the Gulf of Taranto and to the south.175 These 
defections were not simply limited to passive alliances. Hannibal treasured the 
strategic alliances with these towns and on several occasions moved entire 
populations to ensure loyalty or to protect them from Roman attacks. 176 In many 
respects these alliances served both Greeks and Carthaginians. Hannibal needed 
strategic allies to assist him against Rome and the Greeks ensured their own 
immediate safety through Hannibal's goodwill and saw his presence as a possible 
method of regaining their independence. 
The absence of political and diplomatic relations between the Italian Greeks 
and the Carthaginians during the earlier period is natural as both parties were beyond 
the boundaries of the other's interests. During the fifth and fourth centuries, Carthage 
and the Sicilian Greeks battled for dominion over Sicily. Only on the odd occasion 
did the Italian Greeks become involved. Later, the presence of a unique and 
substantial Carthaginian invasion in Italy brought diplomatic ties closer to their 
doorstep. However, only during times of war do we find active diplomacy between 
175 Livy XXII. 61 , XXV.15. 
176 See Chp. IV, ns.l3-21 and text. 
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the Greeks in Italy and the Carthaginians. As a result any connection beyond trade is 
sporadic and dependent on political developments abroad. 
AFRICA 
A poorly attested region of Carthaginian activity was the general area to the south of 
Carthage: the arid North African interior. Large tracts of this region are desert and 
mountainous, and being beyond the means and interest of contemporary Greek and 
Roman sources, we are left with little substantial evidence of Carthaginian activity in 
the area. Nevertheless, there is an obvious window of opportunity for trade with the 
interior which both Phoenicians and Carthaginians would have pursued. It may seem 
unusual for Carthage to depart from its highly successful maritime trade to explore 
interior trade routes, however, the interior of North Africa offered contact with a 
number of tribes and an interior route to Egypt. Like the Phoenicio-Punic system of 
networked trade, the desert routes were dotted with oases and native villages offering 
caravans intermittent 'harbours' en route. Also, the Phoenicians, who probably 
established such a trade route, were accustomed to using land routes in the East. There 
were obvious economic attractions from various sources in the desert and the astute 
Carthaginians were willing to capitalise upon them. 
The geography of the North African hinterland beyond the coastal areas is 
primarily dominated by desert and mountainous terrain. Despite the inhospitable 
conditions, there existed a network of settlements, which Herodotus, describes as 
stretching from Thebes in Egypt to the Pillars of Heracles. 177 These so called 'chariot 
routes' of the interior seem to head generally west and south incorporating a number 
of named tribes, which are difficult to identify and locate. 178 It is possible, although 
not proven, that such routes reached into the interior as far as Lake Chad at one point 
and the River Niger at another. It is possible that several regional routes controlled by 
different groups comprised these general routes as a whole. Nevertheless, Herodotus' 
description suggests the existence of active interior trade lanes stretching from Egypt, 
177 Hdt. IV.181-18S. Although Herodotus does not attest an active caravan route along the North 
African interior he does mention that oases were dotted in intervals of ten days' travel. He also lists 
several of the major native groups, which we know were active traders to the east of Carthage. 
178 For an overview of these routes and several possible identifications see R.C.C. Law, "The 
Garamantes and Trans-Saharan Enterprise in Classical Times", Journal of African History VIII.2, 
1967, pp.181-186. 
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then through Libya, before generally heading southwest.179 Much of the Carthaginian 
trade along the Trans-Saharan routes was to the east and to the south. The northern 
location of Carthage and the paucity of mountain passes directly to its south pushed 
the main Carthaginian centres of contact with the desert east, such as Leptis Magna, 
Oea, and Sabratha.180 Their general location removed several hundred kilometres' 
distance and placed them closer to the major passes to the south and naturally closer 
to their trading partners. If we return to Herodotus, who remains the most insightful 
ancient geographer of the region, we find a detailed, if often colourful account of it 
and its peoples. 181 For our interest, however, he demonstrates that there was a well 
established trade route by the fifth century. Herodotus was certainly gleaning his 
evidence from the Greeks in the region, concentrated around Cyrene. Greek interest in 
the area would have provided them with a good knowledge of the trade routes in the 
area, as the Cyrenaeans were probably accustomed to trading there themselves. 
Although Herodotus does not mention Phoenician or Carthaginian activity in the area, 
his account is by no means complete. We should remember that the climate of the 
region during the first millennium BC would have been less arid with higher moisture 
levels resulting in smaller desert areas than exist today.182 This is possibly suggested 
by the fanciful account of a Carthaginian named Mago who apparently crossed the 
desert three times only eating dry food and not taking a drink 183 Presumably this was 
on three separate occasions. This account seems unlikely if we assume the desert to be 
the Sahara. If that desert had been smaller than at present, the feat becomes more 
feasible. Still it is possible that the desert referred to was only a specific section of the 
Sahara and not its whole distance, i.e. across a certain stretch of desert such as 
journeying to the Fezzan or between two oases or settlements such as those attested 
by Herodotus. Perhaps it is best to reject the image of an unbroken interior route 
179 A similar universal trade route, although maritime, is later suggested by Diodorns (XVllI.4.4) when 
reporting the list of projects Alexander hoped to complete. This route was to be constructed with ports 
and shipyards from Alexandria to the Pillars of Heracles. 
180 The only ancient evidence we have of an attempt to cross the Atlas Mountains survives in Pliny 
(V.14-15). Suetonius Paulinus (Cos. 66 AD) advanced south across the Atlas range and into the Sahara. 
Judging from the tone of the account the journey was difficult; Paulinus' party was forced to traverse 
snowy peaks before descending into an uninhabitable desert. 
181 Hdt. IV.186ff. 
182 e.g. Sharon E. Nicholson, "Saharan Climates in Historic Times", The Sahara and the Nile, Martin 
A.J. Williams and Hugues Faure (eds.), (Rotterdam 1980) pp.173-175. Studies have shown that the 
Saharan region, including East Africa was 'considerably wetter' around five or four thousand years 
ago. From this period, a general trend toward its current climate has progressed. Between ca. 1000-150 
BC, the Sahara was not as large as in present times. 
183 Athen. Deip. II.44.d. 
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stretching from Egypt to the Atlantic as implied by Herodotus. It seems more likely 
that such a route was comprised of separate smaller routes operated by several groups 
of people. 
The Trans-Saharan route to the south appears to have been an attractive area 
for Carthaginian trade. Although our evidence grows increasingly scarce as we travel 
south, it is likely that traffic extended at least to the territory of the Garamantes and 
possibly further to the region of Lake Chad and the Boe1e Depression. It is even 
possible that Phoenician and Carthaginian trade reached the areas of Timbuktu or the 
River Niger. 184 Such a trade route is not inconceivable when we consider Carthaginian 
interests along a similar latitude along the west coast of Africa. It is also possible 
given the Carthaginian use of intermediary groups for trade in North Africa. We have 
witnessed the importance of and effort behind Hanno's periplus of the fifth century. 
The design of such a journey was to establish a trade network on the Atlantic coast of 
Morocco. However, having achieved this, Hanno continued south exploring new 
lands for possible settlement and trade. This brought a Carthaginian presence to 
coastal equatorial Africa. Carthage was surely attracted by a number of resources in 
the area and was possibly hoping to settle there. It is possible, on the assumption of 
further exploration of the interior, that a route linking the interior route with the sea 
could have been established in Nigeria. Unfortunately, without further evidence we 
are unable to establish certain Carthaginian activity, if any, in what is an enormous 
area. 
Several interior trade routes in North Africa can, however, be located with 
some certainty. We already know of the importance of Egypt in Carthaginian trade 
and its influence on Carthaginian culture. The Ammonioi described by Herodotus are 
presumably located at Siwah and are the first group en route from Thebes and the 
natural connection with Egypt,185 From interior centres such as Siwah, the 
Carthaginians, either through their own caravans, or possibly tribal intermediaries 
were able to maintain routes to the east largely unaffected by the political climate of 
the Mediterranean. Beyond our scant archaeological evidence there is some literary 
evidence suggesting a tradition of contact between the Carthaginians and Siwah. 
Apparently Hannibal visited the oracle and learnt that he would be buried in his native 
184 Soren et al., p.78. 
185 Hdt. IV.182.1. 
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land. 186 Whether true or not, such a claim connects the Carthaginian Hannibal with the 
oracle at Siwah and suggests a degree of familiarity. There is a more poetic allusion, 
suggesting that when Virgil has Aeneas arriving at Carthage, he spoils a possible 
marriage between Elissa and Hiarbus, the supposed son of Ammon and the nymph 
Garamantes. 187 The god worshipped at Siwah, after all, was Ammon. There are 
several layers of etymology and forced aetiology present in this myth, but the general 
connection between Carthage, Siwah, and intermediary tribes is presupposed. The 
limited literary tradition automatically connects Siwah with Carthage. This may 
simply be a geographic inference or possibly a more knowledgeable one based on 
established trade and traffic between the two sites. 
The best way the Carthaginians were able to maintain long interior trade 
routes was through their use of intermediary peoples. Along the North African coast 
and in the interior there are several tribes, which benefited themselves and Carthage 
by maintaining trade through their respective territories. Some of these interior tribes 
apparently maintained close economic ties with Carthage. The Macae were an 
important ally of Carthage on their eastern border. It was with their help that the 
Carthaginians were able to repel the attempt of Dorieus to establish the colony of 
Cinyps somewhere in the vicinity of Leptis Magna. 188 The Macae would have been 
the first important tribe to the south or east. A good relationship with Carthage is 
understandable and certainly would have promoted trade in the area. 
The N assamones, who dwelt to the east of the Macae, were also an important 
tribe along the Saharan trade routes. Herodotus relates an anecdote of some 
Cyrenaeans visiting the oracle at Siwah. They claim that several young Nassamonian 
men attempted to explore the Sahara to the south. 189 Despite being kidnapped by 
pygmies, they returned to retell their story, which Herodotus preserved. Heading 
south they ventured west until they were carried off through a great marsh until they 
reached a large river which flowed from west to east. It is possible that this 
description is of the River Niger. If trade routes reached as far south as Lake Chad, 
the men may have travelled along several of them. Otherwise the story is useful, as 
not only does it describe a connection and familiarity between the Ammonioi (located 
in Siwah) and the Nassamones to the west, but some supposed knowledge of the 
186 Diod. XXV. 19, Aipucrcm Kp\:nvEt P&A.Oc; 'Avvipa OEf.lac;. 
187 Aen. IV.198-199; H.W. Parke, The Oracles a/Zeus (Oxford 1967) p.243. 
188 Hdt. V,42. 
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territory of the Sub-Sahara. It is likely that the Nassamones, like the Macae, both 
acted as intermediaries along such trade routes and traded with Carthage. 
One of the more important tribes in the region was the Garamantes. They were 
located to the south of Leptis Magna and dominated a large and important stretch of 
territory in the North African hinterland with important trade routes. From our limited 
accounts, it appears that they were relatively civilised compared to their neighbouring 
tribes with a capital Garama, chariots, personal grooming including tattoos, and 
ostrich skin shields.190 The paths of the southern and eastern trade routes would 
certainly have made the Garamantes an important tribe. They have been hailed as the 
'middle-men' of the trade route with good reason. l9l One of the main commodities 
traded with the Garamantes were precious carbuncle stones. This trade between the 
former and Carthage must have been considerable as the land of the Garamantes is 
described as the source of Carthaginian stones, i.e. carbuncles. 192 Later sources also 
suggest a Carthaginian connection with the Garamantes. Silius Italicus mentions a 
contingent of Garamantes in the Carthaginian army.193 Both Sallust and Pliny describe 
their huts as mapalia, a Punic word describing a specific type of mud hut in North 
Africa.194 As we have seen, it is natural for a state such as Carthage to influence its 
neighbours, especially those not as highly developed. 
The nature of Phoenicio-Punic trade with the Sahara and beyond is often 
difficult to pinpoint owing to the nature of the goods being traded. Trade with regions 
such as Egypt is attested by the amount of material remains scattered throughout 
Carthage and its territories. Carthaginian activity in such areas is not well attested by 
archaeological remains possibly owing to the nature of the commodities which they 
were exporting. A similar problem affects discussion of Carthaginian trade with the 
Sub-Sahara. We may assume that Carthage traded for raw materials and precious 
items which leave little discernible trace. Likewise, there is little evidence of Punic 
189 Hdt. n.32. 
190 Hdt. IV.174-l75; Pliny NH. V.36. There is evidence of chariots depicted in rock art on two routes: 
one travelling north-south and another east-west suggesting two distinctive travel routes. See Law, 
pp.18l-l82. 
191 Soren et at. p.77; Law p.l87. The Garamantes controlled the important middle ground of both trade 
routes and thus became an indispensable participant in any trade in the area. 
192 Strabo xvn.3.l9. 
193 Pun. III.313-3l4. 
194 The term magalia is the Punic root form of the more common Latin mapalia. Both forms 
specifically describe a type of North African hut. The term magalia is used twice by Virgil in the 
Aeneid (lV.42l, 259) and once by Livy (XLI.27.l2). The Latin mapalia is employed by Virgil (G. 
III.340), Sallust (lug. XVIII.8), and Tacitus (Hist. IV.50), and several other sources. 
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remains in the Sub-Sahara which demonstrates open trade between the two regions. 195 
The only hint of more developed goods being traded with native African tribes points 
further to the west. Pseudo-Scylax claims that the Phoenicians traded Attic pottery, 
Egyptian stone, and perfume with the Ethiopians for wine, hides, and ivory from their 
island base of Cerne. 196 As yet, there is no further archaeological evidence proving 
such trade existed. 
There appear to have been several major exports from the Sub-Sahara which 
Carthage actively traded, either itself, or more likely through intermediary tribes. 
Presumably ivory was a major commodity as a luxury item in the Greek and Roman 
worlds and Carthage as the main power in Africa was able to benefit from such trade. 
Further animal products such as skins may also have attracted Carthaginian interest. 
Another export may have been manpower. Black slaves were present in Carthage and 
possibly certain groups served as contingents in various Carthaginian armies. The 
Sub-Saharan trade also transported precious stones to Carthage including carbuncles 
(possibly garnets). To a lesser extent chalcedony, which would have fetched high 
prices throughout the Mediterranean. Carbuncles themselves were obviously an 
important part of trade in the area as Pliny and several other authors refer to these as 
'Carthaginian stones'.197 One of the other more valuable commodities traded in West 
Africa was gold. Herodotus and Palaiphatos both comment on the existence of West 
African gold, and the former describes a gold trade active between the Carthaginians 
and the Libyans living 'beyond the Pillars of Heracles' .198 There is no contemporary 
evidence proving that there was a Saharan gold route, which certainly existed during 
later periods.199 Although these two examples are located on the coast, it is possible 
that a secondary gold trade existed in the interior. Several commodities traded in the 
Trans-Saharan routes were in high demand among Greeks and Romans. By 
developing several possible routes and using intermediary groups Carthage benefited 
from acquiring such items despite the arduous journeys required into the Sahara and 
possibly beyond.2°O 
195 Law, p.187. 
196 GGM. 1. 112, pp.93-94 (ed. Muller). 
197 Pliny XXXVII.92; Strabo, XVII.3.19. 
198 Hdt. IV.196; Palaiphatos (F. 31) claims that the inhabitants of the West African island of Cerne were 
wealthy in gold. 
199 See Law, pp.188-190. 
200 For aspects of Carthaginian trade in the Sub-Sahara and later into the Roman and Moorish periods 
see E.W. Bovill, The Golden Trade of the Moors (London 1958). 
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BEYOND THE PILLARS OF HERACLES 
The Phoenicio-Punic monopoly in the West meant that the Atlantic regions beyond 
the Pillars of Heracles remained largely unknown to both Greeks and Romans alike. 
As a result, estimating the extent of exploration beyond the Mediterranean in antiquity 
is fraught with problems. This is of particular interest to this discussion considering 
the Phoenicians, followed by the Carthaginians, were probably the first Mediterranean 
people to travel extensively in this area of the Atlantic. The nature of the 
Carthaginians' restrictions on Greek and Roman traffic has certainly limited our 
knowledge of their involvement in areas beyond the Pillars of Heracles. Nevertheless, 
it appears that the Carthaginians, like the Phoenicians before them, were active in 
several important areas in the Atlantic beyond the reach of their competitors. 
We have already looked at Carthaginian involvement in Atlantic Africa in 
some detail. The Phoenicians actively settled the area with important sites such as 
Lixus and Mogador. Carthage also expressed obvious interest in the area as the 
voyage of Hanno testifies. The Carthaginians settled a number of sites along the 
Atlantic coast, establishing a trade network of settlements facilitating coastal sea-
borne trade while enabling Carthage to trade with the native populations in the 
interior. The heaviest traffic and settlement, as Hanno's account and archaeological 
evidence suggest, was along the west coast of Morocco. 201 Nevertheless, we have seen 
exploration and possible trade stretching as far south as Senegal, Ghana, or possibly 
Cameroon. 
Other areas of possible Phoenicio-Punic contact were the Atlantic islands off 
the West African coast: namely the Canaries and the Madeira Islands, as well as 
several other possible groups. 
The main group of islands which both Phoenicians and Carthaginians were 
likely to come in contact with were the Canaries. Sea-borne traffic along the 
Moroccan coast would certainly have spotted the islands, which at their most easterly 
point, Fuerteventura, lie only one hundred kilometres off the coast. Unfortunately no 
certain archaeological evidence attests any Carthaginian settlement. It was only under 
Juba II during the first century that the islands were more fully explored and exposed 
201 See Ch. III regarding the periplus of Hanno, other literary examples, and archaeological remains. 
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to those in the Mediterranean.202 Any Phoenician and/or Carthaginian settlement on 
the Canaries must have been superficial as there is no lasting evidence of any 
habitation. Juba apparently noticed remains of buildings on the island of Canaria 
(Gran Canaria).203 The only other inhabitants known on the Canaries were the 
mysterious Guanches, themselves of Berber stock. 204 This group remained in isolation 
until the thirteenth century. It is possible that the remains Juba discovered were part of 
an abandoned Phoenicio-Punic outpost. The islands did possess an excellent climate 
and various natural resources which may certainly have attracted some form of 
Phoenicio-Punic interest. 205 
The Madeira Islands may also have seen Phoenicio-Punic activity at some 
period. Once again there is no firm archaeological evidence to support permanent 
settlement. Our best evidence of Carthaginian contact is a story, probably by Timaeus 
and preserved in Diodorus. He transcribes a relatively lengthy account of a 
Carthaginian (he states Phoenician) ship blown off course from the Pillars of 
Heracles. For many days it travelled west into the Atlantic until reaching an island 
which, with the exception of navigable rivers which Diodorus claims existed there, 
resembles the island of Madeira.206 Apparently the Tyrrhenians wished to establish a 
colony on the island, however, they were refused access by their Carthaginian allies 
owing to the utopian image and prosperity of the island.207 A similar account is 
preserved in Pseudo-Aristotle who is presumably using the same source as 
Timaeus.208 This account also claims that the Carthaginians lived on the island and, 
observing their reputation, killed anybody who even proposed to sail there so that the 
202 Pliny VI.202-205. 
203 Pliny VI.205, apparere ibi vestigia aedificiorum. 
204 Otto Rossler, "Libyca", Wiener Zeitschriften Kunde Morgenland 49, 1942, pp.282-290. Rossler 
proved that native literary fragments discovered on the Canaries were linguistically related to 
Numidian. 
205 Two island groups south of the Canaries may have also attracted interest from the Phoenicians and 
the Carthaginians if they were active in the area. The Carthaginians may have known of the existence 
of the Cape Verde islands. Although five hundred kilometres off the West African coast, these islands 
are far enough north to suggest the possibility of discovery. It is also doubtful, but possible that the 
Carthaginians discovered the equatorial islands of Sao Tome and Principe. The former lies just over 
two hundred kilometres off the coast of Equatorial Guinea. Such a possibility depends on the lasting 
success of the discoveries of Hanno and subsequent Carthaginian activity in the Gulf of Guinea. 
Naturally neither island group has revealed any evidence suggesting Phoenicio-Punic activity, let alone 
discovery. 
206 Diod. V.20.3. 
207 V.20.4. This would suggest a date which coincides with the Etrusco-Carthaginian alliance and 
previous to the crippling defeats of Himera and Cumae which destroyed Etruscan sea-power thereafter. 
A plausible date for this anecdote could be somewhere between 525-475 BC. 
208 Mira. Ausc. 84. 
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island would not become overcrowded and spoilt. An interesting account survives in 
Plutarch's Life of Sertorius. 209 While a fugitive in Gades, Sertorius supposedly met 
two seamen who had just travelled to a group of two islands a great distance off the 
coast of Africa (/lupiou<; 0"'tcx8iou<;). The geography and description of the islands 
most likely points to the Madeira Islands. The large distance mentioned in the text 
seems an arbitrary guess. Regardless of the exact identification there is a possible 
connection between Carthage and the Madeira Islands. Sertorius was present in Gades 
in 82 BC, only about sixty years after the fall of the Carthaginian Empire, of which 
Gades had been an integral part. If any connection between the Madeira Islands had 
been established, it most likely originated from Gades. The sailors were possibly 
residents of the town with an acquired knowledge of such routes. Finally from the 
journeys of Himilco, there is a report of vast tracts of seaweed which float on the 
surface entangling ships.210 It has been supposed that this reference is to the Sargasso 
Sea, which is closer to the Madeira Islands than any other group, although it lies 
further to the south and to the west. Himilco was reputedly absent for four months, 
which is ample time to explore sizeable tracts of the Atlantic as well as the coast of 
Europe and the British Isles.211 Evidence of Phoenicio-Punic knowledge, let alone 
settlement, on the Madeira Islands, as with other Atlantic island groups remains 
largely inconclusive. However, it is possible that the Phoenicians or Carthaginians 
discovered any number of such islands on their characteristic missions of exploration 
or long-range trade. 
The areas north of the Pillars of Heracles offered both Phoenicians and 
Carthaginians new and relatively uncharted areas for exploration and trade. Although 
states such as Massilia and Emporion were accustomed to dealing with interior France 
and Spain, the west coast of Europe and the Atlantic remained mostly unreachable to 
both Greeks and Romans. Ironically, it was not until periods of weakness in 
Carthaginian naval power that traders and explorers such as Pytheas of Massilia (ca. 
300 BC) were allowed maritime access to the area. Presumably for long periods the 
209 Ser. VIII. 
210 Avienus OM. L1.122-124,plurimum inter gurgites, extarefucum et saepe virgulte vice, retinere 
pup(p)im; 408-409, exuperat autem gurgitemfucusfrequens, atque impeditor aestus hic uligine. 
211 There has been some speculation that the Carthaginians reached the Azores which lie some 1800 
km. from Europe. The supposed discovery of eight gold Punic coins on the island of Corvo in 1749 
highlights this claim which has hitherto been unsubstantiated and must remain unreliable. 
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Phoenicians and Carthaginians possessed sole knowledge of some of the lands and 
peoples of Atlantic Europe. 
The problem with any theory of Phoenicio~Punic settlement or activity along 
the European Atlantic coast is the lack of any substantial archaeological evidence. 
There are no settlements attested north of modern day Lisbon in Southern Portugal. 
This does not discount the existence of hitherto undiscovered or unknown settlements 
along the Atlantic coast. A vienus claims that inhabitants of Carthage once dwelt in 
villages and towns on the European side of the Pillars of Heracles.212 Gades would 
qualify as one of these towns along with several other smaller settlements in the 
vicinity. The text is vague as to how many of these existed along the west coast of 
Spain and Portugal. What seems more likely, however, is that any possible 
settlements would have been temporary shipping ports which often leave little trace. 
Such a system and a general lack of physical evidence are symptomatic for 
Phoenician and Carthaginian coastal networks in several areas. 
There is some literary evidence of Phoenicio-Punic presence in the Atlantic 
north of the Pillars of Heracles. The most renowned, and unfortunately less detailed, 
is the account of the Carthaginian seafarer Himilco. Although only alluded to by Pliny 
and in A vienus, it appears that Carthage launched a mission of exploration into the 
North Atlantic probably during the first half of the fifth century.213 We have 
previously encountered anecdotes suggesting Carthaginian activity in the Atlantic. In 
his four~month journey, however, it appears that his main purpose was perhaps to 
explore the coasts of Brittany and Britain. A vienus writes of islands known as the 
Oestrymnides and their native people,z14 He claims that the Tartessians once 
conducted trade with these people, stating that they were mercantile in their thinking 
212 Ll.375-377, ultra has columnas propter Europae latus, vicos et urbis incolae Carthaginis, tenuere 
quondam. 
213 The dating of Himilco's journey is as vague as several of the other details. A date of 480 has been 
widely suggested because of Pliny's phrase: Cartilaginis potentiaJlorente (ll.169). This would predate 
the disastrous Battle of Himera. However, we have on several occasions seen the ability of Carthage to 
recover from often serious loss to recover in matter of a few years. Pliny's dating simply states "when 
Carthage was powerful". This term is naturally vague, as Carthage was continually powerful in the 
Central and Western Mediterranean for several consecutive centuries. The temporal reference of Pliny 
seems more an arbitrary statement aimed at completing a vague anecdote. This is coupled with the 
unlikely simultaneous dispatch of both Hanno and Himi1co. Presumably Himi1co would have 
commanded a sizeable expedition with a number of ships and considerable manpower. Hanno 
supposedly commanded sixty penteconters and some 30000 colonists and crew. It seems unlikely that 
even Carthage could afford to send out a second expedition after such a drain. Therefore a different 
date seems more likely for Himilco's voyage, possibly ca. 450. 
214U95, 96,113,130,154-155. 
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and that their land abounded in lead and tin.215 Apparently this island lay only two 
days sailing from the Holy Island (sacra insula, also known as the Isle of the Blest). 
A vienus claims that Carthaginians came to these seas including Himilco himself. 
Unfortunately we are left to speculate which islands A vienus is referring to with no 
conclusive evidence.216 The description of the Ligurian land is also ambiguous. 
A vienus claims that the Ligurian lands lay across from the Oestrymnides and that the 
inhabitants were driven from the coast by a band of Celts.217 Whether this refers to 
Southern Britain or coastal France is unclear. The ambiguous nature and wording of 
the text has opened several possible avenues to identify vague terms with actual 
geographicallocations.218 Regardless of their exact identity, the texts suggest that the 
Carthaginians had some presence in or at least knowledge of the general area. 
A second account provided by Strabo helps clarify Phoenicio-Punic activity in 
this area of the Atlantic. He describes a group of ten islands known as the 
Cassiterides.219 Apparently the local people wore black robes and were of tragic 
appearance, much like the Furies.22o This description is similar to Tacitus' description 
of the Druids of Anglesey in the first century.221 The islands also have deposits of tin 
and lead, with which the locals traded for basic animal, pottery, and bronze wares. 
Strabo continues by stating that the Phoenicians frequented these islands and once 
monopolised this trade based from Gades. The location of these islands is vaguely 
described as further from Spain than the south coast of England. These islands are 
again difficult to identify with any certainty. The two groups of islands in the 
immediate vicinity are the Channel Islands and the Scilly Islands. The latter of the 
two is probably the group Strabo is reporting. The geographical position is similar to 
the Scillies only about 45 km. from Land's End in Cornwall. The archipelago 
215 Ll.98-100. 
216 It is possible that the Oestrymnides was possibly Cornwall, an area known for deposits of tin and 
lead. This would suggest that Himilco mistook the coast of Cornwall for islands and therefore the Holy 
Isle could be identified as Ireland. Another possibility is that the Oestrymnides were in fact the Channel 
Islands off the coast of France. The description of a group of several islands, which lie widely apart, 
seems a better description of the Channel Islands. The alleged deposits of tin, and especially lead also 
concur with such a description. This would mean that the large Holy Island was in fact Britain, which 
could be reached in two days' sailing from Europe. 
217 Ll.129ff. 
218 See J.P. Murphy's notes to the text in Ora Maritima (Chicago 1977) pp.52-57. 
219 111.5.11,11.5.15. 
220 III.5.ll, ai O£ Ka't'tl'tEpioEe; oEKa flEV Eicrt KE'iv'tat o'eY'{ue; aAAllAffiV 1tpOe; apK'tov a1tO 'tOU 'trov 
'Ap'ta~pffiv AtflEVOe; 1tEAaytat. flia 0' atJ'toov EPl1floe; ecr'tt 'tae; 0' aAAae; OiKOUcrtV aV8pffi1tOt 
flEAaYXAatVot 1tOO~pEte; evoEoUKO'tEe; 'toue; Xt'toovae; e~fficrflEVOt 1tEpt 'ta cr'tEpva flE'ta pa~offiv 
1tEpt1ta't01)V'tEe; DflOtot 'ta'ie; 'tpaytKa'ie; I1otVa'ie;. 
221 Ann. XIV.30. 
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comprises over 150 isles and rocky outcrops, several of which are large enough for 
habitation. The only problem with the Scillies being identified as the Cassiterides is 
that they contain no stocks of lead or tin which is the main reported reason for a 
Phoenicio-Punic presence. 
It is possible that the Cassiterides and the Oestrymnides were in fact the same 
group of islands. If both groups are identified as the Scillies, then the lead and tin 
described by both A vienus and Strabo may have been transported from Southern 
Britain. The islands may have served as a depot where the Tartessians, Phoenicians, 
and Carthaginians may have traded stocks of tin and lead with Cornwall before 
transporting it south. The Phoenicians and Carthaginians were well accustomed to 
establishing offshore bases to trade with the mainland. 222 The Scillies were a perfect 
way station for trade, but also for further travel. Positioned in the west, Phoenicio-
Punic ships would not have had to sail fully around the northern peninsula of the Bay 
of Biscay and into the English Channel. The nature of such trade may have normally 
been seasonal. This may also explain the lack of evidence suggesting a Phoenician or 
Carthaginian presence on either the south coast of Britain or on the Scilly Islands 
themselves. 
The nature of Himilco' s journey north of the Pillars of Heracles poses an 
interesting question. If the Phoenicians had been trading with Britain and presumably 
several other ports along the Spanish and French Atlantic coasts, why was he 
commissioned to spend four months exploring the area? The Tartessians and then the 
Phoenicians presumably travelled the European Atlantic coast for some time before 
the rise of an independent Carthage. Himilco, presumably departing in the spring 
would have naturally faced adverse winds and sea currents travelling to the north. 
Moreover, four months is an excessive period simply to sail along a familiar coast and 
possibly to the British Isles. It is likely that his intentions were somewhat greater and 
unfortunately lost to us. It is possible Himilco explored areas of the mid-Atlantic 
during his long voyage. The same may be said about the British Isles. If Britain, 
beyond the Bristol Channel, was still unknown to Carthage, its exploration may have 
been a task of Himilco. Even if Pliny was correct in claiming his main mission was to 
explore the European coast, we do not know how far north he reached or possibly 
222 This is suggested by M. Cary and RH. Warmington, The Ancient Explorers (Baltimore 1963) pp.32-
34. The account of Pytheas describes the tin trade with Cornwall based from the small offshore island 
ofIctis, which has been identified as St. Michael's Mount off Penzance (Diod. V.22.2.4; Pliny IV. 104). 
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how far inland along several navigable rivers.223 Unfortunately our scanty sources 
leave us to speculate what Himi1co's entire mission was and how far he actually 
travelled. 
The nature of the Carthaginian Empire saw it come into contact with a number 
of peoples and areas, both developed and others virtually beyond the borders of the 
ancient world. Several of these areas became important points of contact, which 
Carthage benefited from for various reasons. Trade was a natural motivation behind 
several such areas of contact. Carthage's propensity for trade saw it interact with 
several highly developed states throughout the Mediterranean. Egypt, the Etruscans, 
the Greeks, and Rome were primary trading partners with Carthage. With the flow of 
trade, we find an increase in influence and types of contact. Such trade enabled 
Carthage to acquire commodities which were in high demand in other markets. The 
nature of this trade is of interest as material remains suggest it was one directional. It 
is possible that the types of commodities the Carthaginians were trading were less 
likely to leave a lasting impression on material remains. As a result, Punic remains are 
scarce in developed areas beyond Carthage's control, whereas trade with areas such as 
Egypt, Rome, and Greece is usually attested in Carthaginian centres alone. It is also 
interesting that trade, for the most part, endured political upheaval. There is evidence 
of constant trade with areas deemed hostile. Presumably Carthaginian merchants were 
a common sight in the harbours of Syracuse, Rome, or Massilia and a welcome 
economic occurrence, despite official enmity. This even extended to considerable 
Carthaginian populations residing in centres which we normally consider 
Carthaginian enemies. Trade was the motivating factor behind Carthaginian contact 
with areas beyond the boundaries of contemporary attention. Carthaginian trade 
spread into the Atlantic, both to the north and south as well as the Sub-Sahara. By 
creating trade routes, by both land and sea and by using local peoples as 
intermediaries for trade, Carthage was able to maintain distant trade and to obtain 
commodities, which were inaccessible, and therefore naturally in high demand in 
Mediterranean markets. 
Beyond the realms of trade, we have seen that Carthage maintained active 
diplomatic contact with several states. From often fragmentary literary evidence there 
223 11.169, sicut ad extera Europae noscenda. 
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is evidence showing Carthage was active in a number of alliances and Carthaginian 
envoys were often present in foreign states, as foreign delegates were likewise in 
Carthage. A number of treaties existed and were surely advantageous to participating 
states, as we have seen with Carthage and the Etruscans and then Rome. Others were 
more rudimentary, dealing with territory and the cessation of hostilities, as we have 
seen constantly on Sicily. It also appears that Carthage maintained a number of allied 
states, or at least sympathisers in other states. This is obvious in Sicily and Southern 
Italy, where on a number of occasions we find a number of Greek, Sicilian, and Italian 
centres supporting Carthaginian interests in the area, or at least containing a 
sympathetic party. Carthaginian diplomacy was not restricted to developed states. 
Examples from several areas under the Carthaginians' control or interest suggest that 
they often established, or at least attempted to establish, amicable links with local 
peoples. Although the Carthaginians became more aggressive toward foreign groups, 
like the Phoenicians before them, they still recognised the importance of establishing 
such ties to strengthen their influence abroad. 
Carthaginian contact with areas and peoples beyond their control was a 
natural, yet integral characteristic of their empire. Through trade, diplomacy, and 
other various points of contact, Carthage was better able to maintain its position. 
From such contact the nature of the Carthaginian Empire becomes more apparent. A 
common conception regarding Carthage is that it maintained a hardline policy with its 
neighbours, to protect its own territory. However, it appears it actively sought contact 
with other states. Although it maintained areas of exclusivity within its empire, and a 
growing tide of expansion often brought it into conflict, Carthage benefited from 
various forms of contact with a number of areas and peoples, both allied and 
ostensibly hostile. 
238 
VII. METHODS AND MOTIVES OF 
CARTHAGINIAN AGGRESSION AND EXPANSION 
We have witnessed in some detail various attempts, both successful and otherwise, of 
the Carthaginians establishing contact abroad for their own benefit. These developed 
in several forms: diplomacy, political influence, and trade for example. However, let 
us not forget the Carthaginians' proclivity for military conquest. Although this 
activity is evident throughout Carthaginian history, we have yet to discuss it as a 
specific Carthaginian activity. 
On a number of occasions, Carthage actively invaded foreign territories or 
invited conflict for its own benefit. Although the results varied, we are now able to 
discuss possible motives for separate campaigns. Carthage launched military 
campaigns for different reasons, whether it was for territory, economic gain, or 
protection of pre-established interests. With a better understanding of Carthaginian 
expansion, both by military and political means, we may now tum to conflict as a 
direct policy of empire. Naturally such a discussion precludes any conflicts beyond 
the initiative and direct control of Carthage.1 These activities were often sporadic and 
spread throughout several regions of the empire. Nevertheless, from such examples, 
specific motives behind Carthaginian campaigns as active foreign policies become 
apparent. 
EARLY CONQUEST - BUILDING THE EMPIRE 
The first period of Carthaginian expansion through military means can be dated to the 
period of 654/3 to 480 BC. The former date is the year in which Carthage founded the 
colony of Ebusus and in many respects, by completing this official and independent 
act, evolved into a developed political entity separate from its Phoenician forebears. 
The latter date excludes the disastrous campaign to Sicily which ended in the defeat at 
Himera. This early stage of Carthaginian military expansion perhaps can be defined as 
Carthage cementing its own position in its provinces and beginning to look abroad for 
further territory. Motives behind campaigns during this period may appear as simple 
1 The most obvious example of such conflict was the Third Punic War for which Carthage was not 
responsible and was certainly unwilling to initiate. Others include the invasions of Agathocles and 
Masinissa, and the revolts of the mercenaries in North Africa and the Sards in Sardinia. 
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expansion, but they do establish important precedents for later Carthaginian activity.2 
Carthage did not, like most ancient empires, need to acquire the bulk of its empire by 
conquest. The Phoenician legacy remained in several important areas in the Western 
Mediterranean. In a number of areas Carthage had been growing as the natural 
successor of the Phoenicians, and when the latter declined in the sixth century, 
Carthage assumed control as the economic and social centre of the old Phoenician 
'Empire' in the West. There was no need for Carthage to exercise its physical 
authority over separate settlements or areas, as it already was the dominant city in the 
West. 
THE GREEK ENCROACHMENTS 
The first major conflict we are aware of is that mentioned by Thucydides: the 
Carthaginian naval defeat at the hands of the Phocaeans when they were founding 
Massilia ca. 600.3 Although there is no further evidence offered by Thucydides on the 
matter, we can make several assumptions. The location of the encounter is unknown; 
presumably it was in the region of Massilia or in the Tyrrhenian Sea. The 
Carthaginians' presence in this region during this period is attested through their 
connection with the Etruscans and their growing influence in Sardinia. Therefore we 
may assume that it was the Carthaginians wishing to forbid further Greek expansion 
which caused this battle. The Phocaeans were intent on founding a new colony and 
presumably would have avoided conflict if possible. Carthage on the other hand 
wished to protect its growing interests in the Tyrrhenian Sea and surrounding areas. 
Both the Phoenicians and the Carthaginians exercised exclusive settlement in areas of 
Western Sicily, Sardinia, and the Balearic Islands. Greek settlement along the 
Southern Gallic coast could undermine Carthaginian interests in the area and was 
most likely recognised as a direct threat. 
The establishment of Massilia did not herald a period of peace between 
Carthage (and Etruria) and the Phocaean Greeks. The Battle of Alalia ca. 535 
demonstrated a similar motive for attack as was shown sixty-five years previous at the 
founding of Massilia. Herodotus specifically states that the reason behind the joint 
2 The period ending in 480 is the most poorly attested in our literary sources. Often entire military 
campaigns are covered very briefly while others, we must assume, remain entirely unknown. 
3 Thuc. 1.13.6. 
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Carthaginian-Etruscan attack was the Phocaeans' pillaging of the areas surrounding 
their settlement at Alalia.4 Presumably both Carthaginians and Etruscans would have 
felt uneasy watching the establishment of a Greek settlement on Corsica. This is 
emphasised by the apparent prosperity of Alalia, no doubt on the back of trade and 
plunder in the region. What is certain is that both the Carthaginians and Etruscans 
were eager to put a stop to any piracy or trade competition from Alalia. The Greeks 
were defeated and forced to abandon the settlement. The Carthaginians and Etruscans 
were able to resume more or less exclusive activity in the Tyrrhenian Sea.5 This 
example is similar to the later Battle of Cumae in 474. Although this battle occurred 
in the period following the first major Carthaginian invasion of Sicily in 480, it is best 
discussed alongside similar earlier examples. The Etruscans and an unknown number 
of Carthaginians were defeated by Hieron while ostensibly attempting to check Greek 
expansion in the area.6 It appears as though this earlier tactic remained active 
especially regarding the protection of exclusive rights in the area. 
The battle for control over the important trade routes between the Greeks and 
the Carthaginians extended further west. A fragment of Sosylos attests the Battle of 
Artemisium to the year 490.7 This battle most likely took place off Cape Nao in 
South-western Spain. The Carthaginians are not named as the opponents of the 
Massiliots and King Heraclides of Mylasa. The time and location implies the 
Carthaginians as the enemy during this period, as they were the only non-Greek 
power in the area capable of a naval battle.8 As we have discussed, Cape Nao is a 
natural and likely terminus for Greek settlement down the east coast of Spain. We 
may presume that this battle was a Carthaginian attempt to halt the progress of Greek 
expansion. Although they were defeated, the Carthaginians were actively attempting 
to protect their interests from the establishment and expansion of foreign rivals. 
4 Hdt. 1.166.1, Kat nyov yap 01-] Kat e<pepOV 'tOU~ 1tePlOiKOU~ a1tav'ta~ a'tpa'teuov'tat (bv E1t' a,)'tou~ 
KOtVCP 'A6ycp XPllaci/leVot Tupallvot Kat KapX1l06vlOt Vlluat EK(i'tepot E~~KoV'ta. 
5 It appears that Carthage did not actively wish to settle Corsica, however, the Etruscans did settle 
certain sites on the island (Diod. V.13.4). Nevertheless, both parties had vested interests in keeping the 
island and its surrounding sea-routes in friendly hands. The event is characteristic of Carthaginian 
policy: accepting the Etruscan presence while going to great lengths to exclude the Greeks. 
6 Pind. Pyth. 1.71-72; Schol. Pyth. I.137a (ed. Drachmann). 
7 F.Gr.Hist. 176, F.1. 
8 This fragment is followed by a second account in which Sosylos describes a later battle of 
Artemisium (presumably the same location as the first) between the Carthaginians and a combined 
force of Romans and Massiliots during the Second Punic War. It is likely that Sosylos was listing 
battles either in the area, or possibly between Carthage and the Greeks. 
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SARDINIA 
One of the major areas where Carthage sought to extend its influence during this 
period was Sardinia. Like areas of Sicily and North Africa which were settled by the 
Phoenicians, the coastal network of settlements was predisposed toward Carthaginian 
authority and most likely transferred allegiance from the Phoenicians to Carthage. The 
native Sard population seems to have posed a potential threat to Carthaginian interests 
on the island. According to Justin, Malchus conducted war on Sardinia and was 
defeated with the loss of the greater part of his army.9 This campaign was presumably 
that against the Sards during the second half of the sixth century. This seemingly 
unsuccessful campaign is followed by that of Hasdrubal, son of Mago, who was 
wounded and died on Sardinia. 10 This second campaign most likely took place during 
the last quarter of the sixth century. According to Polybius, Carthaginian Sardinia 
appears under control at the swearing of the first treaty with Rome in 509/8.11 Other 
sources hint at a successful Carthaginian outcome on Sardinia but remain vague as to 
when or how it was accomplished. 12 Our archaeological evidence also suggests a 
partially successful Carthaginian campaign in Sardinia during this period. As we have 
seen, the Carthaginians constructed a series of interior fortresses during the fifth 
century to protect its increased territory in the south and west of the island. 
It appears that the Carthaginian military intervention on Sardinia was directly 
aimed at the Sards. There is no evidence to suggest that Greeks, rival Phoenician 
settlements, or any other foreign peoples were involved. It is likely that Carthage 
assumed control over Phoenician Sardinia in a relatively peaceful manner. The 
interior Sards posed a larger threat and either because of this, or the desire to 
dominate the entire island along with its wealthy minerals, the Carthaginians launched 
a number of invasions. 
9 XVIII. 7. 1-2. 
10 Justin XIX. 1.3. 
11 111.22, Sardinia is mentioned alongside Libya as areas of Carthaginian economic supremacy. 
12 Both Diodorus (1v'29.6) and Strabo (V.2.7) claim that Carthage either fought for or was master of 
Sardinia. 
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SPAIN 
In a number of areas of the Carthaginian Empire, we are left to suppose how Carthage 
initially established its influence. Areas such as the Balearic Islands and Atlantic 
Africa were settled by means of orthodox colonisation. Parts of Sicily and North 
Africa seem to have simply been absorbed into the growing Carthaginian Empire. 
Sardinia was first assumed and then (in part at least) forcibly brought under 
Carthaginian influence. It is possible that the incorporation of Spain into the 
Carthaginian Empire was carried out differently. 
We have discussed the likelihood that Carthage assumed control over the 
Phoenician emporia in Southern Spain. Although this was probably accomplished 
peaceably, there is evidence to suggest that Carthage initially entered the area under 
arms. According to Justin, the Carthaginians were initially invited into Southern Spain 
by the inhabitants of Gades, who were under direct threat from tribes in the interior. 13 
Although Justin's chronology is unclear when discussing the history of Spain, he 
claims that the Carthaginians entered Gades under terms of kinship to aid the locals 
against the threat from the interior. 14 He simply states that the expedition was 
successful and that subsequently Carthage added the larger part of the province to its 
dominion. 15 A second account from Vitruvius implies that the Carthaginians actually 
besieged Gades and took the site by force. 16 This may suggest that Gades was at some 
13 XLIV.5. 
14 Justin mentions this account just before that of the Barcids in Spain during the third century. 
Although this suggests a later date, it seems likely that Justin remains oblivious to a major 
chronological gap. First, we know that the Carthaginian presence in Spain begins with the end of 
Phoenician influence during the first half of the sixth century. Justin also claims that the problems arose 
after the rule of the kings was at an end. The only influential monarchy in the region predating the 
Carthaginian presence was that of Tartessus. Previous to this description Justin narrates the story of 
King Habis in some detail. Therefore we may assume he is referring to the Kingdom of Tartessus 
which also collapsed during the sixth century. From this admission we may assume that Justin's events, 
if indeed factual, refer to an earlier period - i.e. long before the time of the Barcids. It also seems likely 
that after the fall of Tartessian and Phoenician influence in the area, the immediate period of confusion 
would encourage any number of Spanish tribes to attempt to attack the wealthiest and weakened 
settlement in the area: Gades. From such evidence coupled with our archaeological record, we can date 
the Carthaginian arrival in Southern Spain to the late sixth or early fifth century. 
15 XLIV.5, Post regna deinde Hispaniae primi Karthagenienses imperium provinciae occupavere. Nam 
cum Gaditani a Tyro, unde et Karthaginiensibus origo est, sacra Herculis per quietem iussi in 
Hispaniam transtulissent urbemque ibi condidissent, invidentibus incrementis novae urbis finitimis 
Hispaniae populis ac propterea Gaditanos bello lacessentibus auxilium consanguineis Karthaginienses 
misere. [bi felici expeditione et Gaditanos ab iniuria vindicaverunt et maiore iniuria partem provinciae 
imperio suo adiecerunt. 
16 De Arch. X.13.1. The possibility of a Carthaginian siege of Gades is also attested by Athenaeus 
Poliorcetus (9), see Tsirkin, "The Downfall of Tartessos and the Carthaginian Establishment on the 
Iberian Peninsula", p.148. 
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stage, probably during this period, in favour of retaining its independence and 
possibly preferred itself as an independent centre in the area. Whichever account is 
true (possibly both), it appears that initially Carthage was forced to resort to military 
means to establish itself in the area. 
Presumably with the addition of Gades, by force or other means, the 
Carthaginian desire to control the emporia, trade, and industry in Southern Spain was 
facilitated. If the Phoenician settlements in Southern Spain were incorporated into 
Carthaginian territory as a result of this military action, it certainly justifies and 
explains why it was launched. Initial Carthaginian influence in the area is difficult to 
estimate. Whether some form of military action heralded the Carthaginian presence in 
the area or Carthage simply assumed economic and cultural dominance over the 
Phoenician emporia remains unclear. 
NORTH AFRICA 
North Africa would seem the most likely candidate for Carthaginian military 
campaigning during this early period. However, Carthage's expansion into its own 
interior is traditionally viewed as contemporaneous with the establishment of the 
larger Carthaginian Empire and the development of Punic culture during the fifth 
century. Presumably Carthage encountered little difficulty in influencing and 
dominating well established Phoenician settlements in the area, as these were 
probably accustomed to dealing with Carthage as a provincial capital. It would have 
been but a small transition to Carthage's development into a fully independent capital 
based in the West. What is of interest, however, is how Carthage expanded into 
territory belonging to native peoples. In all probability the different Numidian and 
Berber tribes would not welcome the expansion of Carthaginian control in any form 
more intrusive than the occasional port. Unfortunately, we know very little of events 
during this period. It is likely that Carthage began to seize African territory by the end 
of the sixth century. There is a passage in which Justin claims that the general 
Malchus whom we have seen defeated in Sardinia in the later half of the sixth century 
was also active in North Africa prior to this. 17 It appears that Malchus was placed in 
charge of the Sardinian expedition, partially owing to his prior success against the 
17 XVIII.7. 
244 
Africans (probably Berbers). Although brief, this statement suggests that Carthage 
was actively pursuing a policy of expansion against the native Africans. It is likely 
that Carthage would expand its surrounding borders from an early period. Whether 
this began during the sixth century is unknown and most certainly would not have 
been as intense as during the following centuries. 
SICILY 
Sicily presents a similar problem as to whether or not Carthage conducted military 
campaigns prior to the invasion of 480. Once again we have several possibilities. In 
all likelihood the major Phoenician settlements in the west of the island were already 
accustomed to treating Carthage as a major ally and source of influence. Their 
adoption of Carthaginian control was probably peaceable and no cause for a major 
adjustment. Carthaginian relations with Greeks and Sicilians may, however, have led 
to hostility. Unfortunately Phoenician and Carthaginian relations with the Greeks in 
Sicily are practically unattested between Thucydides' short digression regarding 
Sicily (ca. 600) and the Carthaginian invasion of 480. Although no major conflict is 
attested during this period, there is some suggestion that Carthage did maintain a 
military presence on the island. It is likely when the Phoenicians retreated from the 
east of Sicily at the onset of Greek settlement, there was some struggle for power on 
the island which created spheres of influence: both Greek and Phoenician (later 
Carthaginian). It is possible that Carthage continued such a policy by sporadically 
fighting various Greek states. This certainly intensified during the fifth century. In 
addition to this, there is some evidence that Carthage was active in various military 
manoeuvrings on Sicily. An example mentioned by Justin claims that Malchus, who 
in addition to waging war against the Africans and Sardinians, conquered part of 
Sicily.18 The lack of further literary evidence suggests two possibilities. First, Malchus 
only conquered a minor part of Sicily. Second, his success was probably against a 
non-Hellenic group (Le. Sicanians or the Sicels). Presumably Carthage did not engage 
in hostilities with the Elymians who remained close allies of both Phoenicians and 
Carthaginians. Although Justin's claim is possible, it is certainly not substantial 
enough to suggest any major conflict on Sicily during the sixth century. Nevertheless, 
IS XVIII. 7. 
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the two failed attempts to colonise settlements by Pentathlus and then Dorieus show 
that Carthaginians/Phoenicians were willing to pursue an active military policy from 
the mid-sixth century to maintain exclusive rights in the western half of Sicily. 
Coupled with this we discover that Carthage was maintaining several probable 
military treaties with the Elymians and even the Sicanians. Thucydides claims that the 
Phoenicians initially withdrew to the west of Sicily partly because of an alliance with 
the Elymians. He claims that the Phoenicians relied on this alliance presumably to 
ensure their tentative position on the island. This alliance continued with Carthage, 
which also relied on amicable terms with the Elymians to maintain its presence on 
Sicily. 
During this early period on Sicily we see a military policy continued from the 
Phoenicians. Carthaginian interests on the island are defensive in nature. We have no 
certain indication of Carthaginian hostility on Sicily before 480. Carthage was most 
likely content to establish itself on Sicily aided by a longstanding friendship with the 
Elymians, who in many respects acted as a buffer separating Carthaginian controlled 
territory from that of the Greeks to the east. Early Carthaginian military action on 
Sicily is best described as defensive. The possibility of further examples exists, 
however, our examples show that Carthage preferred to ward off would-be invaders 
rather than actively expanding their territory during this period. Even this seems to 
have depended heavily on aid from the Elymians in Western Sicily. 
Early Carthaginian military endeavours are by no means consistent. As 
Carthage was still developing prior to 480, it chose its battles, which appear mostly 
minor. Its major attested attempts of military expansion were against smaller and less 
developed peoples such as the Sards, Southern Spanish tribes, and perhaps Berbers. 
Otherwise, during this period Carthage concentrated on protecting its borders against 
encroachment. On several occasions both against the Massiliots and the Greeks in 
Sicily, Carthage actively attempted to check Greek expansion in its territories. The 
period preceding 480 was certainly a developmental period for Carthaginian military 
policy abroad. In securing the majority of its basic territories, by the advent of the 
fifth century, Carthage had matured into a powerful and united state. 
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CARTHAGE AT ITS HEIGHT 
The period from 480 to 279 BC saw Carthage reach its peak as an expansive power. 
Naturally this period also saw the bulk of active Carthaginian military activity. We 
find a number of full-scale invasions attempting to secure further territory. Carthage 
no longer had need of Phoenician protection and assumed full control of its foreign 
policies. From this period a number of Carthaginian tactics become apparent in 
several areas. As Carthage developed further, so did its ability to confront highly 
developed states in addition to those less developed peoples it was more accustomed 
to dealing with. The Carthaginian theatres of conflict during this period were those 
well associated with its empire: North Africa, Sicily, and to a lesser extent Spain and 
Sardinia. By investigating various reasons behind separate military offensives, we are 
able to characterise their use to and to understand Carthaginian motivation. 
NORTH AFRICA 
North Africa developed into a major area of Carthaginian activity during the fifth 
century. As previously mentioned, the date of Carthaginian expansion into the interior 
of North Africa remains vague. Owing to constant contact with the Berbers, it 
becomes almost impossible to date when control of numerous settlements became 
officially Carthaginian. When looking at Carthaginian military activity in the area it 
becomes apparent that Carthage actively expanded its interests and holdings in the 
interior by force. It appears that Phoenician settlements along the North African coast 
also developed into Punic influenced settlements during this period. Presumably this 
was both a cultural and political transition whereby these sites retained their local 
autonomy, but acknowledged greater Carthaginian control. 19 The main obstacle 
confronting Carthaginian domination of the interior to the south and west remained 
the Berbers. 
19 Several major settlements along the coast appear to become steadily more Punic from the sixth 
century onwards, including Leptis Magna, Hadrumentum, Sabratha, and Utica (Chp. IV, ns.27-32 and 
text). Their acceptance of Carthage as the major power and cultural influence in the area becomes 
apparent. Nevertheless it appears that they retained varying degrees of autonomy under this system, see 
Chp. II, n.90. 
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The main reason for dating the majority of aggressive military campaigns 
against the Berbers to this period (instead of to a possible earlier date) is that it 
coincides with the advent of Carthaginian expansion by similar methods elsewhere. 
Moreover, a scattering of literary references also supports such a date. The area of 
official conquest is presumably the interior south of Carthage incorporating the six 
pagi to the Gulf of Gabes and to the west incorporating such settlements of Cirta and 
Thugga. Such areas appear within the bounds of Carthaginian political control as well 
as cultural influence. However, the level of Carthaginian authority in the interior is 
unclear. Still, the means by which the Carthaginians obtained certain areas appear to 
have been aggressive. 
Probably the best, and unfortunately shortest account of possible Carthaginian 
expansion in this part of North Africa during this period survives once again courtesy 
of Justin. He first claims that the Numidians demanded payment for the land on which 
Carthage was settled and confronted the sons of Mago, Hasdrubal and Hamilcar. This 
situation was apparently defused when Carthage paid the Numidians,20 However, 
Justin then claims that during the time of the Magonid dynasty in Carthage, the 
Carthaginians made war on the Africans who were compelled to return the tribute for 
the building of the city (Carthage),21 This follows Justin's earlier account claiming 
that Malchus had begun conquering Numidian territory in the previous century. This 
dating also coincides with the accepted date of concentrated Carthaginian expansion 
into the interior during the first half of the fifth century,22 Whether Justin is continuing 
the literary theme of Carthaginian problems with neighbouring tribes since the time of 
Elissa is unclear. Whatever the Carthaginian motive, it seems likely that this offensive 
provided a major instance of land annexation in North Africa. It seems likely that 
there were precedents for such invasions and later attempts to expand the chora of 
Carthage. Such a strategic change mirrors the rapid rise of the Carthaginians' military 
strength and expansive ambition during this period. Initially preferring to choose their 
battles for defensive or consolidation purposes, by the fifth century they were able to 
mount aggressive military campaigns to increase their territory. 
20 XIX. 1. 
21 XIX.2, itaque et Mauris bellum inlatum et adversus Numidas pugnatum et Afri conpulsi stipendium 
urbis conditae Karthaginiensibus remittere. 
22 Justin claims that Hamilcar was killed in Sicily (at Himera in 480). He had three sons: Himilco, 
Hanno, and Giseo. Mago's other son Hannibal also had three sons: Hannibal, Hasdrubal, and Sappho 
(the last name may be a textual corruption). It is possible any of these individuals could have 
commanded such an offensive in North Africa. 
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Possible Carthaginian military activity in North Africa is suggested by one of 
their more distinctive methods of warfare, the chariot. Although viewed as an archaic 
method of war by Greek and Roman sources, the Carthaginians' use of chariots 
served them well in areas where the terrain was generally level and unbroken.23 Large 
areas of North Africa suited the use of war chariots. This is attested by constant 
Carthaginian use in addition to that of other North African states including Cyrene, 
Barca, and even the Garamantes to the south.24 This tactic should have proved 
successful, as the Carthaginians were willing to experiment with chariots elsewhere 
despite widespread abandonment by contemporary powers.25 The Carthaginians' 
continual use of chariots suggests their successful use in North African conditions. 
This is interesting as it shows that the Carthaginians were actively fighting in North 
Africa, presumably against the Berbers. 
The fifth century presumably did not witness the end of Carthaginian 
expansion into North Africa. Since Carthage dominated the region until the end of the 
third century, it is reasonable to assume that Carthage expanded into the interior 
assuming control of the major Numidian towns including sites such as Thugga and 
Cirta. Such sites show evidence of Carthaginian influence and occupation. The 
expansion of Carthage into its North African hinterland only becomes apparent from 
later literary accounts. There are a number of accounts from the third and second 
centuries detailing a number of Carthaginian controlled settlements and forts. The 
area comprising the six pagi and beyond was most likely the result of stages of 
conquest that resembled the area we are familiar with by the third century. 26 This 
territory or possibly extended Carthaginian control formed a distinctive Carthaginian 
province. We have already witnessed the Punic coins of the third century referring to 
"in [the] lands/districts" probably in North Africa and the Neo-Punic inscription 
describing a 'land overseer' in similar pbrasing.27 Presumably beyond this area of 
control, there existed a boundary area where Carthage maintained a stronger presence 
to protect its core territory. Several sites are mentioned as possible Carthaginian 
outposts at various times. There are several sites which seem to have served as 
23 On this see generally Ameling, Karthago, pp.227-235. 
24 Cyrene or Barca: Xen. Cyr. VI. 1.27, 2.8; Aen. Tact. XVI.14; Diod. XX.4I.l, 64.2; Garamantes: Hdt. 
IV.183.4. 
25 The Carthaginians often employed war chariots on Sicily e.g. Diod. XIV.54.5, XIV.55.3, XVL67.2, 
XVL77.4, XVL85; Plut. Tim. XXV.I, XXIX. I. 
26 See Chp. II, n.7, for their geographical descriptions. 
27 See Chp. VI, ns.145-146. 
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Carthaginian military outposts. Sites like Capsa and possibly Sicca Veneria operated 
in such a manner. 28 The exact extent of Carthaginian military expansion in the region 
is difficult to place. During the invasion of Agathocles, Archagathus captured five 
Carthaginian-run towns: Tocai (Thugga), Phelline, Meschela, Hippo Arca, and 
Acris.29 Hecatompylus (Theveste) was captured in 247 by Carthage but may already 
have been under previous Carthaginian control. 30 Again the town of Sicca was another 
likely candidate with Carthage removing its troublesome mercenaries there in 241.31 
Presumably Sicca was under Carthaginian control, but far enough beyond its 
immediate reach for safety. Beyond the basic references of several authors, there is 
little evidence supporting official control in settlements beyond the six pagi. Further 
references to the extent of Carthaginian territory have already been discussed. During 
the period following the defeat after the Second Punic War, we find Masinissa 
seeking restitution of lost native territories, which presumably were taken by force. 
Masinissa disputed the territory known as 'the big fields' and the country belonging to 
the fifty towns called Tysca.32 The description of the disputed area is reminiscent of 
the extended Carthaginian territory which incorporated numerous Berber towns. Apart 
from this we also learn that Carthage was to surrender all its North African territory 
beyond 'the Phoenician trenches' .33 Later in the second century Masinissa claimed 
that Carthage had possessed too much territory in North Africa, referring to the 
original purchase of the Carthaginian chora (i.e. the Byrsa).34 He also claimed that 
this territory had once belonged to the Numidians and that Carthage had unlawfully 
seized it. 35 Such evidence implies that Carthage was successful on more than one 
occasion in its attempts to extend its territory in North Africa by force. 36 
28 According to Sallust (lug. LXXXIXA) and Orosius (Adv. Pag. V.15.8), Capsa was supposedly 
founded by Heracles possibly explaining some Phoenicio-Punic influence associated with Melqart. 
Other centres including Theveste have been suggested as other possible sites, see Gsell, HAAN II, 
pp.98-99; Ilevbare, p.22. 
29 Diod. XX.57A-6. 
30 Diodorus reports that the site was simply captured (XXIV. 10.2). Polybius simply states that Hanno 
brought matters to a satisfactory conclusion (1.73.1). Unfortunately there is little other evidence of 
earlier Carthaginian involvement at the site. 
31 Polyb. 1.66.6-10. It was also used as a rallying point for a Carthaginian army slightly later (Polyb. 
1.67.1). 
32 App. Pun. 68. 
33 App. Pun. 32,54, 59. 
34 App. Pun. 67-70. 
35 Livy XXXlV.62 
36 There are a number of comprehensive guides to the expansion of Carthage into the hinterland of 
North Africa. Gsell, HAANII, Chp. II, provides a wide-ranging geographical history of this expansion. 
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SICILY 
At the beginning of the fifth century Sicily became the major target of Carthaginian 
expansion. This interest was not characterised by one or two sporadic invasions, but a 
number from the early fifth to the third century. The height of Carthaginian expansion 
is characterised by Carthaginian attempts to gain control of Sicily. 
Presumably the major attraction for Carthage was the position of Sicily. It lay 
extremely close to Carthage as we have seen, making it an automatic choice for 
controL This is significant when considering that Carthage possessed all its 
surrounding territories and several others considerably further away. Coupled with 
this was its strategic location. If Carthage had full possession of Sicily, it could be 
used for a number of strategic purposes. Defensively it would act as a buffer between 
Carthage and the other major powers in the Mediterranean. After all several later 
invasions, including those of Agathocles and the Romans, were launched from the 
island?7 Second, the strategic position of Sicily as a base of operations cannot be 
underestimated. For both trade and military operations, Sicily would have been an 
unparalleled possession in the Central Mediterranean. By the fifth century, Carthage 
was certainly attracted to Greek influence and trade. If Carthage could seize control of 
Sicily, it would not only control a large Hellenic population, but would also move into 
immediate contact with Greece itself. Sicily would also prove an invaluable area for 
the trade routes to the east and Carthage would also be able to extend routes further 
into Italy and the Adriatic. One of the most important advantages, from a purely 
strategic point of view, was the fall of Sicily would literally divide the Mediterranean 
in half and enable the Carthaginians to monitor and control all seaborne traffic in the 
west. Carthage could control all the strategic sea-lanes including the Straits of 
Messina. This is an important consideration when for over a century Carthage had 
often attempted to exclude Greek expansion in the Western Mediterranean. Coupled 
with this, Carthage would be better positioned for affairs in Italy, especially combined 
with its allies the Etruscans, and later Rome. The capture of Sicily held great 
Regarding the territories of the Nurnidian Kings and their contact with Carthage see Maria R-AlfOldi, 
"Die Geschichte des numidischen Konigreiches und seiner Nachfolger", in Die Numider, pp.43-74. 
37 This is earlier attested after the defeat at Himera in 480, apparently when the Carthaginians were 
concerned that Gelon would cross over into North Africa from Sicily and besiege Carthage (Diod. 
XI.23.3-4). 
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incentives for the Carthaginians. By controlling this island they would benefit from its 
economic and strategic potential. 
Himera on the north coast of Sicily was the first major reported engagement 
between Carthaginians and Sicilian Greeks in 480. The campaign itself is mentioned 
in brief detail by Diodorus and alluded to by Herodotus.38 Whether or not the 
Carthaginian commander, Hamilcar were acting in a private capacity (as Ameling has 
argued39), presumably his intentions were greater than Himera. Although the figures 
of three hundred thousand troops and a fleet of two hundred warships are most likely 
exaggerated, it was still a major invasion force. The best evidence to support this is 
the reaction of Gelon. If the Carthaginian force had been small and only aimed at 
Himera, he would have been slower to act, if he would have acted at all. However, 
Gelon recognised the threat of a large invasion force early and preferred to strike afar 
rather than to deal with it in his own territory. He raised an army, which was probably 
of a similar size to that of Hamilcar. 
Hamilcar's campaign perhaps foreshadows later Carthaginian attempts to 
conquer Sicily. First, the choice of Himera as the initial point of attack suggests 
Carthaginian caution. This was the first major Greek settlement east of the 
Carthaginian territory on the north coast of Sicily. If Himera fell, the continuous area 
of Carthaginian domination would increase. Selinus and Segesta were likely 
Carthaginian allies and did not pose a threat if Carthage proceeded along the northern 
coast.4{) If the attack did not go to plan, at least Hamilcar and his force could retreat to 
the safe haven of either Soloeis or Panormus. The location of Himera along the coast 
from Panormus also allowed for the Carthaginian fleet to follow the army. 
There appears to have been a good deal of planning and preparation leading to 
the invasion. We have already discussed the large size of the invasion force. The fact 
that an agreement with Selinus had been reached in advance and with the apparent 
support of Terillus of Himera and Anaxilaus of Rhegium,41 it seems that Hamilcar had 
clearly been preparing this invasion for some time. However that may be, Gelon 
decisively defeated him. 
38 Diod. XI.20ff.; Hdt. vn.165ff. 
39 Karthago, pp.35-38. 
40 Segesta was a traditional ally of Carthage. Diodorus suggests Selinus was allied with Carthage and 
had a prior agreement to provide Hamilcar with reinforcements (XI .21.4). 
41 Hdt. Vll.l65 
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Following this defeat, there was a lull in activity on Sicily. The Carthaginians, 
who had been badly defeated, preferred to avoid further engagement on the island and 
after the Battle of Cumae in 474, sued for peace with Syracuse, a peace which lasted 
most of the of the fifth century .42 Carthage preferred to expand its interests elsewhere, 
beyond immediate threat. It is during this period that the voyages of Hanno and 
Himi1co emphasise the active nature of Carthaginian settlement and enterprise in the 
Far West. During this time Carthaginian culture appears to undergo a marked change 
with the full emergence of Punic culture and a number of constitutional 
developments. Despite the severe defeat at Himera, Carthage still maintained an 
active policy of expansion, and coupled with its internal developments, was ready for 
a second advance into Sicily at the end of the fifth century. 
The second Carthaginian offensive on Sicily came some seventy years after 
the first, led by Hamilcar's own grandson, HannibaL By the closing stages of the fifth 
century, Carthage, now the Punic capital with a stronger and established empire, was 
ready once again to try and accomplish its plan of conquering Sicily. The motive of 
the invasion of 409 was presumably that of 480: capture Sicily and bring the 
independent Greek city-states under a united Carthaginian rule. Gelon was long dead, 
as was his successor Hieron. Syracuse had recently defeated Athens but appeared at 
one of its weaker points in the last seventy years. Coupled with this there was 
disunion among other settlements on the island, namely Selinus and Segesta. The 
political situation at the time seemed inviting to the Carthaginians, in regard to their 
plans of conquering Sicily. 
The Carthaginians embarked on their second reported invasion of Sicily 
ostensibly to aid the Segestaeans who were at war with the Selinuntians in 410.43 The 
Segestaeans, faring badly, turned to Carthage offering to place their city in Carthage's 
42 Diod. XI.24.4, XI.37.7, XII.26.3. It is possible that there was some intermittent fighting on Sicily 
between the invasion of 480 and that of 409. Although not located on Sicily, the Carthaginians appear 
to have joined with the Etruscans against Hieron at Cumae (see Chp. VI, ns.29-32 and text). Otherwise 
Pausanias (V.25.5) claims that Motya and Acragas went to war some time during the first half of the 
fifth century. It is possible a limited conflict occurred between Acragas and a Carthaginian city. Even if 
factual, the account may be misreported. We rarely find Phoenicio-Punic settlements on Sicily fighting 
independently during this period. 
43 This conflict had erupted five years previous, but owing to the Athenian invasion of 415, the main 
theatre of operations had shifted to the east of the island. SeHnus had allied itself with Syracuse, 
whereas the Segestaeans, after first having been turned down by Carthage, had allied themselves with 
Athens. After the Athenian defeat the Segestaeans were concerned about a backlash from the Sicilian 
Greeks. Therefore they turned once again to Carthage for aid (Diod. XIL82-3). 
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hands if it would send aid.44 Hannibal, like his grandfather before him, invested in 
preparation for an invasion, which would once again prove a showdown with 
Syracuse.45 As Hamilcar had planned in his invasion, Hannibal landed his troops well 
within Carthaginian territory at Lilybaeum, while protecting the fleet off Motya. Once 
all was ready, the force proceeded inland. Once more the careful and defensive 
attitude of the Carthaginians can be seen early in their campaign. Hannibal maintained 
his position safely, carefully proceeding from the base of Carthaginian power in the 
west of Sicily. 
The tactics of Hannibal demonstrate the Carthaginians' intentions on Sicily. 
They wished to conquer the separate Greek cities until the entire island was subdued. 
The first town to fall was Selinus.46 This city was captured, not only because it was 
one of the protagonists of the war along with Segesta, but because it was the nearest 
Greek town to Carthaginian territory on the island. With its capture, uninterrupted 
Carthaginian territory increased. This is further demonstrated when the site was 
resettled as a Carthaginian tribute state. The next town was naturally Himera. 
Although the Carthaginians, and in particular Hannibal, held a personal grudge 
against this town, again it was a strategic attack.47 Although Hannibal pillaged and 
razed the city gaining a great deal of plunder, the fall of Himera greatly increased 
Carthaginian territory in Western Sicily. The site was also resettled as a Carthaginian 
tribute state, Thermae. It is during this period that we see the full emergence of the 
Carthaginian plan systematically to conquer Sicily.48 In 406, Hannibal began to 
organise another force to finish the task which he had started three years previous. 
The first settlement Hannibal faced was naturally the next major Greek settlement 
heading east from Carthaginian territory, Acragas.49 From Selinus, to Himera, and 
then Acragas we see a definite trend of a large Carthaginian force moving east, 
overrunning Greek cities one by one. With the fall of Acragas, Carthage had 
established a clear boundary from north to south. Carthaginian territory had been 
44 Diad. Xllr.43ff. 
45 Diodorus (XIII.54.5) quotes both his sources for figures of the invasion force. Ephorus believed the 
Carthaginian force comprised two hundred thousand infantry and four thousand cavalry, Timaeus 
reckoned (more realistically, but still perhaps exaggerated) around one hundred thousand men. 
46 Diad. XllI.55-59. 
47 XIII.60-62. 
48 Even Diodorus describes this plan, claiming that Carthage planned to enslave all the cities on the 
island, XIII.79.8, E1Ct8u/loUV'tE<; arcuau<; 'ta<; EV 't11 vfJaCflrcoAEt<; Ku'tu8ouAwaua8ut) and it was eager 
to become master of the entire island, XIII.80.l, am:u8ov'tE<; arcu01l<; 'tft<; vfJaou KOptEUaat). 
49 Diad. XllI.85-90. 
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greatly increased on Sicily, through a systematic process of conquest, a process 
Carthage wished to continue. 
Following their initial success the Carthaginians pushed even further east and 
captured the next major Greek settlements on the southern coast of Sicily: Gela and 
Camarina which had been evacuated in advance.5o Syracuse remained the final goal in 
the conquest of Sicily. Unfortunately the majority of the army was beset by a 
mysterious plague which decimated the ranks and the Carthaginians' resolve.51 Both 
sides were happy to swear a peace, and the tattered remnants of the Carthaginian force 
returned to North Africa. 
Carthage had failed to fulfil its ambition of conquering Sicily. Nevertheless, 
the campaign of Hannibal was a resounding success. Carthage, according to the peace 
terms concluded with Dionysius of Syracuse, still controlled much of its conquered 
territory. Its holdings on the island had temporarily increased while the Greeks had 
been reduced to the eastern segment. In many respects the invasion of 409 is similar 
to that of 480. Both invasions appear well organised with considerable forces and 
good use of strategic bases on the island together with allies. Presumably the first 
invasion had the same goal as the first: the conquest of Greek cities on Sicily from the 
west. By conducting the campaign in such a manner, Carthage did not need to worry 
about hostile states harassing its progress or its supply lines. Each conquest increased 
unbroken Carthaginian territory on Sicily. The major difference between the 
campaign of Hamilcar and that of Hannibal is that the former faced a strong Syracuse 
led by Gelon whereas the latter exploited Syracuse's weakness. 
The advent of the fourth century saw a shift in Carthaginian fortunes on Sicily. 
This was mostly brought about by the reign of Dionysius of Syracuse. With a 
powerful Syracuse, it was only a matter of time before the inflated Carthaginian 
territory on Sicily would be challenged. In 398 Dionysius attacked Carthaginian 
territory.52 Presumably the war progressed well for the Greeks as by 397 they had 
reached Eryx, deep in the heart of Carthaginian territory in Western Sicily.53 
Dionysius ravaged Carthaginian territory and captured Motya and destroyed the city. 
50 Diod. XIII. I 08, XII!.111. 
51 Diod. XIII. I 13. 
52 Diod. XIV,41. This attack coincided with a plague that was ravaging North Africa. This rumoured 
epidemic, if factual, was likely the same one which forced the Carthaginian withdrawal from Syracuse 
less than a decade earlier. 
53 Apparently the Greek cities which had been captured by Hannibal and the Carthaginians several 
years earlier had been liberated and readily supplied Dionysius with troop levies (Diod. XIV,47.5-6). 
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Carthage finally responded by dispatching Himi1co with a considerable force, and 
joined by the Sicels, they defeated Dionysius and mounted another invasion of Sicily. 
Landing at Panormus, the Carthaginians concentrated on the north of the island, 
preferring to avoid direct conflict with Dionysius' army. The Carthaginian force, 
having been welcomed by the Himeraeans,54 then seized Messana, and in doing so 
dominated the Straits of Messina and blocked Greek aid from Italy.55 The 
Carthaginians then pushed south toward Syracuse, first capturing N axos and then 
defeating Leptines, the Syracusan admiral at sea and capturing Catana. Himilco then 
besieged Syracuse by land and sea and on the eve of victory once again his army was 
supposedly struck down by a mysterious plague. Dionysius counterattacked and burnt 
Himilco's fleet.56 Himilco sued for peace and returned home to Libya under truce, 
abandoning his mercenaries to the Syracusans. 
Instead of simply attempting to defeat Dionysius in the field and to push him 
back to the east of Sicily, the Carthaginians attempted to capture Syracuse, which 
would prove the key to dominating the whole island. Therefore Himilco and the 
admiral Mago skirted the north coast of Sicily from the stronghold of Panormus. They 
then utilised some possible centres of Carthaginian sympathy at Himera and Messana 
to reach the north-eastern point of Sicily unscathed. Pushing south they defeated or 
subdued the major Greek settlements in the area before besieging Syracuse itself.57 
Unfortunately for Carthage, its campaign against Syracuse was defeated in spite of 
overwhelming odds supposedly by plague and a Syracusan counterattack.58 
Nevertheless, we can compare the Carthaginians' tactics with those during their two 
54 This may coincide with the resettlement of the site as Thermae following its destruction only a 
decade previous. 
55 A large proportion of the population was evacuated prior to the attack facilitating the capture of 
Messana. The Carthaginians then razed the site (Diod. XIV.57, 59). 
56 Diod. XIV.70ff. 
57 The tactie of subduing all pockets of possible resistance is obvious as after Naxos and Catana fell, 
Himilco unsuccessfully attempted to seeure the allegianee of Aetna (Diod. XIV.58). 
58 This is the second consecutive time the Carthaginian army was decimated by a mysterious plague. 
Whether or not this plague actually beset the Carthaginians remains unclear. Diodorus has a habit of 
misrepresenting his sources, often resulting in unintentional doublets. The major problem we have is 
that for the first encounter the description of the plague is missing (Diod. XlII.113). However, its 
effects are prominent in the lead-up to this war against Dionysius. The second account is more 
descriptive regarding symptoms, and Diodorus claims that it was the same disease which ravaged the 
Athenians some fifteen years previous and his description appears to be adapted from that text (see 
Lionel Pearson, The Greek Historians o/the West (Atlanta 1987) p.181). It is possible that two separate 
bouts of a mystery disease affected two Carthaginian armies. If so, it is likely that the first had the more 
deadly effect. The second was more of a distraction to the Carthaginians, who were then surprised and 
defeated by Dionysius' forces. It appears that in the subsequent peace treaty, a considerable portion of 
the Carthaginian army returned to North Africa. This seems to be the case also for the Sicels who 
returned home and the mercenaries who were either captured or re-employed by Dionysius. 
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previous attempts at invading Sicily. Syracuse remained the key to the domination of 
Sicily. Carthage had proved that it was quite capable of either capturing or subduing 
the other Greek city-states by various means. Although the Carthaginian strategy was 
sound, it failed again, and once again Carthaginian plans on Sicily were thwarted. 
This third defeat at the hands of the Syracusans did not dull Carthaginian 
interest in the island. In 392 Mago led a fourth invasion force to the island, hoping to 
link with the Sicels of the interior and to move eastwards.59 Unfortunately for Mago, 
he found himself isolated in the territory of the Agyrinaeans and was forced to sue for 
peace. Although a brief and unsuccessful attempt, it is obvious Mago wished to push 
east and to concentrate on an interior route to Syracuse. Although he planned to join 
the Sicels, his attempts prove that unlike on previous expeditions, he did not invest in 
securing allies on Sicily in advance. Despite heading out from the Carthaginian 
stronghold in the west of the island, now augmented by the foundation of Lilybaeum, 
he advanced too far into unsecured hostile territory. Without supporting allies and 
bases of supply he found himself isolated and was forced to retreat. 
The Carthaginians exacted revenge a decade later. It appears that the truce 
between Dionysius and Carthage had held with the former concentrating his activities 
in Southern Italy. However, by 383 Dionysius once again attempted to oust the 
Carthaginians from Sicily.60 Although Carthage was not the instigator of this war, it 
did send over a sizeable army under the command of Mago. Upon arrival he joined 
with an unknown quantity of Italian Greeks and then split his army between Italy and 
Sicily in preparation for an attack. This is the first occasion in which we find 
Carthaginian troops active in Southern Italy. Once more we see a planned 
Carthaginian invasion with pre-established allies and a strategy determined in 
advance. The main theatre of conflict remained on Sicily, where after an initial 
setback, the Carthaginians defeated Dionysius at Cronium. However, instead of 
pursuing the defeated Dionysius, they secured peace which included tribute and the 
abandonment of the settlements of Selinus and Acragas together with all territory up 
to the Halycus River.61 It is unknown why Carthage did not pursue its victory in 
Sicily. For whatever reasons, Carthage chose to playa waiting game in Sicily. 
However, as we will see, it still considered the conquest of Sicily a primary goal. 
59 Diod. XIV.95ff. 
60 XV.l5ff. 
61 XV. 17.5. 
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There was one final encounter between Dionysius and the Carthaginians. The 
peace was broken again in 368 when Dionysius decided to try once more to dislodge 
the Carthaginians from Sicily. Although successful in capturing Selinus, Entella, and 
Eryx, Dionysius was checked outside Lilybaeum where Carthage defeated his fleet 
before the onset of winter. During this time an armistice was arranged and Dionysius 
withdrew, fell ill, and died in 367.62 Carthage, for some reason, did not seem willing 
to continue this conflict despite a naval victory and the death of Dionysius. 
The political upheavals in the mid-fourth century in Syracuse saw the next 
reported altercation between Carthage and the Greeks in Sicily.63 The commotion in 
Syracuse which saw the deposition of Dionysius II, followed by the assassination of 
Dion, and the struggle between the former and Hicetas for Syracuse gave Carthage a 
new opportunity to attack its old enemy. In 345 Carthage moved a considerable force 
to Sicily and prepared for another attack on the Greek states of Sicily.64 To compound 
matters Hicetas went into negotiations with the Carthaginians to secure his position as 
tyrant of Syracuse. Meanwhile, the Syracusans had implored their metropolis, Corinth 
for aid. Corinth promptly sent a small force led by Timoleon. The Carthaginian force 
led by Hanno initially was eager to divert Timoleon away from the island at Rhegium 
but failed. Hicetas and the Carthaginians under Mago occupied Syracuse briefly, but 
suspecting treachery, Mago left Hicetas to his fate. 65 Timoleon then made short work 
of Hicetas, who had been abandoned by his Carthaginian allies, and seized Syracuse 
and rallied the Greek cities of Sicily to his side. Following this he managed to secure 
a considerable following in Sicily with the support of several Greek states. With all 
prepared, he decided to meet the Carthaginians on their own territory in Sicily. 
Carthage responded by sending a new force to Lilybaeum in 340/339. Both armies 
met at the Crimisus River near Acragas, and owing to superior tactics on the part of 
Timoleon, coupled with the onset of a violent storm, the Carthaginians' superiority in 
numbers was nullified and they were defeated.66 Despite an attempt by Mago to 
reinforce the Carthaginians at Messana, he was defeated and Carthage was forced to 
accept terms of peace. 
62 Diod. XV.73. 
63 After the death of Dionysius, there was a general lull in activity on Sicily. Both parties seemed 
content with the status quo and a peace between Dionysius IT and Carthage was concluded (Diod. 
XVI.S.2). 
64 Plut. Tim. IT; Diod. XVI.67. 
65 Plut. Tim. XXA. 
66 Plut. Tim. XXVIT-XXIX; Diod. XVI.7S-Sl. 
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The Carthaginians' activity on Sicily during this period is symptomatic of 
their attempts to capture the entire island. As in the period following the defeat at 
Himera, Carthage was probably wary of a strong Syracuse, and chose to bide its time 
until political weakness gave it an opportunity to attack. Carthage refrained from 
major unprovoked invasions on the island during the later reign of Dionysius and also 
during that of Dionysius II. With the political wrangling between Dionysius, Dion, 
and Hicetas during the 350's and 340's, Carthage saw its chance finally to defeat 
Syracuse and probably all of Greek Sicily. However, a mix of poor decisions, the 
advent of a strong figure in Timoleon, and poor fortune resulted in failure. It is 
obvious that there was planning behind both Carthaginian invasions. The first force 
under Hanno moved across from Libya and watched developments from the west of 
. the island.67 Although it ravaged territory, it was for the most part on the defensive, 
not prepared to move far beyond Carthaginian territory. Carthage also used its 
diplomatic skills in securing a prominent ally in Hicetas.68 When Hicetas had secured 
most of Syracuse, the Carthaginian force under the admiral Mago simply sailed into 
the city and occupied the greater part of it.69 Unfortunately for the Carthaginians' 
aspirations on the island, they made two fatal errors. First, they underestimated 
Timoleon. Despite attempting to blockade him at Rhegium, they failed to prevent him 
from reaching Sicily. Then, quite mysteriously, Mago, using the excuse of suspected 
treachery, abandoned Hicetas at Syracuse and left the city. This action practically 
handed the city to Timoleon, who naturally united it and several other Greek states 
against Carthage. The second Carthaginian force reverted to older tactics of moving 
from its power base in the west of the island. The commanders Hasdrubal and 
Hamilcar hoped to defeat Timoleon before conquering the rest of the island.70 Even 
after the defeat, Carthage sent out an auxiliary force to Messana with hopes of 
disrupting the Greek campaign. Both invasions during the time of Timoleon 
demonstrate familiar Carthaginian tactics in Sicily, and familiar failures. 
Following its defeat at the hands of Timoleon, Carthage seems to have 
abandoned its plans of capturing Sicily through full-scale invasion. Several heavy 
67 Pluto Tim. 11.1. 
68 Diodorus (XVI.67) claims that Carthage made several representations to Greek cities in order to gain 
their support. 
69 Pluto Tim. XVII. 1-2. 
70 Plutarch (Tim. XXV. 1) claims that this time the Carthaginians did not want to continue fighting the 
Greeks in a piece-meal fashion but were gearing up to drive the Greeks from Sicily, w<; otncE'tt 
1tOlllcrofl£VOt lCo:'tU flEPO<; 'tOY 1tOA£flOV aAA' OfloU 1tacrll<; LtlC£Ato:<; E~£Aacrov't£<; 'to\><; "EAAllVO:<;. 
259 
defeats, each within living memory of the previous attempt, suggest that the 
Carthaginians were resigned to the fact that Sicily would not fall through conventional 
military methods. This however, did not diminish their interest in the island. 
Following the withdrawal of Timoleon, Syracuse resorted to its usual political 
wrangling. Carthaginian interest in the area is evident some twenty years after 
Timoleon's death in 317. The rise of Agathocles in Syracuse saw his ambitions 
conflict with those of the aristocracy and especially Sostratus. The latter two were 
expelled and immediately sided with the Carthaginians in order to re-establish 
themselves in Syracuse.71 After several pitched battles, the elitist 'Six-Hundred' 
managed to seize control of Syracuse and to force Agathocles to swear a peace treaty 
with themselves and the Carthaginians. Nevertheless, Agathocles feigned peace 
before enrolling more military support and recaptured Syracuse. Although this 
Carthaginian action in Sicily was not as extravagant as previous encounters, it does 
show an interest in undermining potential opposition from Syracuse and in installing a 
sympathetic government there. This was achieved, albeit temporarily, with limited 
military support. The Carthaginians' support of the deposed oligarchs shows their 
policy of establishing allies on Sicily before attempting an attack. Once again, 
however, their actions proved unsuccessful. 
Following the establishment of Agathocles as tyrant of Syracuse, there are 
several indications of Carthaginian military activities on Sicily. Diodorus discusses a 
peace treaty in 314 between Agathocles and several Greek states in Sicily, which was 
actually brokered by Hamilcar, a Carthaginian.72 In 312, a fleet of sixty Carthaginian 
ships prevented Agathocles from rallying support in Acragas.73 This is followed by a 
request from a Syracusan, Deinocrates to send aid against Agathocles.74 A 
Carthaginian fleet of fifty light ships then attempted to enter the harbour of Syracuse, 
but failed to gain any advantage. The Carthaginians then joined with Deinocrates and 
his force occupying a hill near Gela. However when the latter was defeated, the 
Carthaginian force withdrew.75 Once more we find a smaller Carthaginian attempt to 
disrupt political stability in Syracuse. By securing allies, Carthage believed it could 
install a sympathetic government and thus would be able to control larger portions of 
71 Diod. XIX.4.3. 
72XIX.71.6-7. 
73 XIX. 102.8. 
74 XIX.I03. 
75 XIX. 104. 
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Sicily without resorting to major conflict. Once again its efforts proved futile. With 
the situation in Sicily growing ever more hostile under the command of Agathocles, 
Carthage decided to mount a major offensive in 311.76 Setting out with a sizeable 
force under Hamilcar, son of Gisco, the fleet met a storm en route to Sicily and 
apparently suffered great loss. Nevertheless, the surviving force disembarked in Sicily 
(presumably at Lilybaeum) and re-enforced its numbers. According to Diodorus, 
several Greek towns were ready to defect to the Carthaginian side, and this number 
greatly increased when Hamilcar defeated Agathocles outside Gela. Once more 
Carthage was in a strong position to deal Syracuse the killer blow and finally 
dominate the whole of Sicily. However, Agathocles did the unthinkable by gathering 
his forces and invading North Africa, catching the Carthaginians unawares. 
Agathocles caused havoc in North Africa while inexplicably Hamilcar was defeated 
outside Syracuse ending another promising but unsuccessful attempt to capture the 
city and with it all of Sicily.77 
Following the defeat outside Syracuse and the pressure placed on Carthage by 
Agathocles, Carthaginian influence on Sicily waned. Despite several attempts of 
varying size, by the end of the fourth century, Carthage had little more to show for its 
efforts than what it had possessed two hundred years previous. Carthage had gained 
some ground, presumably in Thermae (Himera) and Selinus as well as building larger 
support bases in centres such as Messana, Rhegium, Acragas, and even Syracuse. 
However, its desire to dominate the island of Sicily went unfulfilled. 
We have seen that Carthage used various strategies in its attempts to conquer 
Sicily. It certainly possessed the resources and manpower to defeat the Greek states, 
especially Syracuse. Therefore the question remains as to why Carthage failed to 
capture Sicily especially in light of other successful campaigns elsewhere. Although 
we have avoided looking at the Carthaginian military in detail previously, it may be 
useful here to suggest an explanation for the failures on Sicily. There have been 
several arguments addressing the flaws of the Carthaginian army and system of 
command. Often the Carthaginians' reliance on mercenaries has been identified as an 
inherent weakness of their military strength. However, Carthage was simply following 
a larger trend. By the fourth century most Greek and non-Greek powers used 
mercenary forces to a large extent. During the third century we find Hannibal 
76 XIX.106. 
77 XX.29-30. 
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successfully maintaining a large mercenary force on campaign for many years. In 
addition to this, Carthage still used large numbers of its own troops from throughout 
its empire on campaign.78 Another possible reason was the lack of Carthaginian 
military leadership. This may be true of some individuals, but a number of 
Carthaginian commanders were noted for their leadership including Hannibal and 
Mago in Sicily, and later the Barcids in Spain. Neither of these arguments can explain 
the countless failings on Sicily. 
Perhaps the problem lay deeper in the Carthaginian political and military 
ethos. The one failing evident in most of the Carthaginians' campaigns on Sicily was 
their lack of initiative in the face of defeats, which more often than not were final. 
Despite ostensibly having the ability to send reinforcements, Carthage preferred to 
withdraw, regroup, and try again at a later date. The fear of loss seems to have played 
heavily on the minds of the Carthaginians. On several occasions, Carthage was 
defeated by Syracuse and simply retreated, although the Greeks were exhausted 
themselves. Vague descriptions of plagues and possible treachery before defeats 
appear as common but insufficient explanations. The problem with Carthage was 
most likely systemic. The lack of determination on the part of the generals was 
probably reinforced by the overriding attitude in Carthage. The terrible fate which 
often awaited a number of unsuccessful generals on their return to Carthage is 
symptomatic of this failing. 79 The harsh reaction to failure of the Carthaginian 
government did not warrant the risk of mUltiple failures for a Carthaginian general. 
This is further emphasised by the lack of interest in sending out auxiliary forces or 
campaigns with a view to deliver the coup de grace to the Sicilian Greeks. This 
failing again appears during the Punic Wars and especially in Hannibal's Italian 
campaign where he succeeded almost on his own despite the constant failure of 
Carthage to supply him. It is possible that the mercantile character of Carthage denied 
it the determination to succeed where Rome would later prove. Often it appears too 
78 Diodorus (XVI.73.3) and Plutarch (Tim. XXVII.3) describe the Carthaginians amassing 
reinforcements to counter Timoleon in 341. The Carthaginians raised a levy of Carthaginian citizens, 
drafted Libyans, and hired mercenaries from Spain and North Africa. Such a force was characteristic of 
Carthaginian armies and, although mixed, it was not totally dependant on mercenaries. For a 
comprehensive overview of the use of Carthaginian citizens, subjects, and mercenaries fighting 
Carthaginian armies see Ameling, Karthago, Chp. VII. 
79 The Carthaginians often crucified or stigmatised defeated generals. During the First Punic War for 
instance, Hanno was crucified for surrendering to the Romans at Messana; as was Hasdrubal in 241; 
and another Hanno after the capture of the Aegates Islands. Otherwise there appears to be an obvious 
stigma regarding defeat. Hamilcar's son, Gisco, was exiled to Selinus rather than allowed to remain in 
Carthage (Diod. XIII.43.5). The same fate earlier befell Malchus (Justin XVIII.7). 
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willing to abandon ideas of conquest in favour of reverting to its economic mainstay 
of trade. This failure in its foreign policy was perhaps a legacy of its Phoenician 
forebears who also avoided military action especially against developed nations. 
Often defeats on Sicily are followed by an obvious shift in Carthaginian interests. 
Between the invasions of 480 and 409 there were at least two major voyages of 
settlement and exploration into the Atlantic as well as presumable expansion into 
North Africa and Sardinia. The situation on Sicily required a stronger form of 
aggression than one based on mercantile interests. Unfortunately for Carthage, it did 
not possess the determination to press its interests in Sicily. Although it was fighting a 
developed nation, was prepared to experiment with its strategies, and to make several 
attempts, the Carthaginians failed to conquer Sicily because of their own systemic 
failings which manifested themselves in a reluctance and inability to force a 
conclusion regardless of the price.80 
SPAIN 
Following the supposed defeat at the Battle of Artemisium ca. 490 there is no 
surviving evidence of further hostilities involving the Carthaginians in Spain. This 
lack of evidence, however, does not discount the possibility of further hostilities in the 
area. Carthage had two possible rivals in the region: the Greeks and the native 
Spaniards. It seems possible that by the fifth century the Greeks had expanded down 
to Cape N ao and possibly beyond. It is uncertain how Carthaginian and Greek 
boundaries were settled in the region. Presumably, following the defeat at Artemisium 
(probably around Cape Nao) Greek interests would have held the ascendancy. This 
could make several Greek settlements in the area, including such proposed sites as 
Mainake and Hemeroskopion, appear more probable.81 If Greek settlement did stretch 
further south, it is likely that it did not last. By the third century the Greek and 
Carthaginian spheres were reasonably well defined and both cultures were actively 
trading with each other. Carthage had redeveloped a number of settlements in 
80 It is perhaps best to suppress further speculation regarding the problems of the Carthaginian military 
as it is not essential to this discussion. There have been a number of modern interpretations which 
provide more detailed accounts. The most comprehensive modem account covering facets of the 
Carthaginian military is Ameling, Karthago, passim. Also see Werner Huss, Die Karthager, Chps. 
XIff. For more specific descriptions of the nature of the army see Gsell, HAANII, Chps. II-III and 
Picard, Carthage, Chps. II-VI. 
81 Strabo IIIA.6. 
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Southern Spain during the fourth century and shown a distinct lack of interest in 
expanding further into the interior or up the east coast. If Carthage did remove Greek 
settlements in Spain, it is reminiscent of the scenario in Sicily and North Africa where 
it acted with such motives to remove Greek competition by destroying the settlements 
of Dorieus. Presumably the motive would have been the same: to maintain exclusive 
zones of activity and to remove any possible threat. This was a tactic employed early 
by both Phoenicians and Carthaginians, but one the latter would certainly become 
known for during this period. Whether Greco-Carthaginian boundaries in Spain were 
set after a period of mutual hostility is a possibility, however, this must remain a 
matter of conjecture. 
The native Spaniards in Southern Spain could have posed another threat to 
Carthaginian interests in the area. During this period Carthaginian interests were 
mostly concentrated on the coast with areas of industry in the interior. We have 
already witnessed possible problems faced by Gades following the fall of Phoenician 
and Tartessian influence in the region. Presumably several Spanish tribes attempted to 
seize power in the region by confronting Gades. The latter's plight was only relieved 
by the arrival of a Carthaginian force which defeated the Spaniards and assumed 
control of the area for Carthage. The next reported hostilities between Carthage and 
Spaniards was during the third century when the Barcids fought several prominent 
tribes before defeating the Orissi, seizing their territory, and founding several 
settlements, including New Carthage. The period between these events remains poorly 
illuminated regarding possible encounters. It seems unlikely that Carthage undertook 
any major campaigns against the Spaniards during this period. At this time Carthage 
was not overly interested in acquiring further territory in the region, preferring to 
redevelop pre-existing settlements and to concentrate on the silver industry. As for the 
Spaniards, they were probably content with interacting with the Carthaginian 
settlements in the area as there is no record of incursions into this area. 
SARDINIA 
Evidence from Sardinia during the fifth and fourth centuries, much like Spain, is 
sparse and often leaves little room for solid conclusion. Once again we have the scene 
set during the sixth century with Carthage sending a number of invasions to secure the 
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island from the native Sards.82 Although our literary record suggests that Carthage met 
with mixed fortunes, it is apparent that the Carthaginians still managed to force the 
Sards back from the southern and western coastal areas into the interior of the island.83 
The next period is not attested, and we next hear of a Sard revolt in the third century 
against the Carthaginian mercenaries. Although relations with the native inhabitants 
possibly relaxed over time, we can assume that there was more fighting between the 
Carthaginians and the Sards. Diodorus briefly claims that the Carthaginians made war 
upon the Sards on a number of occasions with large armies after they had withdrawn 
into the interior. 84 Unfortunately he, or rather his source, goes no further in his 
description. The major evidence, as we have discussed, is the establishment of an 
interior line of fortifications in Central Sardinia. These appear to have been mostly 
constructed during the fifth century.85 The establishment of such a strategic defensive 
network suggests that the Sards continued disturbing the Carthaginians' activity on 
Sardinia to the point of the latter's constructing an elaborate and expensive system to 
check their encroachments. Although not a conventional method of military conquest, 
this system shows the Carthaginians' policy on Sardinia: maintaining a zone of 
exclusive operation, more concerned with any foreign intrusion rather than their own 
expansion. Further evidence suggests that the Sards remained a constant threat and a 
presumable cause of sporadic fighting.86 According to Diodorus, the Sards remained 
unconquered by the Carthaginians for the entire period they were present on 
Sardinia.87 This sentiment is echoed by Pausanias who that claims a group of 
Corsicans, a tribe known as the Ilians, remained free from Carthaginian rule. 88 As in 
the case of Spain, however, we can only assume such conflict in the absence of 
evidence. 
The fifth century witnessed the advent of true Carthaginian expansion through 
more aggressive means. We have witnessed varying degrees of the Carthaginians' 
82 Justin XVIII.7.1-2, XIX.1.3. 
83 Justin does not say whether or not Mago was successful during his invasion (XIX. 1). It is likely he 
did succeed as the first Carthaginian treaty with Rome considers Sardinia a Carthaginian possession by 
509/8. 
84 Diod. V.lS.S. 
85 Chp. IV, ns.170-171 and text. 
86 One such example is mentioned by Diodorus (XV.24.2) ca. 379. He states that because of a plague in 
Carthage the Sards revolted along with the native Libyans. Both revolts were apparently subdued. 
87 Diod. V.lS.S, 'trov 010 KapXT]oowtWV TCOAAaKl<; a~lOMyol<; ouVaIlEVE<Jl cr'tpa'tEucrav'twv ETC' m'l'tou<; 
oux 'to:<; oucrxwpta<; Kat 't~V EV 'tOt<; Ka'taYctOl<; oucr'tpaTCEAEtaV OlEIlElvav aOouAw'tOl. 
88 X.17.8-9. 
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military involvement throughout the major areas of its empire. Carthaginian military 
planning during the fifth and fourth centuries met with mixed success. Although 
Carthage managed to extend its influence as well as its territory in other areas of 
developed settlement, it was often opposed. Nonetheless, we can discern the full 
maturity of the Carthaginians' use of aggressive tactics to increase their domain. No 
longer was Carthage content with inhabiting coastal strips; it now attempted to 
conquer entire regions and populations. The acquisition of territory to supplement 
interests had reached a point of deliberate expansion. In separate military endeavours 
we can discern certain Carthaginian interests. However, by looking at all reported 
actions within a certain timeframe we can see the true extent of this phenomenon in 
Carthaginian policy. 
THE LATER STAGES OF MILITARY EXPANSION 
The final stage of Carthaginian expansion was to prove the most eventful and the 
most unfortunate. From 279 with the invasion of Pyrrhus to the destruction of 
Carthage in 146, the Carthaginians faced a new set of enemies, initially from Greece 
in the form of Pyrrhus and then their greatest foe in Rome. The focus of most interest 
during this period is naturally the Punic Wars. It is best for this discussion, however, 
to look at the basic motives for Carthaginian aggression, thus leaving the more intense 
scrutiny to the military historians. In many respects the unconditional wars Carthage 
faced removed its older practice of limiting an invasion to one specific area. Carthage 
now found itself fighting on several fronts often throughout the Western 
Mediterranean. Carthage still maintained its aggressive tactics during this period and 
was still eager to increase its territory and influence abroad. 
THE LEAD UP TO THE FIRST PUNIC WAR 
The first foe Carthage was to face during this period was Pyrrhus. Although he is seen 
as the aggressor, the Carthaginians reacted with force. The best example is the third 
Romano-Carthaginian treaty which we have discussed already in some detai1.89 
Carthage appears eager to forbid the arrival of another strong force on Sicily. This 
89 Polyb. m.25, see Chp. VI, n.46. 
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mutual aid treaty makes several concessions to Rome which until then had been 
viewed as a junior partner of Carthage. The treaty certainly does not encourage 
Roman intervention on Sicily, preferring to leave the island as free from foreign 
intervention as possible. According to Diodorus, after Carthage had sworu this treaty, 
a Carthaginian force was dispatched to Rhegium in order to secure the Straits of 
Messina.90 Following this, before Pyrrhus landed in Syracuse, there was a 
Carthaginian force besieging the city. On both occasions we see Carthage actively 
taking the initiative on Sicily in order to promote its interests there. The siege of 
Syracuse is particularly important as Carthage controlled most other Greek centres on 
Sicily and with the fall of the former, its desire to control the island exclusively would 
have been fulfilled. 91 
Following the arrival of Pyrrhus and his force the Carthaginians were 
gradually pushed westward through Sicily, as one by one their garrisoned and 
occupied towns were taken. Pyrrhus' advance then stalled outside the last remaining 
Carthaginian stronghold Lilybaeum and after two months he abandoned the siege and 
retreated. Pyrrhus' supposed parting words, "my friends what a wrestling ground we 
leave behind us for the Romans and Carthaginians" ,92 although seemingly prophetic, 
is slightly exaggerated as Sicily had been an area of constant struggles for several 
centuries. 
With Pyrrhus now departed, the Carthaginians were left to reclaim their 
shattered territory on Sicily. Under Hanno and with the Carthaginian forces mobilised 
on Sicily, the Carthaginians recaptured Soloeis and re-occupied Acragas under 
amicable terms.93 It is possible that the Carthaginians sought to continue their 
expansion throughout the island. Then Hieron of Syracuse approached the 
Carthaginians looking to join forces and to drive the Mamertine forces from Messana. 
Rome, possibly alerted to the threat of a united Carthaginian Sicily, decided to aid the 
besieged Mamertines and thus brought Rome and Carthage into direct conflict for the 
first time. 
90 XXIL7.5-6. 
91 Apparently there were a number of Carthaginian garrisons stationed in Greek settlements during this 
period (Diod. XXII.10). 
92 Plut. Pyrr. XXIII.6, Olav O:1toAehtor.uov <p <piA.D1 KapXlloov{Ot<; Kat 'Pcoj.La{ot<; 1taA.ai(J'tpav. 
93 Diod. XXIII. I. 
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THE FIRST PUNIC WAR 
It appears from the outbreak of the First Punic War that Carthage was not the 
aggressive state. Still, this cannot be entirely true for one of the two protagonists 
taking part in a war that lasted over twenty years. There has been much discussion 
regarding the outbreak of the First Punic War in literature, both ancient and modern.94 
One aspect which becomes evident when looking at the First Punic War in detail is 
that the theatres of conflict are mostly in Carthaginian territory.95 This suggests that 
the Romans were the more aggressive of the two states. The nature of the conflict is 
also of interest. The Romans, despite some success with borrowed fleets, eventually 
realised that the best method of defeating Carthage lay in victory at sea. The Romans 
usually commanded the field after land battles against Carthage,96 but until supremacy 
at sea was theirs, Carthage was able to keep fighting. It was not until more than 
twenty years that Rome was able to construct a fleet and to win a decisive naval 
victory off the Aegates Islands and thus to force Carthage to surrender. In many 
respects the war was conducted in familiar circumstances to Carthage, both in its own 
territory and with military tactics to which it was accustomed.97 
The main area of contention was again Sicily. As the war progressed it became 
apparent that the conquest of the island and its associated benefits were the main 
objective for both sides. The major trend of the First Punic War fought on Sicily was 
a slow but steady push west across the island, whereby the Romans drove the 
94 Polybius (I. 7ff) claims that the Romans entered the war out of kinship with the besieged Mamertines 
in Messana. This explanation seems flawed when we consider that a Mamertine force under Decius had 
revolted against the Romans in Rhegium and was itself besieged, captured, and executed. It seems 
more likely that with the fall of Rhegium to Rome, it now controlled the entire Italian peninsula. 
Polybius then claims that if Carthage had been able to capture Messana, Sicily would have fallen and 
Carthage would have dominated much of the surrounding territory of Italy and would have had a 
perfect staging point for invasion. It seems more likely, however, that Rome was the power wishing to 
gain at least a foothold on Sicily with a view to expand further. For some modem opinions on the 
outbreak of the First Punic War see Brian Caven, The Punic Wars (London 1980) Chp. I; Adrian 
Goldsworthy, The Punic Wars (London 2001) Chp. II. 
95 Dio Cassius (XI. 19) best demonstrates this Roman policy when providing the motives for the 
invasion of Regulus. He claims that the Romans believed it best to take the war to the Carthaginians' 
land (i.e. North Africa). If it failed, it would be of little consequence, if successful then the Romans 
would be at a great advantage. 
96 It is ironic that the greatest victory on land for Carthage during the First Punic War near Tunis in 255 
was commanded by a Greek, Xanthippus (Polyb. I.32-36). 
97 This is best highlighted by the Romans' constructing a fleet of their own based on the designs of a 
Carthaginian warship which had washed ashore (Polyb. I.20.15). Polybius claims that this was the 
model upon which Rome constructed its first fleet in order to challenge the Carthaginian supremacy at 
sea. 
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Carthaginians from their extended territory in Greek Sicily back to their own more 
traditional areas of occupation. Within a few years of the beginning of hostilities, 
Acragas had fallen to the Romans; in 254 Panormus; in 252 Thermae and Lipara. By 
250, the Carthaginians, partly through their own tactics were left defending the well-
fortified sites of Drepana and Lilybaeum. There are several occasions when Carthage 
sent considerable forces to Sicily, but these proved inadequate to halt the Roman 
advance. One of the few successes the Carthaginians enjoyed late in the war was 
under Hamilcar Barca who, with an invasion force, recaptured the town of Eryx in 
244.98 Nevertheless, this success proved inconclusive, as Hamilcar was unable to 
relieve the besieged Drepana. Carthaginian actions on Sicily, except for the odd 
occasion, remained defensive. Rome proved a superior land power, and like the 
Spartans trying to deliver the final blow to Athens in the Peloponnesian War, was 
finally able to adapt to become a match at sea. Rome achieved what had been 
Carthage's goal for centuries when after the war the former was willing to lessen the 
war indemnity in exchange for exclusive rights to Sicily and its surrounding islands.99 
There were several lesser theatres of conflict in the First Punic War. Sardinia, 
one of the prize possessions in the Carthaginian Empire was the site of some fighting. 
During the war, Carthage utilised the island as a strategic base. It planned a possible 
invasion from Sardinia during the early stages of the war in an attempt to draw 
Roman forces away from Sicily.lOO Nothing eventuated from this manoeuvre, but the 
Carthaginian planning is clear: take the war to Rome on its own territory. Whether 
this action was a trick or not remains uncertain. The Romans also maintained an 
obvious interest in Sardinia. Polybius claims that as soon as Rome took an interest in 
the sea, it attempted to seize control of the island. lOl Sardinia proved a useful 
Carthaginian base for launching raids along the Italian coast. In 259 we are told of a 
Roman offensive against Carthaginian positions on Sardinia. Io2 After capturing Aleria 
on Corsica, Lucius Scipio and his fleet then proceeded to threaten Olbia on Sardinia 
before retreating. This was followed by a fleet under C. Sulpicius Paterculus, which 
tricked a fleet dispatched under the command of Hannibal and blockaded it in Sulcis. 
Hannibal was put to death, and another officer, Hanno defeated the Roman forces on 
98 Polyb. 1.56. 
991.63. 
100 Zonar. vrn.IO. 
101 Polyb. 1.24.7. 
102 Zonar. Vrn.ll 
269 
land. 103 Sardinia was important to the Carthaginian war effort. It was from this base 
which Carthage was able to muster some form of offensive against Roman territory. 
Its importance to Rome is apparent. Dio claims that Regulus' original demands for 
Carthaginian surrender included Sardinia along with Sicily.104 It is possible that there 
was further action on or around Sardinia during the First Punic War. Our evidence 
and knowledge of the island's role during the war is brief and possibly incomplete. lOS 
The Roman desire for Sardinia transcends simple military purposes, and from limited 
literary accounts, this becomes apparent during the First Punic War. This is further 
emphasised by the Roman annexation of Sardinia from Carthage in 238 under threat 
of war only a few years after the cessation of hostilities.106 
Probably the only example of Carthage actively pursuing its own initiative in 
military affairs during the First Punic War was its raids on the Italian coast. There are 
several examples of this Carthaginian policy which can be justified by their 
dominance at sea. Presumably these raids were launched mostly from Sardinia and 
possibly Corsica, but Sicily also remains a possible location. In 261 we find Hannibal 
ravaging the coasts of Italy by sea so as to upset Roman plans in Sicily.107 This policy 
is echoed later when Hamilcar Barca arrived in Sicily fresh from pillaging the 
territory of Locri and Bruttium in Southeast Italy.108 There is further Carthaginian 
activity suggesting that this policy was pursued extensively. Naturally it depended on 
Carthaginian supremacy at sea, and examples occur before the development of a 
Roman fleet or while this fleet was unavailable. These raids coupled with the 
aforementioned possible invasion from Sardinia provide the only examples of 
Carthage managing an attack on Rome in its own territory. 
Carthage was never able to pursue its own military tactics so long as the 
Roman advance across Sicily continued. It undertook some minor actions in areas of 
coastal Southern Italy, but these were never more than raids. Carthage, as with its 
earlier failings in Sicily, remained unable to mount a proper war with large invasions. 
It preferred to operate the war at a distance and paid dearly for such a policy. In many 
respects Carthage was always a move behind Rome. The latter was able to dictate 
103 Zonar. VIII. 1 I ; Polyb. 124.5-6. 
104 Casso Dio XI.22. 
105 See E. Lipinski, "Carthaginois en Sardaigne aI' epoque de la premiere guerre punique", Studia 
Phoenicia X, 1989, pp.67-73. 
106 Polyb. 188.8-12. 
107 Zonar. XI.10. 
108 Polyb. 156.1. 
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policy and to keep the war away from its own territory, further weakening Carthage. 
Eventually Carthage could not compete with Rome and was soundly beaten. Its 
empire was severely diminished with the losses of Sicily and then Sardinia. 
THE SECOND PUNIC WAR 
From the costly loss of the First Punic War and then the Mercenary War, Carthage 
emerged battered, but still relatively powerful. After the dust had settled, Carthage 
still held sway over its territory in North Africa and Southern Spain. Nevertheless, it 
needed new territory to redevelop its former strength. With Rome now its rival in the 
Central Mediterranean, it was forced to look to the West. In the lead-up and the 
opening years of the Second Punic War, we see a decided shift in Carthaginian 
foreign policy. Despite being humiliated by Rome and its own subjects in war, losing 
large sections of its empire, and being forced to pay large war indemnities, Carthage 
shook off its malaise and went on the offensive again. 
The cause of the Second Punic War, like that of the First, has been discussed 
at great length. The apparent act of war when Hannibal attacked Saguntum was 
simply the culmination of Carthaginian expansion coupled with Roman wariness at 
the former's rapid recovery and newfound strength. The driving force behind this 
offensive was the Barcids. As one of the few competent and surviving Carthaginian 
generals following the First Punic and Mercenary Wars, Hami1car Barca moved into 
Southern Spain in 23817 and began to implement an obvious strategy of expansion. 
Diodorus provides the best account of his campaign in Spain. 109 Hami1car spent nine 
years establishing Carthaginian dominance in the interior of Spain possibly as far 
north as Cape Nao. We find a standard policy for invasion followed by permanent 
occupation. Hami1car settled the site of Acra Leuce (modern Alicante) as a permanent 
base of operations against Spanish tribes named as Iberians, Tartessians, and Celts. 
His method of conquest is reminiscent of Carthaginian policy on Sicily with a number 
of cities won over by diplomacy as well as by conflict. By the time of his death in 
229, he had conquered a large area of Southern Spain with the exception of the Orissi. 
Despite the ancient opinion that revenge was the main reason behind 
Hamilcar's invasion of Spain, there appear to be more practical motives at work. The 
109 XXV.lO. 
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most obvious incentives for such an invasion are income and manpower. Following 
the First Punic and Mercenary wars Carthage was short of both. Hamilcar himself 
suggests the former motive. When he was quizzed as to why he was acting in this 
manner by Rome, he replied that it was so that Carthage could repay its war debt. lID 
This was reinforced by the eventual Carthaginian ability to do so in such rapid time. 
The attraction of obtaining further manpower is obvious, as Carthage would have 
been decidedly undermanned following years of conflict. Even during his campaign 
we find Hamilcar actively enrolling defeated forces into his own ranks, showing 
leniency to others, and preferring diplomatic solutions instead of possible costly 
military action. Such a policy was also to continue under the command of his son-in-
law and son. 
Following the death of his father-in-law, command of Carthaginian interests in 
Spain passed on to Hasdrubal. Like his father-in-law, Hasdrubal continued 
Carthaginian development in Southern Spain. The nature of Carthaginian intentions in 
the area is obvious with the foundation of New Carthage. This base along with 
another unknown settlement suggests that Hasdrubal wished fully to utilise and to 
settle the area. 111 The nature of this settlement and the wealth it generated in bullion 
and other commodities shows that the Carthaginian goal was to glean as much wealth 
from the area as possible. Also like his predecessor, Hasdrubal showed a tendency to 
avoid conflict when possible, preferring more diplomatic channels. ll2 Evidence 
suggests that he would incorporate both to produce the best result as we see when he 
defeated the twelve cities of the Orissi and took a native princess as his bride, and by 
doing so united both Spanish and Carthaginian interests. Diodorus and Polybius claim 
that Hasdrubal commanded considerable power in Spain.1l3 This appears the main 
motive for the Barcid expedition into the area. It is most likely that during this period 
110 Hamilcar's untimely death leaves the question of whether or not he harboured plans against Rome. 
Some Roman sources claim that he acted without the consent of the Carthaginian government so as to 
shift the blame of the Second Punic War onto the Barcid family. This is most evident in Polybius and 
Livy where it appears that Hannibal practically inherited the war from his father. It is possible that he, 
much like Philip in the East against the Persians, planned an eventual attack after all the preparations 
were made. Hannibal carried out the invasion only a decade later, but at least for the moment, 
Hamilcar's (and later Hasdrubal's) main priority was establishing a strong and lucrative province for 
Carthage in Southern Spain. 
111 Diod. XXV. 12; see Chp. III for the strategic purposes and benefits of New Carthage. 
!12 Diod. XXV. 11 , "on 'AGO po\:' ~as lla8ffiv 1t palCn lCco't£pav o1)Gav 'tllS ~{as 'tl,V E1ttd lCElaV 
1tpO£lCptvE 'tl,v EiP~VTJV 'tou 1tOA£1l0U. 
113 Diod. XXV. 12. Diodorus claims that he commanded sixty thousand infantry, eight thousand cavalry, 
and two hundred elephants; Polybius (II.13.3) states the Romans were concerned that he was rebuilding 
the Carthaginian Empire stronger than it had ever been. 
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Rome, concerned with a Gallic revolt and the growth of Carthaginian power to the 
west, arranged for a treaty limiting Carthaginian expansion to the region south of the 
River Ebro. Hasdrubal entered into a unilateral covenant with Rome stipulating that 
he would not cross the Ebro under arms. 114 Hasdrubal never broke this covenant, but 
according to Polybius, the Carthaginian government did not recognise the validity of 
this treaty.ll5 Therefore Hannibal's actions were not bound by the previous oath sworn 
by his brother-in-law, nor was the Carthaginian government.1l6 Nevertheless, 
Carthage was buoyed by its success and the rewards that came with it and continued 
north. 
Hasdrubal also died after less than a decade in command in Spain in 221. Like 
his father-in-law, he had expanded and settled the growing Spanish province. 
Command now passed to Hamilcar's son Hannibal. Under Hannibal, Carthaginian 
military expansion reached a new height. He inherited a profitable and secure 
province from his father and brother-in-law as well as considerable forces. His goal is 
unknown at this stage, however, the result certainly implies a strong will, careful 
preparation, and a strategy for invasion.l17 However, when Hannibal decided to break 
his brother-in-Iaw's agreement with Rome and to commit to an invasion of Italy is 
unclear.llS Roman interference in Spain regarding Saguntum would certainly have 
raised concern and anger in Carthage. The fact was that Carthage remained a major 
power in the Western Mediterranean, a power which had been unfairly treated by the 
Rome and, more importantly, had grown strong again. It is natural that Rome was to 
feel the brunt of Carthaginian aggression. The events and legality of the attack on 
Saguntum are largely irrelevant. By 221, Carthage, led by Hannibal, was ready to re-
establish its dominance again and go to war with Rome. 
The theatres of conflict of the Second Punic War offer an interesting contrast 
to that of the first. During the First Punic War, Carthage suffered as it was unable to 
shift the bulk of conflict from its own territories. Rome and its territory had escaped 
relatively unscathed and was able to resupply its forces seemingly at will. The Second 
Punic War saw a marked shift. This time Hannibal was able to take the war to Italy. 
He made his presence felt by defeating Roman armies, ravaging the Italian 
114 Polyb. III 27 .9. 
115m.21. 
116 B ickerman, pp .18-19. 
117 See Goldsworthy ppJ47-8, regarding Hannibal's preparations for the war. 
118 See Bickerman, pp.19-20. 
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countryside, and breaking the previously secure network of Roman allies throughout 
Italy. Hannibal had learnt from the mistakes made during the First Punic War in 
which Carthage was only able to carry out small-scale raids along the Italian coast. By 
occupying or pillaging any area he wished to, he was able to strike fear into Rome and 
to disrupt large areas of its territory. Again the Carthaginian inability to supply him or 
to protect the vital province of Spain meant that Rome was able to isolate Hannibal 
before drawing him back to North Africa and defeating him. 
Beyond the orthodox military side of the Second Punic War, Hannibal also 
exercised a degree of skill in more political and diplomatic spheres. His main tactic 
beyond the battlefield was certainly diplomacy. During his ascendancy in Italy he 
embarked on a campaign of diplomatic manoeuvring with numerous settlements and 
peoples in Italy. The drive behind such thinking was naturally to whittle down Roman 
allies in Italy and to weaken their stranglehold on the peninsula. Hannibal attempted 
to surround Rome with hostile peoples. As we have seen, the Carthaginians had 
employed this practice against the Sicilian Greeks for some time. Hannibal's success 
at such a policy was mixed as it had been in the past for the Carthaginians. He 
managed several decisive coups by enrolling the support of the likes of Capua in 216, 
the Bruttians along with several other Italian tribes, and a number of Greek 
settlements in the South. 119 Despite Livy's claim that the Italians went over to 
Hannibal's side, he never was able to command the loyalty he desired and desperately 
needed even after such crushing victories as that of Cannae. l20 The Gauls' and 
Italians' support was fickle despite a number of attempts to gain it. These groups and 
others seemed reluctant to desert Rome or to remain Carthaginian allies for long. An 
unlikely alliance was even arranged between Carthage and Philip V of Macedon. l2l 
However, this treaty never resulted in the support Hannibal needed. Hannibal was 
unable to trouble Roman interests beyond his initial, meteoric success. The Romans, 
however, were able to harass Carthaginian supply lines from Spain and then take the 
to war once again to Carthaginian territory ensuring final victory. 
119 Livy xxn.2-IO, XXIII. 1 1. These temporarily included the Lucanians, Samnites, and Campanians 
(of which Capua was the capital); Greek states were divided over allegiances with Hannibal with states 
such as Thurii and Metapontum joining him (XXV.1S) while others such as Rhegium remaining loyal 
to Rome. 
120 XXllI.ll. 
121 Polyb. VIl.9-1O. 
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Beyond the diplomatic policies of Hannibal, the several theatres of conflict 
demonstrate Carthaginian strategies. The Italian theatre would have proved the 
decisive area of the war if Hannibal had been able to achieve more by uniting more 
peoples against Rome and gained better support from Carthage. He proved unable to 
exert enough pressure on Rome and allowed the Fabian policy of avoiding the 
Carthaginians on the battlefield in Italy while the Romans launched offensives in 
Spain, to a lesser extent the Balearic Islands, and eventually North Africa which 
would spell doom for Carthaginian hopes of victory. Rome's ability to bring the 
conflict to Carthaginian territory was reminiscent of the First Punic War and as 
equally effective. 
Two smaller events during the Second Punic War suggest that Carthage had an 
obvious desire to reclaim its lost empire. Although minor in comparison with other 
events, Carthage made attempts to reclaim the islands of Sicily and Sardinia. On 
Sardinia the harsh nature of Roman rule led to the uprising of native Sards led by 
Hampsicora in 215. 122 Despite having experienced heavy losses in Spain, Carthage 
dispatched a force led by Hasdrubal (a Barcid) to unite with the Sards to and defeat 
the Romans on the island. Although Hasdrubal managed to link up with Hampsicora, 
Manlius defeated the force, and all hope of reclaiming Sardinia was lost. 123 A similar 
scenario developed regarding Carthaginian efforts to recapture Sicily. In 215, Hieron 
of Syracuse died leaving the maintenance of his kingdom to his fifteen-year-old 
grandson Hieronymus. Political instability quickly followed, and Syracuse once again 
looked to Carthage for an alliance. 124 According to Livy, the island of Sicily was 
supposed to be redivided between Syracuse and Carthage once the Romans were 
expelled. Once again civil strife handed Carthage an opportunity to regain one of its 
lost provinces from the Romans; once again it failed dismally. Although Carthage 
sent a number of forces and reinforcements to Sicily, had some successes, and 
persuaded a number of towns to desert to its side, a mixture of poor fortune, bad 
decisions, and lack of initiative proved the downfall of Carthaginian hopes on the 
island.125 The capture of Sicily, or at least the use of part of the island might have 
122 Livy XXIII.32. 
123 XXIIIAO-41. This may not have been the first Carthaginian attempt to incite a Sardinian revolt 
against the Romans. According to Zonaras (VIII.18), the Carthaginians secretly persuaded the Sards to 
revolt shortly after Rome had annexed the island. 
124 Diod. XXIVA-7. 
125 For an overview of these events of the war on Sicily see Goldsworthy, pp.260-268. 
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proved decisive in the outcome of the war. With more support and a number of 
strategic ports close to Italy, Carthage would have been connected to Hannibal in Italy 
and better able to resupply his forces. This benefit and that gained by the recapture of 
Sicily was never realised - to the detriment of Carthage and its war efforts. 
After the Second Punic War the Romans were able to strip Carthage of its 
empire and its ability to regain its power. Carthage, now a city-state in North Africa 
was surrounded by its enemies, and despite an economic and social recovery 
following the Second Punic War, was doomed to be dictated to, rather than pursuing 
its own initiatives. The remaining conflicts during this period are testament to such a 
development. Masinissa harassed Carthage until the latter, goaded into conflict, 
invited Rome again to begin the Third Punic War which led to the final defeat and 
destruction of Carthage and the last official remnants of the Carthaginian Empire in 
146. 
Carthage used its developing aggressive nature to good effect in its empire. 
From the sixth century the growing expansive nature of Carthage compared to that of 
the Phoenicians becomes increasingly apparent. This increase, spurred on by 
successful conquest and the wealth it brought, only grew over time. Initially Carthage 
used military force to secure the basis of its empire and to ward off would-be rivals. 
With a power base established, it was then able to use conquest to expand this 
territory and to create for itself a Carthaginian Empire. This growth naturally began to 
intrude on more powerful neighbouring states and, beginning in the fifth century, we 
find the Greeks and then the Romans develop as the main Carthaginian rivals. The 
motives behind certain campaigns are certainly varied, as are Carthaginian strategies. 
In areas where there was a distinct lack of a developed power, Carthage initially 
maintained a basic presence as the Phoenicians had before them. However, aggressive 
Carthaginian tactics soon saw them expand into further territories for various reasons, 
often economic. Once these areas were subdued, then better settlement patterns were 
introduced and Carthaginian provinces were established. Developed nations proved 
more difficult to Carthage and more often than not exposed frailties inherent in the 
Carthaginian system. The nature of the Carthaginians' military activities is varied in 
accordance with their campaigns and the strategies they devised. Military conquest 
was supplemented with diplomacy. Carthage was prepared to conquer areas such as 
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Sicily and Sardinia by mounting several campaigns which as we have seen utilised 
different tactics. However, it was not able to commit to unconditional wars where 
attrition was the deciding factor. When a campaign went awry, Carthage preferred to 
remove itself and to re-address the situation or even to turn its attention elsewhere, 
when in fact a more decisive action was necessary. The mercurial nature of 
Carthaginian military expansion attracted mixed results in different areas. 
Nevertheless, through such methods Carthage was able to establish its dominion in 
several prominent areas of the Mediterranean and by doing so helped define its 
developing nature and the activities it employed. 
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CONCLUSION 
Carthaginian activity abroad is an essential component of any study of the city and its 
empire. Carthage was never an isolated settlement, but developed from one 
Phoenician port into a capital which commanded an expansive empire. Like the 
Phoenicians before them, a great deal of Carthaginian activity and society was based 
around endeavours abroad. 
One of the more interesting aspects when considering the nature of the 
Carthaginian Empire and activity is the ever-changing social and political climate of 
Carthage and the Western Mediterranean. As Carthage developed, so did aspects of its 
presence and influence abroad. This was by no means limited to Carthage itself, 
which dominated an ever-evolving area. Unlike the Phoenicians, who operated in the 
Western Mediterranean largely without competition from developed rivals, Carthage 
was not as fortunate and had to endure encroachments from Greeks and Romans. 
Carthage was forced to remodel the way it maintained and operated its activities, not 
only to protect its own interests, but also to ensure their profitability. Carthage was 
forced to develop its own tactics to cope with foreign pressure. This is most 
recognisable in the way Carthage used aspects of trade, settlement, and expansion to 
operate its empire and its relations with others. 
The unique development of Carthage meant that it maintained its activities in 
several ways. Trade remained the mainstay of the Carthaginians, as it had for the 
Phoenicians before them. It was the prospect of trade which drove Carthage to expand 
its interests abroad. Trade also remained the one constant of the Carthaginian Empire. 
It expanded this further into areas of limited contact such as the Sub-Sahara and 
possible destinations in Southern France and along the Atlantic coasts. Unlike aspects 
of settlement and conquest, which remained sporadic and often fickle, trade continued 
to flow within and beyond the empire. Its durable nature meant that it was a continual 
means of contact with its territories and a wide variety of peoples. 
As a Phoenician city, Carthage was established with a pre-existing legacy of 
colonisation. Although it did not need to establish a large colonial empire, Carthage 
still used various methods of settlement for various reasons both within and beyond 
its recognised boundaries. Carthaginian settlement was unique as it operated on 
several distinctive levels. Carthage literally 'recolonised' the Phoenician settlements it 
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had subsumed. This process was usua1ly lengthy and varied, however, Carthage was 
able to maintain its influence while gradua1ly acculturating Phoenician settlements 
under a Carthaginian system. Otherwise we see Carthage settling colonies and 
emporia similar to Greek and Phoenician practice. The real Carthaginian development 
in this field was an ability to adapt settlement to suit specific areas and needs. This is 
emphasised by the range of settlement practices Carthage utilised over several 
centuries. 
Fina1ly, Carthage developed techniques of its own to cope with its ever-
changing position in the Western Mediterranean, of which the most obvious was its 
increased aggression from the sixth century onward. Unlike the Phoenicians, who 
created a seaborne 'empire' with relatively little territory, Carthage was fu1ly prepared 
to conquer large areas and to dominate them. This activity became more obvious 
throughout its history and was not limited to specific areas, with Carthage fighting to 
maintain or strengthen its influence in a1l its major provinces at some point, as we1l as 
conducting campaigns in foreign territory. Again Carthaginian practice was not 
homogeneous. Areas such as Sardinia, North Africa, and Spain were not as highly 
developed as other areas, so Carthage waged a number of campaigns in these regions 
relatively unopposed by developed nations. In Sicily the political situation was 
completely different. Carthage was forced to adopt several military, diplomatic, and 
political techniques to increase its territory, which met with mixed success. These 
tactics came to dominate ancient, and to an extent, modern opinion regarding the 
nature of Carthage and its foreign policies. However, as we have seen it was one 
tactic among several, and even then it was not governed by a single strategy. 
The Carthaginians conducted their activities in a varied and changeable 
manner. Unlike the Phoenicians who settled for trade, or the Greeks for necessity, or 
even the Romans who colonised for several social and military reasons, Carthage had 
a range of specific motivations which defined its activity, and in many respects 
Carthaginian history and society. As we have witnessed, these methods combined 
several techniques encompassing trade, settlement, conquest, and influence abroad. 
Although our evidence provides a varied picture of Carthaginian activity, we are still 
able to form several solid conclusions regarding its function and character. These 
themes are vital in attempting to illustrate such an important aspect of Carthage, 
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which defines its image as one of the more powerful and enduring empires in 
antiquity. 
EXTERNAL AND CARTHAGINIAN INFLUENCES 
The development of Carthage from a ninth century trading port on the North African 
coast to a powerful empire in a matter of only three centuries is remarkable. The 
Carthaginian Empire dominated much of the Western Mediterranean until the second 
century, largely unopposed in many areas. In many respects, the prominence of 
Carthage remained indebted to the support and influence of others. 
The first of these groups, and certainly the most important was the 
Phoenicians. We have looked at the so-called Phoenician legacy to Carthage on 
several occasions. The most obvious, and perhaps the most unusual aspect of this 
legacy was the expansive network of pre-existing settlements, territories, and trade 
routes. Carthage inherited an existing and functioning empire when the Phoenicians 
withdrew from the West in the sixth century. Carthage, as the most prominent 
Phoenician settlement in the area, assumed control of this empire over the next 
century relatively peacefully. Unlike more traditional empires in antiquity, Carthage 
was able to expand rapidly with relatively little effort, only needing to employ more 
aggressive tactics on certain occasions. It did not need to spend time and huge 
resources establishing its initial territory abroad. 
The development of Carthage was aided by its era as a Phoenician city. Until 
the sixth century it to grew powerful from Phoenician trade and protection. Even its 
first reported independent action of founding Ebusus in 654/3 BC appears to have 
been carried out under Phoenician protection. It almost appears that Carthage was 
being groomed as an obvious heir to Phoenician activity in the West. Tyre naturally 
developed and protected its colony until it could operate and function independently. 
As a part of the Phoenician 'Empire', Carthage remained a semi-independent 
settlement for over two centuries, growing into a prosperous and powerful state and 
eventually assuming control of the old Phoenician settlements by means of 
assimilation and limited conquest. 
There are several other major areas of Phoenician influence which remained 
obvious in many of the Carthaginians' activities. Carthage followed in the footsteps of 
its Phoenician forbears in two of the three main methods it used to expand and 
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maintain its empire: trade and settlement. Although Carthage developed these and 
also increasingly used military and political tactics, the basic methods of trade and 
settlement were handed down from the Phoenicians. Trade (especially maritime) 
remained the major income of Carthage throughout its history, as it had for the 
Phoenicians. Although new patterns, routes, and tactics arose, Carthage remained a 
mercantile state, often developing its empire for this very purpose. Settlement was 
also a theme common to both Phoenicians and Carthaginians. The Phoenician practice 
of founding colonies and emporia continued as a Carthaginian policy. Although 
Carthage developed its own methods of settlement, which became quite distinct from 
earlier Phoenician models, they were based on a common culture of settlement. 
It is impossible to discuss every aspect of society, culture, and policy the 
Phoenicians introduced in Carthage. As the latter was a Tyrian colony and essentially 
recognised as a Phoenician city until the late sixth century, the basis of Carthaginian, 
and to a large extent Punic society, was essentially Phoenician. We have witnessed 
this in detail both in Carthaginian activity abroad and aspects of Carthaginian society. 
Government, religion, economy, and ethnicity were all initially identifiably 
Phoenician. Although we look at the Phoenicians to help us understand the origins 
and nature of the Carthaginians, in many respects we can look to the latter as the 
continuation of the Phoenicians in the West. 
The Phoenicians were not the only group which influenced Carthage, its 
empire, and the development of Punic culture. The Greeks certainly aided in defining 
the nature of Carthage and its foreign policies. Greek influence in Carthage and 
throughout its empire is obvious. As with many non-Hellenic peoples, the 
Carthaginians appear to have been influenced by several aspects of Greek culture. 
This is most evident in the material remains of many Carthaginian sites, where there 
was an obvious taste for Greek commodities and evidence of thriving trade. Contact 
with the Greeks defined much of Carthaginian history. Their co-existence on Sicily, 
despite often resulting in conflict, was enduring and prosperous to both parties. The 
Greeks were ultimately responsible for introducing Carthage to systematised coinage, 
which it adopted to facilitate trade in the late fifth century. This influence was to help 
modernise the Carthaginian economy which was heavily reliant on trade. 
It is likely that the Greeks were also influential in developing Carthaginian 
colonial techniques. After Carthage assumed control over the Phoenician 'Empire', it 
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was able to develop its own foreign policies, which notably became more aggressive. 
This is evident in the field of settlement where Carthage tended to settle large 
permanent foundations which resembled Greek colonies rather than the majority of 
pre-existing Phoenician settlements. The nature of sites such as Lilybaeum and New 
Carthage may have been direct results of Greek influence on Carthaginian policy. 
Contact with Greeks in Sicily, Southern France, Spain, and in the East certainly 
influenced several aspects of Carthaginian society. Although the majority of our 
Greek sources depict Carthage as a constant enemy, there was also constant 
interaction between the two cultures. 
Carthage's reliance on trade brought it into contact with a number of peoples 
who also influenced its development and activities abroad. From the late sixth century 
onwards, the Etruscans remained a close Carthaginian ally before, and to a lesser 
extent after the decline of the former. The obvious military treaty they maintainedl 
saw them joining forces on a number of reported occasions, the most notable were 
their defeat of the Greeks off Alalia in 535 and their loss to Hieron at the Battle of 
Cumae in 474. This contact was probably initially based on trade. From Sardinia, the 
Carthaginians continued a probable pre-existing Phoenicio-Etruscan relationship and 
continued the lucrative trade between the two nations. This is best emphasised by the 
existence of a probable Carthaginian trading community at Pyrgi, operating in the 
territory of the Etruscans.2 
This relationship continued with Rome. Although the intimate connection the 
Etruscans and Carthaginians shared appears absent from any Romano-Carthaginian 
treaty, the two powers maintained an enduring non-aggression pact for several 
centuries, which ensured the continuation of trade between the Carthaginian Empire 
and Central Italy. 
Contact with Egypt, initially established by the Phoenicians, continued with 
Carthage and remained a strong cultural influence. Along with Greek material, 
Egyptian remains are among the most recognisable foreign imports in Carthaginian 
settlements. Although we do not know whether or not Carthage and Egypt maintained 
an official accord, Egyptian influences appear to have had several profound effects in 
Carthaginian society and culture. From a stylistic perspective Egypt seems to have 
been a constant influence on several aspects of Carthaginian taste including art, 
J Arist. Pol. III.S.lO-ll, 12SDa, see Chp. VI, ns.18, 28-33 and text. 
2 KAl. 277; Chp. VI, ns.23-26 and text. 
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architecture, and luxury items.3 Egyptian contact may also have resulted in several 
cultural changes in Carthage. This is most evident in religion. Egyptian type motifs 
are common on stelae in the topheth of Punic Carthage as is other influence in temple 
design and function. 4 It appears as though Carthage remained a willing and constant 
trading partner with Egypt, which led to cultural influence in Carthage and its empire. 
The effect of contact with a number of less developed peoples throughout the 
empire had on Carthage should not be underestimated, although it is often impossible 
attempting to identify the influence such smaller cultures may have had on 
Carthaginian society. From several larger groups, however, we may possibly detect 
some form of influence. Naturally the major point of contact was trade. Carthage 
actively traded and used many groups of peoples as markets, industrial bases, and for 
mining/cultivation. Presumably the nature of such markets helped define settlement 
and trading patterns. This is evident along the coasts of Southern Spain and Atlantic 
Africa. Unfortunately the majority of such contact is poorly reported in most areas 
and can only be assumed in others. 
We may assume that several areas of Carthaginian culture were partially 
influenced by native or localised peoples. The most obvious area for such contact is in 
North Africa. The development of Punic culture appears to be largely a result of 
contact with foreign peoples. The native Berbers in North Africa appear to have been 
the major influence in this development. Through intermarriage and persistent 
contact, Carthaginian culture gradually 'acclimatised' to North Africa.s It is natural 
that the Carthaginians, living in close proximity with several groups of Berbers, 
would show signs of acculturation, despite largely depriving them of political rights 
and social status. The best example of this within the greater development of Punic 
culture was the adoption of Tanit as the primary divinity of Carthage by the fifth 
century. Contact with Berber influences appears the most likely reason behind this 
change.6 A similar process can be seen elsewhere in the Carthaginian Empire. 
3 This is obvious from the considerable remains littering Carthaginian tombs and temples. Items such as 
amulets and scarabs etc. appear to have been widely accepted in Carthaginian culture, e.g. Vercoutter, 
passim; Quillard, pp.1-32; Leclant, pp.95-102. 
4 See Chp. VI, ns.5-9 and text. Topheth iconography is obviously influenced by Egyptian types 
including sun motifs. The adoption of the so-called 'Egyptian throat' for Carthaginian temple 
architecture is another example of cultural influence and active adoption in Carthaginian society. 
5 This was by no means limited to the Carthaginian period. Original Phoenician settlement and mixing 
with native Berbers created the Libyphoenicians, which were a distinctive group particularly in North 
Africa but also attested in other areas of the Carthaginian Empire. 
6 See Chp. II, ns.67-71 and text for some possible explanations of the origins and development of Tanit. 
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Elymian Eryx was developed into a mixed Punic-Elymian settlement based around 
the adoption of the local cult which was assimilated as Astarte. 
Beyond the cultural sphere, it appears that several groups were influential on 
Carthaginian foreign policy. The indomitable Sards radically altered Carthaginian 
military policy on Sardinia and had an obvious effect on settlement and trading 
patterns. The same can be argued to a lesser degree in North Africa with the Berbers 
and later in Southern Spain. Otherwise we see the constant use of a number of 
peoples, both from highly developed societies and localised peoples, as mercenaries 
and allies in Carthaginian armies. Groups of Numidian cavalry, Balearic slingers, and 
Celtiberian troops all became commonplace in a number of conflicts. Carthage 
utilised the manpower available to it throughout the empire which largely 
characterised its army and its military campaigns. This aspect was also influenced by 
a number of allied groups which fought alongside Carthage. The best reported of 
these groups were the Elymians in Sicily. Even from an early period they were allied 
to the Phoenicians to the point where Thucydides claims that their location was partly 
responsible for the Phoenician settlement pattern in Western Sicily.? On a number of 
occasions the Elymians joined or supported Carthaginian invasions or activities on the 
island. Carthage also occasionally often enjoyed the support of the Sicanians and the 
Siceli on Sicily. The relationships with all three groups also seem to have been aided 
by trade. 
Although Carthage remained open to foreign influence, we have seen detailed 
examples of Carthaginian influence on others. This phenomenon is particularly true 
for smaller, less developed peoples throughout the Carthaginian Empire or in 
neighbouring territory. 8 This is evident in several forms and often ironically appears 
after the removal of Carthaginian power demonstrating the residual nature of its 
influence and that of Punic culture. Legacies of political and social organisation were 
evident in North Africa and Spain after the removal of Carthaginian power.9 The 
survival of the Punic language can also be witnessed in North Africa, Sicily, and 
possibly Spain several centuries after the withdrawal of Carthage. lO Several larger 
states were obviously influenced by aspects of Carthaginian society. We have seen a 
7 Thuc. VI.2.6. 
8 This phenomenon was present in most areas of Carthaginian activity, both within the areas it 
controlled and those beyond. For examples of such diffusion of culture, see Chp. V. 
9 Chp. V, ns.2-17, 39-52 and text. 
10 Chp. V, ns.23, 35,41. 
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connection between models of Carthaginian agriculture in North Africa and the 
Roman system of latifundia, or large slave-run estates.ll A more isolated example was 
when the Romans apparently modelled their entire navy on a Carthaginian warship 
after Carthage had shown its dominance at sea during the opening years of the First 
Punic WarY Probably the greatest influence of Carthaginian contact with developed 
nations such as the Romans and the Greeks was their trade. Although both parties 
became familiar with Carthaginian society and culture through a number of costly 
wars, the real point of contact and influence was trade. Because Carthage commanded 
such a vast empire, it also controlled its commodities, which were heavily exploited 
and exported to such nations. 
It is natural for such a dominant and dynamic state to influence its neighbours. 
This is even more feasible when we consider the active nature of Carthage as both a 
trading nation and an expansive power. We can trace several prominent influences on 
peoples with which Carthage came into contact: presumably such influences, although 
often subtle, were widespread. The expansive nature of Carthaginian activity abroad 
dictates that Carthage came into contact with a range of peoples and was open to 
foreign influence, but in tum was also influential to others. 
THE PROBLEMS OF CHARACTERISING CARTHAGINIAN 
ACTIVITY 
As we have seen on numerous occasions during this discussion, there are a number of 
inherent problems in identifying various aspects of Carthaginian history and activity. 
We are left with gaping holes in our knowledge of important periods of Carthaginian 
history and aspects of society and culture. Often we are forced to piece together 
fragmentary evidence in an attempt to reach important conclusions. There are several 
problems which confront us when looking at the nature of Carthaginian activity which 
unfortunately often interact to compound matters further. In some respects the nature 
of Carthaginian activity, which is the main topic of our discussion, is elusive and 
often responsible for the problems we encounter. 
11 Obvious Roman interest in Carthaginian agricultural techniques is attested by writers such as Varro 
and Columella, see Chp. II, ns.14-19 and text. 
12 Polyb. 120.15 
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The major reason behind this is the nature of our sources, both literary and 
archaeological. Our main hindrance remains the lack of a comprehensive Phoenicio-
Punic literary tradition. Beyond a handful of scattered inscriptions there are virtually 
no surviving written records. Such records existed in reasonable amounts in antiquity 
as we have seen from various citations, however, these have rarely survived in any 
detail. Unfortunately we possess very little of the Carthaginians' input as to how they 
described themselves and their activities. 
We therefore turn to the other major literate societies in contact with Carthage, 
namely the Greeks and Romans. Again we are hindered by an obvious enmity which 
was standard among many of the authors discussing affairs between the Carthaginians 
and their own respective nations. Testament to this problem is the nature of the 
accounts which survive. The vast majority of detailed accounts regarding Carthage 
describe interactions with the Greeks and Romans. Our first major account survives in 
Diodorus (using primarily Timaeus and occasionally also Ephorus) regarding the 
Greek wars on Sicily. The major Roman sources which survive cover the Punic Wars 
courtesy of Polybius, Livy, and Appian. Naturally these accounts are generally hostile 
towards the Carthaginians and other authors who portrayed Carthage in a sympathetic 
light such as Philinus were naturally unpopular and their works have not survived. 
Other accounts regarding Carthaginian society such as Aristotle's description of the 
constitution and Mago's agricultural treatises have survived because they were 
essentially part of larger popular documents. On the whole our ancient literary 
coverage of Carthage remains entrenched in Greek and Roman bias. A large number 
of fragmentary citations spread across a wide spectrum of Greek and Roman authors 
are often anecdotes based on sensationalism and speculation. Unfortunately for such a 
large and prominent state as Carthage, which existed in a period with a reasonably 
high literary output, the literary tradition is poor and remains a major problem in any 
study of Carthage. 
The nature of our archaeological evidence also poses a number of problems 
regarding our understanding of Carthaginian activity, influences, and contact. 
Although our knowledge is increasing with more data being constantly discovered, we 
are still left with shortfalls generally uncharacteristic of a prominent colonising and 
trading state such as Carthage. Several problems develop when we attempt to gain a 
comprehensive archaeological record of Carthaginian settlements or areas of activity. 
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The sheer size of the Carthaginian Empire means that it is nearly impossible to 
provide a thorough archaeological record. Coupled with this is the ambiguous nature 
of a number of Carthaginian settlements. Many Carthaginian settlements are unknown 
because of previous occupation (usually Phoenician) and later settlement (evident in 
sites such as Leptis Magna and New Carthage). The guarded nature of Carthaginian 
activity in a number of areas also meant that many settlements were relatively 
unknown in antiquity (such as possible examples along the Atlantic coasts of Africa 
and Europe). Although a better archaeological picture of Carthaginian activity and 
settlement may emerge over time, like our literary tradition, we must at present deal 
with a number of limitations. 
One of the primary areas of Carthaginian activity was trade. The Carthaginians 
were trading a wide variety of commodities with many peoples over large areas 
throughout the Mediterranean and beyond. One of the startling discrepancies in these 
records is the virtual absence of Carthaginian remains in developed areas where trade 
is attested. Carthage was trading heavily with Egypt, the Greeks, and Rome, yet there 
are very few Carthaginian remains discovered in these areas. On the other hand there 
are considerable remains and evidence of influence from other groups (especially 
Egypt and the Greeks) in Carthage emphasising the existence of trade. Among less 
developed peoples, Carthaginian remains are better attested, especially in areas under 
Carthage's control or bordering its territory. This is discernable in North Africa, 
Sardinia, Spain, and Sicily. Less developed cultures exhibit more Punic material 
culture than highly developed peoples who were perhaps not interested in such items 
as they produced them in high levels themselves. Carthage was obviously exporting 
heavily to maintain such trade, but such export items are often unspecific and 
untraceable. Presumably many of these commodities were perishable and therefore 
largely invisible in our archaeological records. Other items may have been exported in 
raw bulk form and were manufactured elsewhere to leave no discerning trace as to 
their origins. Our indications are that Carthage was particularly interested in the 
extraction of metals, both precious and base. Silver, iron, copper, lead, and gold were 
prevalent in different areas of Carthaginian contact and probably were heavily 
exported and often leave little trace of their origin. We have also seen the trade in 
various perishable commodities which became associated with Carthage. Items such 
as Carthaginian wine, Punic apples (pomegranates), garum (fish sauce), and esparto 
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grass all became synonymous with Carthaginian trade. 13 These specialty items do not 
even cover other major Carthaginian exports such as salted fish, grain, and other 
possible cropS.14 Presumably such items were exported heavily by Carthage and leave 
little impression on archaeological records. Unfortunately literary evidence of specific 
types of trade is usually brief and rare. Carthage was obviously trading with its 
neighbours and despite the anomalies in our records, it is obvious that trade was 
flowing in both directions. 
Another interesting aspect regarding Carthaginian trade was its durability. 
Presumably the sight of a Carthaginian gugga was as common in Plautus' Rome as it 
was throughout much of the Greek world (especially in the West), Egypt, and Etruria. 
Plautus' Poenulus is obviously recognisable to Romans in the early second century. 
Such trade was a staple for many Mediterranean communities and was accepted 
regardless of current political climate. It is interesting that our abiding image of 
relations between the Greeks such as the Phocaean states and Carthage is one of 
hostility. However, we have seen evidence of Punic trading communities flourishing 
in a number of these states. We have also seen the prosperous Greek settlement 
Emporion accept the Carthaginian coinage standard to facilitate trade with 
Carthaginian territory.15 Otherwise on Sicily, it becomes apparent that there were 
considerable Carthaginian populations (based on trade) at Acragas and Syracuse, 
presumably in addition to several other Greek states.16 We have seen the Punic 
inscriptions in Massilia and A vignon also suggesting a reasonable Carthaginian 
presence in a predominately Greek area. 17 These examples are dated the fifth century 
onwards when hostility between the Greeks and the Carthaginians was obvious. Trade 
was evident in a number of hostile states, however, it only receives brief mention or 
usually none at all. It appears that it was an accepted part of numerous economies, 
which only imminent conflict could deter. 
13 Again Plautus mentions several of these stock Carthaginian commodities when describing Hanno and 
his cargo (Chp. VI, ns.52-59 and text). Athenaeus also lists several Carthaginian commodities (see 
Chp. VI, n.94). 
14 Based on the variety of crops being grown in North Africa during the invasion of Agathoc1es in the 
late fourth century (Diod. XX.8.3-4), it is possible that Carthage was exporting a variety of produce 
from the region and other regions in its empire. 
15 Chp. VI, n.92 and text. 
16 Dionysius even expelled a considerable population of Carthaginian merchants from Syracuse in 398 
(Diod. XIV,46). This suggests that it was a possible precedent despite a number of preceding wars 
between Syracuse and Carthage. 
17 KAI. 69-70. 
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The nature of the Carthaginians' settlement in various areas has also affected 
evidence of their activity at several sites. The Carthaginians' settlement patterns were 
unique: inheriting large numbers of prefabricated operational Phoenician and other 
localised settlements which they assumed as their own. They developed many of these 
sites in addition to settling further sites to increase their territory and influence. The 
developing nature of Punic civilisation which was often grafted onto existing 
Phoenician and localised cultures makes it difficult to distinguish exact settlement 
movements. In truth there is probably no exact point at which a pre-existing 
Phoenician site became a Punic site. It was likely a long process which never erased 
the existing culture entirely. Processes of urbanisation, resettlement, and redefined 
trade routes often aid us in determining the changing nature of several settlements. 
However, many more are still ambiguous regarding Carthaginian activity. Our sources 
are of little help in defining the exact nationality of many settlements. Often the terms 
'Phoenician' and 'Carthaginian' are used loosely and appear interchangeable. Other 
authors claim specific sites as Carthaginian, but we know of earlier Phoenician 
inhabitants. This is compounded further by the lack of literary coverage especially in 
areas beyond the reach of Greco-Roman writers. The fluid nature of Carthage 
resettling pre-established sites forces us to look at specific sites to determine their 
origins. Although Carthaginian influence becomes apparent at a later stage, we are 
often forced to guess whether or not it was Carthaginian in origin. 
Carthaginian colonial activity also often leaves us unsure of its exact nature. 
We have established that Carthage did not need to send out many colonies within the 
boundaries of the old Phoenician 'Empire'. It chose its foundations carefully, 
preferring to redevelop existing sites and areas, and if need be, to establish singular 
foundations often designed to dominate a specific area. We only find examples of 
multiple Carthaginian settlements beyond traditional Phoenician boundaries such as 
those of Hanno along the West African coast and possibly some along the European 
coast. Carthaginian colonialism manifested itself in several forms, which unlike other 
colonising nations such as the Greeks and Phoenicians, often makes it difficult to 
trace and identify. 
The other major flaw in our knowledge of Carthage and its various activities is 
the exclusive manner in which it controlled large areas of its empire. The most 
common reason as to why Greek and Roman sources do not comment on a number of 
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Carthaginian settlements and activities may be as simple as they did not know about 
them. Even when a rumour regarding a Carthaginian settlement is reported it appears 
exaggerated and unlikely. Unfortunately, such a simple explanation does little to 
enlighten us regarding Carthaginian movements and settlement. The exclusive nature 
of Carthaginian territory was varied. In areas such as Carthage itself or Western 
Sicily, open trade and traffic presumably welcomed all foreign groups. Other areas 
remained open only to Carthage and its allies, such as the Etruscans in areas of the 
Tyrrhenian Sea and possibly Sardinia. Otherwise areas west of Carthage became 
progressively exclusive to all except Carthaginians.18 This included a complete ban on 
all foreign activity west of Carthage including the North African coast, Sardinia, 
Spain and territories beyond the Pillars of Herac1es.19 The Carthaginians apparently 
resorted to extreme tactics to ensure their control including piracy, drowning sailors, 
and even open conflict against the Phocaeans in the Tyrrhenian Sea and Dorieus in 
Sicily and North Africa. Although such practices were beneficial for Carthaginian 
activity, they left many of their contemporary and later Greek and Roman authors in 
the dark. As a result we have scant literary evidence regarding several key areas of the 
Carthaginian Empire. 
Finally the natural geography of the Carthaginian Empire does little to aid a 
coherent literary and archaeological record. The size and scope of the empire saw it 
operate in several areas beyond the knowledge of contemporary nations. Sub-Saharan 
Africa, the West African coast (and its interior), the European Atlantic coast, and 
possibly Great Britain were areas of Carthaginian activity for centuries. Many of these 
regions remained undiscovered for centuries after the collapse of Carthaginian power. 
The immense size of several of these areas has limited a comprehensive 
archaeological record of Carthaginian activity. Virtually no Carthaginian remains 
have been discovered north of Lisbon in Portugal or further south than Mogador on 
the West African coast, although we know of activity beyond both locations. A 
similar scenario exists in the interior trade routes in North Africa. Although fragments 
18 The nature of the problem is best demonstrated in an anecdote surviving in Diodorus (V.20A). The 
account describes a fertile group of islands beyond the Pillars of Heracles which were discovered by 
the Carthaginians. The Etruscans wished to settle the islands but were refused access by Carthage 
which apparently wanted to keep the islands to itself. Although the excuse of wishing to ensure the 
islands' pristine nature is suggested, it is more likely Carthage wished to maintain its stranglehold on 
all territory and shipping past the Pillars of Heracles. 
19 This area of exclusive activity is defined in the first two treaties between Rome and Carthage in 
509/8 and 306, see Chp. IV, ns.163-165. 
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attest some presence, the amount of likely Carthaginian activity suggests more should 
exist. Unfortunately the likely nature of commodities being traded and the expanse of 
territory involved means our archaeological evidence of Carthaginian activity is often 
as scant as our literary record. 
There are several reasons behind our relatively poor literary and 
archaeological records attesting Carthaginian activity and influence abroad. The 
general enmity toward Carthage surviving in Greek and Roman sources and the lack 
of a comprehensive surviving Phoenicio-Punic literary tradition are major problems in 
our understanding of Carthage and its activities. However, this does not account for 
the varied archaeological evidence we possess. In many respects Carthaginian tactics 
are the primary reason behind our scant sources. The nature of Carthaginian trade and 
activity in certain areas of their empire and beyond are not conducive to supplying a 
constant and thorough record. 
THE EVOLUTION OF 'CARTHAGINIAN' 
The development of Carthaginian society was based on a number of existing activities 
and influences. This is particularly evident in the Carthaginians' activities abroad 
which saw them in regular contact with various cultures throughout the 
Mediterranean. This contact in turn had direct consequences in Carthage itself. We 
have looked at a number of Carthaginian activities abroad which demonstrate a varied 
and evolving foreign policy based on factors such as trade, settlement, politics, and 
conquest both within and beyond the empire. In many respects this has aided in 
defining a specific Carthaginian character distinct from the preceding Phoenicians and 
other contemporary nations. 
One of the obvious differences between the Phoenician 'Empire' and that of 
Carthage was its manner of operation. Previously, the Phoenicians had maintained 
coastal provinces in the West from the East. The Phoenicians were able to continue in 
such a manner by retaining several basic policies. The primary limitations facing the 
Phoenicians' establishment of an orthodox empire in the West were obvious. 
Primarily, based on the technology they possessed, they were too far away and too 
few in number to maintain large areas of conquered territory and subjugated 
populations. Coupled with this, they themselves were often under the vassalage of 
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larger eastern powers. Therefore the maintenance of several coastal tracts of smaller 
networked trading settlements made up for the Phoenicians' inadequacies. These 
settlements often operated on a seasonal or temporary basis maintaining ties with 
local peoples. The establishment of a few larger settlements such as Gades, Lixus, 
Motya, and later Carthage enabled the Phoenicians to operate further and more 
efficiently. 
With the decline of Phoenician influence in the West during the sixth century 
and the rapid rise and influence of Carthage, the latter was able to assume control of 
the Phoenicians' settlements. It is from this period that we can discern a major shift in 
Carthaginian practice from those previously employed by the Phoenicians. Carthage 
was not willing to continue operating a sea-borne empire based on several narrow 
coastal regions of settlement. The central location of Carthage coupled with vast 
potential resources meant that it was able to increase and maintain its territory by 
conquest. From the late sixth century we find Carthage actively expanding in North 
Africa and Sardinia, two areas where it remained the sole developed power. The fifth 
century saw this taken further with the first of several major attempts to conquer 
Sicily. The development of Spain followed during the fourth century and during the 
second half of the third century under the Barcids. In most of these areas we find 
Carthage often willing to depart from the Phoenician practice of partnership with local 
peoples. Carthage assumed control over larger areas of territory and with them their 
respective inhabitants. Although Carthage still maintained several key alliances with 
groups such as the Elymians in Sicily and still needed large native popUlations to 
maintain local industries, it used the more orthodox policies of a conquering nation. 
We might consider that an increase of military activity was the main new 
development in Carthaginian activity abroad. Although this helped characterise 
Carthaginian interests, they were active in several other important pursuits. 
Carthage continued the Phoenician policies of widespread trade and 
settlement, however, it adapted them further to suit its own needs. Trade remained the 
mainstay of the Carthaginian economy and in many respects its society, as it had once 
been for the Phoenicians. We can see the continuation of this in many ways. Even 
during times of turmoil and war, trade continued to dominate the Carthaginians' 
economy. Many of their techniques continued in the manner of the Phoenicians. 
Carthage still excluded all foreign traffic from certain areas of its empire, as the 
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Phoenicians had once done. Many of the commodities exported remained Phoenician 
in nature and developed little from the original successful model. It was not so much 
the concept and practice of trade that developed under Carthage, it was more the way 
the latter redefined it in conjunction with other activities. 
Although Carthage continued to supply the majority of Phoenician 
commodities, it was also able to develop its own industries. The most obvious of 
these came as a direct result of the larger amount of territory under Carthaginian 
control and its use. Unlike the Phoenicians who were forced to rely on an unsecured 
hinterland or sea-borne traffic to supply the majority of its settlements, Carthage had 
the luxury of establishing large areas for farming and production. This is most 
obvious in areas of North Africa. We have discussed at some length the development 
of farming in the area. Carthage was able to utilise its hinterland, developing it into an 
efficient area of production. The apparent development of Roman-style latifundia was 
testament to the high level of organisation in the area. These large slave-run estates 
were populated largely by captured peoples as a direct result of Carthaginian 
conquests abroad. In addition to this specialised type of farming in North Africa, 
Carthage also depended on the Libyan farmers who supplied large amounts of 
produce for Carthage and its empire. Elsewhere we find areas where direct 
Carthaginian control helped diversify and dominate commodity production. The 
foundation of New Carthage meant that Carthaginian territory in the area dominated 
its natural resources. The silver mines and smelters were obvious possessions which 
meant Carthage no longer needed to rely on unsecured labour in order to operate 
them. According to Strabo the site also possessed a thriving salt fish industry and was 
famed for its production of garum. 20 The increase of territory in all areas of 
Carthaginian control meant that Carthage was able to control larger areas of 
commodity production. Unlike the Phoenicians who relied on set relationships to 
maintain trade, the Carthaginians were able to assume control of large areas of 
production, both maintaining existing trade and diversifying. 
A legacy of the Phoenicians' reliance on trade was characteristic superficial 
settlements designed to fulfil this practice. Many original Phoenician sites such as 
Utica and Leptis Magna reveal relatively few authentic Phoenician remains. A 
number of these sites show a clear phase of permanent resettlement during the Punic 
20 IllA.6. 
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period which often dominates the remains of pre-Roman habitation.21 Unlike the 
Phoenicians, the Carthaginians generally preferred to settle a higher percentage of 
permanent sites and developed them to a higher leveL As a result we often find 
smaller numbers of urbanised Punic settlements along coastlines once dominated by 
numerous smaller Phoenician emporia.22 A similar phenomenon occurred in a number 
of interior sites in several areas. In areas of Sardinia and North Mrica we find a more 
intensive Carthaginian presence than during the Phoenician period. The change of 
Carthaginian settlement patterns reflects distinctive motives. The Carthaginians were 
no longer content with establishing small trading ports with a small hinterland. They 
were now interested in the permanent settlement of civic centres based on trade and 
protection with large hinterlands comprising provincial networks. 
Coupled with the new policy of establishing permanent Carthaginian 
settlements in larger Carthaginian territories we find a general increase of the 
establishment of military settlements and larger fortified provincial capitals. We have 
discussed the nature of Carthaginian settlement at length. The policy of establishing 
fewer settlements is apparent. Even then the attested Carthaginian colonies tend to be 
large single settlements designed to dominate specific provinces and their associated 
activities. Sites such as New Carthage and Lilybaeum are examples of this policy. 
Even the nature of many pre-existing sites changes with general increases of 
fortification and military application.23 In addition to this we find a direct escalation of 
military settlements designed primarily to protect and to dominate specific areas. We 
have witnessed these in Spain with the development of Acra Leuce and the 'Towers 
of Hannibal'; in Sicily with several interior sites established; North Africa on the 
bordering territories of the six pagi; and in particular on Sardinia with the formation 
of a line of fortified posts dominating the interior of the island in the fifth century. 
Carthaginian settlement patterns assumed a new image of permanence and 
dominance as opposed to the superficial and co-existent nature of the older 
Phoenician settlements. This practice did not develop quickly or universally. Carthage 
21 It is likely that initial Phoenician contact and permanent settlement were often centuries apart in 
several areas. Sites such as Gades and Utica were supposedly settled ca. 1100, but only reveal remains 
from the eighth century onwards. As a result a number of permanent Phoenician sites were only settled 
for two or three centuries before the decline of the official Phoenician presence in the area and the 
growth of Carthaginian influence which later instituted Punic culture. 
22 This process is most notable in Spain where numerous smaller Phoenician emporia gave way to 
fewer, more urbanised centres during the Punic period, see Chp. IV, ns.127ff. and text passim. 
23 This is particularly evident in the development and use of Motya in Sicily and Monte Sirai and Sulcis 
in Sardinia. 
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developed its settlement patterns over several centuries and maintained an open policy 
rather than an intractable policy of expansion. Carthage's first official settlement was 
that of Ebusus in 654/3. This was little more than a strategic foundation under the 
protection of the Phoenicians. Even then the foundation of Ebusus was essentially 
based on trade within the greater Phoenician 'Empire'. We next find Carthage 
actively settling in the fifth century. The periplus of Hanno was designed to settle a 
designated stretch of the African coast south of the Pillars of Heracles. This mission 
was to create a networked system of small ports similar to those settled by the 
Phoenicians. The reason behind such a large undertaking was to establish a basic 
mercantile presence in a new area. Carthage had no desire to dominate the interior of 
West Africa, preferring instead to revert to the Phoenician practice of maintaining 
coastal bases from which to interact with local peoples for trade. Further examples 
from the fifth century demonstrate other aspects of Carthaginian settlement. In both 
Selinus and Himera, Carthage destroyed the existing Greek colonies and resettled 
them as Hellenic settlements under Carthaginian control. This practice demonstrates a 
new level of Carthaginian settlement. Instead of moving into existing settlements and 
developing them into Carthaginian centres, as had been common elsewhere, Carthage 
exercised military force to complete its task of removing two Greek colonies and 
basically re-establishing them as its own. The evolving nature of Carthaginian 
settlement continued. Lilybaeum was founded as a replacement to Motya which was 
destroyed in 397. It was a large fortified position which could oversee all activity in 
Sicily, and also traffic between Carthage and to the north. The evolution of 
Carthaginian settlement reached its peak with the foundation of New Carthage by 
Hasdrubal Barca in 228. New Carthage was the ideal of Carthaginian settlement. It 
possessed all the required natural attributes including an excellent harbour and a 
perfect defensible location. It was strategically located to dominate the southwest of 
Spain and was a perfect staging point for invasion. It also possessed vast economic 
potential, dominating extensive silver producing areas as well as good supplies of 
other exploitable commodities. 
The nature of Carthaginian settlement did not remain constant. Its major 
characteristic was its ability to adapt and evolve, drawing on established methods 
when required, but also developing new methods to cope with the changing nature of 
the Carthaginian Empire and its activities. 
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With the increase of activity between Carthage and other nations we find that 
the Carthaginians maintained a variety of policies to monitor and influence this 
contact. One such method was the Carthaginians' continuation of the Phoenician 
practice of excluding foreign competitors from lucrative territories and trade routes. 
However, under Carthaginian control it was employed to a new level. Perhaps the 
greatest change was the hard-line Carthaginian attitude which often saw Carthage 
defending areas of control with considerable force. Unlike the Phoenicians (to a 
certain degree), the Carthaginians were more than willing to engage potential 
enemies. The Phoenicians apparently withdrew from Sicily with the onset of Greek 
colonists. In contrast to this strategy, Carthage destroyed a number of attempted 
Greek colonies which threatened to encroach on its territory as well as engaging the 
Phocaeans in three major naval battles in just over a century to maintain exclusive 
rights in areas of the West. Ultimately Carthage preserved its exclusivity in a similar 
manner to that employed by the Phoenicians. However, it did so with a greater 
military presence throughout its empire and a greater willingness to use force when it 
felt threatened. 
Carthage was willing to use force as a means of defence. However, it was 
mainly used to increase its empire and ensure its influence. Unlike the Phoenicians, 
the Carthaginians often launched invasions against their enemies regardless of their 
identity. This is emphasised by the Carthaginian invasions of Sicily and the wars 
against Rome. The aggressive nature, which had developed in other areas of 
Carthaginian society and activity, steeled Carthage for war. This was not only aimed 
against less developed neighbouring peoples but also against highly developed 
nations. Even defeat did little to dim Carthaginian desire for conquest as demonstrated 
when several defeats on Sicily were not enough to stop later Carthaginian attempts at 
conquering the island. Even after the costly defeat following the First Punic War, 
Carthage recovered quickly and was able to mount a massive offensive only twenty 
years later. Although the military nature of Carthage struggled with several systemic 
deficiencies,24 it remained its salient image, one which brought it great success but 
eventually led to its downfall. 
Another area of development which becomes increasingly evident in the 
Carthaginians' activity is their developing reliance on political relations and 
24 Some of these are briefly discussed in Chp. VII, ns.78-80 and text. 
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diplomacy. Although the Phoenicians possessed a high degree of political 
development, there is a general increase of associated activities by the Carthaginians. 
This was a natural consequence of increasing contact with developed states. The 
nature of the Carthaginians' policy saw them in regular contact with Etruscans, 
Romans, Greeks, and Egyptians often beyond the basic military and mercantile 
spheres. We see a range of relationships between Carthage and various states existing 
at a diplomatic level. The Etruscans were close allies of Carthage and maintained 
strict policies of mutual aid and protection. Carthage also continued precise 
mercantile and non-aggression treaties with Rome for several centuries before their 
relationship soured. Carthage also maintained a possible diplomatic link with Egypt in 
order to operate the lucrative trade between the two states. Carthaginian relations with 
the Greeks were an obvious example of the development of political and diplomatic 
activity. The regular contact in areas of Sicily, Southern Italy, Southern France, and 
Greece itself saw relations develop into various forms over several centuries. 
Carthaginian relations with the Greeks (especially in Sicily) revolved primarily 
around trade and invasion. However, we have also looked at a various forms of 
contact including diplomacy and political manoeuvring. Carthage was able to 
maintain an official presence in Sicily despite Greek opposition. In a number of Greek 
centres we find evidence of Carthaginian sympathisers and sometimes resident 
populations. Otherwise we see a range of treaties between Greek states and Carthage 
from different periods. Carthage was a strong military and political presence on Sicily 
and it seems as though courting its favour could potentially hold attractive incentives 
for some Greek states. We have also witnessed examples of Carthaginian attempts to 
undermine various Greek cities through bribery and conspiracy on one hand, and 
others mediating peace between two or more Greek centres on the other. The increase 
of Carthaginian political and diplomatic actions and their variety characterised this 
aspect of Carthaginian activity. Although the Carthaginians maintained several areas 
of exclusivity, they became increasingly interested in the actions of others, often 
taking active roles themselves. Although such a practice is natural for a prominent 
state such as Carthage, it became a specific characteristic of Carthaginian foreign 
policy which increased over time. 
Perhaps one the defining characteristics of the Carthaginians abroad was their 
own concept of their empire. The greatest change in Carthaginian policy from that of 
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the Phoenicians before them was their concept of territory, in particular the formation 
of an empire based on several prominent provinces. Although the sea still played a 
primary function within the empire, Carthage established a tangible territory based on 
land. No longer content with the imperium sine terra of the Phoenicians, the 
Carthaginians advanced their inheritance of several coastal territories inland. In a 
number of areas we are able to discern, with a reasonable degree of accuracy, the 
Carthaginian conception of chara. In North Africa we find several examples of 
defined territory of varying degrees. The six pagi, 'the Phoenician trenches', 'the big 
fields and the fifty towns of Tysca, and the Arae Philaeni all demonstrate varying 
degrees of Carthaginian control based on defined territory.25 Even Carthaginian 
division of such systematised districts is attested in various form including the Neo-
Punic inscription detailing a 'land overseer'26 and the third century Punic coins 
describing "in [the] lands/districts", i.e. North Africa.27 In Western Sicily, the first two 
treaties with Rome define Carthaginian territory in a distinctly Carthaginian manner, 
which suggests that it was a direct description of how they viewed their own territory. 
In Sardinia, we find a line of demarcating fortresses defining areas of Carthaginian 
control and those which remained relatively independent. A similar process can be 
witnessed in Spain, to a lesser extent in several phases during the sixth, fourth, and 
third centuries. Carthage was able to maintain several distinctive provinces which 
were sub-divided accordingly. This naturally assumes a higher level of bureaucracy 
than it took to maintain Phoenician territories in the past. 
An interesting aspect regarding Carthaginian provinces is their common 
geography. We only find provinces dominating a separate geographical landmass 
evident on smaller islands such as the Balearic Islands and Malta. Even larger islands 
were naturally seen as potential single provinces, and as a result we find several 
Carthaginian attempts to conquer the islands of Sicily and Sardinia. These failed 
forcing Carthage to maintain smaller provinces on both islands. In other areas of 
Carthaginian control such as North Africa and Spain, although we find Carthaginian 
conquest expand territorial control, no efforts were made to conquer the entire region. 
North African territory was naturally defined by its arid and mountainous interior. 
Spain however saw little conquest of the interior until the Barcid invasion during the 
25 See Chp. IV, ns.14S-1S6 and text. 
26 KAl. 141. 
27 Baldus, Unerkannte Reflexe der romischen Nordafrika-Expedition", p.l78. 
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second half of the third century. It seems that Carthage was willing to define its larger 
territories in relation to its continued dependence on the sea. Although increased 
territory meant that some areas under Carthaginian control were further from coastal 
areas, official areas of control rarely extended beyond 200 km. into the interior. 
Naturally other activities such as trade continued beyond this, as interest in Sub-
Saharan Africa demonstrates. Although Carthage developed larger land-based 
provinces, in many respects it maintained the Phoenicians' reliance on the sea, 
dictating a reasonable limit to territorial expansion into the interiors of Spain and 
Africa. Carthage maintained its maritime nature to a large degree, although it 
developed it to accommodate its expansive nature based on the conquest of territory. 
The concept of a unique Carthaginian identity and distinctive activities abroad 
can be seen developing in several prominent areas. Carthage was also in contact with 
several prominent Mediterranean societies and was always open to foreign influences. 
In addition to this Carthage was developing its own character based on its actions and 
policies both at home and abroad. Carthaginian activity continually evolved based on 
its own activities and external influences. We have witnessed this evolving in a 
number of forms at different periods. Aspects such as trade, settlement, and conquest 
continued but developed to cope with new circumstances and demands. In many 
respects Carthage was a hybrid of established Phoenician practices, external 
influences, and its own development. Precipitated by its own actions and those it 
came into contact with, Carthaginian activities were often as characteristic for their 
progression as they were for their more accepted roles in Carthaginian history and 
society. 
THE NATURE OF THE CARTHAGINIANS ABROAD - THE 
ACTIVITIES OF AN EVOLUTIONARY STATE 
The nature of Carthaginian activity abroad is characterised by its variety and continual 
development. Carthage was not a state based on conquest or trade alone. It had several 
major areas of activity which were distinguishable and interrelated. Carthage 
developed into a unique society in antiquity. In many respects its institutions and 
activities were identifiable with other contemporary societies, however, its distinctive 
composition and application formed a uniquely Carthaginian character. Carthage was 
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a true hybrid of cultures. Although it was in essence an eastern, and in particular 
Phoenician society, it embraced contact with others often resulting in considerable 
social and cultural change. The Phoenician legacy remained strong in Carthage as it 
did in Punic culture, however, the position and nature of Carthage saw it in varying 
degrees of steady contact with groups of Berbers, Greeks, Etruscans, Egyptians, and 
Romans. Although Carthage maintained varying degrees of contact with such peoples, 
traffic continually flowed and with it cultural diffusion and influence. 
Several obvious developments occurred in Carthaginian policy defining it as 
distinctive from its original Phoenician heritage and other contemporary nations. The 
most noticeable development in Carthaginian activity was its aggressive nature. This 
ever-increasing feature permeated every aspect of Carthaginian policy. Large-scale 
military expeditions became increasingly prevalent from the sixth century. These 
concentrated primarily on conquest and increasing Carthaginian territory abroad. 
Tactics of exclusion, which had been evident in Phoenician practice, became more 
hostile often developing into open conflict on a number of occasions. Settlement 
patterns also tended to become more defined. Often entire regions were operated 
according to defensive or strategic considerations. Even trading practices became 
more aggressive. The standard Phoenician policy of maintaining amicable links with 
many smaller groups for trade purposes was not as evident during the Carthaginian 
period. Carthage still dealt with some peoples in the Phoenician manner, but in other 
regions it resorted to subjugation in order to control territories and their commodities. 
One of the causes of this attitude appears to have been a growing Carthaginian 
desire for control. The Carthaginians appear to have consistently opposed the 
Phoenician practice of maintaining an unobtrusive presence. This was a noticeable 
Phoenician system: preferring to remain located on coastal or off-shore bases, not 
generally becoming involved in conflicts or the affairs of others, and ultimately 
maintaining a smaller mercantile presence. Carthage, however, developed into almost 
the complete antithesis of the Phoenicians in this regard. The Carthaginians' desire for 
control is evident in their conquest of several areas of older Phoenician activity. The 
control of territory also brought control of its people and its natural resources. This 
was oftentimes harsh resulting in resentment among local populations demonstrated 
by several revolts in Sardinia and North Africa and the invasions of Agathocles and 
Masinissa. This desire for control, or at least active participation in the affairs of 
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others is particularly evident in examples from Sicily. Despite the failure of a number 
of invasions aimed at conquering the island, Carthage remained active in its political 
affairs. Its efforts maintained a Carthaginian presence in a number of Greek cities, 
which was often influential. Unlike the Phoenicians who withdrew at the onset of the 
Greeks on Sicily, the Carthaginians were willing both to dominate and to influence 
them whenever possible. 
Probably the most consistent aspect regarding the nature of the Carthaginians' 
activity abroad was their ability to adapt to specific situations. Unlike other powers 
which maintained rigid mercantile or military policies, Carthage was able to develop 
and implement specific tactics for specific occasions. Such a characteristic is 
noticeable in a number of Carthaginian activities. Regarding settlement, Carthage sent 
out relatively few original foundations. However, all the major settlements attested 
fulfilled a specific function. Lilybaeum replaced the site of Motya and provided 
Carthage with a strong new base of operations in Sicily. New Carthage did the same 
but was able to oversee the extraction and production of its surrounding silver 
deposits. The periplus of Hanno was designed to lay a network of new Carthaginian 
settlements along an undeveloped section of West African coast. All had specific 
roles depending on circumstance. Although the mechanisms of each example had 
precedents in other societies, they were isolated strategic solutions. In other areas of 
settlement, we have witnessed a number of innovative approaches to specific 
problems. We have seen how instead of troubling themselves by founding numerous 
settlements, the Carthaginians often redeveloped those which were inherited from the 
Phoenicians. On other occasions we find highly innovative policies of resettling 
potentially hostile states as Carthaginian settlements, as seen at Himera, Selinus, and 
on a number of occasions in Southern Italy during the Second Punic War under 
Hannibal. On the whole Carthaginian settlement was economic by nature, preferring 
to utilise pre-existing locations and populations rather than establishing both at great 
personal cost. However, this was by no means limited by strict policy, with Carthage 
able to adapt to specific conditions and to form appropriate settlement strategies. 
One of the major developments within Carthaginian society was military. Not 
so much the nature of the military itself, which had obvious shortcomings, but its 
strategic use. We have seen the various deployment of Carthage's military forces 
throughout its history. It became obvious that Carthage did not maintain a universal 
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policy regarding warfare and conquest. This is best demonstrated again on Sicily, 
where a number of invasions were carried out using various tactics. Although never 
entirely successful, Carthage devised several distinctive tactics, including orthodox 
land invasions, resettlement policies, and political intrigue to undermine specific 
states. Often a Carthaginian invasion of Sicily was preceded by Greek political 
upheaval, usually in Syracuse. Otherwise we have seen Carthage using military force 
specifically to repel foreigners from encroaching into its territories. Carthage used its 
military strength for both conquest and defensive needs. The variety of specific 
tactics, often applied to a specific area, was characteristic of its variable nature. 
Following an initial loss, Carthage was rarely prepared to risk a subsequent defeat, 
preferring to regroup and perhaps try again later. Although this policy enabled the 
Carthaginians to expand their interests elsewhere, it ultimately cost them their plans 
of complete domination of Sardinia and especially Sicily. Although we may think that 
Carthage was governed by its military ambition, in many respects its was interrelated 
with other important strategies and was thus bound by the capricious nature of 
Carthaginian activity. 
This quality of adaptation can be seen constantly throughout Carthaginian 
history and in part aided maintaining Carthage's image of constant change. The 
mutable nature of Carthaginian policy manifested itself in several areas. After the 
defeat at Himera in 480, Carthage consolidated its presence on Sicily while turning its 
interest elsewhere such as Atlantic Africa and Europe as attested by the journeys of 
Hanno and Himilco. The continual development of trade routes in Africa beyond the 
control of developed Mediterranean powers also demonstrated Carthaginian initiative 
in its trading strategies. Even after the costly defeat following the First Punic War, 
Carthage went on the offensive in Spain to secure a larger province and its wealth of 
natural resources. Defeat in Sardinia saw the Carthaginians develop an interior line of 
defences, abandoning much of the northeast of the island, and preferring to 
consolidate and protect their interests on the rest of the island. By commanding such a 
vast area and many resources, Carthage was in a fortunate position of often being able 
to choose its foreign policy at will. Without foreign intervention, it could concentrate 
on developing new trade routes and areas for exploitation. Even when more pressing 
issues forced Carthage to take specific action, many of its provinces and areas of 
activity seem relatively unaffected and could continue to operate as normaL 
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Carthage was able to maintain a variety of activities, which in turn were 
managed according to circumstance. Reliance on a variety of pursuits meant that 
Carthage was not characterised by a single function, e.g. trade or conquest. This 
permeated Carthaginian society and we find constant development in policies abroad. 
One of the obvious developments in Carthaginian history was the 
development of a distinctive Punic culture. Although our understanding of the nature 
of Punic culture is chequered, it still stands as the salient image of Carthaginian 
civilisation and in many respects what distinguished it from its Phoenician origins. 
Punic culture defined the changing nature of Carthage. It was both a motivating factor 
for change and itself was greatly influenced by the effects of such change. Although 
the image of a new distinctive cultural style may suggest uniformity of culture, Punic, 
like the Carthaginian Empire remained a cosmopolitan entity open to influences from 
a variety of sources. In many respects the development of Punic coincided with 
several other major changes in Carthaginian society. Although this may seem an 
obvious candidate to explain such change, the development of Punic culture, like 
other aspects of Carthaginian society, was dependent on and related to several other 
contemporary movements. Punic was based primarily on the existing Phoenician 
culture, however, the increase of interaction with groups such as the Berbers and 
Greeks formed a new culture which spread from Carthage throughout its empire. 
Even then Punic did not tend to dominate existing cultures entirely. It existed in 
several forms often adhering to existing cultures and influencing them to form a type 
of hybrid culture. We have seen this evident in the pre-existing Phoenician 
settlements of Utica and Gades as well as its remnants during the Neo-Punic period 
under several Numidian Kings. This acceptance and evolution gave Punic a residual 
presence in several areas after the departure of centralised Carthaginian rule. Areas 
which had been exposed to Carthaginian contact often retained traces of Punic culture 
and language as well as Carthaginian political and social organisation. 
The nature of Carthaginian activity abroad is visible in a variety of forms. It 
both mirrored greater changes in Carthage, and was itself responsible for change. 
From a small Phoenician centre in the ninth century, Carthage developed into the 
capital of the Punic world and the Carthaginian Empire. A range of factors 
contributed to this development which in essence identified Carthage as unique. Pre-
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existing Phoenician culture mixed with foreign influences and its own development 
and activity formed to create a distinctive Carthaginian character: a constantly 
evolving hybrid state encompassing old and new influences. Naturally this 
development was based heavily on the activities of Carthage. The prosperity, and to a 
large extent, the survival of Carthage depended on its activities abroad: both within its 
empire and beyond. Carthaginian activity was varied, relying on various forms of 
trade, settlement, and expansion. The large area of Carthaginian activity coupled with 
continual external pressures meant that Carthage was constantly re-inventing the way 
in which it conducted its affairs and maintained its influence abroad. Although such 
factors as the development of Punic culture and its increasing aggressive nature tend 
to characterise Carthage, it was active in several other important fields. Ultimately, 
the nature of Carthaginian activity abroad, like the nature of Carthage itself was 
unique. Although separate activities, institutions, and social changes can be 
distinguished and identified with reference to other contemporary states, they all 
combined to form a distinctive entity. The nature of Carthaginian activity was not 
based on any established model. It was varied and influenced by constant change in 
its environment. Although Carthage was often maligned in antiquity and designated a 
failure because of its destruction, in many respects it was the paragon of a successful 
empire which was not bound by the limitations of its endeavours as much as others. 
Carthage rose to prosperity on the back of these activities, which would largely define 
the state itself, its empire, and its legacy. 
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